Some see the differences and others the similarities. The list I provided was meant for those who can see the similarities. As to the others, they'll have to do their own research.

It's like The Emperor's New Clothes.

Some people seem to have an unwillingness or inability to see similarities between Platonism and Indian monistic philosophy.

For example, while noting some similarities, Gregorios writes that “the Plotinian concept of emanation finds no precise parallel in Indian thought” – P M Gregorios “Does Geography Condition Philosophy? On Going Beyond the Occidental-Oriental Distinction”.

As a matter of fact, the concept of the manifest as an emanation of the unmanifest is not altogether unknown to Indian philosophy. And the Plotinian concept of the One abiding in itself, proceeding out of itself in creation and reverting back to itself (mone, proodos, epistrophe) is certainly comparable to the Indian concept of emanation, abidance and withdrawal (sRshti, sthiti, samhāra) that we find especially in monistic traditions like Abhinavagupta’s Kashmiri Shaivism. Even the concept of “the One” (Greek “to Hen”, Sanskrit “Ekam”) is obviously essentially identical in both systems.

As regards differences, both systems admit five faculties of perception (sight, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling by touch) as powers of the soul, whereby it perceives or “takes in” features of the world such as color, etc. However, in addition to the five cognitive powers of perception, the soul in Indian philosophy also has five motor powers through which it acts on or interacts with the physical world: locomotion or moving about in space, speaking or uttering sounds, excreting, procreating and grasping or taking hold of things.

This seems to be one area to which Platonism appears to give less attention than its Indian counterparts.

Also related to perception, is the Indian theory of impermanence or momentariness (kshanikavāda) which Abhinavagupta seems to have adapted to his own system from Buddhism. Briefly, it holds that an object is perceived in a rapid sequence of very brief units of perception (kshana, moments) which are combined by the mind into a seemingly solid and more lasting image of the object.

I can’t find anything comparable in Platonism but I think that together with the five motor powers of the soul this could be added to Platonism without major difficulties. Obviously, Abhinavagupta was an untiring thinker and his system is extremely elaborate – some, including myself, would say too elaborate – but I tend to believe that Platonism may benefit from borrowing a few elements of it in so far as they are consistent with its own fundamental tenets.

Consider this, according to Advaita all is Brahman and we are Brahman, according at least to a school we are God that forgot whom he is. Where is this found in Platonism?

In the other topic someone asked you about the similarities between Greek and Chinese Philosophy, what is your explanation?

I don't know anything about Chinese Philosophy, I think you're confusing me with someone else.

Not only.

Yes, quite possibly, you are confusing me with more than just one other person.

In any case, I’m not aware of any belief in Platonism about a “God who forgets”. On the contrary, the only one who forgets is the human soul, which is why it descends into the world of matter (Enneads III 1, 15). And even the soul has the potential to remember its true identity and return to its original source.