By and large, we (humans) have two legs. Exceptions are rare, and we might explain them in some way. Does that mean "two-legged-ness" itself exists wholly and independently of all else...? Not really, at least not in any discernible way, and it's not necessary anyway. Similarly, morals can be existentially mind-dependent and shared among such minds, without existing independently thereof.
Does it make sense to speak of morals for ...
• a person torturing a rock? No (bit creepy though)
• a rock torturing a person? No
• a rock torturing another rock? No
• a person torturing another person? Yes
Which suggests that morals are of and applicable to persons, to experiencing social minds.
1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity. — Kenosha Kid
3. Morality is subjective insofar as it is still us as individuals who inherit that biology and culture, and us ultimately that have to make moral decisions, gain experience based on those decisions and their outcomes, and grapple with moral problems specifically for us. — Kenosha Kid
2. Morality is also relative insofar as much of it is also mediated by inherited socialisations which differ across time and space. Historically, those socialisations have been optimised to maximise our ability to apply our social hardware to daily living, which is why there is so much similarity between the cultures of immediate-return hunter-gatherer groups. More recently, those socialisations have evolved to counteract that innate behaviour (serfdom, slavery, individualism), and even more recently they're evolving to reassert that innate morality on a global scale (equality, diversity, tolerance). — Kenosha Kid
Absolutely objective as it is bound by the laws of reason and logic (for those in possession of such — Iris0
Physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective. — 180 Proof
How is that any different from the infinite regress that comes with “is” questions? At some point you just say “it just looks like it’s that way!” Observation is subjective too. — Pfhorrest
You conclude what you've assumed, it seems to me. If one asks "why", then only a "subjective" answer (re: intentions) will suffice – thus, age old category mistakes like asking e.g. "why does the world exist"– but objectively the "subject" is the rider and not the elephant, so to speak. "Feeling" guides but does not ground, or explain, objective morality; only human suffering and eusociality factually ground moral agency ... just as our bodies systemically enable-constrain our "feelings" (affective cognition). — 180 Proof
Is there a way to articulate this position to support your belief (I presume you hold) that "suffering is a bad thing"? — Down The Rabbit Hole
I can't speak for 180 Proof but many models of morality start with a supposition - e.g., that human flourishing should be the goal. This is not objective but objective standards can be built relative to this goal. — Tom Storm
Is there a moral system that doesn't start with a supposition - whether it be religious or secular? — Tom Storm
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