And you're not going to get it because I don't believe in general rules derived from circumstantial decisions. It's why different murderers get different sentences and why murder is sometimes excused due to circumstances. There is no general rule. There never is in ethics.

So in that case he does actually have to treat them, because that's his responsibility. — khaled

But you just said you're not responsible if a thing would happen if you weren't there. Why is the doctor responsible for something that would occur even if he wasn't there and yet you're not when someone is drowning?

No one brought it up in our conversation so far. I have read the OP, and still wonder why Billy should be born but Sarah shouldn't. And what do you mean "depends on the circumstances"? It is these circumstances that I'm asking about. What makes procreation ethical in one (billy) and not the other (sarah) — khaled

But giving random percentages isn't "circumstances".

And yet you did exactly such a calculation to conclude that people in abject poverty will in all likelyhood suffer and so one shouldn't have kids in abject poverty. — khaled

Also, another point, I wouldn't have kids under these circumstances, it's not a universal rule. Maybe someone with a different outlook on life, different skillset etc. would.

What you cause and what you are responsible for are different. If the bad outcome would have happened without you being there you are not responsible for fixing it. You are only responsible for not causing bad outcomes by being there. So had I can't go around drowning people (If I hadn't been there they would not have drowned). — khaled

Yeah, we're lightyears apart on our ethical frameworks. I get where you're coming from though. I'm not trying to convince you but for you to understand where I'm coming from: to me the outcome comes about precisely because you are there and don't do anything. The world where you wouldn't be there doesn't exist so pretending it does exist, doesn't have any relevance to this world, where this happened.

How about a doctor, who can treat a life-threatening condition, and he just decides not to treat a patient? That would be a serious breach of his duties and promises but since the patient would die any way, no responsibility based on the above.

I have no clue how this relates to what I said. No one brought up sufficient and necessary conditions. I'm just looking at the conditions under which having children would be unethical rn. You made the claim that if you can reasonably expect your child to suffer too much, it would be unethical to have them. Yet you do not specify what "too much" means. — khaled

What thread have you been reading? it's in the OP and has been discussed several times in these pages. And, no I don't specify what "too much" is, because it depends on the circumstances, so I can't.

Point is: You cannot know whether or not you will be able to intervene in the circumstances leading up to the suffering, and there is a very real chance you won't be able to. In fact, I'm willing to say it is almost impossible that there will no occasion where your child suffers due to circumstances you couldn't have stopped. So shouldn't intervening earlier be a moral obligation? — khaled

Nope. As you indicate yourself this is all surrounded by unknowns. All I do know is that these types of suffering aren't caused by living because being alive is not a sufficient condition for suffering, only a necessary condition. This is why when I "calculate" this borders on certainty. I'm not concerned with heartbreak of my daughter because I don't cause it.

You are not obligated to help, you are only obligated not to harm in my view. Helping is good though again, not obligatory. — khaled

This is rather perplexing to me. Your choice not to intervene causes the person to drown and die because if it hadn't been for your choice the person would still be alive. So your choice is a conditio sine que non for the drowning. If you aren't supposed to cause harm, you have to intervene.

My take on this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/479032

No one is doing this. Antinatalists are not trying to improve life for anyone. There is no one to be better off. It's a very common misconception. — khaled

And yet it continually happens in this thread and I've already pointed it out several times. The last time was here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/480046

So no, @schopenhauer1 it's not a rhetorical move it's an actual philosophical point. For example, you agree here with Tzeentch:

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent? — Tzeentch

Exactly. Well-stated and concise. It isn't that hard. I called it the Argument Against Paternalism. At base, the answers here is that the parent thinks that it is best for the child, even if it is causing suffering, which is why I say, it is still wrong to cause unnecessary suffering unto another even if one has good intentions to do so. — Schopenhauer1

It's not well-stated at all because consent cannot play a role here because this is once again personifying non-existence as if it has thought processes and a will. And consent isn't even necessarily important for moral questions. Actions can be moral or immoral without another person being involved. Unnecessarily cutting down trees because I like destroying stuff isn't right either. Gluttony isn't right either. Lusting after your girlfriend even when nobody in the world is aware of it, isn't right either.

