philosophy leads to no truths. — Gregory

How about soft, fuzzy truths that we're never done clarifying?

Wittgenstein will put his arguments in weird arrangments to make them appear more profound than they perhaps are — Gregory

Let's say that you realize that a final, perfect system doesn't even make sense. Let's say that there's no particular finite set of utterances that can denote you truly, but you can only keep chopping at it from here or there with this or that hatchet. To me the profound in Witt is something like the profound in 'ordinary' life, which you feel/see or don't from moment to moment.

That is an oversimplification which upon analysis turns out to be false — Metaphysician Undercover

IMV, it's all oversimplification which is (partially) false, incomplete, and vague (just like this very statement.)

Well here again that dont apply
But I’ve gotta use words when I talk to you. — Eliot

context

How are you supposed to know what to do without being told what to do? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think what makes a rule a rule, is to be explicitly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who told you that this is the only acceptable use of the word "rule"?

'Rules' is just a metaphor to be interpreted in context. — j0e

Yes that's what I've been trying to explain, "rules" is just a metaphor. That's exactly the point I'm making. So "language games" is just a metaphor as well. And it's only through looking at these metaphors as if they are literal descriptions, that we come to the conclusion of "hinge propositions". If we maintain that "rules" and "language games" are just metaphors, then we respect the fact that the similarity of the simile must break down at some point, and we see that there is no point to insisting on the incoherent notion of "hinge propositions". This idea is just produced by the belief that "rules" and "language games" provides a true description.

Who told you that this is the only acceptable use of the word "rule"? — Luke

No one told me that there is only one way to use "rule", but that's the point,. There is no rule (used my way) for the use of "rule". And that's the fundamental nature of language, it does not consist of rules for usage. If you want to argue that there is a type of normative "rule" which does not explicitly state what we ought or ought not do, (and guides us through our interpretation and understanding of that rule), and that this type of "rule" which you propose, compels us to do what we ought to do, and not to do what we ought not do, through some hidden or secret method of application, you can go ahead and use "rule" in that way. It's a free world, and there are no rules (my use) as to how you ought to use that word. But there are "rules" (your way) as to how you ought to use that word. However, please do not conflate your idiosyncratic way of using "rule" with the philosophically respected way, or you'll be charged with equivocation. Equivocation renders logic invalid, and it is a stated rule. Rules are introduced into language for specific purposes, like logical proceedings. Notice the contradiction which arises between your way and my way, that's why logic requires a rule against equivocation.

However, please do not conflate your idiosyncratic way of using "rule" with the philosophically respected way, or you'll be charged with equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is the "philosophically respected way" of using the word "rule"? Is it that "there are no rules (my use) as to how you ought to use that word"?

I was attempting to put Wittgenstein in some context but I realize a lot of people find him profound and almost Zen. He is just too minimalist for me

solar system — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking the (solar system) as a thing, do things have an ontological existence ? There are two parts to this question, Whether it has an ontological existence in the mind and whether it has an ontological existence in the world independent of any mind.

The "solar system" in the mind
I agree that in the mind, the "solar system" is a concept, and because a concept "then it is fundamentally a unity". I also agree with "but I do not see how a concept is divisible". I think of the concept "solar system" as a "simples", a whole that cannot be divided into parts, although can be linked with other concepts, such as eight - planets - moons - orbit - around - the sun.

The solar system in the world
However, if there was no mind to observe the world, would the solar system ontologically exist in the world ? As Berkeley wrote: "to be is to be perceived" and "The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them." There is a basic conundrum in asking whether a solar system can exist independently of a mind when the concept "solar system" is dependent on the existence of the mind. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary for "to exist" ends up being circular, but links to the following words - real - imagination - fact - proof - information - true. I continue with my pen and Eiffel Tower analogy that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind because there is no information within any of the parts that links it to a whole.

