The cottage cases are a different matter altogether. They do not follow and/or 'attack' the S knows that P iff... formulations that Gettier does. That puzzles me. Gettier at least begins with a justified false belief. The cottage cases do not.

your issue isn't with entailment but with "justificatory closure". — Michael

Indeed. My issue is not with entailment. As you may remember, I've been grappling with how to best come to terms with Gettier for several years now, off and on. We all know something is intuitively wrong. Gettier's paper causes many people to experience cognitive dissonance upon first reading it. The logic is so impeccable, and serves as an escape from that dissonance for those so inclined to follow it. The logic is incomplete in that it does not take proper account of Smith's belief. The underlying issue is the treatment of Smith's belief as though it were equivalent to a naked proposition.

In Gettier's paper, the issue is with treating Smith's beliefs as though they are equivalent to a naked proposition when they clearly are not. Case I has Gettier forgetting who "the man with ten coins in his pocket" referred to, and Case II has Gettier reporting Smith's belief in a manner that is incomplete. Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. Gettier left out the important bit. That last bit makes all the difference in the world.

Excellent reply! Well, aside from the condescending petty personal remarks and focusing upon irrelevancy that you seem so fond of. Moving on...



Since you've demonstrated the ability...

How exactly is "there is a cow in the field" valid?

The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity. — creativesoul

Evidently, the above is not true in standard formal logic. My error. Good thing none of my objections to Gettier require it to be.

This is a VALID DEDUCTION and the CONCLUSION IS TRUE, yet BOTH PREMISES ARE FALSE. — neomac

Valid deductions preserve truth — neomac

Self-contradiction.

Either it's not a valid deduction or valid deductions do not preserve truth. The premisses were both false. The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity.

If Gettier is guilty of not properly taking account of Smith's belief, if Smith's belief was not equivalent to the propositions Gettier targeted, then there is no issue. JTB is left standing for in order to defeat JTB Gettier has to at least get the belief part right. He did not. End of story.

What's directly below is taken from Gettier's paper. It's worth mentioning here after the recent nonsense...

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:

(a) S knows that P IFF

1.) P is true,
2.) S believes that P
3.) S is justified in believing that P


For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary
and sufficient conditions for knowledge:

(b) knows that P IFF

1.) S accepts P
2.) S has adequate evidence for P
3.) P is true.


Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as
follows

(c) S knows that P IFF

1.) P is true,
2.) S is sure that P is true, and
3.) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ' has adequate evidence for ' or ' has the right to be sure that ' is substituted for ' is justified in believing that ' throughout.

I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified ' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.

I agree with the first point.

Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

Here I disagree. I reject the rules of entailment because, as Gettier showed, we can use them to go from a belief that cannot be true to a belief that is. Logical/valid argument/reasoning preserves truth. The rules of entailment do not. If the preservation of truth is a requirement of valid, coherent, and/or logical reasoning, then the rules of 'logical' entailment fail to satisfy that standard.

In Gettier's argument, Q is not equivalent to S's belief.

The problem becomes apparent when we treat S's belief as S's belief(regarding who he believed would get the job and why he believed the disjunction was true) rather than as a naked proposition. I've done that work already.

An adequate summary...

Smith was not justified in believing anyone with ten coins in their pocket will get the job. He was justified in believing Jones did and would. Jones did not get the job, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief was justified, valid, and false. What happened falsified Smith's belief.

Smith was not justified in believing that the disjunction was true because Q was. He was justified in believing that the disjunction was true because P was. The disjunction was not true because P was. The disjunction was true because Q was, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief was justified, valid, and false. What happened falsified Smith's belief.<---that would be better put differently. What Smith believed to be the case was not.

So, your argument boils down to saying that "there is a cow in the field" is justified because you equivocate and/or abuse the term "valid".

Nice.

There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! — neomac

..these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed). — neomac

Gibberish. One the one hand, you claim there is no inference, deduction, or conclusion possible between mistaking cloth for cow and the assertion "there is a cow in the field", and then call that assertion 'valid' despite just openly admitting that it is not even capable of being so.

Validity and soundness are qualities, characteristics, and/or features of logical arguments, reasoning, and such. They apply or not only after we assess how a belief(inference/deduction/conclusion) is arrived at. That's the part that's missing from the cottage cases. The former is measured solely by virtue of whether or not the target belief follows the rules of correct inference. The latter exhausts the former, but in addition, with sound arguments/reasoning, the target belief is not just validly inferred/deduced, but it is also based upon true premises.

Sigh...

