...

The following vein of thought is promising...

It seems to me that we start off, as children learning a language, taking others at their word
— Harry Hindu

I think rather that how a language is learned, and that it may be learned, is the source of the habit of taking people at their word, but itself is not an example of taking people at their word. — Srap Tasmaner

I would readily agree with this, and would add the following...

Promises aside, when an audience takes a speaker at their word, the audience is granting the sincerity/reliability of the speaker. They trust and/or believe the speaker. When the audience does not take the speaker at their word, the audience is doubting the sincerity/reliability of the speaker. They do not trust and/or believe the speaker. The ability to place/bestow trust upon and/or doubt another is key here.

Taking a speaker at their word is to trust that they are being honest, sincere, and/or truthful. One cannot trust that a speaker is being honest, sincere, and/or truthful unless one knows the difference between that and being dishonest, insincere, and/or untruthful. Doubting that a speaker is being sincere or honest requires first knowing, believing, and/or otherwise realizing that some are not.

When an audience is doubting whether to take a speaker at their word, the audience is believing that either a.)the speaker doesn't know what they are talking about(doesn't have and/or hold true belief about the matter at hand) or b.)the speaker is deliberately misrepresenting their own thought and belief(does not believe what they say).

Typically when we're talking about not taking a speaker at their word, the audience believes that the speaker does not believe their own words. That is, when an audience cannot take a speaker at their word, it's because they doubt the speaker's honesty and/or sincerity. The audience does not trust that the speaker believes what they say.

One who is first learning how to use common language has no ability to doubt such things about any speaker... teachers notwithstanding. They quite simply do not have what it takes to do so. All doubt is belief based. Language acquisition results in one's initial worldview(belief system), and it is precisely that belief system that grounds all doubt... doubting another's reliability, sincerity, and/or trustworthiness notwithstanding.

I don't think a child learning the names of the colors is called on to believe that we are telling them the truth, neither in the sense that we are not lying about what we believe the names to be, nor in the sense that these are indeed the real names of the colors. I want to say that the question of truth just does not arise here at all.

I agree as above. Certainly, the question of truth does not arise in the mind(thought and belief) of the student so early on, but nor does the question of meaning. However, meaning and truth are both inherent to thought and belief formation, long before we are capable of taking that into account, which requires thinking about thought and belief.

In daily life people make mistakes and use words in novel ways and we seem to manage. Do we need a special explanation for that? — Srap Tasmaner

We do so long as we are setting out a criterion for what all successful communication with speech requires and/or consists of. Not 'special' though, just adequate.

...

The connection between storm clouds and rain is not mental. — Srap Tasmaner

Who said that it was?

I would no longer even be willing to say that the meaningful connection drawn between them is mental. There are no clouds or rain inside one's head. The meaningful correlation consists of the clouds, the rain, and the capable creature. Remove any one, and what's left is not enough.

Something in this neighborhood happens, however we characterize it. — Srap Tasmaner

How we characterize it matters most here. Mutual understanding, successful communication with speech, arriving at shared meaning, etc. is something that happens long before we take it into account. The ability to do so has yet to have been described in an acceptable fashion. I don't think Davidson has succeeded there either.

There's quite a bit missing. A gulf between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. All of them are meaningful. Not all of them are existentially dependent upon language use. Not all of them are drawing correlations between language use and other things. Meaning is prior to language creation, acquisition, and/or subsequent use.

Grice's claim that clouds mean rain is fine by me as long as we're talking about a creature capable of drawing correlations between the clouds and rain, because that's when clouds mean rain. Clouds do not mean anything unless or until they become one part of a correlation being drawn by a capable creature. Such a creature draws correlations between clouds and something else(rain, in this case) both become meaningful to the creature as a result. Prior to becoming a part of that meaningful correlation, clouds are just clouds, and rain is just rain. Neither is meaningful.

Drawing such a correlation does not require language creation, acquisition, or use in any way shape or form. It's the mysterious 'ability' pervading Davidson's paper. A sufficiently framed discussion demystifies it.

