My problem is only with the claim that this belief report “P (mistakenly) believed that a broken clock was working” is not only accurate, but even more accurate than “P (mistakenly) believed that a clock was working”. — neomac

It has to do with the content of Jack's belief...

My position can admit and accept all three of the renditions we've been discussing. You're the one who has issue with the fact that we do sometimes believe that broken clocks are working.

Jack believed that a broken clock was working” can be explained also by our common understanding of belief ascriptions, — neomac

Show me again, because thus far you've changed Jack's belief in your translation.

... it seems you are distinguishing 2 cases (belief ascription by Q at t1, and belief ascription by P at t2) even though there is no such difference with respect to what is ascribed to P at time t1 in both 2 cases, according to your belief ascription report (at t1, P believes that a broken clock is working, for both Q at t1 and P at t2). — neomac

You state this as though it is a problem. My report about Jack's belief at time t1 matches Jack's own report at time t2 of his belief at time t1. If that does not count as matching Jack's point of view then nothing will.

Secondly, since for me there is no difference in belief ascription failure between Q at t1 and P at t2, then you are not satisfying my standard, b/c at least in case of Q at t1 - you claim - there is no need for matching. Not to mention the fact that even the belief ascription by P at t2 is not satisfying my standard either, as I intend it: P at t2 is not offering any accurate report of P at t1 if she used your belief ascription report.

At time t2, Jack's own report of his own belief at time t1 matches mine. Somehow, you find this to be a problem. According to the above, we're both wrong. That's an incredible claim!

Now, just to be clear, I agree that there are times that we can know another's belief better than they do, but this is not one of those times(you do not know Jack's belief at time t1 better than Jack at time t2).

If the position you hold forbids you to admit that we can do both, believe that a broken clock is working, and admit of having held that belief at a later time, then I suggest you seriously consider incorporating the fact that we can and do hold belief that we are unaware of holding at the time.

Do you also deny that it is possible for us to believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, or that a barn facade is a barn?

The philosophical task, as I understand it, consists precisely in looking for what justifies one’s intuitive assumptions and not giving them for granted, all the more if they are not shared (like in your case). — neomac

Have you never believed a clock that was not telling the right time?

:worry:

Well, if you do not wish to continue, there's not much more I can do. I am very short on time for doing this stuff, for having this discussion, but I am making time just to be able to do so. You've levied a fair amount of serious charges here, and evidently you do not feel the obligation to allow the accused to provide a defense.

Due to the depth and breadth of the charges, I was planning on going through your objections one at a time. So, I began with your objection that my report of Jack's belief at time t1 did not match Jack's point of view at time t1. That objection was based upon your own proposed standard that our report of another's belief at time t1 match the point of view and/or perspective of the believer at time t1. You further supported this idea of matching the believer's own viewpoint.

So, I raised the valid objection that, at time t2, the believer's own report of their belief at time t1 does not meet the standard you've set. Do you not find that problematic? Are we to say that, at time t2, Jack is wrong about what they believed at time t1? What ground is there for us to accept his point of view at time t1(while mistaken) and reject it at time t2 after he's become aware of and subsequently corrected the mistake?

That's absurd. Special pleading at best.

There is nothing at all wrong with our saying that they held a belief that they were unaware of at time t1, but later when they became aware of the relevant facts concerning the clock along with their belief about it, they would readily admit that they had indeed believed that that broken clock was working.

The problem of our doing so is that it goes against the conventional notions.



You also seem to want to say that I am somehow attributing a self-contradictory belief to Jack, but I've yet to see you explain how I have done so. Thus far it's been gratuitously asserted along with other charges as well. That said, granted, going by the standards you're working from and one absolute presupposition they rest upon, it would be contradictory to say that anyone believed that broken clock was working. However, if we acknowledge the fact that we can and do hold belief that we are unaware of holding at the time of holding it, it is not at all contradictory to believe that a broken clock is working.