So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow... — neomac

Still have not answered the question.

How does the farmer validly deduce/infer/conclude "there is a cow in the field" from mistaking cloth for cow(from believing that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow)?

I didn't even get what your point is. — neomac

I've made several accompanied by subsequent argument. You've chosen to neglect all that.

The latest point was that you could not back up your claims about "there's a cow in the field" being justified. You refuse to answer very basic questions regarding how? Instead, you feign ignorance and distract attention away from your own shortcomings by creating confusion regarding what is meant by the words that you must use in order to make your case. Like your herring a bit red, do you?

You've proven my last point rather nicely.

I'm still willing to see how "there is a cow in the field" satisfies your criterion for what counts as a justified belief. Valid criticism of my own position works too, but if you do not understand it, then it would be unreasonable of me to expect you to provide such.

I'm strongly asserting that it is not justified, and I've offered more than adequate/sufficient subsequent arguments and/or reasoning for that assertion. Those are all the parts you've left sorely neglected.

S begins with a case of mistaking cloth for cow. Cases of mistaken identity do not make for solid, sufficient, and/or otherwise adequate ground from which to reliably infer, deduce, conclude, and/or subsequently believe anything else at all.

we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow — neomac

We could say it. It would not make it so.

Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

I'm thinking that language less creatures beliefs are ineffable, by them or by us. We can talk about them though, so language less belief may not count as being ineffable, or does it? I know that that's not the target of the notion of being ineffable. Rather, it's used more as a safety net by those who cannot put their own meaningful thought, belief, and/or experience into acceptable words.

I take it that you do not have a position on the matter then. Mine has been made clear.

In the cottage cases, the target belief is not justified as a result of being neither, well-grounded nor validly deduced(if we stipulate S following the S knows that P as Gettier did). I've argued for that extensively and in more than one way. In Gettier's paper, which is remarkably different, the target beliefs are not equivalent to Smith's. I've argued extensively for that as well.

Since you refuse to take a position or offer valid criticism of mine, I suppose we have nothing left to discuss then.

Cheers. Be well.

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?
— creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow.
— creativesoul

So what? — neomac

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field justified?

If you're not, then we're in agreement. If you are then now you know how to understand the following questions...

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.
— creativesoul

I agree with this. There's a question you don't include in your summary - whether Smith was justified in believing that Jones owned a Ford. Gettier's answer is that he was. That's the situation that generates the confusion that people feel about these cases. — Ludwig V

I agree that Smith's belief was justified. I deny that it was true, because I deny that the target proposition/disjunction is equivalent to Smith's belief at the time. Looking at what makes them true shines clear light on this accounting malpractice of confusing belief with a naked proposition.

I'm pointing out that Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford. It was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Thus, Smith's belief is justified, valid, and false. That poses no problem for JTB.

Case II has Gettier guilty of not getting Smith's belief right to begin with. Convention did not notice, because he followed all the rules of belief attribution/reporting practices. When we do get Smith's belief right, the 'problem' dissolves completely. As above, justified, valid, false belief is not a problem for JTB. Gettier was/is not alone. He merely followed the historical conventional practices of belief attribution based upon rendering all belief in propositional form. Convention still treats naked propositions as equivalent to belief when rendering an individuals' belief in propositional form. It manifests from the divorce/separation of truth and belief. That's the reason why Gettier's paper has persisted.

Another historical problem is the conventional mistake of treating belief as though it is equivalent to the naked proposition. It's not. We can know that by virtue of carefully comparing what it would take for the belief under consideration to be true with what it would take in order for the naked proposition to be true. They are not always the same. This is one such case. It's not the only one. Case I is yet another.


Smith's belief is not just that the disjunction is true. Rather, it is more about his knowing what makes the disjunction true. Think about what all it takes in order for an individual to do what Gettier suggests Smith does in his thought/belief formation process. Smith has to know enough to deliberately follow the S knows that P formula that Gettier was targeting. Gettier even goes so far as to openly claim that Smith knows the rules of disjunction as well as the rules of entailment, for it is the entailment that Gettier uses in order for him to claim that Smith knowingly deduced P or Q from P. Gettier even added that Smith was aware of the move, which presupposes that he intentionally and deliberately knowingly made it. Then he forgets all about that part. Odd, given he was supposed to be reporting Smith's belief.

Think about it in a way that's been sorely neglected. It's common sense.

If Smith believed that Jones owned a Ford, and he was adept enough to know that the rules of entailment would allow him to deduce "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" from his belief that Jones owned a Ford, then it only follows that he did not believe that the disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts. It was. To quite the contrary, he believed it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. It was not.

