What brand of idealists does that?
— Mww
Subjective idealism or phenomenalism perhaps? — Michael
To me, I am directly perceiving the chicken in the other room, because small parts of it entered my nose. — creativesoul
I'm guessing that you'll deny that the chicken is a constituent of my perception or my experience. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the molecules are a constituent of my perception or experience.
So at least according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur. — Michael
Well, whether or not something follows from one's terms is established by one's meaning, not the others'. — creativesoul
I cannot make sense of hallucination unless compared to non-hallucinatory experience. Non hallucinatory experience does not depend upon hallucinatory in the same sense of "depend". Existential dependency. On the indirect realist account, there is no difference between the constituents.
That's just plain wrong.
A hallucination or dream of an apple does not require a distal object(an apple) except sometime in past experience. For that is when the biological machinery does its perception work. In dreams and hallucinations, its (mis)firing as though it has once again perceived or is once again perceiving an apple, despite no apple being perceived.
There is no difference between the constitution of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes. — Michael
Is hallucination of an apple possible if one has never ever seen one, if one is completely unaware that there are such things as apples? — creativesoul
If hallucination of an apple amounts to the biological machinery doing the same thing it has done in past, while looking at an apple, then it becomes clear which one is existentially dependent upon the other.
They are not the same. Indirect realism cannot seem to account for that. — creativesoul
Fungus huh?
I don't understand what you think indirect realism has to account for. — Michael
I still see something when I dream and hallucinate, — Michael
This again assumes that the only alternative to indirect perception is direct perception. Have you stoped beating your wife yet?You're welcome to redefine "direct perception" if you like, but in doing so you're no longer addressing the indirect realist's claim. Your arguments against indirect realism are against a strawman. — Michael
Yep.Careful, if you think about this too much you might come to understand how words do things. — wonderer1
Again, indirect realism's framing of the discussion is oddly passive, as if all we ever do is look.Reminiscent of Kant's Noumena. The whole denial that I know that the heater grate to my right is what I'm seeing. I know what it's made of. I know where it's located. I know the size and shape. I know it's function. I know some dangers it poses to passersby. I know it's not located in my head/body. I know mental representations are. Thus, the grate I'm looking at is not a mental representation. — creativesoul
I'm not convinced. An hallucinatory cow and a veridical cow are very different things.There is no difference between the constituents of an hallucination and a veridical experience. — Michael
Yep. Was a great night. For a while I even had a split mind which was weird. — Michael
Experiences, whether veridical or hallucinations, are reducible to (or supervene on) brain activity. Therefore anything that exists outside the brain cannot be a constituent of experience. Do you not accept this reasoning? — Michael
How do you distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination? It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that you can distinguish them because the English word "see" should only be used for veridical experience.
By definition, if I have to infer some X then I do not have direct knowledge of X, so I don't understand your argument here. Are you asking how inferences are even possible? Are you calling into question the very scientific method?
Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects (and their properties) do not exist within experience.
The first premise is supported by neuroscience. The second premise is true by definition. The conclusion follows. — Michael
I speculate that there might be a way of achieving some compatibility between intentionalism and disjunctivism. — Banno
We do, after all, have the word "hallucination", "dream", "delusion' and so on precisely because we are aware of that difference. — Banno
You want to say that the experience is the same, but having a dream is qualitatively different to being awake; having an hallucination is different to having a cow.
If all you mean by saying that distal objects are not in the body or brain, well so what? — Janus
Yes. Experience exists within brain. Chickens and odour molecules exist outside the brain. Therefore, chickens and odour molecules are not constituents of experience. Experiences are caused by chickens and odour molecules, but that's the extent of their involvement. — Michael
There's a distinction between a distal object being a constituent of experience and being a cause of experience. Indirect realists accept that distal objects are a cause of experience but deny that they are a constituent of experience. — Michael
When human beings experience features of the world by means of sense perception, the things that they experience cause them to experience them in some specific ways, but the understanding that they bring to bear also shapes the character and content of those experiences. — Pierre-Normand
Would you say that Sue and Lia are caused by the visual presentation of the figure to experience, or see, the same mental phenomenon and that that they give it different interpretations, or would you say that they experience different mental phenomena? — Pierre-Normand
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