↪creativesoul
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity? — Patterner

I cannot, however, I'm not sure that being able to differentiate between accurate information and inaccurate information is the measure for rationality. Isn't that much the same as being able to tell the difference between what's true and what's not?

I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. — Patterner

What if you don't know about gravity and have no idea of the life threatening situation?

I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational. — Patterner

I'm not sure that I disagree.

What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things? — Athena

Our experience is the same on a basic level. All experience consists of correlations drawn between different things. All thought follows that same process/system. The exact things matter, as does the ability/inability to perceive them prior to/while drawing correlations.

Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition. Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things. We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use. There would be no sense of importance. There would be no schemes.

One must be able to differentiate between inaccurate and accurate information then? Basically, rationality boils down to that capability?

A creature that can't test things might still be able to notice things. Like a dog can notice X happens every single day at a certain time, and base its actions on that fact. But if it doesn't notice that X no longer happens every day at thatvcertain time, and has not happened once in several times as long as it originally happened, then I don't see evidence of rational thinking. — Patterner

At that time then, right?

I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Rather, I'm just trying to understand the sense of "rational" you're practicing.

Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard. — creativesoul

If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important. — Ludwig V

:yikes:

A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature. I do not see the relevance/benefit of invoking first, second, and third-person accounting practices

I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information. But, depending on the situation, you might run into problems. If you do, then rational thinking will force you to reevaluate. People were told heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies. Someone could rationally come up with a plan to do something or other, maybe make some invention, based on that "fact." But then they try to test the invention, and it fails. Rational thinking would lead them to examine the whole thing, and the actual fact about falling bodies would be discovered. Rational thinking would see them embracing the newly discovered fact. — Patterner

Hmmm. That's a fairly tall order to fill. It seems to require a creature capable of testing/comparing the world to it's own beliefs about the world, and excludes all creatures incapable of metacognition.

Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?
— creativesoul
Of course not. — Ludwig V

That's not making sense. You charged me with reifying belief.

Another difference is that reasons play a part in teleological explanations, while causes do not. — Ludwig V

Which would explain why I don't employ "reason" voluntarily.

:wink:

Yes. If it was originally showing up for a rational reason, and it was showing up for the same reason years later, the reason was no longer rational. The dog's thinking was not rational. If that's the case, then I would suggest it wasn't thinking rationally in the first place. There was a different reason it was showing up.

If the reasons changed, and the dog was showing up years later for different reasons, then it may have been thinking rationally at all points. — Patterner

Can I take this as evidence that your criterion for what counts as "rational" includes something like based upon fact/events/what's happened and/or is happening?

Well-grounded? Warranted?

The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.
— creativesoul
That's just dogmatic. — Ludwig V

No... it's not.

I've painstakingly explained, on more than one occasion throughout this thread, how thinking about belief is a metacognitive endeavor which requires language/proxy use; naming and descriptive practices. The dog has none. Since metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices, and the dog has none, then the dog is incapable of metacognition. Hence, not dogmatic.

it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior).
— creativesoul
But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense? — Ludwig V

It is.

The dog's behavior all those years after Ueno died is obviously not the result of rational thinking. Why not? If it has the ability to think rationally, why isn't it doing so for a stretch of many years? — Patterner

Well.

The dog's behavior could be the result of rational thinking that belongs to a creature incapable of adjusting its belief based upon facts, or the motivations are no longer include the human's arrival... as you've been saying. Started going for all sorts of 'reasons', including the human's arrival, and continued going for all sorts of the same reasons aside from the human's arrival, in addition to new ones, also not the arrival of the human.

Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down. — Ludwig V

Oh no. I'm not heated. Thank you for the considerate apology. No need though. I just don't enjoy personal slights, and you've begun them. I'm just warning you that I'm quite capable of cutting deeply with words. I avoid doing as much as possible nowadays. However, I will not take too many jabs before parrying and countering with an overhand left.

:wink:

I'm good. Just trying to end any possible increase in personal rhetorical slights.

This is about the words/positions/linguistic frameworks... not the authors.

Words don't play games.

I'll do better to depersonalize my replies.

Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? — Ludwig V

Because the dog is not expecting Ueno to arrive while knowing he may not. Expectation is shown. Hope is articulated in the face of knowing that what one expects to happen may very well in fact... not.

The child named the balloon.
— creativesoul
Exactly. It was the balloon that he named - our description, our concept, not his. — Ludwig V

He did not name your description. He named the balloon. The balloon consists of rubber. It was flying away. Your descriptions... your concepts... they do not fly away, nor do they consist of rubber.

Sigh.

Draughts indeed. Ludwig...

...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew.

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
— creativesoul
Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?

"5 o'clock" is an abstract entity. Abstract things are not directly perceptible. All things meaningful to the dog are directly perceptible. Abstract things are utterly meaningless to dogs. 5 o'clock is utterly meaningless to the dog.

