Is killing a small child wrong? Discuss... — Tom Storm

If it's murder (i.e. intentional / negligent homicide of a defenseless human being by another human being), then it's not only 'illegal' but also immoral. A moral act is, as I understand it, conduct that responds to (the prospect of) harm by preventing or avoiding it, or reduces net harm as much as one is able as described in this ethical framework.^

(continued here)^


^For further elaboration scroll down each respective thread for my follow-up posts.

These constant debates on morality are interesting. They veer into the abstract and the ivory towers.
Morality is really a word for a code of conduct for self and other.

Nobody wants to be robbed or beaten against their will.
Therefore certain aspects of human desire are absolute.
So some morality is absolute.

Now whether people universally follow these rules is obviously not always. But no one disagrees that they themselves personally should be harmed against their will.

Lastly,people can agree with certain moral principles but in reality break them and lie about their motives. That's life in the real world outside of theories.

Killing, raping, and stealing are all obviously, objectively bad. People who say that it's subjective are the people that want to do those things to others.

Excerpt from recent thesis on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion:

Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to
satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek
explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the
consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.

https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1282&context=philosophy_theses — Wayfarer

I skimmed through your post. Sorry, I was in a hurry and what caught my eye was the word "metaphysics" and suddenly a light bulb goes off in my head - pragmatism. What difference does the answer to "Is morality - objective, subjective, or relative?" make in our moral conduct? Is the OP claiming that if morality's subjective, fae'll go on a killing spree or if morality's relative, fae'll marry an 8 year old girl? Now that I think of it, the OP is claiming that! :chin:

So your moral system starts with suppositions that empiricism is true and you can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system. — Tom Storm

No, none of that. Making use of empirical observation does not commit one to empiricism. And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it.

Can you do it in a few dot points?

Your argument presupposes moral truths and so doesn't tell us whether morality is objective or subjective. Premise 1 in your first argument helps itself to appropriateness. But to say it is appropriate to have this or that feeling is to say it is right to feel it.

Thanks. I don't entirely understand syllogism one. But I understand the others. I held a view very similar to this. I see your reasoning. You're essentially adding texture to some utilitarian notions.

One issue to consider (and you may have done so) is whether you take a situational or deontological view of these principles? Is it wrong to cause suffering for a greater good - eg - was taking down Hitler ok even if it involved mass violence?

I'd be interested what others would say about the soundness of the argument.

And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it. — Herg

Having good reason rests on the supposition that reason is a sound arbiter, which in itself relies upon reason and is a circular argument. Anyone using the laws of logic or logical axioms (identity; non-contradiction and excluded middle) needs to presuppose that reason is sound. I don't disagree with this, but it is located in a particular approach.

Morality is subjective. But 'relative' is not an alternative to objective or subjective. The opposite of relative is 'absolute'. So there's whether morality is objective or subjective. And then there's a different question - is it relative or absolute. The answer to the former can help answer the latter, but they're distinct questions.

I should explain why morality is subjective.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective.

Is killing a small child wrong? — Tom Storm

If the child is expected to have a happy life, then by killing it, since happiness is a good, you're expecting to replace net good with nothing, which is a bad thing to do. OTOH, if the child is expected to have a miserable life, then you're expecting to replace net bad with nothing, which is a good thing to do. However, in practice it is very hard to be sure what the future happiness of a child will be, so this simple calculation usually can't be made.

When one can't do the proper calculation, one has to fall back on rules of thumb. A good rule of thumb is that people, even children, usually have a much better idea of whether their lives are happy or miserable than other people do, which suggests that it would be better to leave the decision whether to stay alive to the person themselves. Another good rule of thumb is that a child is not yet a properly formed human being, so it would be a good idea to let it grow up and find out how happy it was. Another good rule of thumb is that if we once allow child-killing, it could get out of hand (children can be very annoying).

I'm going to say that for all these reasons, in practice, killing a small child is almost always wrong.

Your argument presupposes moral truths and so doesn't tell us whether morality is objective or subjective. — Bartricks

Where exactly do I presuppose a moral truth?

Premise 1 in your first argument helps itself to appropriateness.

Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use.

But to say it is appropriate to have this or that feeling is to say it is right to feel it.

That's similar to my premise 1, but IMO not as plausible; and you don't provide any grounds for believing this.

But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. — Bartricks

The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. It just is the case that, for example, if you have a pain, you want the pain to stop. The negative value you place on the pain does not originate in your mind, it is imposed on your mind by the demands of the pain.

Deleted

Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use. — Herg

Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it".

The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. — Herg

So you think the mindless natural world values things? How does that work?

I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.

And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well? This is the stuff of madness.

Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness). EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.

I should explain why morality is subjective.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective. — Bartricks

That's a good way of putting it. The only honest answer for why someone holds their moral axioms is because they feel the axioms are right.

I think @TheMadFool is concerned about where this leads us. Why is it wrong to cause suffering? If there's no articulable reason, why should a psychopath refrain from causing it if they can get away with it?

Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it". — Bartricks

No, it doesn't. But that isn't what I said. Please try to answer what I actually write, instead of changing it to something else and than answering that.

That's a good way of putting it. The only honest answer for why someone holds their moral axioms is because they feel the axioms are right. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Although that's a psychological claim rather than a metaethical one and is not equivalent to what I am saying.

I am not saying that morality is subjective because we feel some acts are right and some wrong and feelings are subjective states. That would be to commit the fallacy of confusing a cause of a belief or impression with what it is 'about'.

I am saying that morality is subjective because it is made of prescriptions and values and only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and value things.

So, I believe some acts are wrong. I believe Xing is wrong. What, exactly, am I believing when I believe X is wrong? Well, I believe that the act is one we are commanded not to perform. So, what would it take for my belief to be true? Well, there would have to be a command not to perform the act.

