Not relevant to my point. As I said,

What is it like? This is a question that elicits a rich source of experiential data from people, the answers are meaningful, but the question probably doesn't elicit specific, verifiable data.
— Tom Storm

For instance, if you were involved in counselling or supporting people to recover from trauma (as I am) or a series of other similar activities, then the question 'what is it like' can be of immense significance in assisting people to navigate their experiences and identity. — Tom Storm

If your point is that such questions(what is it like to..) can be used in common parlance to generate meaningful discussion, then sure, I agree. If your point is that the question can be used to help people come to acceptable terms with past events, then again... sure, I would agree. That's beside the point I was making about the general thrust of the thread...

The context here, in this thread, is whether or not such questions support the charge that idealism is superior to reductive physicalist approaches when it comes to taking adequate account of human experience. The charge was made by the OP that reductive physicalist approaches cannot account for qualia without appealing to obscurity whereas idealist approaches presumably can. I was pointing out that idealist approaches are more obscure than reductive physicalist approaches when it comes to explaining experience.

The typical question posited to bring the so-called hard problem into consideration regarding the inadequacy of explanatory power inherent to reductive physicalist approaches is often one that begins with "what is it like to..."

I was pointing out that such questions are not indicative of any shortcomings of reductive physicalist approaches, but rather serve to muddy the waters and distract(add obscurity) because they are not well formulated questions to begin with.

The entire enterprise of qualia is fraught with ambiguity, obscurity, and untenability compounded by simile and metaphor. It makes for poorly done philosophy.

So, what is it like to watch a sunset?

When we ask, "What is it like to watch a sunset?", what exactly are we asking for?

:brow:

Does that question even have an answer? It seems clear to me that it does not! Watching a sunset is not like anything. To quite the contrary, each viewing is different. One could watch the sun set as many times as one likes, and each time it will be different. Likewise, each day, each moment, of one's so called 'subjective experience' is different from all the other days and moments as well.

Hence, it is the question itself that is problematic in that it is not a well formulated question to begin with. There is no sensible meaningful answer to it.

It is a foundational unprovable assumption/premiss, resting its laurels on terminological consistency(coherence) and/or 'logical' possibility alone(scarequotes intentional).

Indeed, there are all sorts of things that could be said to follow from it, if accompanied by some other premisses, but - by my lights anyway - 'logical' possibility alone does not warrant belief, and untenability is completely unacceptable.
— creativesoul

OK, I don't see it that way: I think that the attributes of things that can be revealed in perception could not be exhaustive of what they are unless some form of idealism were true, and idealism seems very implausible to me. So, it's as I said a logical or conceptual distinction between things as they are perceived and things as they are in themselves, but I don't see the idea that things have their own existence independently of perception as being a mere logical possibility. — Janus

Nor do I. My mistake for not being clear enough. What I meant was that Noumena is a conception that rests upon logical possibility alone and is untenable for the reasons previously given.

Some things are not existentially dependent upon us. Some things are. Some things are existentially dependent on us for their emergence, but their persistence is not.

What is the conscious mental experience that I have every day and every waking moment of my life?

Exactly what qualia are you referring to?

Is obscurity allowed now?

Without appeal to obscurity, reductive physicalist approaches can account for qualia at least as well as any other position. I would argue better than, especially if obscurity is unacceptable. — creativesoul

I disagree: it can’t account for it at all. — Bob Ross

Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for? — creativesoul

...my claim is not that they can’t account for a particular subgroup of qualia but, rather, all of it. — Bob Ross

Well, as above shows nicely, you've just contradicted yourself. I'm not sure what you're claiming. Perhaps it's better to take this slowly. Our respective positions are very different, and that seems to be on a foundational/fundamental level. Right now, I'm just wanting to ensure that I am aiming at the right target, so to speak. So, I ask...

Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for?

Right, it is merely a logical or conceptual distinction, and according to its own lights cannot ever be anything more than that. And yet the distinction seems to be the catalyst for so much speculation. Given the completely unknowable character of the noumena as it is defined can it provide any cogent grounds for such speculation? — Janus

Hey Janus.