So for the next child to be born in this world let's do this. Let's call him Billy. Billy will NOT be born in poverty or have severe disabilities. However despite this, after countless calculations we find that there is a 6% chance Billy becomes more unhappy than happy. Should Billy be born?

You already gave an example of a situation where you shouldn't have a child (poverty and disability). But the only difference between that pretend person (Let's call her Sarah) and Billy is that Sarah has a higher chance of becoming more unhappy than happy due to the circumstances she would be born under. Let's say 60%.

On what basis do you say Sarah should not be born but Billy should be born? — khaled

Small quibble: I gave "abject poverty" as a reason, which is something different than just poverty. People can be poor and happy, abject poverty and happiness usually don't go together.

For the rest, I'm hesistant to answer this question because it doesn't pertain to reality which as a moral question makes it useless. We can't calculate if someone is going to be happy or not so the question to me is for all intents and purposes moot and so would be my answer. Even so, I'll answer to give you insight about how I think about these issues.

For me, the first thing is that intrinsic suffering, like the capacity to feel pain and therefore the certainty you will feel pain at some point, are not caused by life the same way that water doesn't cause itself to be wet. So there's no moral question there.

That leaves contingent suffering. Here the likelihood isn't important. What's important is whether we can intervene in the circumstances leading to suffering. If I can intervene in the causal chain because there's a proximate cause that I can affect, then there's a moral duty on me to do so and avoid another person's suffering. If the proximate cause is certain but unavoidable, only then would I consider intervening earlier in the causal chain as a moral obligation.

Which reminds me, I might have missed it but if you don't recognise moral obligations to save drowning people why a moral obligation not to have kids?

They seem like the same kind of comparison to me. In the first case, you look into the future and predict that the child will likely suffer too much (be more unhappy than happy), and based on that conclude that you shouldn't have a child in poverty. In the latter, you look into the future and predict that the child could suffer too much (be more unhappy than happy) and based on that conclude that you shouldn't have a child, period. The only difference is the probability. — khaled

No, the difference is that I can pretend "as if" a child would exist and attribute qualities and states to it and compare that what I know about lives lived by those around me.

I can't pretend "as if" a non-existent child (eg. nothing) is better off because I don't know how nothing feels because it can't have feelings. They're not the same comparison. This point seems rather obvious.

by memory, build back better? Or something like that?

1) The essential nonsense that we cannot consider the future person being born because there is no person currently existing. I've seen uses of "potential parent" in the mix. Yet, "potential child" is also a consideration of course. Someone will exist, and it is that person who will exist that we are preventing either the suffering or non-consent, or the "not being used for means to an end" result. — schopenhauer1

I stopped reading because it's apparent you don't read what I write. Once again, read the OP. I specifically raise the issue of future persons. The problem is some posters keep insisting on issues of consent. That results in metaphysical mumbo jumbo because nothing doesn't have a will.

Fuck this is tiresome.

I wish.

It is not.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions. — Tzeentch

Denying it doesn't make it so.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future. — Tzeentch

What does "its" refer to here?

I'm not trying to attribute personhood. There's no need for it.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future. — Tzeentch

This is attributing personhood. A thing that doesn't exist, isn't a "child" and does not have the capacity of being "born" and it certainly doesn't have a future. Your "its" refers to nothing.

I am essentially saying that you do not account for a future child who will exist — schopenhauer1

But I do and have accounted for that. It's literally in the OP.

you do not seem to like the idea of generalizing the idea that suffering exists — schopenhauer1

I have no problems with this either. I'm fact I've said that everybody suffers at some point in their lives. This isn't relevant though because it's no proof for life being a sufficient condition for suffering.

and a child will be born that will almost certainly suffer — schopenhauer1

Yes. And? You already know how I treat both types (intrinsic and contingent) of suffering so I don't need to repeat myself do I?

It doesn't logically follow from anything said and alluding to it like this as if it does makes a piss poor argument.

It's in the OP. Since you weren't able to distill the premisse you thought we meant, why don't you ask questions about the part you don't seem to understand instead?

Yes, because you're misunderstanding the objection made by both him and me.

Read the OP again. Then tell me where you find that premisse.

