This is the point I made, which Banno scoffed at. Allowing that a system of beliefs may be imperfect means that the entire system needs to be subjected to doubt. This is proof that the idea of hinge propositions, which it is unreasonable to doubt, is fundamentally flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why not doubt then this need for subjecting the system to doubt?
I think you are taking 'system' too much in a technical sense, as if it were a mathematical proof with a broken link. Instead the system is a big, baggy monster of ways that people do things, things that people 'know,' without having to think about it. You claim that 'perfection is a requirement in logic.' Why is that true? Is that something that everybody just knows? Is that just part of what logic means?

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? To what extra-systematic authority do you appeal? This 'system' is not intended as some philosopher's pet system but as something like a shared system of meanings and taken-for-granted quasi-facts. I say 'quasi-facts' because worldviews change. 'Everybody knows' that the earth is a ball that goes around the sun (which is not to say that every single human agrees with this, hence the loose concept of the 'reasonable' or 'educated' person.) But in other times, everybody knew something different, incorrectly by our current standards.

That's why "existence" is a disputed and unclear concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

IMO, all concepts are more or less disputed and more or less unclear.

The proposed hinge propositions are subject matter, content, and therefore need to be doubted — Metaphysician Undercover

To my understanding, within a particular Wittgensteinian language game are beliefs, foundational beliefs and the logic that ties them together. Wittgensteinian foundational beliefs are now referred to as "hinge propositions".

When Wittgenstein writes in OC341 - "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.", I read this as a performative statement about the nature of hinge propositions rather than an empirical discovery about the world. He is creating some propositions to be exempt from doubt, rather than in looking at the world he has discovered some propositions that are exempt from doubt.

That is, the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" is not open to doubt, as it is part of the logical framework of the language game, and is a logical statement, whereas the proposition "the earth existed before I was born" is open to doubt, as it is a belief.

A hinge proposition is analytic, in the same sense as "all bachelors are unmarried" is analytic.

For Wittgenstein, a language game is internally logically coherent, and therefore is a foundationalist refutation to scepticism.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content.

Why not doubt then this need for subjecting the system to doubt? — j0e

Sure, why not? But be careful not to categorize this doubt as a form of certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain as to yes or no. So to doubt whether or not the system ought to be subjected to doubt, is not to be certain in one way or the other.

This is the problem with the way that many here categorize doubt, as a form of certainty. Doubt is what prevents one from proceeding in action, whereas certainty is what induces action. So the doubters of skepticism, and there are many here in the forum, represent skepticism and doubt as the act of subjecting a belief, or beliefs, to doubt, thereby making the category mistake of representing doubt as an act supported by some form of certainty, rather than an unwillingness to act, supported by uncertainty. This is to incorrectly represent doubt by failing to see it as categorically distinct from certainty, thereby presenting it as the polar opposite within the same category. In reality certainty inclines us to act, while doubt inclines us to be unwilling to act, and they coexist as categorically distinct rather than being the extremes of the same category, and cancelling each other out as hot and cold would.

Instead the system is a big, baggy monster of ways that people do things, things that people 'know,' without having to think about it. — j0e

But then it is incorrect to call this a "system", that's the whole point. If we move away from the "system" representation, to the "big, baggy monster of ways that people do things" representation, then the idea of hinge propositions makes no sense at all, because there is no system for them to be supporting. If there are systems, then the systems themselves must be coherent, so to doubt any aspect of the system implies a doubt of the entire system, including any supposed hinge propositions. Either way, the notion of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is fundamentally incorrect. That's why Kuhnian paradigm shifts are a reality, the entire system along with its foundations must be dismissed.

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? To what extra-systematic authority do you appeal? This 'system' is not intended as some philosopher's pet system but as something like a shared system of meanings and taken-for-granted quasi-facts. — j0e

A belief system must be coherent to fulfill the conditions of being a "system". This means that if one belief within the system is dubious, then the entire system is dubious due to all the beliefs being related through coherency. So it makes no sense to say that some beliefs within the system are dubious but the foundational ones, hinge propositions cannot be doubted. This is like taking a deductive argument, and saying that the logic is valid, the conclusion is dubious, but the premises are beyond doubt. If the logic is valid, we cannot doubt the conclusion without doubting the premises.