It is a foundational unprovable assumption/premiss, resting its laurels on terminological consistency(coherence) and/or 'logical' possibility alone(scarequotes intentional).

Indeed, there are all sorts of things that could be said to follow from it, if accompanied by some other premisses, but - by my lights anyway - 'logical' possibility alone does not warrant belief, and untenability is completely unacceptable.

How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer

Cannot be done. Noumena are untenable. In order to know that what appears is not the way things are(the thing in itself), one must have access to both what appears and the thing in itself in order to perform comparative analysis, and determine that the one is not the other. Given that Noumena, by definition, are what we do not have access to... there can be no comparison. No way to know.

...the question you asked for: “can physicalism possibly account for qualia under its reductive physicalist methodological approach without appeal to an obscurity?”. That is essentially the question that expresses the hard problem of consciousness. If one answers not, then it is a hard problem; however, if they answer yes, then it is a soft problem. — Bob Ross

Without appeal to obscurity, reductive physicalist approaches can account for qualia at least as well as any other position. I would argue better than, especially if obscurity is unacceptable.

There's a need for you to elaborate on exactly what counts as qualia, for that is precisely what any approach is supposed to be taking account of. So, it seems we need to set out a bare minimum criterion for exactly what counts as qualia, such that if some candidate or other satisfies the criterion, then it counts as qualia.

The position you're working from and/or arguing in favor of presupposes that there is a distinction between biological machinery doing it's job and so-called 'subjective' experience.

I'm also quite unsure of the invocation of 'mechanical awareness', in terms of AI or something akin. I've not likened experience to that, nor would I. It's a red herring. Unnecessary distraction.

Exactly what qualia are you and other proponents of the hard problem saying that reductive physicalism cannot account for?

Could you put the "hard problem" in question form please? The question needs to have an acceptable answer, by my lights. So, if you could formulate a question that has a potential/possible answer that you would find satisfactory, it would be super helpful. I want to make sure we're on the same page.

The evolutionary advantages of human conscious experience are plentiful. Perhaps they can be summed up as a tremendous increase in human adaptability.

What are your guys' thoughts? — Bob Ross

Hello Bob,

What struck me immediately was that the OP presupposes that the purportedly "'Hard Problem' of Consciousness" refers to an actual problem, particularly for reductive physicalism. I think that that presupposition is based upon an ambiguous inadequate idea... regarding exactly what counts as being a problem. If there is no problem to begin with, then the entire exercise is moot.

Consciousness is emergent. As such, it is - as we know it - the result of millions of years of evolutionary progression. There is no "aha!" point or moment in time that can be pointed at, and then it can be said "here it is!". There is no magical combination or point in evolutionary progression that consciousness suddenly appears, resides, or has emerged as we know it. That's not how it works.

The reductive physicalist can identify and thoroughly explain how all sorts of 'the parts' commonly associated with conscious subjective experience work physically(See Dennett's Quining Qualia). The opponent will simply state that the hard problem hasn't been solved, or say "that's the easy problems"... Yada, yada, yada.

It's akin to the physicalist pouring hundreds of thousands of grains of sand onto the floor and pointing at the result, while the opponent says... that's not enough to count as a pile of sand.

Thank you for that! Cheers!

Bring on the indictments, for God's sake. — Wayfarer

They're not done... There's more than the public at large will ever be able to know. Trump was and is compromised.

Thanks Jeep!

Somebody link the Mueller Report please...

Gotta link my friend?

I am not just myself, but my relationship with others. — Moliere

Brilliantly put!

Cheers.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. A similar point could be made about the causal implications of specific facts or events. There's another complicated issue for philosophy about disentangling beliefs that have values built in to them (such as the belief that X committed murder or that COVID is dangerous) and their factual content. — Ludwig V

This was one of the aspects that I thought could be further unpacked and explained in terms of how it applies to Gettier.

Another was the equivalence drawn between atomic propositions and beliefs such that convention has it that "Michael was not born in Germany" counts as a belief of some who believes Michael was born in France.

