I've said that the science of perception supports indirect realism and not naive realism. — Michael

...utterly missing the point of those around you.

The science is accepted by both "sides". You still haven't come to terms with that simple fact.

If you were right, and indirect realism is the only view compatible with the physics and physiology of perception, do you honestly think the folk here would have continued denying the science for over sixty pages? Is your opinion of your interlocutors that poor?

Back on page one I said:

This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using "direct" and "indirect". — Banno

Back on page one I said: "This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using 'direct' and 'indirect'." — Banno

And as I said back on page 1:

So to avoid using the terms "direct" and "indirect", my own take is that we have an experience that we describe as seeing an apple, but that the relationship between the experience and the apple isn't of a kind that resolves the epistemological problem of perception (or of a kind that satisfies naive colour realism, as an example). — Michael

The science is accepted by both "sides". You still haven't come to terms with that simple fact. — Banno

The science does not support naive realism.

the epistemological problem of perception — Michael

So let's go back to this, then, while I have your attention - what is "the epistemological problem of perception"? In particular, is there only one?

For my part, the issue is that some folk think there is a need to justify that they see this text, even as they read it.

But that is a symptom of an excess of doubt. Cartesian fever.

what is "the epistemological problem of perception" — Banno

Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties?

Naive realists claim that it does because they claim that distal objects and their mind-independent properties are constituents of sensory experience.

Indirect realists claim that it doesn't because they claim that distal objects and their mind-independent properties are not constituents of sensory experience; they only causally determine sensory experience, and so the properties of sensory experience (e.g. smells and tastes and colours) may not resemble the mind-independent properties of distal objects.

Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties? — Michael

Again, this is a bad question. You say you want to leave out the word "direct', and yet you keep putting it back. Your inclusion of the terms "distal" and "mind-independent" further prejudices the question.

Leave that all out, and you get "Does sensory experience provide us with knowledge of the things around us?"

And the answer to that question is "yes".

Don't you agree?

Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties? — Michael

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects.

For my part, the issue is that some folk think there is a need to justify that they see this text, even as they read it.

But that is a symptom of an excess of doubt. Cartesian fever. — Banno

I think Searle may agree with that sentiment.

As I so far understand the positions held, to me the issue of direct v. indirect realism is misplaced—not because it’s not important or else handwaving, etc.—but because they both occur at the same time yet this from different vantages. To have some terminology to express these two different vantages cogently:

a) Intra-agential reality; aka intrareality: that set of actualities that strictly apply to the one agent concerned; akin to an agent’s umwelt.
b) Equi-agential reality; aka equireality: that set of actualities that strictly apply in equal manner to all coexisting agents in the cosmos; what is commonly understood to be reality at large.

I'll use the issue of the present time to try to change focus on what—if I understand things well enough—is the exact same issue:

From the vantage of (b), everything empirical that we experience occurring in the present is known by science to in fact occur some fractions of a second prior to our conscious apprehension of it (with some estimates having it consciously occur nearly .3 seconds after the initial stimulus onset (1)) —such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. This, then, to me is accordant to indirect realism.

From the vantage of (a), we all experientially know that everything empirical which we experience occurring in the unitary perception of the present’s duration (2) strictly occurs in a present moment of which we are consciously aware, one that is differentiated from occurrences which occur before (even if this “before” is itself within our unitary perception of duration) and those yet to occur—such that, here, there is no time lapse whatsoever between what we empirically experience and our awareness of it (as one example of this to further this point: when we engage in a heated conversation with another agent face to face, the two agents’ awareness of the present moment—in which they each act and react in response to the other and their words—is fully identical relative to the conscious awareness of both agents … with no time lapse that we are in any way aware of). This, then, to me is accordant to direct realism.

From here, things can of course get far more complex when analyzed. For one example, we can only come to know about (b) strictly via (a).