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? — j0e

I'm not really arguing that hinge propositions ought to be doubted. I am arguing that the concept of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is itself incoherent. So my point is not that hinge propositions ought to be doubted, but that there is no such thing as hinge propositions.

I say 'quasi-facts' because worldviews change. — j0e

If you allow that worldviews change, then how can you subscribe to hinge propositions which are beyond doubt?

IMO, all concepts are more or less disputed and more or less unclear. — j0e

So I assume that you do not believe in hinge propositions either.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality. — RussellA

Without any reference to "external reality" we can assume that one language game might have expressions, statements, or propositions which contradict those of another language game. Since this is the case, then we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt. This is why it is unreasonable to designate beliefs which are seen as foundational to any particular language game as beyond doubt.

we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree - as Grayling wrote in section III "As OC stands, it stands defeated"

we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I agree - as Grayling wrote in section III "As OC stands, it stands defeated" — RussellA

As I understand it, it is not that they cannot be doubted but rather that they are not doubted. They cannot both be doubted and serve as hinges. It is not as if they stand alone, as if one could be doubted and all else would remain the same. It is the case, however, that from time to time there is a major shift such as the Copernican revolution where some hinges are not only doubted, they are rejected as false. It was not simply a matter of accepting that the earth revolved around the sun instead of the sun revolving around the earth and our understanding of everything else remained the same.

some hinges are not only doubted, they are rejected as false — Fooloso4

As I see it, hinge propositions are inventions and therefore knowable without reference to the world. They are true by definition and therefore exempt from doubt.

Suppose language game A including the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" was replaced at a later time by language game B including the hinge proposition ""the earth did not exist before I was born". As hinge propositions are true by definition, true without reference to the world and exempt from doubt, the previous hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" remains true.

Propositions are only contradictory with reference to the world, and as hinge propositions are true without reference to the world, hinge propositions cannot be contradictory

IE, even if language games change, the hinge propositions within them remain true in an analytic rather than synthetic sense and therefore cannot be rejected as false.

IE, even if language games change, the hinge propositions within them remain true in an analytic rather than synthetic sense and therefore cannot be rejected as false. — RussellA

The truth of a hinge proposition derives from its status as foundational to the language game in which it is involved.

Hence, if one changes the language game, one may also change what counts as a hinge proposition.

The quintessential example, the Bishop remaining on it's own colour, is a case in point. We might change the rules of chess so that, say, a Bishop in a corner square is permitted to move to an adjacent square of the opposite colour.

The hinge proposition "the Bishop always remains on the same colour" would now be false.

SO when a language game changes, the truth of a hinge proposition may also change.

As I see it, hinge propositions are inventions and therefore knowable without reference to the world. They are true by definition and therefore exempt from doubt. — RussellA

A common mistake that is made, I see it here frequently, is to assume that hinges are all of a kind.

Suppose language game A including the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" was replaced at a later time by language game B including the hinge proposition ""the earth did not exist before I was born". As hinge propositions are true by definition, true without reference to the world and exempt from doubt, the previous hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" remains true. — RussellA

One can play a language-game that disregards what we know of the world, but it plays no part in the world in which we live, that is to say, the world in which it is false that the earth did not exist before you were born.

A hinge is not true by definition. By definition its truth is not called into question.

Metaphysician Undercover misunderstands many things. One of those things is that a hinge proposition has its status only as a part of a language game. Hence, you are closer than Meta when you say

He is creating some propositions to be exempt from doubt, rather than in looking at the world he has discovered some propositions that are exempt from doubt. — RussellA

Wittgenstein noticed that some propositions must be exempt from doubt in order that the language game in which they are involved be played. So you are correct that he is not making a discovery about the world, but about how grammar functions. A hinge proposition is indubitable within a given language game.