Looking for a method to ensure that we agree on the meaning of a sentence or statement is a metacognitive endeavor that is fraught, and puts the cart well ahead of the horse. We 'agree'(scare-quotes intentional) on what 'X' means long prior to taking account of that. I'm inclined to agree with Srap that our doing that is not - at first anyway - a choice that we make. It's the ability that Davidson spoke of throughout this paper. That ability is autonomous and consists of a plurality of capable creatures drawing correlations between language use and other things.

Shared meaning(landing on the same language, etc.) between speaker and audience does not require being taken into account. It is necessary and more than adequate for understanding. It consists of a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things. We agreed to use the term "trees" to talk about trees long before we began talking about the fact that we had. Our 'agreement' prior to talking about our own language use amounted to the fact that a plurality of speakers found themselves using the word "tree" to pick out trees.

With regard to avoiding and/or skirting around the psychology, which Davidson seems to want to do...

Davidson deliberately states it does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the passing theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory, but also says that what must be shared is the interpreter’s and the speaker’s understanding of the speaker’s words. What is understanding if not thought and belief about speech? Nevermind all of the context aside from just the words being used that determines the meaning of the words.

He also attempts to justify calling that understanding "a theory" because a description of the interpreter’s competence requires a recursive account. That conflates his own account(the description) with what's being taken into account(the shared understanding between speaker and audience).

This segues into the much broader problems of convention writ large. The failure to draw and maintain the actual distinction between what thought and belief consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon, and what thinking about thought and belief consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon. I see no reason to say that we cannot acquire knowledge of the basic elemental constituent core of both by virtue of using language, and do not think that our doing so forces us to invent our own psychology. In doing so, it becomes rather apparent that meaning is not existentially dependent upon language, for rudimentary thought and belief are not.

The core is what is common to all of these things. That core is what allows psychology to emerge and grow in it's complexity according to the correlations drawn by the thinking creature. Language creation, acquisition, regular use, and talking about language use(meta stuff and logical notation) are just different 'points' along the timeline of evolutionary progression. All of which emerge from that common core. That is to say that they are all existentially dependent upon the same basic elemental constituents.

I find that the POE has already been made, just like Roe v Wade. No need for another.

...it might be what Davidson thinks. — Srap Tasmaner

Seems to be a goal he strives for. As far as truth conditional semantics goes, truth conditions play a major role in one's belief statements. Belief statements are meaningful to the speaker. We need only look to Gettier's first case to see that "the man..." in Smith's own belief(which is what is being taken account of) can only be Smith himself, and thus Smith's belief is not true.

Gettier uses entailment and in doing so changes the truth conditions of Smith's belief, which completely changes the meaning, and is thus no longer Smith's belief. Salva Veritate. So, I do think that there's something to it.

"The elites" is too ambiguous.

Davidson's approach?
— creativesoul

And related. Basically all the approaches inspired by Carnap and Tarski.

I don't know if there is any experimental evidence at all for the whole model theoretic approach to the semantics of natural languages. There is considerable experimental evidence for lots of stuff in linguistics, but not so much this, so far as I can tell.

For an example of something right next door with experimental support, there's Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory. That's not the same kind of semantics, but does actually tell you something about the semantic connections between words as people actually use them, or at least tries to. — Srap Tasmaner

Unfortunately I cannot open that link. Incompatible user platform, I suspect.

I'm still sniffing around the landscape of semantics a little to see who's actually doing research.

I would personally place more importance upon a theory/explanation of meaning that successfully bridges the gulf between linguistic and non linguistic thought and belief.

There is no syntax in language less thought and belief. I find that cleaving meaning into syntax and semantics results in an inherent inability to take account of that which does not consist of syntax. Meaning exists in it's entirety prior to common language use. Syntax is existentially dependent upon common language use.

Black Lives Matter is a movement that champions fairness and justice; equal treatment under the law. Equal treatment under the law is the standard lying between law and order and an abuse of power.

Trump has used the powers of the presidency to influence matters that are beyond the carefully designed parameters bestowed upon that office in the Constitution. Trump uses the powers of the office of the presidency to discredit any and all people who disagree with him in a manner that can only be categorized as silencing one's own critics prior to presenting them in the worst possible light, simply because they disagree. That is to devalue, deny, and deride the free speech of American citizens, at the very least.

The rights of the accused are shared, especially when the accusations are coming from the president of the United States of America.

