I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions... — Sam26
Perhaps Sam. That would seem to be incommensurate with his talk of hinge propositions... wouldn't it? — creativesoul
Our looking for something shows that we believe that something is there to be found. Here, Witt offers a candidate that is statable, for it is a belief that has propositional content. He gets kudos from me for attempting to remain consistent. — creativesoul
a state-of-mind reflected in our actions — Sam26
Forget the idea that we can state the belief, we can see or observe the belief without the stating. — Sam26
I can think of only two ways to interpret the idea that there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs:
1. To say that a belief is linguistic is to say that it is somehow made of words, that there are attitudes, comportments, or mental states that have an inherently propositional form, perhaps that they are identifiable thoughts. As if the holder of the belief is talking to himself: "I believe the world existed before I was born". This would be in contrast to prelinguistic, built-in expectations and habits.
2. Or, it means that some beliefs cannot be stated (hence Banno's question). — jamalrob
A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement. Or, as photographer might have said, a post hoc thematization (or maybe it's schematization, not sure). We can say that he believes--or he "has a belief"--that the world existed long before he was born, but in doing so we are not identifying any individuated object, an aspect or element of thought or behaviour that exists prior to its rendering as a statement. What we mean is that he acts in a way that shows he expects such and such to be the case, or just doesn't expect not-such-and-such to be the case. — jamalrob
I realize that this was not directed towards me
— creativesoul
Actually it kinda was. :grin: — jamalrob
As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional.
— creativesoul
I don't think this is true... — Sam26
A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices. — creativesoul
Can a belief (a state-of-mind as I define it) have form apart from language? This has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind — Sam26
do our actions reflect beliefs apart from statements or propositions? — Sam26
So if you want to avoid this possibility, you'd have to declare it axiomatically, or demonstrate how it cannot be the case by conflict with some other definition. It's not valid to declare that it simply does not have anything to do with pointing to something in the mind, it doesn't follow from what you have specified so far about beliefs. Unless, of course I've missed (or misunderstood) the argument dismissing such a definition. — Isaac
I'm presuming that from your answer to Banno's earlier questions, you're not referring here to beliefs which cannot form statements or propositions, but rather beliefs which are not statements or propositions? But also, given the above, beliefs which also are not features of the mind (otherwise we very well could point to them in exactly the manner you rule out)?
So what forms are we left with that a belief might take? — Isaac
I'm not saying there isn't something going on in the mind. I'm only saying that we don't point to things in the mind to defend the idea that we have beliefs. No more than we point to something in the mind to define a word. There are things that occur in the world that reflect these things. — Sam26
A belief that the world existed long before oneself is most certainly a linguistic one. That belief is the result of holding two very complex notions side by side for comparison. The age of oneself. The age of the world. Comparing the two requires naming and descriptive practices.
— creativesoul
I don't think it does. Take a person with no language at all, present them with a time machine... — Isaac
A belief can be a particular neural network. — Isaac
Is there still something missing from that description? — Isaac
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