Nevertheless, to stick to the thread’s subject, I find that both these realities (the indirect one and the direct one) necessarily co-occur. The same co-occurrence of the two can just as well then be specified for our seeing that purple shirt there yonder (I've used "purple" because colors from purple to magenta don't occur as a wavelength, being only real in sense (a) and not sense (b)).

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1)

Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3081809/

2)

Direct, unitary perception of duration occurs up to a maximum period of approximately 1.5 to 2 seconds from the beginning to the end of a continuous sensory stimulus. — https://www.britannica.com/science/time-perception/Perceived-duration

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Edit: I also think of things in terms of inter-agential realities (intersubjectivities), such as the human-relative intersubjectivity of all non-blind and non-colorblind people commonly seeing the same purple ... but for the sake of keeping things simple I've only specified those two reality types of (a) and (b).

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul

All our perceptual experiences involve bringing our conceptual abilities, past experiences, and sensorimotor skills to bear on them. The latter two also are brought to bear on the experiences of non-rational animals or pre-verbal children. Even before we recognize an apple as a Honeycrisp, we perceive it as edible or within reach. In this sense, the properties we ascribe to objects in experience are mind-dependent, shaped by our cognitive and embodied capacities.

However, this mind-dependence doesn't imply that objects can't be as we perceive them to be. Objects can fail to have the properties they perceptually appear to have, as in cases of misperception. This highlights a different sense of mind-independence: the idea that the world can fail to meet our expectations about it.

Claims about the mind-dependence or mind-independence of properties like color often conflate these two senses. When @Luke insists that we directly perceive objects without perceiving the world as it is in itself, he is acknowledging this distinction. Seeing an apple as red may track its surface reflectance profile, a property that is mind-independent in the first sense. But our perceptual categorization of this profile as "red" depends on our species-specific discriminative abilities and culturally informed color concepts, making it mind-dependent in the second sense.

So while our perceptual ascription of properties to objects always involves the mind, this doesn't rule out those objects having objective features that our perceptions can either accurately track or misrepresent.

everything empirical that we experience occurring in the present is known by science to in fact occur some fractions of a second prior to our conscious apprehension of it (with some estimates having it consciously occur nearly .3 seconds after the initial stimulus onset (1)) —such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. This, then, to me is accordant to indirect realism. — javra

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event.

How's that again?

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event.

How's that again? — Banno

Not what I quite explicitly stated. Do you disagree with the linked to science?

, ; drop colour and re-phrase this in terms of shape. What happens?

Not what I quite explicitly stated. — javra

Yeah, it was.

Not what I quite explicitly stated. — javra

Yeah, it was. — Banno

Wait for it ... Nope, it wasn't.

As a refresher:

such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. — javra

Does not translate into:

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event. — Banno

And you haven't answered the question I asked regarding the science. Somewhat disingenuous.

Meh.

Again, I would be very surprised to find any disagreement as to the physics or physiology of perception here.

Hence, and this is addressed to all, if you think that simply asserting the science is sufficient to show that indirect realism is the case, you have not understood the disagreement.

Ciao, then.

drop colour and re-phrase this in terms of shape. What happens? — Banno

The same analysis applies to shape as to color. Our perception of an object's shape, such as an apple being graspable in a particular way, involves bringing our conceptual abilities and sensorimotor skills to bear on our experiences of them. In this sense, the shape properties we ascribe to objects are mind-dependent, just like color properties.

Likewise, this mind-dependence in the ascription of shape properties doesn't preclude objects having shapes that our perceptions can accurately track or misrepresent. An object's shape can be different from how we perceive it, just as its color can be different from the color we perceive in abnormal illumination conditions.

The main difference between shape and color concepts is that shape is perceived multimodally through both sight and touch, while color is primarily visual. But from the standpoint of modern physics or the special sciences, shape is not more or less fundamental than color.

The traditional primary/secondary quality distinction, which treated shape as more objective than color, is outdated. Locke's analysis of secondary qualities, which highlighted the two senses of mind-dependence I previously distinguished, is still relevant but should be extended to so-called primary qualities like shape as well.