But hinge propositions are not all analytic. indeed, any proposition might count as a hinge proposition given the appropriate language game. There is nothing particular to the internal grammar of hinge propositions, but rather it is their role in a language game that makes them hinge propositions.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA

Yes! And being part of the logical form of the system (the language game) they are not subject to falsification by observation alone. This puts them in line with Kuhn's paradigms and Lakatos' research programs; Feyerabend was interestingly first planing to be a student of Wittgenstein, who's death led him to change supervisors to Popper. If he had been able to study under Wittgenstein we may have had a definitive answer to the question of the incommensurability of language games. That didn't happen, and so we are left with what I think is one of the key issues in this area of study.

Hinge propositions cannot be questioned within a language game - that's what they are. In order to doubt them we must change the way the game works - change the nature of the game itself. In my own view, Feyerabend describes in detail how the change takes place, in his most detailed account of how Galileo cheated in order to change the way folk looked at the world; he changes the rabbit to a duck. I read Feyerabend as showing that Galileo changed our picture of the world, and hence changed the language game in which we were involved.

But I would add to that Davidson's rejection of the incommensurability of language games. If language games were incommensurable, we would not be able to move form one to the other. But we do understand Aristotelian motion - the theory taken as granted before Galileo; and we understand Newtonian physics despite it having been replaced by relativistic physics.

Meta (in so far as he can be understood) apparently accepts a referential theory of meaning - the meaning of a word is the thing it names. After the Linguistic Turn, vey few philosophers would accept this. But that view has the result that Meta thinks a proposition can be compared to the world directly; that is, without considering how the proposition fits in to what we are doing with the words in which it occurs. So it is not the individual hinge proposition that can be doubted, but the entire game. Compare this to Quine's epistemology. So I think your critique of Meta hits the mark.

But I cannot agree that "OC stands defeated'; that would be a trivialisation of what is going in in what is, after all, an incomplete work, more a display of where Wittgenstein's later thought was heading than a set piece with definite conclusions that might be overthrown. Wittgenstein taught philosophers to look to use rather than meaning. Better to see OC as an admonition to look at how we assume certain things to be true by the way we use words.

A common mistake that is made, I see it here frequently, is to assume that hinges are all of a kind. — Fooloso4

Agreed; and to push this, I'll conjecture that any proposition might be taken as a hinge proposition in some language game. That is, given some proposition we could invent a game in which it is taken as granted.

How useful that game is, remains beside the point.

I think that this is correct. I would add that Wittgenstein was not interested in just any game that one might play with language, The language-games that interest him are tied to some activity beyond simply playing.

Yes, the "logical space" of language games is vast, but only some very few are of use. "This game is played".

A belief system must be coherent to fulfill the conditions of being a "system". This means that if one belief within the system is dubious, then the entire system is dubious due to all the beliefs being related through coherency. So it makes no sense to say that some beliefs within the system are dubious but the foundational ones, hinge propositions cannot be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are reading too much into 'system,' putting your own spin on it. To me it's not surprising that what 'everybody knows' turns out to be wrong sometimes. I also read Wittgenstein as an anti-foundationalist. There's know particular finite set of foundational beliefs, though we can plausibly imagine some beliefs as more central and weight-bearing than others.

I am arguing that the concept of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is itself incoherent. So my point is not that hinge propositions ought to be doubted, but that there is no such thing as hinge propositions. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I see it, no particular belief in this system is beyond doubt. But a doubt only has a specificity (as opposed to paralyzed madness ) through a place in this system. While I doubt that I have hands, I am not doubting that I understand what a hand is, etc.

If you allow that worldviews change, then how can you subscribe to hinge propositions which are beyond doubt? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't subscribe to fixed (eternal) hinge propositions. No need for it in the fuzzy theory.