That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect.
— creativesoul
Now you are reifying beliefs and conflating explanations by reasons and explanations by causes. You are trying to play chess with draughts (checkers). — Ludwig V

There's a whole lot of presupposition packed up in very few words.

Evidently, I've misunderstood your position.

You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action.



Regarding my own, and the reification charge...

Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?

(There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)
— Ludwig V

That's not true.

All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate. — creativesoul

I didn't say anything about what belief consists of. I only said something about how we describe belief. — Ludwig V

Yes, and what you said has just been falsified.

...what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich. — Ludwig V

Guilt is what one experiences when they know they have done something that they believe they should not have done. The dog does not believe that he ate the tuna out of the sandwich. He knows he did not.

So, attributing guilt to the dog is a mistake. The dog doesn't feel guilty even though it may be perfectly capable of it.

Feeling guilty requires belief about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior(moral belief). The dog, if it has lived long enough to attribute causality to its own behavior and what happens afterwards(praise/condemnation/punishment/etc.) then it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior). We could call this rule following. It acquires this groundwork for rule following by drawing correlations between its own actions and the praise/condemnation that follows.

The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship.

The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.

Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.
— creativesoul
One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours. — Ludwig V

A child learns to utter "Bye, Bye" in certain situations. The balloon was leaving, and I say that for your benefit, not mine. The child knew it was time to utter "Bye, Bye." in situations where things were leaving. The "one" qualification is interesting. The child named the balloon. That is... he picked that balloon out of the world to the exclusion of all else. He isolated the balloon.

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?

My guess is it was conditioned — Patterner

Succinct.

Yup.

Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.
— creativesoul
Yes, you do need to look more widely... — Ludwig V

Indeed. It's the approach that matters.

The correlations drawn by the dog between all the different sights, sounds, smells, etc., exhaust the dog's experience.

Let's say that there is a cat and that the cat has chased a mouse into hiding. The cat will wait and watch the entry point. Say it's a small opening under a cabinet. We could talk about the cat's thought and/or belief by saying the cat believes that the mouse is under the cabinet. I would have no issue with that. The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. However, the cabinet, the mouse, the smell, the taste, and the spatiotemporal relations are not meaningless at all in such circumstances. These elemental constituents of the cat's belief are the content. The content of a language less animal's belief are directly perceptible to them. The cat is biologically capable of perceiving and drawing correlations between those things. Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result.

Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations.
— creativesoul
That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat. — Ludwig V

That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog.

But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.

Yeah. I see no reason to deny that a dog can expect to eat in many situations. Hope, on the other hand... not so much.

When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.

If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images — Ludwig V

This troubles me. Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard.

However, I suspect there's little disagreement between us when it comes to what counts as an accurate report of another's belief if and when the other speaks our language. The question here is how to go about accurately reporting the belief of a language less creature.

That clauses are problematic here. The propositional attitude approach misses the mark altogether. Propositions are not meaningful to language less creatures. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating it.

Someone who thinks in images draws correlations between those images and other things.

My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog.
— creativesoul
Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below. — Ludwig V

I don't see the relevance. I don't think I've made my point clear enough. I'll try a question...

Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.

(There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.) — Ludwig V

That's not true.

All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate.

but my best answer is that they consist in what we say and do. — Ludwig V

That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect.

how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, — Ludwig V

The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes.

What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.
— creativesoul
I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other. — Ludwig V

They belong to the dog. They are meaningful to the dog. If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them.

What do those beliefs consist of?

Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.
— creativesoul
I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book. — Ludwig V

Well, in all fairness, I cringed far too much. Literally, viscerally. To use an intentional stance in a way that attributes agency where none is justifiable, was simply too much for me to accept. The book is chock full of anthropomorphism. Dennett just accepted that criticism and continued. He knew. What other method do we have??? That seems to have been his thoughts on the matter. Of course, he also regularly used a notion of "design" that most naturalists eschew.

I still, to this day, have a very hard time accepting much of what he argued for as a result. To be clear, Dennett was and remains an admirable public figure in American history.

Quining Qualia was brilliant!

The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day.
— Ludwig V
I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all. — Patterner

Nice input. I'm oblivious to the details of the actual events. My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog. By my lights, it was the connection to the human that was meaningful to the dog. Thus, the significance that the train has to the dog had nothing to do with the time of arrival. Additionally, it was claimed that the dog hoped for the human to arrive. The question was asked, "Why else?" would the dog continue going.

That drew my attention to the differences between simple expectation and hope. Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations. I've no issue with dogs having simple basic expectations regarding what's about to happen. I do not think that dogs are capable of having expectations that extend/exceed past the immediately perceptible. How far into the future one can consider is a measure/increment determined by its means of accounting for time/change. The details of the story are now better known by myself, and as a result, it seems that there could have been any number of reasons the dog continued going to the train station around the same time daily. I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train.
 