So then, do you accept the implication of your premise? — Tzeentch

What premisse and what implication?

It's not avoided at all. I specifically mention unavoidable poverty.

Have you even read the OP? Because this was dealt with in there. It's not a problem.

If a baby is 99% sure to get tortured if born, we don't need it to be born to have torture, so that torture exists so that we can then say it is wrong. — schopenhauer1

This is a straw man by the way. Nobody argues this.

My argument doesn't deny either of those things.

So are they important or not? — Tzeentch

You're missing the point. There is no "they". You're asking whether nothing is important and pretending that something exists that doesn't exist.

This is not true. "Individual" is defined by unity, not by being differentiated from its environment. That's why the universe, which is supposed to be a unity of everything, is an individual without the need of being differentiated from anything else. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not how people use the word individual. Being individual means discrete, e.g. seperated, distinct and differentiated. Unity can be more things united as a whole. So several individuals can form unity.

Take the universe as an example of an individual is a bit ridiculous really because quite clearly it contains individuals.

No, because as is clear these aren't caused by life.

Edit : Or to put it more clearly, life is not a sufficient condition for any of these situations. Without tiredness, there would be no sleep. Without hunger, no eating. It's always something else and that something else is always the proximate cause of suffering. Nobody using "cause" in any sensible way, will blame this on life. I stubbed my toe today and it hurt like hell. It was carelessness that caused it.

Does living cause you to eat? Or is it your decision to move that fork into your mouth? How about falling asleep last night? Life, habit or because you were tired? And waking up? Life or your circadian rhythm? Everybody eats, sleeps and wakes too but nobody is so confused in their use of language or understanding of causality that they blame life for it.

People who don't watch the news have no identity. — frank

So people without a TV don't have an identity? What does this even mean man? Even as part of your party I cannot make heads or tails from this statement.

Are we referring to inherent or contingent? If inherent then, being born is the direct reason why someone is alive which, if inherent suffering exists, is a directly entailed with being alive. What brought about this inherent suffering? Birth. I see inherit suffering as similar to the Eastern version I discussed several posts ago.

Contingent suffering is contextual. It technically is not entailed in being alive, but mine as well be based on the material circumstances. For example, almost everyone will get sick, and that's just a basic example. Then there are just daily challenges great or small to overcome. Somehow this is seen as "justified" by the paternalistic types that think people should be born, to overcome challenges so they can experience the higher "meaning" in overcoming them.

With either example, a future person can be prevented from going through this. Why, someone might ask, would we not just end humanity? And my response, for the thousandth time, is that consent is a huge factor. I give the example usually of veganism. Maybe veganism is correct. Maybe it is best not to eat or use animal products. However, to force this on people would violate that consent idea. — schopenhauer1

As to suffering entailed by life, see the OP. I'm not going to repeat myself.

As to sickness, that's mostly caused by bacteria or viruses. Not life.

moral duties typically lead to laws. — khaled

It's a misunderstanding to think law is about morality. It's not. It's about economics first. Just claims have statutory limitations and lapse into moral claims that aren't legally enforceable. Crimes have statutory limitations too. The obligation to account based on IFRS or GAAP or to drive left instead of right aren't moral rules themselves. The majority of laws regulate, they don't enforce morality.

@schopenhauer1 It doesn't change the assessment that living is not a sufficient condition for such suffering. But maybe your should get specific. Name a suffering.

I didn't reply and won't because we'll move in circles. The OP says quite clearly there's two types of suffering. Intrinsic and contingent. Intrinsic isn't caused by living, for contingent life is never a sufficient condition on its own and never a proximate cause and almost always even intervened upon by other circumstances. In my view there's no causality any way you cut it 99% of the cases.

I'm not one for universal rules or objective morality but it seems to me that intervening in a life threatening situation such as drowning, where we are capable to do so, is a moral obligation because not doing so contributes to the harm of another. There's a direct relation between your action or inaction and resulting harm and in this example it doesn't cost us anything except some inconvenience. We cannot expect the same from people who can't swim or are too weak. So there's an issue of capability and the weighing of interests between the person who does or doesn't act and the person that is affected by that action. This is why we don't have a moral obligation to enter a burning building either. Where capability is present and the person's interests, affected by the action, outweigh those of the actor, then there is a moral obligation.