He only believed the disjunction was true because he believed Jones owned a Ford. He would never have uttered it otherwise. Belief that (P v Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account.

That is one historical accounting malpractice.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.
— creativesoul

But surely is one part of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunction is true. "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owned a Ford. Yes? Also "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Yes? That's all I'm saying. — Ludwig V

Yes. The disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts, contrary to Smith's belief that it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. Gettier admitted as much, but neglected to take that into consideration when reporting Smith's belief. Smith only deduced the disjunction as a result of his believing it was true because Jones owned a Ford.

Belief that the disjunction is true because of P is false when the disjunction is true as a result of Q.

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices.
— creativesoul

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by conventional or unconventional accounting practices. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V

No worries.

This post touches upon and/or skirts around that aspect a bit more. Happy to answer any questions.

Mistaking that particular cloth for a cow is to believe that that cloth is a cow. That's the beginning of this particular farmer's thought and/or belief formation process. It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. A case of mistaken identity grounds it.

The cottage industry cases completely neglect to include the beginning of the farmer's thought and/or belief formation process.

It does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow that one is justified in asserting/believing that "there is a cow in the field" is true.

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. Starting at "there is a cow in the field" completely neglects to assess the belief underwriting the exclamation. Those give rise to "there is a cow in the field".

Besides that, "that's a cow" would be the first thing the farmer thought/believed upon looking at the cloth. Then, he may deduce "there is a cow in the field". It makes no difference. Neither follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

...the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template — neomac

The cloth looked like a cow.

...plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit... — neomac

As if any judgment habit counts...

I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field" — neomac

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?

Whose distinction is a categorical error?

You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. Try this...

Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

I am using a variation of Kant’s definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment. — TheGreatArcanum

Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas?

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices. From convention accounting practices' inability to properly render Smith's belief in both Gettier cases, to belief attribution practices(including but not limited to the de re/de dicto distinction) claiming that the farmer's belief statement is justified, when it is clearly not if we look carefully enough at what grounded that statement, to the practice of being far too strict with what ought only apply to some beliefs, and working from the presupposition/dogma that all belief ought be only rendered in terms amenable to belief as propositional attitude simply because openly espoused ones can.

There is a basic (mis)conception of meaningful human thought and belief in philosophy proper, and it's been there for a very long time. As a result of getting thought and belief wrong on such a basic level, we've gotten something basic wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered when offering a report about their origin.

It's no wonder that there are no notions of belief at work(that I'm aware of) that are rendered in terms easily amenable to evolutionary progression. With all the talk about consciouness, it doesn't look hopeful for this to be corrected, in small part at the very least, any time soon. You'll have that.

I'm very busy in real life everyday practical financially rewarding endeavors, and I'm very lucky to have been fortunate enough to be the one who's currently in my shoes, so to speak. That being said, there is something that I get from doing philosophy well, and listening to others who also do, that simply cannot be gotten any other way. So, sometimes I piddle...

I appreciate your responses thus far.

Very professional. Oh...

And you're more than welcome for the earlier reply. It was my pleasure.

I prefer to put Gettier's Case II in long form, for that's how those sorts of beliefs are best understood, and it's also much easier for the average Joe to register and/or otherwise understand the problem.

Smith believed that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because Jones owned a Ford. It was not. To quite contrary, it was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Smith's belief was false. The conventional accounting practices used by Gettier leave all that completely neglected. Hence, I find those practices to be lacking in explanatory power when it comes to correctly reporting(taking account of) Smith's belief.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.

Salva veritate.

"Report" implies that we are talking to someone other than the farmer. So we report in the first way. If we were talking to the farmer, he would obviously not recognize what we would say. But to repeat to him the words he would use would suggest that we share his belief, so I can't use those. Before I can say anything to him, I have to ensure that we both understand the reference of the sentence. I must correct his mistake. “You know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth” would do the trick. — Ludwig V

I understand the concerns with clarity, particularly when it comes to expressing one's views in a philosophical discussion with other philosophers. We can be a picky bunch. However, I no longer share any deep concerns at all over these matters we're currently discussing. To me, it is as plain and simple as the nose on my face. Gettier's Case I has everything to do with reference. That being said...

Sure, we could inform the farmer of his mistake by doing as you suggest or something similar. That would do the trick, if that amounts to allowing the farmer to become aware that he had false belief, unbeknownst to himself at time t1.