The standard you've presented presupposes that a believer is always aware of their own belief at the time it is influencing their behaviour. That is a false presupposition.



You've also complained several times about the fact that I've been using a thought experiment and/or hypothetical scenario, as if that is a problem? Surely, you do not want me to show you how absurd that is... do you? Here's the thing, it's not just a thought experiment...

It's something that happens! It is also something that can be tested in a controlled environment. Now, I would agree that the subjects would agree to both reports; that they believed that that clock was working, and that they believed that a broken clock was working. They could do so without any self-contradiction whatsoever.

Lastly, it has become more and more apparent to me that we have mutually exclusive notions of belief at work. I'm still wondering about something you said earlier regarding whether or not our notion of belief ought match our standard for belief ascription or the other way around. I'll ask you again...

What are you attributing(ascribing) to another prior to having a standard for what exactly counts as belief?

Ah shit! That's true! At time t1, I did believe that that particular broken clock was working!

There are a few things I'd like to talk about here. First, we are discussing our differing standards regarding exactly what counts as an acceptable rendition of another's belief. You've suggested that our report must match their perspective and/or their point of view at that time(time t1). You've placed emphasis upon our keeping their point of view and/or perspective in mind. You've subsequently charged that my proposal of what they believe at time t1 does not match their point of view and/or perspective at time t1. You're perfectly well within the bounds of saying so. I've said so myself. So...

I agree. That is not a problem, for I am talking about a belief that they are unaware of having at time t1. Thus, my proposal ought not match their point of view at time t1. My proposal of what they believe ought match what they believe. Sometimes we believe things that we are totally unaware of.

At time t1, if we should ask, "Hey!... Jack!... Do you realize that you believe that that broken clock is working?" they would be quite surprised that they had just believed that that particular broken clock was working.

In my comment, I contrasted P’s belief prospective at t1 with both Q’s belief prospective at t1 and P’s belief prospective at t2 (when she understood her belief at t1 to be wrong). And I said our report is accurate when it matches P’s belief prospective at time t1. — neomac

According to the standard you've put forth for what counts as an acceptable report of Jack's belief at time t1, Jack's own reporting at time t2 would not meet that standard.

Indeed I reported that premise (there was a typo: I wrote “intenTional” instead of “intenSional”), b/c if you want to make a philosophical proposal that is appealing to me, or those holding the conventional view of belief ascription, you should feel intellectually compelled to show understanding toward what we are concerned about (de dicto report are necessary for rendering believers' p.o.v.), and prove by that that we are not talking past each other. The burden is on you, b/c it’s you who wants to challenge the conventional view, not the other way around.
Otherwise our exchange will just end up in butting heads against the wall of our diverging intuition pumps. It’s pointless. So we can work out our different views better if we start from common grounds or at least reciprocal concessions. — neomac

Very well put. I'm fairly certain that we are not talking past each other. I'll give your objections due attention as soon as time permits. There's quite a bit wrapped up in there, and again... I appreciate the due attention. You've presented what seems to be a cogent well considered reply and as such it deserves the same in response.

Yet one can wonder if all intensional belief ascriptions can be in principle replaced by extensional belief ascriptions without omitting the believer’s perspective. How? By rendering the believer’s perspective in terms of metalinguistic belief ascriptions (belief about the truth-value of some propositions).
This is why one can claim as valid both <Jack believes a broken clock is working> (extensional belief ascription) and <Jack believes the proposition “a broken clock is working” false> (extensional belief ascription rendering the believer’s perspective in metalinguistic terms).
Where is the benefit? At least, in preserving truth-value through substitution of co-referent terms, even for belief ascriptions, and without giving up on the believer’s perspective. — neomac

The above is not half bad. That's supposed to be a compliment.

We commonly take a believer’s perspective on a given situation as a fundamental accuracy condition for belief ascriptions about him, and intensional belief ascriptions are designed for expressing this understanding — neomac

Is the practice of using "intensional" to ensure that our ascriptions are somehow congruent and/or otherwise amenable to the believer's perspective at the time? Given what I've quoted below, it would seem so.