What is the physical/physiological difference between the two? — Michael

I don’t know if there is any physical/physiological difference. We are both positing mental representations.

If you accept that mental "representations" exist… — Michael

I do.

…and if you accept that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations… — Michael

I don’t know what you mean by “direct knowledge”. The relevant question is whether or not we have direct perceptions.

…and if you accept that the qualities of these mental representations (smells, tastes, colours, etc.) are not (and are possibly unlike) the mind-independent properties of distal objects… — Michael

It may be helpful to speak in terms of correspondence. A naive realist claims that their perceptions perfectly correspond to the world. An indirect realist claims that their perceptions perfectly correspond only to their mental representations, and that their perceptions imperfectly correspond to the world (if at all). This “correspondence” is therefore synonymous with a “direct perception”.

However, there is another meaning, or another aspect to the meaning, of “direct perception”. This other meaning involves the mediation of one’s perceptions; that we either perceive real objects directly or via something else.

I agree with the indirect realist in the first sense, that our mental representations of the world do not always perfectly correspond to the world. However, I disagree with the indirect realist in the second sense: that we cannot directly perceive the world; that our perceptions must be mediated. That is, I disagree with the indirect realist that we have perceptions of mental representations of the world. My argument is that perceptions are mental representations and that perceptions/mental representations can be directly of the world; of real objects, without first requiring the perception of any mediating factor.

Just understand that your direct realism is not inconsistent with my indirect realism. They're the same position, just given different names. — Michael

You can call it a merely grammatical dispute if you like, but then you must be in agreement with me that our perceptions are mental representations, that our perceptions of the world do not require any mediation, and that we can have direct perceptions of the world.

But I don’t see how this is consistent with the indirect realist position that our perceptions are directly of mental representations and only indirectly of the world; that is, that our perceptions of the world are mediated by mental representations.

I've quite lost track of where you stand on the issue at hand, there being too many voices here. I lost you in the noise.

There was this:

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul

and this:

However, this mind-dependence doesn't imply that objects can't be as we perceive them to be. — Pierre-Normand

And it seems to me that arguing for mind-dependence and mind-independence is fraught with ambiguity.

So questions such as "Is the fact that the cup has a handle mind-dependent or mind-independent?" strike me as confuddled. What's true is that the cup has a handle.

While questions such as "Is the fact that the cup is red mind-dependent or mind-independent?" bring on issues of illumination and language - things that are to do with the circumstances - factors that are not relevant to how many handles it has. Whether the cup is red or green might well depend on the observation being made, in a way that the cup having handles does not.

All of which is removed from the topic at hand. And I've spent more time here this morning than is conducive to good mental health.

Edited.

I beginning to lose patience with the move trying to be made here that because our body directly interacts with objects (in this one avenue of sense, anyway) that somehow our mind is doing the same thing. This is patently untrue…

There we have it. Dualism.

If you were right, and indirect realism is the only view compatible with the physics and physiology of perception, do you honestly think the folk here would have continued denying the science for over sixty pages? Is your opinion of your interlocutors that poor? — Banno

Yes. As it so happens, he's right and you've ignored it the entire thread long. Such is life.

I think Searle may agree with that sentiment. — creativesoul

You mean the dude whos career rests largely on literal hand-waving?

drop colour and re-phrase this in terms of shape. What happens? — Banno

Nothing changes for the argument, but you get less comfortable. This is beginning to show a rather nice pattern.

For my part, the issue is that some folk think there is a need to justify that they see this text, even as they read it. — Banno

"see"
"read"

And your position is that everyone who has well and truly knocked your position out of hte park are somehow linguistically stuck. Hehe. It would be funnier, if you were more humorous.

See what happens when one irrelevant comment is made? It becomes the focus. Easy to avoid the difficulty that way, I suppose. — creativesoul

I'm not sure how to explain the irony of this, in response to what I said. Quite a good chuckle here.

