I've said that the science of perception supports indirect realism and not naive realism. — Michael
This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using "direct" and "indirect". — Banno
Back on page one I said: "This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using 'direct' and 'indirect'." — Banno
So to avoid using the terms "direct" and "indirect", my own take is that we have an experience that we describe as seeing an apple, but that the relationship between the experience and the apple isn't of a kind that resolves the epistemological problem of perception (or of a kind that satisfies naive colour realism, as an example). — Michael
The science is accepted by both "sides". You still haven't come to terms with that simple fact. — Banno
what is "the epistemological problem of perception" — Banno
Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties? — Michael
Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties? — Michael
For my part, the issue is that some folk think there is a need to justify that they see this text, even as they read it.
But that is a symptom of an excess of doubt. Cartesian fever. — Banno
Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3081809/
Direct, unitary perception of duration occurs up to a maximum period of approximately 1.5 to 2 seconds from the beginning to the end of a continuous sensory stimulus. — https://www.britannica.com/science/time-perception/Perceived-duration
Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul
everything empirical that we experience occurring in the present is known by science to in fact occur some fractions of a second prior to our conscious apprehension of it (with some estimates having it consciously occur nearly .3 seconds after the initial stimulus onset (1)) —such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. This, then, to me is accordant to indirect realism. — javra
Not what I quite explicitly stated. — javra
Yeah, it was. — Banno
such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. — javra
Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event. — Banno
drop colour and re-phrase this in terms of shape. What happens? — Banno
What is the physical/physiological difference between the two? — Michael
If you accept that mental "representations" exist… — Michael
…and if you accept that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations… — Michael
…and if you accept that the qualities of these mental representations (smells, tastes, colours, etc.) are not (and are possibly unlike) the mind-independent properties of distal objects… — Michael
Just understand that your direct realism is not inconsistent with my indirect realism. They're the same position, just given different names. — Michael
Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul
However, this mind-dependence doesn't imply that objects can't be as we perceive them to be. — Pierre-Normand
If you were right, and indirect realism is the only view compatible with the physics and physiology of perception, do you honestly think the folk here would have continued denying the science for over sixty pages? Is your opinion of your interlocutors that poor? — Banno
I think Searle may agree with that sentiment. — creativesoul
drop colour and re-phrase this in terms of shape. What happens? — Banno
For my part, the issue is that some folk think there is a need to justify that they see this text, even as they read it. — Banno
See what happens when one irrelevant comment is made? It becomes the focus. Easy to avoid the difficulty that way, I suppose. — creativesoul
I strongly suspect you and I have different opinions on what the issue is. — creativesoul
If impressing one's own face into a custard pie does not count as directly perceiving the pie, then nothing will and one's framework falls apart if it is of the materialist/physicalist variety — creativesoul
There we have it. Dualism — NOS4A2
Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul
You can call it a merely grammatical dispute if you like, but then you must be in agreement with me that our perceptions are mental representations, that our perceptions of the world do not require any mediation, and that we can have direct perceptions of the world.
But I don’t see how this is consistent with the indirect realist position that our perceptions are directly of mental representations and only indirectly of the world; that is, that our perceptions of the world are mediated by mental representations. — Luke
Again, this is a bad question. — Banno
Do you agree that sensory experience provides us with knowledge of the things around us? — Banno
This distinction you're trying to make just doesn't seem to make any sense.
The indirect realist claims that something like mental representations exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these mental representations, and that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations. — Michael
I don’t know what you mean by “direct knowledge”. The relevant question is whether or not we have direct perceptions. — Luke
If you want to make the same claim but call it "direct realism" then you're welcome to, but as it stands there is no meaningful difference between your direct realism and my indirect realism. — Michael
You can call it a merely grammatical dispute if you like, but then you must be in agreement with me that our perceptions are mental representations, that our perceptions of the world do not require any mediation, and that we can have direct perceptions of the world.
But I don’t see how this is consistent with the indirect realist position that our perceptions are directly of mental representations and only indirectly of the world; that is, that our perceptions of the world are mediated by mental representations. — Luke
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