It also looks to me that you might have been reading Cavell? — Ludwig V
I'm only gesturing at the point that what's in question is not "ordinary", contingent falsity, but something more radical, in that Ayer uses "direct" and "indirect" in an incoherent way. — Ludwig V
To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue,
— Antony Nickles
I'm thinking that there is an argument in the background that is confusing people. It relates to Corvus' question
You still have not answered whether Austin was a direct realist or not.
— Corvus — Ludwig V
If you accept Austin's ordinary language definition of direct and indirect perception, then he does accept that some perceptions are direct and others are not. — Ludwig V
The understanding of Ayer's position that I've come to in this discussion is that there is such a thing as direct perception - perception of sense-data - and the objects of this kind of perception are always real, in the sense that they are what they seem to be, but always unreal in that they are not what we would like to think they are - perceptions of "external" "objective" reality. Austin rejects that idea, not on the ground that it is false, but on the ground that it is incoherent. — Ludwig V
Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.
— Antony Nickles
"Evidence" needs to be interpreted here. — Ludwig V
”There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking… deciding whether a thing is stuffed or live” — Richard B, quoting Austin
However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here. — creativesoul
It could be argued that we cannot expect "ordinary language" to be adapted to cater for this (relatively) new kind of knowledge - yet — Ludwig V
I'm inclined to attribute Ayer's approach to Cartesian scepticism, rather than to any ethical question. — Ludwig V
Ayer seems to back off the radical implications of his theory by denying them — Ludwig V
As I see it, the problem is only "manufactured" if we buy into the idea that there is only one correct way to think about it. Otherwise, you just have different ways of thinking and talking about perception. — Janus
[With a blue imagine and blue wall, or bent pencil in water or just a bent pencil] we may say the same things ('It looks blue', 'It looks bent', &c.), but this is no reason at all for denying the obvious fact that the 'experiences' are different. — Austin, p. 50
Perhaps I should have noticed the difference if I had been more careful or attentive; perhaps I am just bad at things of this sort (e.g. vintages); perhaps, again, I have never learned to discriminate between them, or haven't had much practice at it. — Austin, p. 51
Is he dismantling anything or merely presenting a different way of thinking about it. — Janus
...I still feel the classic account of indirect perception which has been around from the time of Plato is more reasonable. — Corvus
...where he discusses difference in usage of the words "looks" "seems" and "appears" ...was more like English semantic chapter rather than Philosophy... — Corvus
It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions. — Corvus
(emphasis added)Anyway, pointing out the eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. — Corvus
I think he accepts that perception involves a fair amount of interpretation. — frank
[Eyes as a medium for visual perception] could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. — Corvus
obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue — Corvus
When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works? — Corvus
Part of the difficulty is understanding the significance of what he says. It is too easy to trivialize "ordinary language". — Ludwig V
But I think that is a reaction to the difficulty of seeing what one might do next in philosophy. So much is being dismantled that the landscape can seem to be a desert. Bringing the nonsense in philosophy to an end is one thing. But bringing philosophy to an end is something else. Whatever motivates philosophy has certainly not gone away. — Ludwig V
Is that consistent with me using a cup to trap a spider?
People surely have the ability to see ways of using things, in ways no one has before. So surely what we 'see' is more than just previously recognized linguistic and usage associations? — wonderer1
“Pure sensation” or “qualia” or whatever term you prefer is what we call the unabstracted perception, the unconceptualized sensation specific to one setting and one time. We then go on to “see X” based on what we’ve learned about how to see. I think Austin considers this issue of “seeing as . . .” later in the book. — J
But I may not be understanding you. How does any of this problematize sensing? — J
I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :) — Corvus
He quibbles throughout, but then says that, according to the argument from illusion, sense-data is perceived directly. — NOS4A2
the argument from illusion is intended primarily to persuade us that, in certain exceptional, abnormal situations, what we perceive—directly anyway—is a sense-datum
Austin intimates somewhere, all perception is direct. — NOS4A2
My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. Isn't this part of what we need to recognize here? If nothing could count as direct perception, then the idea that perception is actually indirect doesn't make sense. The problem is the move from "some perception is indirect" to "all perception is indirect". — Ludwig V
But I agree that setting this issue aside enables us to understand what is going on here better, even though I'm not entirely sure that the last word has been said here. (I have in mind Cavell's idea that the idea of a last word on scepticism is a mistake.) — Ludwig V
Does such a position [with qualia] involve believing in sense-data? — J
But my biggest puzzle is what would count as direct perception. — Ludwig V
Yes, I was somewhat concerned not to present Wittgenstein's view. — Banno
Basically, I think that reality does exist objectively. — javi2541997
Perception is far more than just to say, what I see is "real", and that is it. The aftermath of perception is more complex, deep, rich and meaningful in human perception. — Corvus
Do you mean that it would be more accurate to say "roughly correct" or "very good approximation of the actual shape"? — J
[Arguments against Ayer] 4. …it is also implied, even taken for granted, that there is room for doubt and suspicion” - Austin — Austin
For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression? — Witt, PI 245
Can't we imagine a rule determining the application of a rule, and a doubt which it removes—and so on? But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. — Wittgenstein, PI#84