I'm afraid I'm one of those who people who see every sentence as a (potential) speech-act so the context, including the audience, always needs to be considered. — Ludwig V

Of course. That's a beneficial consequence stemming from your namesake's insistence upon looking at how we use language in order to ascertain the meaning. I do not foresee that as being a potential problem here.

I don't understand your diagnosis of Gettier's case 1. I think you've misremembered it. — Ludwig V

Well, that surprises me.

Okay. I just looked it up and you're completely right, I did misremember. My apologies, but the basic objection still stands. I just mixed up who Smith believed would get the job. Easy enough to correct. Thank you for pointing that out! Much better to report the Case correctly, especially given this discussion.

So, Smith justifiably believed that Jones would get the job, and he had counted the coins in Jones' pocket earlier. Gettier invoked the rules of entailment to have Smith go from "Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". Smith got the job instead of Jones, and unbeknownst to Smith he too had ten coins in his pocket, so "the man with ten coins in his pocket", which is what Gettier reports as Smith's belief, turns out to be true even though Jones did not get the job, and Smith believed that Jones would.

Treating Smith's belief as a naked proposition is to change what sorts of things would make Smith's belief true. Smith did not believe that he would get the job. He believed that Jones would get the job. So, in Smith's mind the person referred to by "the man with ten coins in his pocket" was Jones, and no one else. Smith got the job, contrary to his own belief.

The difference between Smith's belief and the proposition when treated as a naked one is clear. The proposition would be true if any man with ten coins in their pocket got the job. Smith's belief is not about any man. It is about Jones, and no one else. Smith's belief would have been true only if, only when, and only because Jones got the job.

If I understand you rightly (and I'm not sure I have), your diagnosis of Case 2 is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true iff P is true or Q is true. So, according to Gettier and me, if Smith believes that P, they are justified in believing that P or Q. But, as you say P is false, yet, as Gettier tells us, Q is true. Smith's justification relies on P and the truth relies on Q. It's that mismatch that creates the problem. My solution to this example is to point out that Smith's justification fails and so he cannot know P or Q, which can be summarized as "no false lemmas".

Well, it doesn't seem to me that my diagnosis of Case II is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true if P or Q is true. Rather, that is precisely what makes the case.

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jone's owned a Ford(because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.

(P or Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account. Just like the first case, Smith's belief is not equivalent to the naked disjunction (Por Q). Rather, Smith believed that P or Q was true because P. Leaving out that last bit (because P) is to provide an accounting malpractice of Smith's belief. It is not equivalent to the naked proposition/disjunction.

the summary is altogether mistaken now
— creativesoul

@invizzy apparently he changed his views. — neomac

I changed how I present them.

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Okay.

Do we agree that at time t1, the farmer believed that the cloth in the field was a cow, but he does not know that?

We can discuss things more later. For now though...

Let's start at the beginning of this particular famer's thought and belief formation process. Let's talk about how he goes from seeing a cloth to "there is a cow in the field". Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?

My position on this has evolved a bit since our first conversation. Your summary to invizzy would be closer to what my position was back when you and I were discussing Jack. After much consideration, I've sharpened it up a bit, so the summary is altogether mistaken now.

I am not saying anything at all about going back and changing what S would say at the time.

Here is a more straightforward answer: we all learnt to report S’belief at t1 based on what S says at t1. That’s the practice. — neomac

Is that what counts as a valid reply/answer these days? That may count as an answer to some people, but others can plainly see that it does not answer the questions that it should.

With regard to your question...

Indeed, it is standard practice to report S's belief at time t1 based upon what S says at time t1. That is precisely the problem in certain cases like this particular farmer story. I've shown how that practice has been found wanting, lacking, and begging for truth about the farmer's belief at time t1.

Upon what ground do you accept the farmer's self-report at time t1, when he was wrong about what he saw and believed about that, and reject his report at time t2, when he is correct about what he saw and believed at time t1?

At time t2, would you argue with the farmer about what he believed at time t1, based upon standard accounting/belief attribution practices, in the same manner you've argued against me here?

I'm not doubting that you have not laid it all out. I'm rejecting using the notion of "necessary" as a means to discriminate between kinds of true statements.

It also seems like you're equivocating the term "necessary", at first blush anyway.

Here's how I see it...

Simply put:Our disagreements boil down to the differences between our notions of belief.

I was hopeful that there was a bridge when you mentioned "perceptual beliefs", but that notion turned out to be rather empty it seems. All belief is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological machinery), including those that are arrived at in the 'other' ways you mentioned. Thus, I found that rather unhelpful for adding any clarity.