I think these are related...

Professor Chomsky:

Hello! Welcome to the forum. Many of us are very happy to have you. Given that your expertise spans many different fields of study, I expect that you'll see a vast array of questions. I'd like to focus this question on philosophy. Would you please share your view regarding the currently popular topic of consciousness? In particular, I hope to have you shed light on the so called 'Hard Problem'. I'm familiar with your view on it, but I believe that it would be beneficial to the overall philosophical community if you could explain your view regarding the 'Hard Problem' on this forum.

Thank you in advance, and for the public service(s) you've provided throughout your lifetime.

But it’s not really a language. We give the molecules symbols and talk of “translation” and such, but that’s a projection. — Mikie

Anthropomorphism

Cheers!

You’re saying im being irrational just like Pi.
— invicta

Hmm. Well, it seems you both go on forever. — Banno

:rofl:

That's the funniest thing I've seen in quite some time. I probably should not be promoting it, but damn... that was funny. I momentarily lost control of myself.

Afraid I won't be of much help.

1) Can objects be understood without reference to human subjectivity? — schopenhauer1

Thanks for the invite. Not sure how much I can help, or whether or not I can add anything of substantive value to the discussion.

Interesting OP. I may have finally found "my label"... Speculative Realist.

If the notion of understanding is on par with a worldview and/or belief system, and as such need not be true, accurate, or correct, then it seems to me that understanding is nearly identical with/to 'human subjectivity'.

We can and do understand all sorts of stuff without referencing human subjectivity. It's all fraught though. I mean, by my lights, the very distinction between subject and object is inherently inadequate. It cannot take into account anything that consists of both subject and object. Understanding is itself is one such thing. The very same is true of everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. Such things consist of both, subject and object. Hence, neither "subject' nor "object" is capable of taking proper account of thought, belief, and/or anything else consisting thereof, whether just in part or wholly.

Employing the subject/object dichotomy as a linguistic framework to take account of ourselves and 'the world' results in rendering stuff as one or the other. Not all things are one or the other. To quite the contrary, some things consist of both. Hence, I find that it is an inherently inadequate framework to begin with, ontological or otherwise.

2) Is it even wise to try to overlook the human aspect to all knowledge? Is this not only a fool's errand but somehow anti-human or is this just trying to take out a pernicious anthropomorphism that might lead to a more open field of exploration? — schopenhauer1

Anthropomorphism is to be avoided. What I mean is that it is a fatal mistake to attribute uniquely human capabilities to that which is not human.

Most Western philosophical tradition holds/held that all thought is uniquely human. It has been believed that it was our minds that separated us from the mere 'dumb' animals. Hence, the overwhelming majority of academia will still reject the very idea of non-human thought and/or belief, on pains of coherency alone. That's not entirely wrong, but it is wrong enough to have caused deep misunderstandings concerning thought and belief. It's also made it near impossible for current convention to arrive at a notion of thought and belief that is easily amenable to being explained in terms of evolutionary progression.

The aforementioned mistake was/is the account of human thought and belief. It's nowhere near refined enough, ontologically speaking, to be capable of adequately explaining the different degrees of complexity inherent to human thought and belief. Notably, some is prior to common language use, does not include language, and is not existentially dependent upon language in any way, shape, or form. Such thought and belief can equally be formed and/or 'held' by some language less creatures replete with the biological machinery required for doing so.

Those are the ones current convention and everyday people has/have trouble with. The result of the former is denial of language less thought. The result of the latter is often anthropomorphism.

The United States has never been a democracy. It's always been a republic with democratic traditions. The logistical 'problems' mentioned in the OP are features of a representative form of government not flaws.

One big problem is monetary corruption. It's legalized bribery now... quite literally. Another is conflicts of interest. Another is when faced with a choice between what's in the best interest of the overwhelming majority or what's in the best interest of the very few, the US government has been erring on the side of the few for around 50 or 60 years. That's the result of the corruption, not the form of government.

