Since it seems that you're advocating a physicalist account of belief.

What role does the tree play in an individual's belief about the tree? The tree is an irrevocable elemental constituent of all belief about trees according to the position I'm advocating for/from. It's one of the elements within the correlation itself. Trees are one part of the correlations drawn between them and other things. Without trees, there can be no belief about them.

For example, belief that a tree has green leaves requires nothing more, and nothing less, than learning how to pick out trees by name, and learning how to pick out the detectable light reflected into our eyes - from trees - also by learning conventional naming and descriptive practices. We pick trees out as well as their color by virtue of learning how to talk about trees and their color, and in doing so, we take it to be the case that trees are green.

That last bit's just for you

:rofl:

An individual can take it to be the case that the floor is solid without thinking about the floor.

That follows from your claims.

Are you ok with that?

I thought that could easily have counted as a reductio ad absurdum. I'm surprised. I will be even more so if you are still ok with those consequences tomorrow.

Hope you are well... beyond the procedure.

:smile:

Are you assuring me that you are ok with the consequences I've just set out?

What correlations do you mean here - are they important to your point? — Banno

I'm not so much as making a point at this time... I'm more involved with trying to understand what each participant here has been saying.

The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor. — Banno

Indeed. And such a person would be forced to admit that taking something to be the case does not always require thinking about what is being taken to be the case.

You are ok with that?

:brow:

So I understand what you mean when you say that a belief is the (imagined) state of affairs one takes to be the case. But to a physicalist, that definition falls short because we then want to know where such a thing is. Without positing a domain of thought (and I sincerely hope you're not suggesting we do that), we need to know where such a state of affairs is, what does and imagined state of affairs consist of, physically. It's not in the real world outside of our minds - it's not the actual arrangement of such, otherwise beliefs could not be wrong. So what are we physically talking about when we say "an imagined state of affairs"? My answer is a particular arrangement of neural connections, hence that's what a belief is, physically. A belief is 'the imagined state of affairs one acts as if were the case' and all 'imagined states of affairs' are particular neural arrangements in a capable brain. The alternative is dualism. — Isaac

That's not the only alternative.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

I would agree with saying your cat took that to be the case long ago, and am more than happy to expand upon that line of thought. The correlations were drawn at the time between it's own mental ongoings and the noticeable change in the surface; going from wobbly to solid.

Testing for a wobbly surface after being on one doesn't continue on for a very long time after the steadiness of the surface returns to normal(after the change back to solid). One does not check for a wobbly surface while learning how to walk. Testing for a wobbly surface always follows first being on one. One gains stability while traveling on foot while traveling on foot. When one suddenly realizes that the ground has moved, one begins an involuntary balancing act. Uncertainty and discontent make up part of it. We humans do balancing acts intentionally. We create the conditions necessary for performing one. Cats do not.

Cats draw correlations between the moving ground and it's effect/affect upon them. That effect/affect is completely involuntary. Cats draw connections between the uncertainty and fear and the wobbly ground. They test. Only when the ground stops moving under their feet, can they go on their way and no longer think about it.

Hence, I would agree with saying that your cat may have taken that to be the case long ago...

This time however...

The cat did not approach the surface about to be walked upon with a clearly recognizable and undeniable apprehension regarding the trustworthiness of the floor. The cat did not test the surface for sturdiness. The cat did not use a single front paw in a manner which undeniably shows it's own apprehension/reservedness/hesitance/caution/distrust/discontent regarding the steadiness, dependability, reliability, sturdiness, and/or wobbliness of the floor. The cat showed no signs whatsoever that it was paying attention to the floor.

What sense does it then make for us to say that the cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, while the cat's not even paying attention to the floor? That is to say that it is taking something to be the case while not paying it any attention.

Add a timeline, and there's no problem I can see aside from saying that the cat's belief is statable. That I'm still mulling over...

Hence... my agreement proposal at the beginning of this post.

Taking something to be the case...

The something is always a statement.

We have to render both into statements to talk about them, but neither actually consist of the statement.

You seem to be saying that beliefs are necessarily a different kind of thing where the fact that we have to render them into statements carries some additional burden not applicable to physical laws or features. It's this step that I'm not understanding. — Isaac

This critique is spot on.

Elemental constituency is what matters here. Belief existed in it's entirety prior to being talked about. Prior to language. Thus... such belief cannot consist of language use. Being amenable to language use would bridge the gap and offer some sort of evolutionary explanation...

Correlations between different things is the best bridge I've been able to come up with.

Instead of talk of belief, let's talk about what is taken to be the case, and to do so without further definition except as may come in the discussion that follows.

So I take it to be the case that this is a sentence of English in a thread about Wittgenstein. I take it to be the case that I am typing this post, and presumably you might take it to be the case that you are reading this post.