The word "whole"
There is a world of matter, energy, space and time, in which there are parts and wholes. However, it is possible to refer to a whole as a set of parts without giving the word "whole" an ontological status. The status of the set is open to debate. On the one hand, Aristotle in Metaphysics wrote: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. On the other hand, Eubulides used mathematical induction to show that a heap of sand cannot exist, in that i) A single grain of sand is not a heap. ii) If n grains do not make a heap, adding one grain doesn’t create a heap.
IE, the word "whole" does not of necessity have an ontological status.

Summary
IE, I agree that the "solar system" as a concept in the mind is a whole, a unity, and not divisible, but as regards the solar system in a world independent of any mind, the solar system is a whole (in the sense of a set or collection) that has parts that are spatially seperated.

I was attempting to put Wittgenstein in some context but I realize a lot of people find him profound and almost Zen. He is just too minimalist for me — Gregory

I found him a bit dry at first, but then I started to get it and like it dry.

Wittgenstein was a positivist... — Gregory

That seems to me to be exactly wrong.

Take a read of Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Thought Style and Thought Collective. Just the abstract should give you an idea of why what you proposed is wrong.

Who told you that this is the only acceptable use of the word "rule"? — Luke

A good question.

Meta is so off centre in his critique of Wittgenstein that it's hard to know where to begin. It is ironic, but he and Wittgenstein might agree that stated rules are not central to language - if that is what Meta is claiming. Wittgenstein's analysis of rules leads him to suppose that they are best understood not by stating them, but looking at what it involved in following or going against a rule. It's the use that counts - what you do with words.

The implications of this for hinge propositions are of the greatest interest. It's a mistake to think, as Grayling seems to, that hinge propositions are defined by their structure; they are defined by the role they play. Their value is in examining what it involved in following or going against a hinge proposition.

I'd suggest making a close reading of PI at around §48, the criticism of the notion of simples, and having a go at applying that to Meta's theorising.

Or take a read of Of Simples and Samples

It doesn't seem clear what exactly Wittgenstein proposed and why the Philosophical Investigations were a reversal. Bertrand Russell said Wittgenstein first work was great but his second a giving up of true philosophy. As I already said, maybe Wittgenstein is not for me because I understand the words and syntax he uses but I don't get any ideas from it. Thanks for the clarification

Poor old Russell lived long enough to see his professional contribution to philosophy pretty much completely overturned. It's not a surprise that he was a bit pissed about it all. And I suspect Wittgenstein would not have been too upset to be described as having "given up" on doing philosophy; he pretty much showed it to be an odd word game.

Philosophy, at least in the faculties, is pretty much self-consciously just such a sophistic game, with the emphasis on funding and student numbers rendering it necessary to confuse undergraduates enough to keep them interested. Hence the very many threads hereabouts on identity, transhumanism, German idealism and so on, as those with a smattering of philosophical learning seek clarity.

So why are you still involved in the odd word game? You enjoy sophistry and 100 page threads arguing over the status of red cups and apples?

Yep.

Philosophy is like that damn chipped tooth that you can't help but explore with your tongue. Some folk do cryptic crosswords for much the same reason - they go with the toast and coffee.

I get where your coming from I guess, but if I say "everything in the universe has a cause" that is an intelligent assertion. I don't think the Prime Mover is an intelligent answer because " pure act " is a pretty ridiculous idea but I turn to German Idealism for a way to understand causality. You are saying it seems that causality is not a meaningful idea and I don't know how you reached that conclusion.

Well, see Causality, Determination and such stuff. "Everything in the universe has a cause" is another example of a notion taken from one area of thought and dumped into another, only to muddle the enterprise.