A distinction, you say?

I'm uncomfortable with this whole approach to semantics... — Srap Tasmaner

Davidson's approach?

It is a populism based upon fairness and justice that is able to distinguish between law and order and an abuse of power.

Do you not see the connection?

:lol:

But a populism based on fairness and justice is able to distinguish between law-enforcement proper and abuse of power. One is worthy of admiration while the other of scorn. Consequently, one can be for law and order while being against the abuse of power. — NOS4A2

Black Lives Matter

Yeah, Trump's all for law and order unless he's the one it's being enforced against.

...

I think we're both saying that Davidson is unjustified in his move to attribute his theory to another. On my view it's a clear conflation between his accounting practice and what's being taken into account. However, earlier you expressed a resistance to such a framework.

There's talk of 'covid fatigue' being a cause of increasing case and death numbers. I think that there can and ought be a very strong case made regarding how Trump's approach, as well as others', is the root cause of the fatigue.

People are tired of this new normal. We are not creatures who thrive in isolation. Rather, we are interdependent social creatures and necessarily so. We need intimate connections with other people.

Trump's approach to addressing covid has caused covid fatigue. We must get past covid. The only way to do that is to contain it. The only way to contain it is to stop the spread. The only way to stop the spread is to reduce close interpersonal contact.

Had we pressed pause on all financial transactions, on all debt repayment, mandated isolation and self quarantine, while guaranteeing the necessary resources for each and every individual American to live in relative comfort during the meantime, all the while putting every bit of the resources needed into ramping up testing, ppe, and contact tracing efforts, we would have long since already been in a place to be able to effectively begin safe efforts to re-open the economy and/or go back to life 'as normal'.

That remains the best path forward.

Something that struck me as rather self-defeating nonsense...

Trump is supposed to be running on a law and order type of platform. At least, he loves to say the words. Here's the problem...

The FBI are law enforcement officers.

The interpretation is the result of someone or something solving the problem presented by the defective utterance, but it will be captured by Davidson simply as an interpretation, slotted into a bit of model theory in the usual way with no trace of its historical psychological origins. That procedure might be fine for aggregating language use within a population, but then attributing this "passing theory" to a member of that population isn't self-justifying. — Srap Tasmaner

The interesting thing to me, is that by virtue of creating his solution(prior and passing theories) he's actually doing what's necessary for successfully interpreting malapropisms but his accounting practice cannot take account of what he, himself has just done. — creativesoul

Aren't we saying much the same thing?

:smirk:

The system is beginning to drive a wedge between itself and Trump. Cleave Trump off, and the pre-existing issues that gave rise to Trump remain, but all those who mistakenly think that Trump is the problem will celebrate that Trump is gone.

I sense Heraclitus' river coming around the bend...

Davidson's notions of prior and passing theories 'overlap' in odd ways that allow for their evolution one into the other and must, I suspect, in order to perform the task he's placed upon them. A sort of "well, something is missing here", but what is it that is clearly needed but lacking from the current description? Something beyond the scope of what counts as acting in accordance with convention. He notes this more than once.

But if you don't notice and still land on the intended interpretation? Then the utterance has just been handled by System 1 for you and doesn't bother to tell you it corrected an error in the utterance. Who solved the problem then — Srap Tasmaner

There is no problem in such situations. The prior theories are equivalent to the passing theories. Passing theories are the 'dark matter/energy' of Davidson's position, whereas the prior theories are equivalent to current convention. Nothing is missing if successful communication happens.

The interesting thing to me, is that by virtue of creating his solution(prior and passing theories) he's actually doing what's necessary for successfully interpreting malapropisms but his accounting practice cannot take account of what he, himself has just done.

I think a discussion of conscious vs sub-conscious processing would be too far from the topic of this thread. — Isaac

Probably so, but they could be characterized in a manner that relates. A problem I see is the often implicit presupposition that consciousness is clearly delineated from unconsciousness in a way similar to a light switch; on and off; present or not; or some such accounting practice. I suspect it's much more a matter of naturally occurring 'degrees' of complexity, whereas the simplest evolve into the more complex given the necessary preconditions for doing so.

I appreciate the evolutionary bent.