So one observation we might make is that taking something to be the case is a relation between some state of affairs and some individual, or if you prefer, some agent. — Banno

Taking it to be the case that this is a sentence of English in a thread about Wittgenstein requires thinking about language use while using it. It is existentially dependent upon language use. It involves language use. It's about language use. The same holds good of the other two examples above. Thus, they are all linguistic beliefs.

This one, however...

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

...is not. Cannot be.

Now what one takes to be the case is what one believes.

And hence, what one believes can be stated. — Banno

The floor is solid. <--------that's what you are proposing your cat takes to be the case and/or believes.

That doesn't sit well.

...this perhaps leaves open that what is taken to be the case might be some mental correlation between different things.. — Banno

Best.

The problem you have is shared by me. Translation is not readily forthcoming. That's where we were earlier, and we remain there. I do anyway. Still mulling it all over.

...this perhaps leaves open that what is taken to be the case might be some correlation between different things.. — Banno

Better.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Ah. The Dogma. — Banno

You know I've good reason(s) supporting this. Thus, you know it's not unsupported. Dogma always is.

There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic.
— creativesoul

What exactly distinguishes one from the other? — Banno

It's the elemental constituency(the ingredients, so to speak) that matters most when talking about non linguistic and linguistic belief.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. Non linguistic belief consists of correlations drawn between different things, as does linguistic belief. That's the commonality that makes them what they are. The difference is the content of the correlation(the different things). Non linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things, none of which are language use. Linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between language use and other things.

...thought better...

Alright then try: I have no clear idea what "there are non linguistic and linguistic beliefs" could be saying.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that have not been expressed in language, then it is trivial and I agree.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that cannot be expressed in language, then I think it wrong.

If it is saying something else, then I know not what. — Banno

Too much philosophy.

There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic.

That's all it's saying.

Hope your procedure has the best possible results...

Much of my admiration for you is had in the helpfulness of your participation. You and several others here have broadened the scope of my own understanding by bringing up stuff that I had not yet considered...

We have sharpened one another's thoughts. Of course, that's true from where I sit regarding consequences of my engagements with you, but I'm assuming it goes both ways...

:wink:

Again, kudos on that post!

In treating beliefs as what is taken to be the case, we stop treating belief as a thing and start seeing it as a way of behaving. — Banno

Banno's suggestion here to stop treating belief as a thing is spot on. Belief is not a single thing. Belief certainly does not have a spatiotemporal location.

Again... I commend that post!!!

:smile:

The fundamental misapprehension of which I spoke is evident in the very phrasing that "there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs". It's not clear how this could even be stated in terms of what is taken to be the case and what is not...

That's the long-term objection I've had to much of what creativesoul has to say on this topic. — Banno

While I still admire the clarity in your post, it does not make for much of a valid objection to a differing position, such as my own. I'm actually not sure how far apart we are. I suspect that we're very close, aside from my tendency to speak about belief in terms of it's elemental constituents(ingredients) whereas you're prone to talk about it in terms of what's taken to be the case.

To use that difference, or apparent translation difficulty as reason for objection/rejection is to reject another position because of the inherent incommensurate/incompatibility of translating one into the terms of the other. I'm reminded here of your rejection of the very idea of incompatible conceptual schemes. Yet, here we are. It's not clear how "there are non linguistic and linguistic beliefs" could be stated(translated) in(to) terms of what is taken to be the case and what is not.

A vein of thought deserving more of my attention.

Well done Banno...

I could certainly raise issues, but those would be based upon our frameworks. What you've set out here is perfectly in line with your own... and Witt's as far as I can tell.

Kudos. I second Jamalrob's notion.

Is there still something missing from that description? — Isaac

The content of the belief(about-ness, I've seen it called).

A belief can be a particular neural network. — Isaac

There is no one to one correspondence between particular beliefs and neural pathways/networks.

A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices.
— creativesoul

I don't think it does. Take a person with no language at all, present them with a time machine... — Isaac

Time machines require language.

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional.
— creativesoul

I don't think this is true... — Sam26

Weren't many of his most trusted contemporaries proponents of JTB?

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, — Sam26

That's Witt's idea.

I realize that this was not directed towards me
— creativesoul

Actually it kinda was. :grin: — jamalrob

:razz:

Hey Jamalrob. hope this finds you well!

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement. Or, as photographer might have said, a post hoc thematization (or maybe it's schematization, not sure). We can say that he believes--or he "has a belief"--that the world existed long before he was born, but in doing so we are not identifying any individuated object, an aspect or element of thought or behaviour that exists prior to its rendering as a statement. What we mean is that he acts in a way that shows he expects such and such to be the case, or just doesn't expect not-such-and-such to be the case. — jamalrob

A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices.

Drawing a mental correlation between a specific sound and eating food does not require naming practices, nor descriptive ones. We can observe such situations. With a creature that has already drawn them, hearing the sound - again - after the correlation has been drawn between the sound and eating causes them to exhibit behaviour that clearly shows us that that connection has long since been made. It does not consist of propositional content. It need not be stated by the creature, for it has no language.