Thanks for the explanation. In what little spare time available I've been watching Chomsky. There's an abundance of interviews old and new. It seems you've fairly characterized the main thrust of his view. I particularly noted that he's prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level. Our views differ there, so it's probably best for me to end it here.

I should clarify that I agree with saying that language and thought are the very same thing at their core. It's just that my explanation of that core is starkly different than Chomsky's I language or innate grammar.

Well, I find that there are examples of both. I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience. I've done fairly well in public speeches, including impromptu, using quick outline notes, and well rehearsed written speeches. So, performance with language use(E language) has multiple ways it can considered.

Oral - on the fly. Oral - after practice. Written - on the fly. Written - after editing. Written - after practice. That's just right off the top of my head...

I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable.

There is an interesting consequence of Chomsky's temporal/causal rearrangement of grammar and language. As it was traditionally held, performance generated competence. Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance.

It's far more complicated than this snippet, but I found that consequence intriguing.

Chomsky's view also makes perfect sense of baby babble and twin speak, moreso than other traditional views. I do struggle a bit to make sense of the claims that equate grammar, universal grammar, and/or I language to physical structures in the brain.

This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. — RussellA

I suppose that I was thrown as a result of you saying that no one would know it's meaning. I should have asked if you believed that the statement has meaning in that case, because "it" referred to the statement. The time frame in question was void of humans. So, I wondered why and/or how you believed that statements could still be meaningful in such a situation.

I would agree that there are no such things as meaningful language or statements in that situation. If we imagine a time in the future when all humans have perished, the once meaningful and true statement "The Eiffel Tower is in Paris" would be neither true nor meaningful.

That's why saying that "no one would be around to know it's meaning" threw me a bit. Still does, but the thread is more about the analytic synthetic distinction, and Chomsky's take on that. So... I'll leave well enough alone...

Thanks for the answers.

:smile:

:up:

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?
— creativesoul

Is "ya mnara lipo nchi" true if there is no one who knows what it means. If no one knows its meaning, then it isn't a language, it's an object like a pebble, and as a pebble cannot be true or false.

Similarly, "the Eiffel Tower is located in France" would no longer be a language, it would become an object, and just like a pebble, cannot be considered as either true or false. — RussellA

So, would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" still be be meaningful if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out, but it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning, or would it no longer be meaningful at all?

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?
— creativesoul

Yes.

We observe something in the world and then name it "The Eiffel Tower". This something existed before we named it. As this something existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

Similarly, we observe somewhere in the world and then name it "Paris". This somewhere existed before we named it. As this somewhere existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

As both the something that has been named "The Eiffel Tower" and the somewhere that has been named "Paris" can exist without a name, they can continue to exist even if there was no one around to name them. — RussellA

Okay.

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?

:rofl:

Yup.

Chomsky very recently characterized chatGPT as glorified plagiarism, or words to that effect.

I do think that awareness and the material world we are aware of are two seperate things. — lorenzo sleakes

I never said otherwise. I criticized the presupposition that sensation and mind are completely distinct 'things'. Seems to me that the former are part of the latter in such a way that complex minds such as ours evolved - over enough time and mutation - from simple sensation(s). In other words, without sensations there could be no minds.

There are currently all sorts of offline activities that are more productive for me, practically speaking. I agree with the frustrations that can come with this medium. I can certainly relate. To answer your question...

Not all beliefs are reasons for doing something. That pretty much sums it up... broadly speaking.

I've read back a bit, but I'll need to carefully reread further back in order to better remember what all we had been discussing. I do seem to remember that there were some very interesting aspects that I hoped we would further explore.

Yes. We might use the metaphor of a distorting lens. — plaque flag

I've called it the worldly fingerprint placed upon each of us by virtue of natural language acquisition/adoption. That's another matter in its own right, and would be too far tangent to be considered on topic.

Yeah, I should probably not continue here. My own position rejects both direct and indirect realism as it's currently defined. That is due to the stark ontological differences in what constitutes thought and belief, and subsequently... a mind.