That's a bridge between two things that I've yet to have connected. Intriguing. I suspect that I will not grant meaning or truth to such simple biological mutations(replication 'errors'). Seems that causality does the trick.

There are specific circumstances in which we must say that appealing to convention is an unjustified, unjustifiable, wrong, and/or otherwise mistaken move. Some of these specific circumstances are certain kinds of discussions, particularly those involving our talking about that which existed in it's entirety prior to our taking it into account.

Successful communication via language use is one such thing.

How are appeals to convention wrong in those types of situations? In the only way they can be; the characterization, definition, and/or description of such things. We can be wrong about what such things consist of as well as what they are existentially dependent upon. The same is true regarding everything that exists in it's entirety prior to our account. It's what we say about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our discussing it that matters most here. Perhaps this be best put another way.

It is the methodological approach that matters most here. That approach involves setting some common sense standards. Any and all reports/accounts require something to be reported upon and a means for reporting. X exists in it's entirety prior to our report. That which exists in it's entirety prior to our report cannot consist of our report. That which exists in it's entirety prior to our report cannot be existentially dependent upon our report.

Successful communication with speech cannot be existentially dependent upon our account of it. Successfully communicating with speech is an event that happens before taking such events into account. We all agree that that event involves language use. We miscommunicate prior to taking such situations into account as well. We do both long before ever talking about the fact that we do. It only follows that neither are existentially dependent upon our taking them into account, even given the fact that they are both existentially dependent upon language use.

What do all successful attempts at communicating with speech require; what is the bare minimum needed in order for that to actually happen; what do such attempts consist of; what are they existentially dependent upon?

This line of reasoning/questioning has been left sorely unanswered.

Many philosophers and linguists alike hold that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned and/or have somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation - as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. Linguistic competence, I presume is aptly described here. I've seen no adequate objection to the contrary. The odd success of malapropisms are prima facie evidence that that is just not the case; that is not enough;that no such method fills the bill. The only conclusion is that successful communication/interpretation with speech does not operate solely on such a basis.

To quite the contrary, paraphrasing Davidson...

Some successful interpretation happens in a way that is not in accordance to convention; that does not operate solely on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities, but are rather also derived by wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely, etc. There is no more chance of regularizing, or teaching, this process than there is of regularizing or teaching the process of creating new theories to cope with new data in any field—for that is what this process involves.

Creating new theories...

Novelty.

That's what's left sorely unaccounted for. The attribution of meaning to that which is not already meaningful(to the capable creature under consideration). If an appeal to conventional standards were unassailable then paradigm shift would not happen. The conventional accounting practices involved in setting out what's necessary for successful communication via language use are found wanting. The approach is the problem. The presuppositions that truth and meaning are existentially dependent upon language are the fatal flaws underwriting every bit of this discussion(at least on the academic side of it). That is not to say that linguistics and/or philosophy ought be cast aside and/or flippantly dismissed. Rather, it is only to say that it's come time to revise and sharpen some of the core tenets.

Davison made a valiant attempt. His conceptual framework was inadequate to begin with, unfortunately. To his everlasting credit, he began to shed some much needed light upon the deep seated connection between truth and meaning, especially in his other works prior to this paper. The two are existentially codependent upon one another, to put it mildly.

On a more personal level, I like Davidson, or at least what I've seen of him. His temperament was kind curiosity, worthy of emulation. Admirable. I hold him in much higher regard than many of his contemporaries as a result.

If you want to better understand what Davidson is getting at, like I do, then perhaps we could use our discussion to our mutual benefit. Rather than reading him through a highly suspicious and critical lens, like we're both prone to doing, perhaps we could bounce his words - and the discourse in this thread - off of one another as a means for doing so?

:smile:

I'm down.

...it points to the fact that word selection and grammar are secondary to general communication... — Isaac

:up:

I suggest that you carefully read the aforementioned pages to better understand what Davidson is doing with "theory". — creativesoul

I've already read the paper. What do YOU think he's doing with it? — Janus

Since you've claimed Davidson is using the term "theory" in an 'inapt' manner, I've thought about it and decided that you could not be more wrong, my friend. Whether or not Davidson uses a term in an inapt manner is determined by whether or not his use of that particular term is suitable and/or appropriate for the circumstances. Given that he's painstakingly setting out how a standard description of linguistic competence is inadequate, and he's proposing his own solution to that problem, then his use of "theory" is perfectly appropriate and/or suitable to the situation at hand.