All I can say is that the most accurate report of someone’s belief at time t1 is the one that best matches the point of view of the believer at time t1. Why would I pick the point of view of some person P at time t2 (or some other person Q at time t1) as a criterium of accuracy for reporting P's belief at time t1? — neomac

One great reason to deny the need for a match between our report and the person's own perspective and/or point of view at that time is when they believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, but they've no idea that they believe that. That man in that suit is a very large part of the meaningful content of any belief that he is a sheep. That man in that suit is both, unknown and influential to the believer.

The believer does not know at the time that they believe a man in a sheep suit is a sheep.

One great reason to pick the same person at another time is when we find ourselves discussing another's belief that they themselves do not know that they have. We can ask them later after they become aware of the relevant facts. It seems to me that that part of what I'm saying here honors and satisfies your standard of matching the individual's perspective concerning what exactly they believed at time t1. Moreso even than the alternative.

In your rendering of my contentions here, you've placed far too much importance on the notions of intentional, intensional, and extensional. One in my position could be easily flattered by such misattribution. I mean, it looks like a very intelligent viewpoint is being described.

That is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.

That barn facade is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That sheet hanging from a clothesline is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That man dressed in a sheep suit is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That stopped clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.

So, above are two different ways to describe some of the beliefs under consideration. It seems that I am the only one around here who finds the bottom set to be more accurate and/or acceptable than the first. Most of the objections are based upon the idea that the believer needs to assent to their belief when put into propositional form. That the scope of one's belief needs to be limited to only what they would say of themselves at that time.

That barn facade is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That sheet hanging from a clothesline is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That man dressed in a sheep suit is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That stopped clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.
Jones owns a Ford and disjunctions are true if either disjunct is. Therefore, 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because Jones owns a Ford.

SO now I am wondering if you have a clear grasp of what a proposition is. — Banno

There's a certain bit of irony here. I could say "pots and kettles" too...

Need I remind you of the absolute mess you made of the notion during the debate? There is more than one accepted use of that term. On my view, all propositions are proposed. It follows that having an attitude towards some proposition such that one believes it to be the case requires an individual capable of proposing and an individual capable of understanding that proposal and subsequently taking it to be true.

I understand what you are arguing. You're just wrong. — frank

That's not at all convincing to an astute audience. Gratuitous assertions such as these may convince some, but not I. We'll see if I'm wrong. That has yet to have been determined and/or established. I'm not even finished yet. Time constraints.

I just don't see anything here that supports your contention. — Banno

To which contention are you referring?

You're moving goal posts. — Harry Hindu

(That broken clock is working) has been proposed as the belief from the beginning. Any change was for elucidation only, not as a way to avoid valid objection. Evidently you do not understand what's being argued. That reply was meant more for others anyway...

I think that it would be helpful to show how the objection is inapplicable to what I'm arguing here. Your example is one of switching referents. Mine is not.

He never held an attitude towards the proposition (that broken clock is working) such that he believed it true. — creativesoul

Belief that that barn facade was a barn. Belief that that sheet hanging from a clothesline was a sheep. Belief that that man dressed in a sheep suit was a sheep. Etc.

Belief that does not permit itself to be rendered as a propositional attitude.

Seems to me that this is clearly a belief that does not allow itself to be rendered in propositional form such that the believer would hold it to be true, or as true. — creativesoul

Here I'm extending this to barn facades and sheets in fields that resemble sheep...

...

It's that "broken clock" is an extensional definition, while believes is an intensional operator.

The typical example of intension is

Jack believes Stephen King's first novel is The Shining.

If we stuck an extensional definition in there it would read

Jack believes that Carrie is The Shining.

Same thing. — frank

Could you apply this to (Jack believed that a broken clock was working)? I'm curious to see exactly how it is the same...