It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.

The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachikō would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachikō died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)

That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands. — Ludwig V

Being a part of routine is itself positive reinforcement, especially if that routine resulted in dopamine dumps and/or other sorts of good feelings within the dog. Those things happen autonomously and happen throughout the experience. So, when the human was alive, the good feelings began prior to the arrival. Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.

What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?
— creativesoul
There's no easy way to answer that - especially if you are trying to find commonalities between thoughts that are articulated in language and thoughts that are not. The only place that they overlap is in their role as reasons in rational actions. — Ludwig V

That's not true. If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap. That's not the only sense of the key terms.

They(all thought and belief) are all meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating them. They all consist of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Some creatures' correlations include language use. Others do not. Some creatures' include the rules of correct inference. Others do not. Some creatures' correlations include trains and humans. Others include community standards such as the time schedule...

↪wonderer1
That's really awesome! Thanks! — Patterner

Ditto.

Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.

RIP Professor Dennett.

In fact I thought it was hilarious.
— NOS4A2

You thought Trump "grabbing women by the pussy" was hilarious or that he said that or what? And what's hilarious about it? — Baden

Some find the glorification of being able to use one's status as a means or excuse for committing sexual assault hilarious... evidently.

The problem with mental health care is a part of the deconstruction of the hospitals and other state institutions that has been done under the idea that such work could be redirected to community level support. This process has been under way for decades. The fallout is perhaps now forcing itself into a wider public awareness. To be clear, this does not resolve into any particular political agenda. It is an intellectual failure of our society as a whole. — Paine

Yup. A concerted effort began in the early seventies to manufacture consent to eliminate social programs meant to help the less fortunate people in society, and lower taxes on the wealthiest.

It was tremendously successful and is still in effect. Hence, loads of Americans are still convinced to vote for people who vilify social welfare programs, public schools, publicly owned entities, organized labor, American manufacturing, self-sufficient practices, and the like. A commonly occurring theme is to treat the US government as though it is a privately own business. You hear people talk all the time about it. Hence, it was part of the groundwork laid for Trump. People believed a good businessman would be a good president by virtue of having the skills necessary. Well... it's a completely different skillset, for starters, nevermind the serious questioning regarding whether or not Trump id s good businessman. Plenty believed he was/is. The US government is not in the business of being profitable. Etc. All this amounts to a vote against what's in their own best interest.

Welcome to an America that once had the funds and infrastructure to take care of those incapable of taking care of themselves, of those who were mentally ill in ways that they needed caregivers... but stopped doing so and gave the resources back to the richest of Americans who could not care less about less fortunate people and mentally ill folk having no safety net. Let em loose. I don't live around em.

The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day. But those are two separate beliefs... — Ludwig V

Okay, this is where things could get interesting very quickly.

The claim is that the dog has two separate beliefs. What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.

"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means
— creativesoul
Some animals eat what they can find.
Some animals can use a tool, if they find a good one, to help them get food.
Some animals can make a tool to help them get food.
Some animals can use tools and plan a couple steps ahead to get food.

Seems like increasing abilities to me. — Patterner

Oh yeah. I meant to comment on this method. Perfectly performed. Pick out simple true statements. Verifiable. Falsifiable. Build upon and with them.

Kudos.

Tool use, I think it's safe to say, facilitated greater abilities; new correlations; new coordination of preexisting biological machinery; increased the complexity of meaningful experience; etc. I would say that tool use also could have influenced/effected slowly occurring physical effects within the central nervous system of the users. Biological structural changes over time with enough mutation to result in newer more specialized structures, which in turn, facilitated more complex thinking processes and or the ability to vocalize wants and desires.

Rational thought and thought that is not.
— creativesoul
You are distinguishing between thought that the thinker is able to articulate in language and critically evaluate and thought that the thinker is not able to articulate in language or critically evaluate. — Ludwig V

Well, I may draw and maintain such distinctions. However, I was not doing that when using the terms "rational thought and thought that is not". Perhaps you missed my earlier clarification regarding the sense of those terms when I use them?

Rational thought/belief is consistent with and/or follows from past thought/belief. Non rational is not and does not. I'm not using them as a means of value assessment/judgment. What counts as being "rational" is secondary.

What counts as thought is primary.

This world is not simply composed of entities arranged before us, waiting to be picked out — Ludwig V

The irony. "Waiting to be picked out" is anthropomorphism. That's a very odd thing to say. I didn't, nor would I be willing to assent to that, as it's written.

I would say that the world was composed of all sorts of things that existed in their entirety prior to the emergence of humans. Meaningful experience of non human creatures was one such thing.

Do you disagree?



