There's not a problem with it but you demonstrated a naturalist theory of religion and I was saying that it implies anaturalism even if you only use members of naturalism (e.g. it's not sufficient an explanation to say "the reason people thought zeus existed was to explain thunder" because it requires elements outside naturalism to substantiate it which it usually declares gods as being of the mind which isn't sufficient to explain the proposition as said). — Shwah

I've no idea what you're attempting to say here.

It is established, well documented, undeniable knowledge that many people across the globe of history have attributed all sorts of things to supernatural beings, of which gods are species. As the gaps in our knowledge have been bridged, the need to posit supernatural beings like gods has diminished.

The interesting thing, however, is that there is still room to posit forces of unknown origin. Hence, I find the agnostic stance the most reasonable one when it comes to the origin(s) of the universe, despite having more than enough reason to reject the God of Abraham as well as the other mythical gods throughout history.

What's the problem with what I wrote?

Is that supposed to count as relevant to what I wrote?

Why not go the whole nine yards and adopt atheism? — Agent Smith

Much of the deep-seated meaning and the resultant seemingly disparate array of meaningful influence that religion has had upon so many different kinds of people throughout the known history of humanity is found lacking in atheism. That's as it should be, given that atheism is a lack of supernatural belief, generally speaking. More specifically speaking, it is often described as a lack of belief that there is some supernatural creator of the universe. The point is that people have attributed a whole lot of meaning to gods and other supernatural entities. To some, religion gives answers to some of life's most important questions. Some of these questions, atheism has no answer for.

It is no accident that so many different people from so many different corners of the earth throughout human history all found themselves with explanatory needs; gaps in their knowledge base. No, that is no accident at all, my friend. To quite the contrary, Gods are just one kind of supernatural explanation, and we invented supernatural explanations out of necessity. Nowadays, many atheists dismiss them due to lack thereof. Supernatural beliefs are part and parcel to the everyday lives of most, I would dare to guess. It was necessary. I mean, in prehistoric days, people took note of the sun. Some got sunburned, and put two and two together. Some noted that certain animals only came out at night, and because they wanted to eat them, those people would wait for the sun to disappear from the visible sky while planning a hunt. Others wanted to know "why" the sun traveled in the sky the way that it did. People wanted to know what it was, this bright object in the sky. All this only to say that the sun - like all meaningful things - became more and more meaningful as people attributed more and more meaning to it. In short, we do this by drawing correlations between the sun and other things. At some point, we gave the star at the center of our solar system a name, and began using that name to pick it out to the exclusion of all else, all as a means to talk about it. Some worshipped the sun, which is not such a far stretch for a bunch of ignorant humans seeking to explain stuff.

So, it seems likely to me at least that the gap in our knowledge base is the origin of the gods throughout known history, including the God of Abraham.

I find that many raised in some sort of 'Christian' background, have a hard time shaking the vestiges of the religion. Some of those remnants have become codified by American law.

Anyway, to get back to the question asked at the top of this post...

It's takes a certain kind of person in a certain kind of situation in order to have what it takes to lose their religion. I can only tell you my own personal experience:It's not easy. Many find it difficult or impossible to find personal meaningful contentment and/or fulfillment without relying somehow upon some supernatural belief or another. In short, religion is far more meaningful to religious people that you seem to realize.

I had fun primarily in being articulate, clear, focused, logic and versatile while formulating my objections against your view... — neomac

:smile:

The above presupposes that you have a good grasp of my view. I'd like to see you offer a comprehensive summary of the position I hold and have been arguing in favor of. I mean, in order to levy valid objections against another's viewpoint, that viewpoint must be first understood rightly. So... show me.

I'm explicitly stating that my 4 claims are different from your 2 claims, except for their logic structure... — neomac

The structure was different. That is exactly what I pointed out. So, they are not just different except for that structure. To quite the contrary, they are different structures altogether, as I've already pointed out clearly enough for the average person to grasp.