Your notion of what counts as being within the scope of our belief includes only what we would assent to if asked.

Jack would assent to once believing that that particular broken clock was working if asked after having become aware of the relevant facts. Not before.

So, the scope of Jack's belief ought be broadened a bit so as to include what he believed rather than what he would admit to believing. The scope of Jack's belief ought include all of Jack's belief. He was totally unaware of his false belief that that particular broken clock was working while he believed it. He believed what the clock said, and would readily admit to this all after having become aware of the relevant facts. After becoming aware of the broken clock, he would have become aware of his own mistake. At this point in time he would readily agree if asked "Did you believe that that broken clock was working?"...

He would have never agreed if ever asked if the proposition/statement "That broken clock is working" were true. He never held an attitude towards the proposition (that broken clock is working) such that he believed it true.



That's a bit more cleaned up.

Seems to me that this is clearly a belief that does not allow itself to be rendered in propositional form such that the believer would hold it to be true, or as true.

SO you do not understand that...

"the broken clock" is not a description Jack could correctly make?... — Banno

At least not while he believed that the broken clock was working.

SO you do not understand that...

"The broken clock" could not be within the scope of Jack's belief? — Banno

I would agree if what counts as being within the scope of our belief are only what we would assent to if asked. Jack would assent if asked after becoming aware of the relevant facts.

However, if the scope was broadened a bit so as to include what we all actually believe rather than what we know, and/or would admit to, we would surely see that the scope of Jack's belief is beyond his own knowledge.

The move to set it outside the scope of Jack's belief is due to the fact that it would be impossible for Jack to make such a statement based on his belief. — Harry Hindu

Well, yes and no.

While believing that that broken clock was working, it would be impossible.

However, after becoming aware of the fact that he believed that a broken clock was working, by showing him that clock had stopped, after becoming aware of exctly how he had come to believe that it was 3 o'clock, he could no longer believe that that clock was working. At this point in time, Jack could readliy admit to having once believed that that particular clock was working, and that that particular clock was broken at that time, so he had once believed that that particular broken clock was working.

So, no, it is not always impossible to make such a statement based upon his belief.

Here's the interesting part...

Never did he have an attitude towards that particular proposition(that broken clock is working) such that he believed it to be the case, or true. Thus, he cannot be sensibly said to have an attitude towards that proposition such that he takes it to be the case, or takes it to be true. If an accurate rendering of Jack's belief were put into belief statement form, he would not assent. That is not a problem at all for what I'm saying here. He did not know he was wrong. He believed that that broken clock was working nonetheless.

That example stands in direct opposition to underlying false presuppositions pervading some of the objections to the simple account I'm offering here. Namely, 1.that we must be aware of everything we believe, and 2.all belief can be rendered into propositional form such that the individual to whom the belief belongs would assent.

Neither of those are true. I'm offering an everyday example that warrants our tempering our confidence in those two notions. A bit more carefully well-placed skepticism is appropriate.

There are some interesting aspects to some of your objections. However, we seem to be having difficulty focusing upon what I think is of importance. That's on me.

The example is akin to believing that a facade is a barn, or a sheet is a sheep. These could all be broken down into two propositions as Moore did with (it is raining and I do not believe it).

I'm going to postpone any further replies to you for now. You seem to be taking things personally. Mea culpa on a few of those things you said in the last long reply...

We're all stubborn around here. :smile:

I understand that and most of what others are objecting to. The rendering of the belief as (a broken clock is working) is said to be problematic. On my end, it would be better put as (that broken clock is working), but the objections would remain. What I do not understand is the move to set (that broken clock) outside of the scope of Jack's belief and replace it with (that clock) when the example hinges upon the fact that the clock is broken but Jack believes what it says. Jack does not know it is broken, so he cannot believe that it is broken. I grant that much entirely, but there's no reason to say that he cannot believe that that broken clock is working.

We're in agreement there. I've never argued otherwise.

The content of belief is what the debate is about.