The solar system in the world
However, if there was no mind to observe the world, would the solar system ontologically exist in the world ? As Berkeley wrote: "to be is to be perceived" and "The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them." There is a basic conundrum in asking whether a solar system can exist independently of a mind when the concept "solar system" is dependent on the existence of the mind. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary for "to exist" ends up being circular, but links to the following words - real - imagination - fact - proof - information - true. I continue with my pen and Eiffel Tower analogy that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind because there is no information within any of the parts that links it to a whole. — RussellA

The law of identity stipulates that there are things independent of the mind, and these things have an identity proper to themselves. The true identity of the things might be completely different form how we conceptualize things. The thing itself is what Kant called noumenon. Of course, that there are independent things, and that they have an identity, are simply assumptions. And Berkeley makes very valid points, that we know things as forms, and a thing's identity is its form, therefore there is no need to assume the existence of matter at all. But when we deny the reality of matter then we need a mind to support the existence of the forms. So the recourse to Berkeley's arguments is to deny that there are any forms, things with identity, in the independent world, and assume that all is matter. Now we have your position, "that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind". There is matter outside the mind, but no things.

The word "whole"
There is a world of matter, energy, space and time, in which there are parts and wholes. However, it is possible to refer to a whole as a set of parts without giving the word "whole" an ontological status. The status of the set is open to debate. On the one hand, Aristotle in Metaphysics wrote: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. On the other hand, Eubulides used mathematical induction to show that a heap of sand cannot exist, in that i) A single grain of sand is not a heap. ii) If n grains do not make a heap, adding one grain doesn’t create a heap.
IE, the word "whole" does not of necessity have an ontological status.

Summary
IE, I agree that the "solar system" as a concept in the mind is a whole, a unity, and not divisible, but as regards the solar system in a world independent of any mind, the solar system is a whole (in the sense of a set or collection) that has parts that are spatially seperated. — RussellA

I agree, the question of existence of a "whole", as a form, or a thing with identity, is the issue here. We can assume that there are such things in the world, wholes which have an identity as a thing, but this is just an assumption which remains unproven. Furthermore, wholes are by their very nature organized structures, and it appears evident that only minds have the capacity to organize disorganized parts into a whole. So the question of a true whole, with organized parts, existing independently of all minds is very difficult.

Where you and I seem to disagree is on this issue of spatial separation in the independent world. I believe that if parts are united as a whole, there cannot be spatial separation between the parts. Space is what is external to a whole, and within the whole there cannot be "space" in the same sense of the word, because that is where the whole is. So whatever it is which unites the parts into a whole, it is existing in this area which is the internal of the whole, such that we cannot say that there is spatial separation between those parts.

The law of identity stipulates that there are things independent of the mind, and these things have an identity proper to themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nuh.

The law of identity: A thing is the same as itself. What does this mean to you? Do you see any mention of a mind needing to apprehend that thing?

Yeah. I think it's pretty settled that you have an - odd - notion of identity.

So let's keep it strict and clear. You said that "The law of identity stipulates that there are things independent of the mind..."

It doesn't.

To be sure, there are things independent of the mind; but the law of identity does not stipulate that there are.

OK, I'll recant, and say that the law of identity implies necessarily, that things are independent of the mind. So let me explain this, in a way which you might be able to understand.. In fact, I'll present it in two slightly different ways.

The law of identity stipulates that the identity of a thing is the thing itself. A thing is the same as itself. Since it does not say that a mind is necessary for a thing to be the thing that it is, yet it is necessary that a thing is the thing that it is, we can conclude that to be the thing that it is, does not require a mind. Simplified: "things are independent of the mind".

Another way to consider this is that identity in modern terms is sometimes said to be the relationship which a thing has with itself. It can be argued that it requires a mind to draw a relation between two distinct things. But the relationship between a thing and itself is not actually a relationship at all, the thing and itself are one and the same thing, and this is absolute, not relative. Hence, no mind is required for a thing to be the thing that it is, because being the thing that it is is not a relationship.
.
This is a principle which Aristotle made a great effort to explain, requiring many pages, even multiple books, in his "Metaphysics". It is the reason why most philosophers will argue that Aristotle was not idealist, even though he clearly placed form as prior to matter in his metaphysics. It is a principle which is mostly unlearnt in modern society, as not even philosophy graduates are required to understand Aristotelian metaphysics.