One may say that he's using the term 'loosely', because the strict scientific sense of "theory" differs greatly from his use in the paper. That would be a mischaracterization, to say the least. He's using it to describe how successful communication with speech happens, and he's doing so in a rather exquisitely explicit fashion. He's setting out a rather nuanced, but perfectly understandable notion/sense of "theory". To understand what Davidson is claiming, one must - at the very least - grant his use/definition of the term.

Any failure to do that will most assuredly result in misunderstanding. A reader who sincerely desires to understand another, particularly when there are novel language uses at hand, must be ready to think anew. Below are just a couple of relevant excerpts from the paper which provide more than enough information for the astute reader to readily understand what Davidson means when he uses the term "theory".

From the pages suggested earlier...

To say that an explicit theory for interpreting a speaker is a model of the interpreter’s linguistic competence is not to suggest that the interpreter knows any such theory...

In any case, claims about what would constitute a satisfactory theory are not, as I said, claims about the propositional knowledge of an interpreter, nor are they claims about the details of the inner workings of some part of the brain. They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the interpreter. We cannot describe what an interpreter can do except by appeal to a recursive theory of a certain sort. It does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory.

Principle (2) says that for communication to succeed, a systematic method of interpretation must be shared. (I shall henceforth assume there is no harm in calling such a method a theory, as if the interpreter were using the theory we use to describe his competence...

According to Davidson, the problem is this: what interpreter and speaker share(the understanding of the speaker's words), to the extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to speaker and interpreter in advance; but what the speaker and interpreter know in advance is not (necessarily) shared, and so is not a language governed by shared rules or conventions. What is shared is, as before, the passing theory(the understanding of the speaker's words); what is given in advance is the prior theory, or anything on which it may in turn be based.

All the things Davidson assumes an interpreter knows or can do depend on his having a mature set of concepts, and being at home with the business of linguistic communication. His problem is to describe what is involved in the idea of ‘having a language’. He finds that none of the proposals satisfy the demand for a description of an ability that speaker and interpreter share and that is adequate to interpretation.

My take is that Davidson posits "prior" and "passing" theories as a means of satisfying that demand.

If Davidson is claiming that people generally have "complex theories" about the rules of language use, which he says in the passage you quoted that I responded to he assumes "must be about right" then I would say that is an inapt use of 'theory'. for the reasons I already gave. — Janus

There's a bit of a misunderstanding between us, and it seems to be growing. Let's see if we can resolve that prior to continuing, for if we cannot, further discussion will result in futility. The passage you mention(copied below) was Davidson's report of the standard description of linguistic competence at the time. That standard is not Davidson's, although he does overtly accept some responsibility for it.

If his report is accurate, then the standard description of linguistic competence at that time was...

...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way. This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right. The difficulty lies in getting clear about what this sense is...

To that you replied...

Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. A complex theory may be able to be formulated after the fact based on analysis of practice... — Janus

If Davidson's report is accurate, then you're objecting to the standard description of linguistic competence.

Are you denying the accuracy of the report, or are you questioning the standard description itself?

It does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory

This part is curious.

I suggest that you carefully read the aforementioned pages to better understand what Davidson is doing with "theory".

Yes, and I think his use of "theory" in that context is therefore inapt — Janus

You'll have to spell this out for me, by quoting him in the relevant context. He's covering a lot of ground in that paper... or trying to anyway. I suggest a very careful read of pages 256 and 257.

Sorry not sure what you mean; lacking in what capacity? — Janus

Do you find that the three principles are lacking in the capacity to take proper enough account of the approaches you mentioned? He also talks at length about the inherent limitations of general accounts.

Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. — Janus

Davidson agrees, and actually talks about that in a little bit of detail. It's not that the speaker and/or audience is aware of how they successfully communicate, it's rather that they can and do. He speaks at length about his use of "theory".

I'm not sure. Do you find the three principles somehow lacking in that capacity?

...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right.

The above is Davidson's report of the conventional understanding regarding what successful communication with speech requires. The three principles set that out in a bit more detail.