We can use language to acquire knowledge of belief that exists in it's entirety prior to being talked about.

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, we can see or observe the belief without the stating. — Sam26

If all belief consists entirely of mental correlations between different things, then we cannot observe them in any reasonable sense of the term "observe".

I can think of only two ways to interpret the idea that there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs:

1. To say that a belief is linguistic is to say that it is somehow made of words, that there are attitudes, comportments, or mental states that have an inherently propositional form, perhaps that they are identifiable thoughts. As if the holder of the belief is talking to himself: "I believe the world existed before I was born". This would be in contrast to prelinguistic, built-in expectations and habits.

2. Or, it means that some beliefs cannot be stated (hence Banno's question). — jamalrob

I realize that this was not directed towards me, but I'm an advocate of non linguistic and linguistic belief.

It's the elemental constituency(the ingredients, so to speak) that matter most when talking about non linguistic and linguistic belief.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. Non linguistic belief consists of correlations drawn between different things, as does linguistic belief. That's the commonality that makes them what they are. The difference is the content of the correlation(the different things). Non linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things, none of which are language use. Linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between language use and other things.

I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions... — Sam26

Our looking for something shows that we believe that something is there to be found. Here, Witt offers a candidate that is statable, for it is a belief that has propositional content. He gets kudos from me for attempting to remain consistent.

Langauge less creatures can look for things as well. Witt's framework struggles to take proper account of what that belief consists of.

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes?
— Banno

To followup on creativesoul's comment, other animals can't state their beliefs in language. — Marchesk

Exactly. Yet they have beliefs. Those beliefs do not have propositional content. Our reports of them do. It would behoove us all to keep that in mind.

I don't think this is true. I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions. But of course this isn't the thrust of OC. — Sam26

Perhaps Sam. That would seem to be incommensurate with his talk of hinge propositions... wouldn't it?

Clearly he did not finish that part of his project, so his thoughts on the matter are only as has been recorded. Too bad we can't ask him. It seems he had not yet come to acceptable terms with all of it(concerning basic beliefs and/or hinge propositions and how they did not require justification).

Well grounded true belief does not always consist of language.

Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated?

That is, not just beliefs which have not been stated, but beliefs which are un-statable?

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes? — Banno

Language less creatures do not make claims about private ineffable beliefs(or meaning). Witt's beetle in a box is all about such claims.

:brow:

Right?

I'm in agreement with the thrust of Sam's thoughts here, or at least what I think they are based upon what's been said by him, and my own reading and/or understanding of Witt's On Certainty, which was of course published posthumously.

Witt was an adherent of JTB, and was looking to avoid the problem of justificatory regress. Hinge propositions were his attempt. They are defined as the ones(beliefs) that lie beyond the scope of justification... somehow. They need no justification. Witt never clarified how. Witt also seemed to believe that all knowledge is dubitable. Being able to doubt 'X', was part of Witt's own personal criterion for being classified as a bit of knowledge(as knowing 'X'). His remarks on Moore support this interpretation as well.

Sam's participation here seems to be shedding some much needed light upon pre-linguistic belief. It is worth noting that it exists in it's entirety prior to being named. It certainly does not consist of propositions.

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional. Hence... the most basic and foundational beliefs were dubbed - in Witt's framework - "hinge propositions".

This is where I part ways with Witt upon this matter. I suspect Sam may agree, at least in part.

???

Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated? — Banno

Do language less creatures state anything?

The point of me saying, "keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein," is that they are my thoughts, not necessarily Wittgenstein's. It doesn't concern me if Wittgenstein had an interest in prelinguistic beliefs or not. I'm exploring the idea because I find it interesting in terms of what is bedrock.

The only point I'm trying to make about prelinguistic beliefs, is that they are the starting points of all beliefs. They are the most basic of all beliefs. The structure of all beliefs rests on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. — Sam26

Yep.

"Work ethic"?

Perhaps there is your problem: "How do we make more people middle class?"

The United States has not just forgotten to look after each other, but long pushed a myth that actively rejects looking out for each other as worthwhile. No wonder it is in such a mess. — Banno

Spot on.

You gave this reply serious thought, and made it worth reading, so "thank you!"

Of all your suggested disciplines, the effort to step out of one's habitual frame of reference and into another conflicting, unsettling, even hostile frame of reference is the great challenge of the seeker of truth and wisdom. We use our "truths" to navigate the world and don't abandon or even modify them readily. There is however a tipping point in thinking where the model just will not continue to accommodate the incoming new data. In an extreme case, it's like an addict admitting that his efforts to control his addiction have been based on false premises, and it's either die or make changes. We hold to our falsehoods that strongly, and sometimes only a crisis is sufficient to break through our defenses. But what a wonderful world it might be if all people were to apply your listed guidelines for critical thinking. — Frank Pray

You're not alone here in this take... that's for sure!

Combined with last post for brevity...