Hinge propositions cannot be questioned within a language game - that's what they are. In order to doubt them we must change the way the game works - change the nature of the game itself. — Banno

The real solution is to recognize that language is not a sort of game at all, nor is it analogous to game playing. When we see that "game" when applied to language is just a metaphor, and not a description, then we can grasp the fact that there is no such thing as language games, and we do not need to step outside the language to doubt its terms.

Meta (in so far as he can be understood) apparently accepts a referential theory of meaning - the meaning of a word is the thing it names. After the Linguistic Turn, vey few philosophers would accept this. But that view has the result that Meta thinks a proposition can be compared to the world directly; that is, without considering how the proposition fits in to what we are doing with the words in which it occurs. So it is not the individual hinge proposition that can be doubted, but the entire game. Compare this to Quine's epistemology. So I think your critique of Meta hits the mark. — Banno

This is so far from what I've been expressing. Where did I say that a word refers to a thing? Just because I do not agree with you about the nature of meaning, doesn't mean that you can choose randomly, a theory of meaning which you do not agree with, and say that this is a theory I accept.

Well, in my defence, I do find you verging on the incomprehensible.

IMO, all concepts are more or less disputed and more or less unclear.
— j0e

So I assume that you do not believe in hinge propositions either.
--MU

A little more on this. I think the concept of 'hinge propositions' has a certain utility. As we use the sign 'hinge propositions,' its fuzzy public meaning will float and drift like a cloud. This semantic drift seems to be slow enough so that we can understand one another well enough to keep the conversation going. (Now we can say the same thing about 'semantic drift' and so on. We all depend on our ('blind') skill of navigating the rapids of language. )

Well, in my defence, I do find you verging on the incomprehensible. — Banno

Ten days ago it was more than just "verging on".

Meta does not see that he is writing nonsense. — Banno

Why pretend that you can understand what I'm saying? Is this what your form of anti-skepticism gives you, confidence that you know what another is saying when what the other is saying is incomprehensible to you?

A little more on this. I think the concept of 'hinge propositions' has a certain utility. As we use the sign 'hinge propositions,' its fuzzy public meaning will float and drift like a cloud. This semantic drift seems to be slow enough so that we can understand one another well enough to keep the conversation going. (Now we can say the same thing about 'semantic drift' and so on. We all depend on our ('blind') skill of navigating the rapids of language. ) — j0e

I think there is a problem with accepting a proposition or a premise on the basis of its utility, when it is known to be a falsity. This is what deception is made of, the utility of falsity.

Would you say that the word 'proposition' is being used in this thread the same way Witt used it?

I think there is a problem with accepting a proposition or a premise on the basis of its utility, when it is known to be a falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm no physicist, but do you believe in quarks? If so, how exactly do they exist ? Talk about quarks has a place in the entire context of our civilization, and it's connected to how iphones are designed. In many cases I don't think metaphysical statements are clear enough so that they can be known to be a falsity. One might say that they are not even wrong, while yet being useful in some indirect way. I like this take on Wittgenstein.

[T]he most basic linguistic know–how is not mastery of proprieties of use that can be expressed once and for all in a fixed set of rules, but the capacity to stay afloat and find and make one’s way on the surface of the raging white–water river of discursive communal practice that we always find ourselves having been thrown into... — Brandom

How does one get this 'raging white-water river' noticed by theoretical types who want a final method ? One philosophical fantasy as I see it is the invention of automated critical thinking. Someone one day will write that final book and get the method that lets us escape the noise of that raging white water....

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA

This conclusion is clear evidence of how the metaphor of "language games" leads us astray if we take it seriously, as a literal description rather than a metaphor. The concept imposed as "language games" produces the need for hinge propositions as foundations for the games. But what is required from "hinge propositions" dictates that they are neither formalities (rules of a game) nor foundational content (subject matter). Upon analysis, the concept of "hinge propositions" turns out to be a logical impossibility, a fundamental incoherency produced from the assumption that "language games" provides a literal description, rather than a metaphor. In other words, Wittgenstein proposed language games as a metaphor, then took himself too seriously and had to look for hinge propositions as required to support the literal interpretation.

