If it's murder (i.e. intentional / negligent homicide of a defenseless human being by another human being), then it's not only 'illegal' but also immoral. A moral act is, as I understand it, conduct that responds to (the prospect of) harm by preventing or avoiding it, or reduces net harm as much as one is able as described in this ethical framework.^Is killing a small child wrong? Discuss... — Tom Storm
Excerpt from recent thesis on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion:
Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to
satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek
explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the
consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1282&context=philosophy_theses — Wayfarer
No, none of that. Making use of empirical observation does not commit one to empiricism. And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it.So your moral system starts with suppositions that empiricism is true and you can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system. — Tom Storm
Can you do it in a few dot points?
And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it. — Herg
If the child is expected to have a happy life, then by killing it, since happiness is a good, you're expecting to replace net good with nothing, which is a bad thing to do. OTOH, if the child is expected to have a miserable life, then you're expecting to replace net bad with nothing, which is a good thing to do. However, in practice it is very hard to be sure what the future happiness of a child will be, so this simple calculation usually can't be made.Is killing a small child wrong? — Tom Storm
Where exactly do I presuppose a moral truth?Your argument presupposes moral truths and so doesn't tell us whether morality is objective or subjective. — Bartricks
Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use.Premise 1 in your first argument helps itself to appropriateness.
That's similar to my premise 1, but IMO not as plausible; and you don't provide any grounds for believing this.But to say it is appropriate to have this or that feeling is to say it is right to feel it.
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. It just is the case that, for example, if you have a pain, you want the pain to stop. The negative value you place on the pain does not originate in your mind, it is imposed on your mind by the demands of the pain.But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. — Bartricks
Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use. — Herg
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. — Herg
I should explain why morality is subjective.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective. — Bartricks
No, it doesn't. But that isn't what I said. Please try to answer what I actually write, instead of changing it to something else and than answering that.Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it". — Bartricks
That's a good way of putting it. The only honest answer for why someone holds their moral axioms is because they feel the axioms are right. — Down The Rabbit Hole
Again, I didn't say that.↪Herg
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature.
— Herg
So you think the mindless natural world values things? — Bartricks
True, but again, not what I said.I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.
And again.And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well?
No, this is your collection of straw men.This is the stuff of madness.
It's not ambiguous. You are begging the question against ethical naturalism. The point of the first premise is to point out that a value claim can also be a claim about natural properties. Your characterisation of that as 'ambiguous' rests entirely on your own tacit assumption that this cannot occur. But it does.Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness).
It shows that nature sometimes dictates what our values are to be.EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.
Yes.↪Herg How am I begging the question against the naturalist? The naturalist identifies moral properties - such as rightness and goodness - with natural features, yes? — Bartricks
My argument explains that.But for an act to be right is for it 'to be done'. That is, there is a prescription enjoining us to do it. How does a natural feature issue a prescription?
I'm not claiming that it does. You're confusing the action of valuing a thing with a thing having value.And for something to be morally good is for it to be morally valuable. How does a natural feature value anything?
True.Here are two statements:
"Xing is wrong"
"Xing has natural feature P"
They are very different. Both are descriptions, but the first describes a prescription, whereas the second does not.
True.So they are not equivalent.
False. Naturalism asserts that they are already statements of both kinds. 'We ought not to inflict pain' = 'there is an obligation not to inflict pain', and this is both descriptive and prescriptive.Yet naturalism turns all moral statements into statements of the second kind.
Q; Why do we have anaesthetics?
A: Because pain is bad. Everyone knows this, except a handful of subjectivist philosophers. — Herg
Although that's a psychological claim rather than a metaethical one and is not equivalent to what I am saying.
I am not saying that morality is subjective because we feel some acts are right and some wrong and feelings are subjective states. That would be to commit the fallacy of confusing a cause of a belief or impression with what it is 'about'.
I am saying that morality is subjective because it is made of prescriptions and values and only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and value things.
So, I believe some acts are wrong. I believe Xing is wrong. What, exactly, am I believing when I believe X is wrong? Well, I believe that the act is one we are commanded not to perform. So, what would it take for my belief to be true? Well, there would have to be a command not to perform the act.
Would a command of my own do the trick? Well, no. For in order for my commands to be capable of rendering moral beliefs true, I would need to be responsible for everyone - now and throughout history - getting the impression of moral commands. And I am not responsible for that - i have had no hand in it at all. And so the truth maker of my moral belief that Xing is wrong is not my own commanding activity.
Thus, the truth maker of moral beliefs must be the subjective states of some third party. — Bartricks
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