False belief cannot possibly be true.
— creativesoul

Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. — neomac

...we can claim of a belief (or proposition) that is proven to be true (or false), that it could have been false (or true)... — neomac

Arriving at incoherence is a sign of self-contradiction and/or equivocation. You've littered the thread and this conversation with such things. I've just been far too busy attempting to be a charitable reader to care enough to point out all of the flaws in what you've offered here. There is plenty to choose from. The irony though is that nearly all of your critiques and/or objections are invalid. You do know what that means right? They do not follow from what I've said, but rather, they follow from your interpretations thereof and/or your own linguistic framework. You've demonstrated a deeply ingrained habit of assessing my claims based upon a framework other than the one I'm employing.

How many strikes do we get again in your game before being counted out?

I am very well aware of the difficulty inherent to what I'm setting out. I am very well aware of the affront that it exemplifies, particularly against propositional logic as well as paraconsistent logic. That's okay though, because neither of those practices have ever gotten belief quite right to begin with. I suppose you also hold the rules of logical entailment as a standard also, based upon what I've seen here.

All the shit you've said about me and logic is far less convincing when you employ practices that permit changing the truth conditions of belief as well as outright attributing belief that could possibly be true to an individual that has belief that cannot possibly be true. That you do not see that as a problem is typical though, you do follow the conventional practices that allowed Russell's clock, Moore's paradox, and Gettier the footholds that they still have to this day.

The sole purpose of logic(the rules of correct inference) is to preserve the truth of the premisses. The sole purpose of logical notation is to take proper account of human thought, belief, and/or statements thereof. It is claimed that there is some basic form that that comes in. Logical notation is purportedly setting that out. Currently, convention fails on both counts. That's no secret.

Reminding the reader of the notion of belief you're working from again...
— creativesoul

Unfortunately for you, my objections to your ignoratio elenchi fallacy do not depend on my theory — neomac

You're such a moron. The objection was based upon a conflation of belief and statements. I do not conflate belief and statements. The objection was based upon what you did, not I. What you did is irrelevant.

The irony is still strong...

An astute reader will note that the critique above holds good only if we conflate belief and statements.
— creativesoul

I'm not conflating anything — neomac

Reminding the reader of the notion of belief you're working from again...

The contents of an individual's belief, according to your own words, "express the point of view" of the individual believer. "That clock is working" is a proposition and/or statement which expresses of the individual's point of view at time t1, according to what you've been arguing here. You've also claimed that that proposition/statement could be true, and hinted at possible world scenarios...

False belief cannot possibly be true. The statement you've been arguing in favor of can.

So, yes you are.

There's nothing at all problematic about metacognitive endeavors which point out the simplest of details such as a true belief cannot be false; a false belief cannot be true; it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood; and it is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. The first two claims can be said of true and false propositions without issue. It is unproblematic to say that when we discuss whether belief or propositions are true or false, that our reports are qualifying both propositions and beliefs.

The issue is that all truth apt belief is either true or false, and that is the case regardless of whether or not we further qualify them during our metacognitive endeavors.

So, when we know that an individual's belief is false, we can also know that it cannot possibly be true, and that the individual cannot knowingly believe whatever it is that they do at the time. If we then make the further metacognitive claim that they believe something that can be true, or something that is believable, then we've just ascribed a belief to the individual that they cannot possibly have.

If convention has issue putting what I've presented into logical notation, it is not a flaw of what I've presented, rather it is the accounting practice that is found lacking.

A logic reader will understand that you are not logic. — neomac

Brilliant.

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language use. Not all belief are.

It is relevant to show:
the genesis of your ignoratio elenchi fallacy as explained here (third point).
That even if you compare beliefs and propositions you should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects in your conditionals
The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se. — neomac

When an author is critiquing something other than what I've wrote, and/or something that quite simply does not follow from what I wrote, it is an irrelevant critique.

...

An astute reader with a keen eye will surely note that the critique in the post prior to this one, while seemingly reasonable, particularly at first blush, is based upon what the author takes to be an accurate report and/or rendering of what's being critiqued. It's plainly not. What I wrote can be simplified as follows...

If all A's can possibly be true or false, and false B's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false B's.
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and true B's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true B's.

The above puts what I wrote into simpler form. I'm comparing two distinctly different things, propositions and belief. As clearly shown below, the critique is not. Rather, the critique compares different kinds of the same thing. Salva veritate. There is an obvious substitution error here.

