I don't know what point you think I'm going to make. You've made a distinction, and you've said that the distinction is foolish. I'm pretty confused about this. If I think something is foolish, I generally try not to do that thing (admittedly, sometimes I fail)

I fall all the time, so no worries about it.


Going back to your original comment: I meant I'm fine with making a distinction between direct and indirect realism. What I believe is that it doesn't hold up as a theory of realism though.

Have you presented an argument about why? An argument that addresses what indirect realists actually say, rather than the thing about bodies touching other bodies.

That gets back to asking you for an argument: what argument do you want me to address?

you just said indirect realism doesn't hold up. I just want you to explain your own reasoning for saying that

Ah.

Indirect realism is a halfwayhouse between transcendental idealism, and materalism. It wants to be neutral, but can't be because it's incoherent when you try to make it work.

What do you mean when you say 'touch the ball directly'? — flannel jesus

That's the question I ask the indirect realist!

This bit:

But I will repeat a point that may have gone unnoticed. The argument, in the title and in the OP, is framed as if there were two sides, the one being indirect realists who point out various anomalies they think show that we never perceive things directly; and a presumed opposition who think that somehow we do perceive things directly...

But why not reject the very framing of the argument in those terms:
There is an alternative, which is to reject the juxtaposition of direct and indirect experiences entirely, and admit that we do sometimes see (hear, touch, smell...) things as they are; and that indeed this is essential in order for us to be able to recognise those occasions in which we see (hear, touch, smell...) things in the world erroneously.
— Banno — Banno

but you still haven't said why. Why is it incoherent? What makes it incoherent?

That's the question I ask the indirect realist! — Banno

Indirect realists don't really make claims about touching balls directly. The claims of indirect realists are about experience and perception. If that's what you ask, I suspect you're misunderstanding what indirect realists think.

The argument that dislodged me from my belief has already been alluded to. It's the infinite regress argument. Suppose that we're only indirectly aware of reality. If so then how are we aware of our perceptions? Aren't we a step away from those too?

If so then I think we're committed to a homuncular fallacy.

But for the realist without these in/direct commitments, we can say these interminable temptations are just puzzles.

The argument that dislodged me from my belief has already been alluded to. It's the infinite regress argument. Suppose that we're only indirectly aware of reality. If so then how are we aware of our perceptions? Aren't we a step away from those too? — Moliere

Interesting argument, thanks for making it explicit instead of just alluding to it.

I don't think indirect realists necessarily have a model of perception that is humunculous-like. I can kinda vaguely see what some might have the intuition that they do, but I don't think that's a required feature of being an indirect realist.

What are the underlying beliefs you think are the same? — Moliere

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe in i) Realism rather than Idealism, ii) that there is a long and complex causal chain of events between the object in the world and our eventual perception of it and iii) there is a causal indirectness and a cognitive directness between our perception of an object and the object itself.

However, whilst both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that there is a cognitive directness, they differ in what that actually means.

Suppose that we're only indirectly aware of reality. If so then how are we aware of our perceptions? Aren't we a step away from those too? — Moliere

No, why should we be?

Mmm. I've spen a bit more time on this than just Google and wikipedia.

But hey, you go for it.

According to these definitions I'd not qualify is either, yet I certainly believe reality doesn't care about my beliefs, at least.

I'm not tempted to define realism in opposition to idealism, for instance. And what I paused at most is notions of cause in relation to perception -- I think a realist is open to non-causal relations, as long as they are real.

And obviously there's a difference in meaning, but surely we can parse it together here?

Seems to follow the logic of indirect realism -- there's an intermediary between reality and you, whatever that is. Acknowledging that there's a difference between the real and perception gives conceptual ground to say something like "your perception of perception is what you need to know to say anything", and so on up the chain if you understand my meaning. You can slip in as many layers of "reality" as you like in the notion to justify whatever you want, in spite of your senses.

You can slip in as many layers of "reality" as you like in the notion to justify whatever you want, in spite of your senses. — Moliere

But just because you theorize that people CAN do that doesn't mean indirect realists DO do that. Why does it matter if someone can do this? Surely it matters what indirect realists actually say, and not wild things you've imagined they can say

Certainly.

you did ask, though -- and I answered. And I think, at this point, we've given the blogger enough fodder to blog upon lol.

You could quote indirect realists who talk about that, instead of being sarcastic and snarky. That might be more fruitful.

you did ask, though -- and I answered — Moliere

My question was why do you think what you think about indirect realism, why do you reject it. You reject it because things you imagine indirect realists might say? And not what indirect realists do say?

That wasn't sarcasm.

It's late here and I'm not going to spend time gong over this with a newbie right now.

Take a look at the thread i cited earier -

The arguments you present were articulated by Ayer and demolished by Austin. See the thread Austin: Sense and Sensibilia. — Banno

at this point I just want you to say which indirect realist you're talking about. I don't believe in indirect realism. I also don't believe in jesus, in comparison. Why the hell should I bother with it?

indirect realists are often non skeptical realists. Representationalism is treated as borderline synonymous with indirect realism by a hell of a lot of sources.

"This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using direct and indirect."

It's quite possible that you're disagreeing with indirect realists for this very reason - failing to understand what they mean by indirect.

you tell me, why are you bothering with it? The distinction is foolish, in your own words - nobody is forcing you to make this foolish distinction. You are free to ignore it

I'm not tempted to define realism in opposition to idealism, for instance. — Moliere

There is realism and idealism as concepts and there is Realism and Idealism as proper nouns. As concepts they overlap, but as proper nouns are distinct. For example, the SEP articles on Realism and Idealism.
===============================================================================

I think a realist is open to non-causal relations, as long as they are real. — Moliere

Yes, the Eiffel Tower and Empires States Building are related, but non-causally.

My perception of an object and the object causing my perception are related, and causally.

I'm a bit tempted to say the Big Building Thing is causally related. Why build a bigger monument? To show up the other one!

I suppose my thought is that "perception" can't separate us from the real in the manner I perceive indirect realists to say.

I suppose my thought is that "perception" can't separate us from the real in the manner I perceive indirect realists to say. — Moliere

We perceive a stick bent in water. Is the stick in water really bent?

I believe it is and isn't -- just depends on how you want to say things, but doesn't depend on the light, the water, or the stick. Language is tricky.

The stick is bent.

But it's not really bent. in that way.

For reals, you can pick up the stick yourself!

Please give constructive feedback and arguments — Ashriel

I reject the dichotomy of the 2 realisms. They are not direct and indirect realism. There is no such difference or categories in the realism.

They are rather sense perception and sense perception with reasoning.
Every perception is via sense, and this is the primary perception for all animals with the sense organs.
We see apples, and know they are apples. We eat apples, and also taste the apple via the sense organs.

But there are times, we think about apples. We see the apples, and try to figure out what type of apples they are i.e. are they cooking apples, or the Golden Delicious types? In this type of perception, we are applying the reasonings on the apples, and infer or deduce the data from the apples. This is sense perception with reasoning, which they used to call as indirect realism. Indirect realists think they are not perceiving the object directly. But that is not true. All perception is direct. It would be nonsensical to say that you were eating and tasting the sense data of the apples.

When you see a bent stick in the glass of water, you are just using your sense perception. It looks bent when perceived via the sense organ only i.e. your eyes. But when you apply your reasoning on the sense perception, you know it is the visual effect of the lights refracted in the water of the glass.

Therefore, it is not meaningful distinction to say Direct or Indirect Realism. They are just different type of perceptions. One is sense perception, and the other is sense perception with reasoning.