No it's not. Light often causes us to see colours, but they are not the same thing, as evidenced by the obvious fact that I can see colours when I dream and my eyes are closed in a dark room. — Michael
measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.
Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are literal constituents of conscious experience and that as such we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties, and so our knowledge of them is direct and there is no epistemological problem of perception. The external world just is as it appears. They call this "direct perception of distal objects". — Michael
Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part).
I don't think there's much point in continuing since you refuse to acknowledge that my position is even possible: that one can reject naive realism without being an indirect realist. — Luke
If you get a few minutes I wonder if you could give this article a read and tell me what you think? — frank
It's a big one. But I'll have a look at it for sure! — Pierre-Normand
Bye the way, my outlook owes much to John Haugeland, Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty who themselves owe much to Heidegger. — Pierre-Normand
You think that by "we perceive mental phenomena" the indirect realist means "our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena". They don't. — Michael
where is it that non-naive direct realism and indirect realism disagree? — Michael
(2) that our visual perception of [...] material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part);
As I've stated several times now, it is over part (2) of Fish's definition: — Luke
Otherwise, I don't know what indirect realists mean by indirect perception. — Luke
As I've stated several times now, it is over part (2) of Fish's definition:
— Luke
Except according to what you mean by "perceive some other entity, such as sense-data", (2) is something that indirect realists accept. — Michael
It's something I do not accept.
According to what I mean by it, it is that we have sensory perceptions of sense-data. but you have been telling me that that's not what you mean by it. — Luke
Except by this you mean "our eyes respond to light reflected by sense data" which isn't what indirect realists believe. — Michael
Except your explanation of what indirect realists believe is that our perceptions of material objects are not mediated by the perception of some other entity, which is therefore not indirect realism. — Luke
What indirect realists mean by "perception of some other entity" isn't what you mean by "perception of some other entity". You're equivocating. — Michael
My usage is consistent. Indirect realists equivocate over the meaning of "perception", using it to mean both the sensory perception of external objects and the Russellian acquaintance of mental representations. — Luke
It's only equivocation if they start from the premise that we are acquainted with mental phenomena and then conclude that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena, but they never draw this conclusion. This is the strawman conclusion that you and others are fabricating. — Michael
Acquaintance primarily concerns knowledge. — Luke
The direct/indirect realism dispute primarily concerns sensory perception — Luke
Yes, hence the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael
Naive realists claim that sensory perception does provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are literal constituents of conscious experience, and so we are acquainted with distal objects.
Indirect realists claim that sensory perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not literal constituents of conscious experience, and so we are only acquainted with mental phenomena. — Michael
Do you restrict experience to only humans? Are non human animals forbidden, by definition, from having any experience? — creativesoul
For my part, although we cannot know everything, we can surmise one very important feature of our own experience. It is meaningful to us. — creativesoul
Experience, as such, yes, the reason being, all of that by which experience is considered a valid concept is derived purely a priori from the nature of human intelligence alone, and insofar as this concept is a priori, it can never apply outside the intelligence from which it arises.That being said, experience, as such, is forbidden to non-human animals, but that does not preclude them having something conceptually congruent with it, albeit exclusive to their kind of intelligence. — Mww
…..we must first get our own meaningful experience right prior to being capable of discriminating between experiences that only humans are capable of and experiences that some other creatures are as well. — creativesoul
Direct perception of distal objects is one physiological capability that all experiencing creatures must possess. This points towards the irrevocably important role that biological machinery plays. — creativesoul
Just because it is so for humans does not mean it is so for all intellects. — Mww
This presupposes all experiencing creatures experience via direct perception, which makes explicit there is no other way to experience, irrespective of the type of creature. We have no warrant for claiming that is a valid condition... — Mww
..we must first get our own meaningful experience right prior to being capable of discriminating between experiences that only humans are capable of and experiences that some other creatures are as well.
— creativesoul
And how do we get our experiences right? — Mww
…..a bare minimum criterion…. — creativesoul
I'm saying that direct perception of distal objects is necessary for all cases of human perception, and that there are many other creatures capable of it as well. — creativesoul
Are you saying that direct perception of distal objects is not necessary for meaningful experience….. — creativesoul
…..or that direct perception of distal objects is insufficient for meaningful experience…. — creativesoul
…..or that direct perception of distal objects is something that is exclusive to only humans? — creativesoul
I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it. — creativesoul
Again, I think that one basic necessity for having meaningful experience is the ability/capability of attributing meaning to different things. I do not see how it is possible for any creature that is inherently incapable of perceiving different things. — creativesoul
And how do we get our experiences right?
— Mww
That's a great question. Methodological approach matters. Guiding principles matter. Basic assumptions matter. Comparison to/with current knowledge base matters. — creativesoul
…..a priori and a posteriori are used to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on experience — creativesoul
But most indirect realists do think that these explanations are directly evidencing indirect realisms. — Apustimelogist
No, I'm not implying it in a fundamental metaphysical sense. But some have pointed out that my actual view on mind-body metaphysics is not so dissimilar from a kind of neutral monism (maybe a very minimalist one) so maybe you would still think it the case of my view anyway. Though I don't think I see my view that way. — Apustimelogist
I'm not sure to be honest. I think it depends on the angle you take. As you say below, it can be quite vague all this talk I think. I don't think indirect realists necessarily have to bring strong metaphysics into it beyond the talk of realism about representations, similar to the way you can talk about whether scientific theories (are real)*. The science I think provides quite a good description of how perceptions would be indirect so not much work is needed to be done there. Naive direct realism I'm not so sure. — Apustimelogist
But the experiences still extend into the outside world beyond the head? — Apustimelogist
Well I only use it in a weak sense as opposed to a fundamental, tangible ontology. — Apustimelogist
Well I'm not sure since it seems you were perhaps using affordance in different sense, ha. But possibly yes, I definitely think I have preferred starting points in my reasonings that are probably not the same as yours. — Apustimelogist
I don't know exactly what you mean for experience to compliment activity. — Apustimelogist
If everything is experience, there is no hard problem because the problem just becomes "why are there experiences?" — Apustimelogist
then this is no different from "why does anything exist?" — Apustimelogist
And maybe people similarly-minded to Dennett actually want to turn the hard problem of consciousness into this kind of more trivial hard problem - i.e. the reasoning going something like - Why does anything exist? Can we even answer that? Do we have to make up an additional metaphysical substance of consciousness that needs its own separate answer? — Apustimelogist
only come about in idealism when you postulate something like observers that have a way they seem to themselves, via their own experiences, which is different to how they seem from another observer's perspective. — Apustimelogist
Obviously, this construction has an inherent indirect aspect to it in the sense that there are experiences out in the world and then your own experiences which seem to be about those experiences but are not the same - they are separated. — Apustimelogist
At the same time, without indirect mediation I feel like there would be no need to identify brain processes and experiences or distinguish internal experiences from external stuff. — Apustimelogist
So I think in that sense hard-type problems in idealism do presuppose indirect realism (including external objects to be realist about which are qualitatively different from internal perception). — Apustimelogist
So it appears you already anticipated the answer I gave about why idealism doesn't necessarily have a hard problem of consciousness. — Apustimelogist
For instance, if realism is a concept that can be attributed to mathematical scientific theories, why can't it be attributed to the representations and models built in machine learning? — Apustimelogist
I agree that this “perception of a perception” is confusing and unnecessary. It’s a large part of the reason why I am not an indirect realist. — Luke
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