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false propositions cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false propositions.
If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true propositions cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true propositions.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and false beliefs cannot possibly be true, then beliefs are not equivalent to false beliefs.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and true beliefs cannot possibly be false, then beliefs are not equivalent to true beliefs. — neomac

If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and false A's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false A's.
If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and true A's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true A's.

In the first rendering they compared kinds of propositions. In the second, they compared kinds of beliefs. Both have the form above. Neither shares the form of the claims I made. Those claims are what is purportedly being critiqued. Hence, it is an irrelevant critique, as a result of critiquing something other than what I wrote. Given that what followed, as copied below, is based upon a fatally flawed rendering of what I wrote, there's a bit more irony involved yet once again.

However, differently from your former 2 claims, what these latter 4 claims make more evident is that:We should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects (like “true proposition” or “false proposition” vs “proposition”, or “true belief” or “false belief” vs “belief”) as reported in these claims. If we do not distinguish them appropriately, then the antecedents of the conditional claims will be contradictory: e.g. if “all propositions” means “true propositions and false propositions” then “all propositions can possibly be either true or false” is a contradiction in terms, while if we take "propositions" to generically refer to any proposition prior to (or independently from) any assessment of its truth-value then there is no contradiction.
The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se. — neomac

emphasis above is mine

Differently from my claims...

Indeed!

The idea that science doesn't, or cannot address moral and conceptual framework neurologically, is itself a claim. One that is not true. — Garrett Travers

Science has nothing at all to say about what we ought do.

Meaning, ordinary people could do a lot for the wellbeing of their own culture and country, and it is primarily by saying no to foreign influences. — baker

All or some?

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false belief cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false belief.

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true belief cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true belief.

You've ascribed a belief to Jack that is true. I have not. Jack's belief is false.

Correct but I don’t get what is supposed to prove... — neomac

It only follows that the belief you ascribed to Jack is not Jack's belief.

So your argument amounts to an ignoratio elenchi fallacy. — neomac

The irony.



At time t1, an individual capable of telling time wonders what time it is. Like all other folk who know how to read the hands of a clock, they look towards one. However, unbeknownst to the individual, they looked at a particular clock that had just so happened to have stopped working exactly twelve hours prior. While looking at the clock, the individual formed belief about what time it was based upon exactly what it said. The clock said it was three o'clock, and the individual believed it was three o'clock. The belief about the time was true, but that belief is not concerning. Rather, it is their belief about that clock that is of utmost importance.

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be true. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes.

QED

my theory doesn’t require any truth — neomac

Clearly.

At time t1, an individual capable of telling time wonders what time it is. Like all other folk who know how to read the hands of a clock, they look towards one. However, unbeknownst to the individual, they looked at a particular clock that had just so happened to have stopped working exactly twelve hours prior. While looking at the clock, the individual formed belief about what time it was based upon exactly what it said. The clock said it was three o'clock, and the individual believed it was three o'clock. The belief about the time was true, but that belief is not concerning. Rather, it is their belief about that clock that is of utmost importance.

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes.


Twat.

And you're proud of your behaviour here...

A gifted shitshow consisting of a gross misattribution of meaning bordering on deliberate obfuscation...

I've much more important matters to be involved in.

Belief contents express the point of view...
— neomac — creativesoul

This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief.

A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake. Hence, when we ask Jack at time t1, what he's doing immediately after looking at the clock, he will not say "I believe that that broken clock is working". Rather, he will say something about finding out what time it is/was.

He is unaware of being mistaken. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown.

Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working.

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?
— creativesoul

I answered that already. Belief contents express the point of view... — neomac

Cats sometimes believe that a mouse ran behind a tree...

It makes no sense at all to me to say that the cat's belief has content that expresses the cat's point of view.

...we need your theory of meaning and truth... — neomac

Much, arguably most, of the groundwork has already been offered, here in this very discussion...

I misunderstood your argument because this is how you presented it: — neomac

Has nothing to do with failing to read the next few lines...

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error...
— creativesoul

Well if we accept all your premises (and I haven't accepted any so far) maybe you are right... — neomac

Maybe I am right if you do not.

:brow:

A true belief cannot be false. A false belief cannot be true. It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Do you agree with all four of the above tenets?