However, that aspect, I think you called it "processing" or something similar, very well could be great material to build a bridge of mutual understanding.

That's why I asked that... first.

You cannot have one without the other. Earlier you spoke of necessary truths didn't you?

I remember. That's why I asked.

I cannot make head or tails out of that answer. except that it seemed to be some sort of critique of my approach. Strange answers to very straightforward questions.

That's where you balked last time too.

Yeah, I'm not keen on using "necessary" to discriminate between kinds of true statements. I prefer the way I set out in that OP. We may discuss the differences, or not.

The expression "perceptual belief", as I use it, it's simply pointing to the genesis of that belief. If a belief is processed out of perceptual evidences, it's perceptual, if it's processed out of other propositions through reasoning it can be deductive or inductive belief, if it's processed out of a communicative channel it's a transmitted belief, etc.
This is at least part of my background assumptions while thinking about justification. — neomac

I see.

Curious how you would answer the questions I posed to Ludwig.

You could always quote something from that link and discuss it.

Well surely you see that I'm rejecting that sense of "necessary"?

:wink:

In each and every case of causation there is a correlation between cause and effect/affect.

There certainly seems to be a problem about the farmer’s belief that a piece of cloth is a cow. You seem to be assuming that in reporting the farmer’s beliefs, you need to use words that he would have done, and he certainly wouldn’t have said that a piece of cloth was in the field. The tricky bit is that that is exactly how we would formulate his belief and we can’t say that there’s a cow in the field (unless we are referring to the cow that is in the field, which would be very misleading.)

First off, “see” is a factive verb. In reporting what people see, we need to report what they actually see, not what they think they see. When we report what they think they see, we have to make it clear, so we need to report, not that he sees a cow in the field, but that he believes he sees a cow in the field, or that he sees what he believes is a cow in the field.

We focus too much, in these discussions, on what people say in reporting their own beliefs. But that is only one way that people show what they believe. Their beliefs also show in what they do and in other things that they say. That’s how we know that he believes that a piece of cloth is a cow. But I would use that way of putting it only to other people, not to the farmer himself. Curiously, if I was telling the farmer about his mistake, I would say “you know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” Or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth”. — Ludwig V

My apologies for not recognizing what all you've said here. It deserves better attention than I gave it earlier. Gestalt was in control, I suppose. I have no idea how I missed this. :smile: I wondered why you had not addressed my last reply to you, but after rereading through our exchanges, now I think I know exactly why. You had addressed my concerns(at least regarding the cottage industry cases) on a basic level here, and I somehow missed that completely, and instead summarized the basic points I've made without ever actually giving due attention to the ones you made here. Again, my apologies.

Regarding the above quote...


I completely agree that we need to report what people see. We need to report what they say. We also need to report what people believe, especially in the odd cases where they do not know what they see and/or believe about what they see. This is one such case. We seem to agree that the farmer believes that that particular piece of cloth is a cow. Where we seem to disagree is what we ought say in our report about what the farmer believes at the time. You seem to be agreeing with conventional belief attribution practices when you suggest that our report of the farmer's belief ought be what the farmer would likely say himself at that time in particular.

The farmer would not say that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow while looking at a piece of cloth that he believes is a cow. The farmer does not know that he is mistaken about what he's looking at. He does not know that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow. So, he certainly would not say that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow. That is a belief that is impossible to knowingly hold.

So, if we do as you seem to suggest here, which is in line with conventional accounting/belief attribution practices, we would not be reporting what the farmer believes. To quite the contrary, we would be going with what the farmer says at the time.

Everything can be identified under many descriptions. We use the one that is most appropriate for the context, including the method of identification that works for our audience. When we come to reporting the belief (and knowledge) of other people, we do not stick to the reference that they are using or would use; we use the reference that works for the audience we are reporting to. After all, the point is to enable our audience to understand.

It is complicated, so I hope this is reasonably clear.

Actually it's not. You've answered in what seems to be a very non-committal manner, as if straddling both side of a fence. This could be cleared up, however. I've a question for you...

Ought we report what the farmer believes(that a piece of cloth is a cow), or what the farmer would likely say at that particular time(that he believes a cow is in the field)?

A follow-up...

If we are going to go with what the farmer would say, upon what grounds are we claiming that the best time to do that(to go with what the farmer says) is when the farmer is wrong about their own belief, rather than when they become aware that they had once believed that a piece of cloth was a cow(rather than go with what the farmer would say when they're right about what they saw and what they believed about what they saw)?