Would a command of my own do the trick? Well, no. For in order for my commands to be capable of rendering moral beliefs true, I would need to be responsible for everyone - now and throughout history - getting the impression of moral commands. And I am not responsible for that - i have had no hand in it at all. And so the truth maker of my moral belief that Xing is wrong is not my own commanding activity.

Thus, the truth maker of moral beliefs must be the subjective states of some third party.

What are you saying, then? IF I say that something is 'inappropriate' I am not reporting how a word is used, am I? So drop the word inappropriate and express premise 1 in an unambiguous way.

NOte too that you haven't answered my questions.

Do you think the mindless natural world can issue prescriptions and value things? If so, then are you not mad?

Or do you think that morality is not composed of prescriptions and values? If so, then are you not misusing the word morality?

↪Herg
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature.
— Herg

So you think the mindless natural world values things? — Bartricks

Again, I didn't say that.

I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.

True, but again, not what I said.

And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well?

And again.

This is the stuff of madness.

No, this is your collection of straw men.

Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness).

It's not ambiguous. You are begging the question against ethical naturalism. The point of the first premise is to point out that a value claim can also be a claim about natural properties. Your characterisation of that as 'ambiguous' rests entirely on your own tacit assumption that this cannot occur. But it does.

EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.

It shows that nature sometimes dictates what our values are to be.

How am I begging the question against the naturalist? The naturalist identifies moral properties - such as rightness and goodness - with natural features, yes?

But for an act to be right is for it 'to be done'. That is, there is a prescription enjoining us to do it. How does a natural feature issue a prescription?

And for something to be morally good is for it to be morally valuable. How does a natural feature value anything?

Here are two statements:

"Xing is wrong"
"Xing has natural feature P"

They are very different. Both are descriptions, but the first describes a prescription, whereas the second does not. So they are not equivalent. Yet naturalism turns all moral statements into statements of the second kind. So it is false.

↪Herg How am I begging the question against the naturalist? The naturalist identifies moral properties - such as rightness and goodness - with natural features, yes? — Bartricks

Yes.

But for an act to be right is for it 'to be done'. That is, there is a prescription enjoining us to do it. How does a natural feature issue a prescription?

My argument explains that.

And for something to be morally good is for it to be morally valuable. How does a natural feature value anything?

I'm not claiming that it does. You're confusing the action of valuing a thing with a thing having value.

Here are two statements:

"Xing is wrong"
"Xing has natural feature P"

They are very different. Both are descriptions, but the first describes a prescription, whereas the second does not.

True.

So they are not equivalent.

True.

Yet naturalism turns all moral statements into statements of the second kind.

False. Naturalism asserts that they are already statements of both kinds. 'We ought not to inflict pain' = 'there is an obligation not to inflict pain', and this is both descriptive and prescriptive.

Who is issuing the prescription?

Who is issuing the prescription? — Bartricks

Nature.

Q; Why do we have anaesthetics?
A: Because pain is bad. Everyone knows this, except a handful of subjectivist philosophers.

Who is issuing the prescription?
— Bartricks

Nature. — Herg

Oh, so you're mad. Nature issues prescriptions. I see. Stones speak to you do they? What are the molecules telling you to do today?

Q; Why do we have anaesthetics?
A: Because pain is bad. Everyone knows this, except a handful of subjectivist philosophers. — Herg

You are committing the naturalistic fallacy. The word 'is' in 'Because pain is bad' is ambiguous. It could mean that pain and badness are one and the same. That would be the 'is' of identity. Or it could mean that pain 'has' badness (in the way that 'ice cream is cold' doesn't mean ice cream and coldness are identical, but that ice cream has coldness as a property).

Now, what the naturalist does is thinks "oo, pain is bad" - which is (normally) correct, if the 'is' in that sentence is the is of predication. Normally pain does indeed have badness. But then they conclude that pain 'is' bad as in 'pain and badness are one and the same. And that's to commit the naturalistic fallacy - to equivocate over the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication.

That doesn't by itself establish that pain and badness are distinct, it is just a fallacious way of arriving at a conclusion.

Are pain and badness one and the same? No, for if they were then it would be impossible for there to be pain that is not bad. Yet sometimes pain is not bad, for instance when it is deserved.

Furthermore, for something to be 'bad' is for it to be disvaluable. So, for pain to be bad is for pain to be disvalued. But pain could not itself 'be' the badness, because that would require that pain disvalue itself. Which is insane as pain is a mental state and is not in the business of valuing or disvaluing things.

So, anyway, you're wrong. Subjectivism is true, albeit divine subjectivism.

agreed.

Although that's a psychological claim rather than a metaethical one and is not equivalent to what I am saying.

I am not saying that morality is subjective because we feel some acts are right and some wrong and feelings are subjective states. That would be to commit the fallacy of confusing a cause of a belief or impression with what it is 'about'.

I am saying that morality is subjective because it is made of prescriptions and values and only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and value things.

So, I believe some acts are wrong. I believe Xing is wrong. What, exactly, am I believing when I believe X is wrong? Well, I believe that the act is one we are commanded not to perform. So, what would it take for my belief to be true? Well, there would have to be a command not to perform the act.

Would a command of my own do the trick? Well, no. For in order for my commands to be capable of rendering moral beliefs true, I would need to be responsible for everyone - now and throughout history - getting the impression of moral commands. And I am not responsible for that - i have had no hand in it at all. And so the truth maker of my moral belief that Xing is wrong is not my own commanding activity.

Thus, the truth maker of moral beliefs must be the subjective states of some third party. — Bartricks

When I say "feelings" I am referring to our intuitions. That our intuitions are the only basis we can have for moral beliefs, is surely a reason for labelling them subjective?