Meaning is based in intent, and the intent of that statement, "a thing is the same as itself", the law of identity, is to say that a thing does not require a mind to have an identity as a thing, i.e. to be the thing that it is. The intent of this statement is derived from the context, Aristotle's "Metaphysics", understanding of which is required to determine the meaning Due to the tendency of human beings to believe that identity is something we assign to things, the idea that a thing has an identity, and is therefore a thing, independent of us assigning an identity to it, is not easy to dispel.

Simply stating that things exist independently from the mind does not suffice to put down skepticism, as it 's just a bald assertion. So the law of identity is formulated from the necessity that a thing must be the thing that it is (it has an unique identity); and it cannot be other than it is or else it would be something else, two distinct things at the same time. If we accept this proposition, and it seems reasonable to me, then the thing's identity is within the thing itself, not the identity we assign to it, because assigned identity is not a necessary relation. Then the thing's existence as a thing is necessarily independent from the mind.

Mind=Mind

the question of existence of a "whole" — Metaphysician Undercover

We are faced with the insolvable problem of how the mind can know things that exist independently of the existence of the mind.

Paraphrasing Kant as regards a priori pure intuitions, we can imagine the concept of empty space, but we cannot imagine the concept of there being no space.

As Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason, "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings". (A26, A33)

We are faced with the insolvable problem of how the mind can know things that exist independently of the existence of the mind. — RussellA

It is not really insolvable, because we do this with logic. That is what logic does for us, it allows us to extend our knowledge beyond the limits of our immediate experience. The problem is that there are limits to what we can do with logic, and there are judgements as to validity and soundness which must be made. So, depending on how you define "knowledge", and the degree of infallibility which you require as the criteria for "knowledge", our knowledge of such things is limited.

Kant may have expressed it as his opinion that we cannot know things which exist independently of the mind, but Plato allowed that the mind has direct contact with independent Forms. With such direct contact we can understand independent Forms (things) through the use of logic, without relying on the medium of sense perception. Perhaps Kant would disqualify such fundamental ontological principles as not fulfilling the criteria of "knowledge", but Plato places this as the highest form of knowledge, just like Aristotle positions intuition as the highest form of knowledge.

I think what makes a rule a rule, is to be explicitly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no rule (used my way) for the use of "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is it, MU?

OK, I'll recant, — Metaphysician Undercover

I acknowledge and respect that.

But...

It sounds profound to talk of the Law of Identity; we need to keep in mind that what we are talking about is just a=a.

Metaphysical statements cannot be derived from logic alone. So a=a can tell us nothing about what is in the mind and what isn't.

Your argument here:

Since it does not say that a mind is necessary for a thing to be the thing that it is, yet it is necessary that a thing is the thing that it is, we can conclude that to be the thing that it is, does not require a mind. Simplified: "things are independent of the mind". — Metaphysician Undercover

...is unconvincing for this reason. As it stands it is impossible to confirm its validity, let alone that it is cogent. It mixes terms - mind, necessity, dependency - that need considerable work to be understood.

It is also clear that a=a is a relationship, contrary to what you claim; all you have done is stipulate that relationships are between different individuals. I might choose to stipulate otherwise. Indeed, we do so when we make use of statements such as 1+1=2.

Perhaps the reason Aristotelian logic and metaphysics is not required reading any more is that we have progressed beyond that.

:rofl:

Mind=Mind — Luke

Hence mind is mind-independent. Cute.

Paraphrasing Kant as regards a priori pure intuitions, we can imagine the concept of empty space, but we cannot imagine the concept of there being no space. — RussellA

I don't get this - as with many arguments from Kant.

I have a clear idea of what dimensions are; and I understand what zero-dimensional space would be. like. Saying I can't imagine it - so what?

It's just that our understanding of space has moved on considerably since Kant. As with most things. I find it hard to understand folk's fascination with the fellow.