Jack believes(or believed) that a broken clock is(was) working. So, what is that belief about, and what is the content of that belief?

The belief under our consideration is problematic for the conventional rendering of belief as a propositional attitude. It is not problematic for rendering it in propositional form — creativesoul

Jack believed that a broken clock was working.

So, Banno, I'm wondering what you think of this? It seems to be not at all problematic for being rendered in propositional form, but Jack never believes the statement is true. Do you not find that both odd and interesting?

Jack believes that a broken clock is working.

You're either forgetful or dishonest. You have been levying charges against the claim. That's not something one does unless the claim is problematic, or they are not arguing in good faith.

As far as the charges I'm levying against convention...

The belief under our consideration is problematic for the conventional rendering of belief as a propositional attitude. It is not problematic for rendering it in propositional form.

As I said, this is the kind of de re belief ascription that we can use when we are not sure about a de dicto belief ascription (i.e. we don’t know what someone else’s beliefs are really about, see the case of the kid in the park). In the case of Jack, I would prefer that form of rendering, if e.g. I’m not sure whether Jack is holding contradictory beliefs or he simply ignores that that clock is not working. Certainly, if I knew that Jack ignores that clock is not working, I would prefer to say “Jack believes that clock is working” or “Jack mistakenly believes that clock is working” instead of “Jack believes of that broken clock that is working”, or worse, “Jack believes that broken clock is working”. — neomac

Jack cannot believe both simultaneously, that the clock is broken, and that a broken clock is working. There is no possibility of misunderstanding what is meant by "Jack believes a broken clock is working" unless one has already bewitched their own thinking skills by virtue of arriving at a gross misunderstanding of what belief is as a result of working from a misconception thereof.

All belief as propositional attitude is one such misconception.

Interesting thing here to me is that on the one hand you're railing against propositional calculus(as you call it), and yet again on the other your unknowingly objecting based upon the fact that Jack would not assent to his own belief if it were put into propositional form and he was asked if he believed the statement. At least, not while he still believed it.

Mary's room is based upon the dubious presupposition that we can learn anything about seeing red without seeing red.
— creativesoul

In other words, qualia is ineffable. Why else can't Mary learn everything about red without seeing red? — Agent Smith

No. Not in other words 'qualia is ineffable'.

What qualia?

:worry:

...the problem I have is with "Jack believed that a broken clock was working" since your are insisting on it. — neomac

Indeed. That is at issue. I'm waiting for a valid objection.

You came up with this rendering based on the propositional calculus suggested here: “Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working?”.
So I proposed you the following propositional calculus: if one can render “I did/did not believed that p” as “p and I did/did not believe it” and vice versa. And asked you: why can’t we do the same with p="Jack believed that a broken clock was working"?
So I'm challenging you to explain why your propositional calculus is correct, and mine is wrong based on your own assumptions. This is the problem you should address, hopefully in a non ad-hoc way.

Rather than propose something I've not, would it not just be easier to answer the question following from the simple understanding set out with common language use? I've no issue at all accounting for Jack's belief.

Do you not find it odd that Jack would agree, if and when he figured out that the clock was broken? He would have no issue saying that he had believed that a broken clock was working. So, what's your problem with it?

From Jack's point of view he doesn't believe anything about a broken clock, obviously, since he thinks the clock is not broken. Of course we can say that he believes of a broken clock that it is working. But so what; people entertain mistaken beliefs all the time? — Janus

Which clock does he think is not broken?

The broken one. Clearly, he does believe something about a broken clock. He believes that the broken clock is working.

I'm not sure what possesses you to see this as problematic.

Anyway, how's this thread going? — Banno

:smile:

What's your view regarding Russell's clock, Gettier's cases, and Moore's paradox?
— creativesoul

Not sure about it, also because knowledge is a wider issue. — neomac

We're not discussing knowledge. What's your view wrt belief? Do you agree that in the Russell and Gettier cases that the belief was properly accounted for?