Those prehistorical things existed in their entirety prior to our ever having acquired knowledge of their existence, hence prior to our even being able to become aware of them. There are other things that existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices, but not prior to humans.

Meaningful experience of humans with limited language capacity was one such thing.

Do you disagree?



Earlier you mentioned the complexity involved in talking about thinking. I would concur, without hesitation. Methodological approach is pivotal. Crucial.

Criteria matter.

What counts as thought, on your view?

Are you denying that thought and belief is prior to thinking about thought and belief?
— creativesoul
If being awareness of my belief is thinking about belief, then surely the two are simultaneous, since the one follows logically from the other. But perhaps awareness of something is not thinking about it - even though awareness of something is being conscious of it. — Ludwig V

Thinking about X presupposes something to think about, and a creature capable of thinking about X. All creatures capable of thinking about X possess some means/process of doing so. All thinking creatures share the exact same basic process of thinking, regardless of X's value, and regardless of the specific biological machinery possessed by the candidate themselves.

Awareness of something is itself existentially dependent upon thought and belief, for it emerges as a direct result of thinking about whatever that something is(whatever grabs our attention). Exactly what sorts of things we can become aware of, and how completely we can become aware of them is determined strictly by our means/process of thinking as well as the ontological constituency(the basic make-up of exactly what is being thought about). The same is true of all thinking creatures capable of having meaningful experience. I cannot stress how important these considerations are.

All thought, belief, and meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience.

Steering clear of meaning is to steer clear of exactly what needs to be understood in order to acquire knowledge of meaningful true belief and meaningful false belief that creatures other than humans can have. It is also to steer clear of what needs to be understood in order to understand how humans think, and thus how they thought prior to gaining the ability to think about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right.

I've no issue with saying - roughly speaking - that awareness of X requires thinking about X, however, I do not depend upon any notion of awareness to set out the basic outline of all thought, belief, and meaningful experience(consciousness).

The notion of "awareness" adds unnecessary confusion often enough that I tend to avoid it. It has no explanatory power above and beyond thought, belief, and meaningful experience. Those notions exhaust "awareness" but not the other way around.

We could even say that being aware of something is being conscious of it. I do not depend upon a preconceived notion of what counts as consciousness either, except as a general guideline regarding the target of examination/consideration.

Thought, belief, meaning, coherence(consistency), correspondence(with/to fact), and falsity all emerged onto the world stage long before creatures ever became lucky enough to be able to become aware of them. We are such creatures. I would argue, and do, that we are the only such creatures.

...perhaps awareness of something is not thinking about it - even though awareness of something is being conscious of it. — Ludwig V

What counts as thinking about something?

That is precisely what has yet to have been determined here. It is only after that is established can we fill "something" in with "one's own belief" and make sense of metacognition.

In order to know what sorts of things some candidate or another is capable of thinking about(including ourselves), we must know how they think about the world, as well as how that process enables or excludes them from being able to think about the "it" under consideration.

All thinking creatures do so by the very same basic process. Regardless of the complexity of the biological machinery and/or abstraction level of the thinking, all thinking creatures do so solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. There are no examples to the contrary. I'll gladly reassess the certainty I maintain regarding the justificatory strength of my position should anyone, anywhere, anytime present a black swan.

All thinking about X requires isolating X by virtue of drawing distinctions between X and all else. It requires the creature directly perceive X 'as a thing', different from other things. If those distinctions require common language use(shared meaning), then only language users can think about such things. Truth and falsity exist prior to our awareness of them. Language less creatures can form, have, and/or hold true and false belief(expectations are based upon them). However, they cannot be aware that their own thought and belief are true or false, for they do not have what it takes. Our own awareness of that required metacognition. Metacognition requires language use replete with meaningful utterances to stand in proxy for our past beliefs, regardless of whether or not they are true/false.

Thanks for that clarity. Good. It seems we're in agreement. As close or closer than any other participant in this thread. Strong methodological naturalist bent with significant importance placed upon acceptable explanations/criteria being amenable to an evolutionary timeline.

We may be pursuing different projects. — Ludwig V

Indeed. The topic is clear. It presupposes the existence of at least two distinct kinds of thought. Rational thought and thought that is not.

What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?

However, on the other hand, I thought we were also pursuing the exact same project. Avoiding anthropomorphism. Succeeding in that endeavor requires knowing what sorts of thoughts and belief are of the kind that only humans are capable of forming, having, holding, and/or articulating. It's not using the terms "thought" and "belief" merely to explain the actions of a language less animal or ourselves. There are much better ways to do that.

Certain sorts of things captured our attention - as a species - long before documented histories began being recorded. Things become meaningful that way.
— creativesoul
The same is true of many animals. So what's the problem? — Ludwig V

Not a problem. A similarity to be properly accounted for.