Would you say that the word 'proposition' is being used in this thread the same way Witt used it? — frank

I posted this the other day.


From Stanford:

"The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

One might wonder whether a single class of entities can play all these roles. If David Lewis (1986, p. 54) is right in saying that “the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata,” then it will be impossible to capture our conception in a consistent definition.

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat."https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

It is not Moore's statements about his hand that function as a hinge. If Moore's propositions about his hands are hinges then what revolves around them? Most people do not know who Moore is. It makes little or no difference if he claimed to have hands. Not much hinges on the statements that any of us make about having hands.
It is the fact of our having hands around which things pivot. Our doing things with our hands, our holding tools and other things designed for hands. Even our statements about hands hinge on our having hands.

Right. So Witt wasn't talking about speech acts. He was talking about something in the range of things discussed in that SEP article.

So Witt wasn't talking about speech acts. He was talking about something in the range of things discussed in that SEP article. — frank

I will sidestep the theory of speech acts and say that hinges are not limited to what we say.

From earlier posts:

A key passage in OC is a quote from Goethe's Faust:

"In the beginning was the deed." (OC 402)

This is expanded upon:

"But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal." (OC 359)

"I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination. " (OC 475)

Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not. — Fooloso4

A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges. — Fooloso4

:up:

literal description rather than a metaphor. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language game is a metaphor for having rules, and rules are needed in order to cope with the raging white-water confusion of the world. People literally need some kind of bedrock, some set of working assumptions, axioms, rules, hinge propositions, etc.

incommensurability of language games — Banno

I believe that incommensurability is in large part a mereological problem of relationships
Wittgenstein wrote that as the meaning of a term or concept is highly contextualised, two different contexts - whether a theory or culture - can be incommensurable even though they present a loose similarity.

Person A observes the world and has a strong belief that there is a god. Having a strong belief they invent the hinge proposition "there is a god", which becomes part of their language game. Person B observes the same world, and has a strong belief that there is no god. Having a strong belief they invent the hinge proposition "there is no god", which becomes part of their language game.

Persons A and B in observing the same world may have observed the same objects, but for a finite number of objects there are almost an infinite number of relationships between them. This is the mereological fact that even for 4 objects there are 32 possible relationships. Person A's belief is founded on the objects they see and a particular set of relationships between those objects. Person B's belief is founded on the same objects but a different set of relationships between those objects, as it is statistically highly unlikely that the relationships Person A chooses will be the same relationships Person B chooses.

Once Persons A and B have invented their different personal hinge propositions, these hinge propositions become part of the logical form of their private language games.

Banno wrote - (hinge propositions) "And being part of the logical form of the system (the language game) they are not subject to falsification by observation alone". Therefore , even if Person A points out to Person B those particular relationships they have based their own beliefs on, as Person B's beliefs have become part of the logical form of their private language game, it is unlikely that Person B can be persuaded by observation alone.

IE, once a person's beliefs have become part of the logical structure of their language game,
they become highly immovable to persuasion by observation alone.

Language game is a metaphor for having rules, and rules are needed in order to cope with the raging white-water confusion of the world. People literally need some kind of bedrock, some set of working assumptions, axioms, rules, hinge propositions, etc. — RussellA

The problem, is that if "game", and "having rules" is just speaking metaphorically, then there is not any rules, literally speaking. That's just a metaphor. But if we ignore that this is just a metaphor, and we infer that language literally consists of rules, then we start looking for things like "hinge propositions", which is really an incoherent concept because language is not a game consisting of rules.

"I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination. " — Fooloso4

He isn't doing anyhropology here. He's taking aim at the Tracticus, right?

He's taking aim at the Tracticus, right? — frank

Yes, but I think he is also challenging traditional assumptions about man and reason.

Wittgenstein wrote... — RussellA

Where?