I strongly suspect you and I have different opinions on what the issue is. — creativesoul

Yes, very much agree. And I strongly suspect your 'opinion' on what the issue is sidesteps the issue. You can be fairly sure of this, reading your other responses.

If impressing one's own face into a custard pie does not count as directly perceiving the pie, then nothing will and one's framework falls apart if it is of the materialist/physicalist variety — creativesoul

More-or-less, yep - part of why Physicalism ultimately ends up being entirely unsatisfying for 98% of people I suspect.
But as noted, this is exactly the sidestep i'm losing patience with. Your face touching the pie physically is not a perception. It isn't even the process of perception if we're going to keep confusingly conflate the two. Your conscious experience, which lies at the end of process initiated by pressing your face into a pie - which, in this case, will include several sensory experiences, is (i prefer the term experience, because that's what it is). That these are being treated as either the same thing, or somehow supervenient in such a way that they are representing the experience in both cases is baffling, counter to the empirical considerations and very much a side-step. One is a state of affairs, one is an empirically removed shadow of that state of affairs in consciousness. That this is highly uncomfortable isn't that interesting. \

There we have it. Dualism — NOS4A2

You say this like it does anything other than show me what you think of Dualism. It says nothing at all for the position, the arguments or the glaring mystery we're all dancing around.

You post has no content.

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects. — creativesoul

I'm not arguing against direct realism. I'm arguing for indirect realism and against naive realism. Much of my time has been spent trying to explain that non-naive direct realism seems consistent with indirect realism: see Semantic Direct Realism.

You can call it a merely grammatical dispute if you like, but then you must be in agreement with me that our perceptions are mental representations, that our perceptions of the world do not require any mediation, and that we can have direct perceptions of the world.

But I don’t see how this is consistent with the indirect realist position that our perceptions are directly of mental representations and only indirectly of the world; that is, that our perceptions of the world are mediated by mental representations. — Luke

What is the physical/physiological difference between mental representations existing and not being mediations and mental representations existing and being mediations?

This distinction you're trying to make just doesn't seem to make any sense.

The indirect realist claims that something like mental representations exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these mental representations, and that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations.

If you want to make the same claim but call it "direct realism" then you're welcome to, but as it stands there is no meaningful difference between your direct realism and my indirect realism.

Again, this is a bad question. — Banno

No it's not. It's a pertinent question that seeks to address the extent to which our body's physiological/psychological response to sensory stimulation allows us to form justified beliefs about the existence and mind-independent nature of distal objects.

A bald assertion.

Leave that all out, and you get "Does sensory experience provide us with knowledge of the things around us?"

And the answer to that question is "yes".

Don't you agree? — Banno

Do you agree that sensory experience provides us with knowledge of the things around us?

Do you agree that sensory experience provides us with knowledge of the things around us? — Banno

It provides us with knowledge that there are things around us and that our bodies respond in such-and-such a way to sensory stimulation, but that's it.

Naive realists falsely claim that we know more than this because they falsely claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of sensory experience. Indirect realists reject these claims.

This distinction you're trying to make just doesn't seem to make any sense.

The indirect realist claims that something like mental representations exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these mental representations, and that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations. — Michael

I don’t know what you mean by “direct knowledge”. The relevant question is whether or not we have direct perceptions. — Luke

If you want to make the same claim but call it "direct realism" then you're welcome to, but as it stands there is no meaningful difference between your direct realism and my indirect realism. — Michael

You can call it a merely grammatical dispute if you like, but then you must be in agreement with me that our perceptions are mental representations, that our perceptions of the world do not require any mediation, and that we can have direct perceptions of the world.

But I don’t see how this is consistent with the indirect realist position that our perceptions are directly of mental representations and only indirectly of the world; that is, that our perceptions of the world are mediated by mental representations. — Luke

...and that our bodies respond in such-and-such a way to sensory stimulation, but that's it. — Michael

Thank you.

Sensory stimulation takes place, then?

Yes.