So I would say that charity is only a moral obligation for the obscenely rich but in most cases for most people only a moral act for various reasons that are particular to the giver and the recipient.

Nah. Sounds like bs to me. Will have to go back and read more closely. — khaled

The universe guarantees life. The big bang did it! That would be the bs.

In both you seem to be saying that since birth does not guarantee suffering, you cannot say that having children causes suffering, and therefore it is okay to have children.

If that is the case then the fact that the act (pulling the trigger) does not cause harm should be enough of a reason to say pulling the trigger is okay. — khaled

People who are born are guaranteed to suffer but being born doesn't cause suffering. There's an important moral difference here and the analogy breaks down because of it.

Yes that is laughable. Since when is a gun jamming an action by a moral actor? It's not relevant to the moral question.

That's a moral obligation, obviously. You seem to graps the concept of doing something because it's better without an obligation as well. So that explains the difference between a moral act and a moral obligation, doesn't it? You don't have to agree even if you understand it.

I've answered all this in the OP already. Either suffering is intrinsic or it isn't. When it's intrinsic it's irrelevant, if it's not intrinsic it's not a sufficient condition. Simple.

No obligation either way. It is better for your health to refrain from doing so. No. — khaled

Right. So one is better but there's no obligation. Not that hard was it?

Ok, so you go the point right here though. We know what life's impositions are. It is not something that is unknown. You keep making it seem like we cannot fathom what things befall people who are born. Of course we know. If anything, one of the themes of my posts are to recount what those are. — schopenhauer1

Yes yes, you keep falling back on the intrinsic suffering of life but those aren't caused by life. You seem to have problems grasping what causality means and why you must distinghuish between intrinsic suffering and particular and specific suffering. The first are morally irrelevant (because not caused by) the second are not caused by because it's not a sufficient condition without proximate causes. It's only when we're aware of particular and specific circumstances that will be proximate causes for suffering that there's reason to consider not having a child.

So the unavoidable suffering of life that you're so hung up on such a death, boredom and whatnot, are morally irrelevant.

Why is charity a moral act but saving a drowning person is a moral obligation? You sound like you're just dodging the question by rephrasing the things I'm asking about over and over. What properties make charity optional but make saving a drowning person mandatory? — khaled

Because I think people should make an effort to search for answers themselves. Should you stuff your face with cake everyday because you can? Or is it better to refrain from doing so? Is there an obligation to refrain?

I hold they're both optional because I cannot find such a morally relevant property. — khaled

And that's cute too. There is no moral property to be found. You either subscribe to a moral framework or you don't.

We do know that but they're not caused by living and therefore dealing with only a sufficient cause misses the point.

Here's some examples to clairfy. Let's assume selling guns is illegal.

I sell you a gun. You go out and murder someone. Did I murder that person?
I sold you a gun 10 years ago. You go out and murder someone. Did I murder that person?
My grandfather sold your grandfather a gun. You inherited it and go out and murder someone. Did my grandfather murder someone?

The proximate cause is you murdering someone. The sufficient conditions are the sale and your murder taken together. The sale of the gun alone is a necessary condition. You murdering the person alone is a necessary condition too.

I sell your neighbour a gun. You steal it and murder someone. Did I murder that person?

Here there's a proximate cause: your murder. An intervening cause, your theft. All necessary conditions but only together do they form the sufficient condition of murder.

And certainly the death is avoided by taking away the gun before I can sell it but my sale of the gun cannot be morally blamed for the murder because there's no causal link - at least, we do not say the sale caused the death, we point to the proximate cause - your decision to murder someone. And this is what you keep doing, you blame the sale for every bad things that happens afterwards.

The only scenario where this is acceptable is the following:

I sell you a gun knowing you will use it to murder someone. You murder someone. In that case I'm almost as morally culpable as you except for the agency you exercised by actually pulling the trigger. But I can certainly be blamed for that death.

I'm asking what the difference is. Why does not saving a drowning person make you a bad person while not donating to charity doesn't? — khaled

Because there's a difference between a moral act and a moral obligation.