:brow:

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. — neomac

Either works for me. I'm not picky about it. The only difference is that one is more general while the other(the one you prefer) is about a particular broken clock.

...if only 1 is the accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief, then your requirement is at best necessary... — neomac

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error...

What grounds the truth of the claim — neomac

That question makes no sense on my view.

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument — neomac

:worry:

We cannot knowingly believe that a broken clock is working.

...you should explain why it is impossible to knowingly believe it... — neomac

:yikes:

See above. There is no need for further explanation. I've more than adequately explained several times over in a variety of ways.

Jack can not knowingly believe that broken clock is working because “that broken clock is working” is a linguistic form of a contradiction. — neomac

Well yes and no. Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true, because it is a contradiction in terms, necessarily false, etc. That's all about language use. Jack's belief is not.

It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work.

Jack believes that broken clock is working.

The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form". Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

The sentence "That broken clock is working" is a contradiction in terms.

It's always the same question... — neomac

That's not true. You're mistaken.

I'll answer whatever questions you like, so long as they follow from what I'm arguing or are just plain ole simple questions about basic facts that seem to cause an issue for my position if and when my position is held in light of those facts. I've no problem at all bearing the burden of my claims. Questions based upon non sequiturs are another matter altogether.

I'm asking you (7th time): in the belief report that you claim more accurate, namely "At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock was working.", I see 3 items: broken, clock, was working. Explain what each of them stands for. Start from was working. — neomac

Here's what you've done...

You've broken down the basic belief report that I am arguing for(At time t1, Jack believed that that broken clock was working) into disparate bits of language use, which is to say that you're not focusing upon the meaningful set of marks I've presented, as I've presented them. Then... you're really asking me what the words "is working" stand for, as if - when isolated from the rest of the report - they stand for something that I bear the burden of elaborating upon?

What is it that you believe can be gleaned here by virtue of this procedure of yours? What does that question have to do anything we've discussed? Explain to me the relevance of the question. If it is relevant, I'll be glad to answer it. Teach me something new. I'm always game for that.




You've been asking, in more than one way, how I've tied this novel understanding of "belief" that I have into my report/account of Jack's belief. You held two claims(well... parts of them anyway) beside one another, basically asking me to explain their congruence. You asked about Jack's belief in terms of correlations drawn. It seemed that you wanted to know how I made sense of belief as correlations when it came to Jack's belief at time t1. I've obliged. I've set that out a number of times. The response was basically rhetorical huffing and puffing followed by some insults and handwaving. Simply put, you've ignored and deflected.

All belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature capable of doing so.

At time t1, Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Jack's belief consisted of all the meaningful correlations he drew while wondering what time it was and then looking at a broken clock to find an answer to his question. The content of the correlations Jack drew at that time are the content of Jack's belief at that time. So, I simplified the answer for ease of understanding. The non propositional content included Jack's wondering what time it was, and a broken clock. That satisfies the criterion perfectly.

It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood; to knowingly be mistaken; to knowingly form, have, or hold false belief. Jack's belief is false. Thus, when Jack's false belief is put into proper linguistic form, it will be impossible to knowingly believe.

Propositions are not.

the belief content is the fitness condition expressed by the completive clause — neomac

Could you elaborate?

you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief — neomac

No, I'm not.

the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is... ..."Jack believes that broken clock is working" — neomac

No, it is not.

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.

The content of Jack's belief are correlations drawn by Jack between directly and indirectly perceptible things. That would include the broken clock and his wondering what time it was, amongst other things less relevant. That's at least the fourth time I've said that and answered your question. It's fishy that you act as if I've avoided it.

my primary task is not to develop a theory of belief, but to understand as much as I can the logic of our common belief attribution practices. — neomac

Logical notation? The form of belief attribution? "The logic"???

How can anyone establish what counts as acceptable and/or unacceptable attribution of belief to another if there is no standard regarding what counts as belief? We're faced with the dire need for an adequate minimal criterion for belief which, when satisfied by some candidate or another, warrants concluding that that candidate counts as a belief.

What exactly would we be attributing to another when ascribing some belief to them, if we did not already have an idea of what beliefs are?

This especially comes to the forefront when ascribing belief to language less creatures.