These are explanations for phenomena used to support indirect realism which don't resort to the position of indirect realism — Moliere

But most indirect realists do think that these explanations are directly evidencing indirect realisms.

I think "information" counts as kind of idealism, if you're positing it as a kind of fundamental substance that everything is composed of. — Moliere

No, I'm not implying it in a fundamental metaphysical sense. But some have pointed out that my actual view on mind-body metaphysics is not so dissimilar from a kind of neutral monism (maybe a very minimalist one) so maybe you would still think it the case of my view anyway. Though I don't think I see my view that way.

Isn't that pretty much what the topic of indirect or naive realism is about? Fundamental metaphysics? — Moliere

I'm not sure to be honest. I think it depends on the angle you take. As you say below, it can be quite vague all this talk I think. I don't think indirect realists necessarily have to bring strong metaphysics into it beyond the talk of realism about representations, similar to the way you can talk about whether scientific theories (are real)*. The science I think provides quite a good description of how perceptions would be indirect so not much work is needed to be done there. Naive direct realism I'm not so sure.

I'm uncertain of the best way to put it, but at the very least what it means is that though direct realists directly perceive objects in the world that does not then entail that what they see is a fixed property, or that there are not other properties which a given perception is not perceiving.

It's mostly the notion of permanent objects and their essences that I'd try to avoid -- things are in constant flux. — Moliere

My intuition is that this would certainly require a more elaborate metaphysics about the world.

- a term of art meant to contrast with "properties", is what I was thinking. — Moliere

Ah well, fair enough.

Perhaps this is a way of differentiating the naive from the direct realist: I think the naive realist is seeing something real, that literal objects are a part of their experience, but that does not then mean that every judgment about that real thing which a naive realist makes is going to be true or comprehensive. — Moliere

But the experiences still extend into the outside world beyond the head?

While I've come to discount the notion of an information ontology, you're far from alone in thinking like that. — Moliere

Well I only use it in a weak sense as opposed to a fundamental, tangible ontology.

in a sense I'd say that every judgment has a dual-awareness -- the judgment ,and what the judgment is about) — Moliere

Yes, I think I understand.

But how do we really differentiate which is the better way to talk? — Moliere

Well I'm not sure since it seems you were perhaps using affordance in different sense, ha. But possibly yes, I definitely think I have preferred starting points in my reasonings that are probably not the same as yours.

Edit: ( )*.

I don't think I'd be a Marxist if I thought we are stuck with our own worldview.

It's not like I started thinking these thoughts from birth, right?

This morning I heard on NPR a person who has schizophrenia who started a podcast, or something like that, to interview people at his campus about what it would feel like if they knew a person with schizoaffective disorder was on campus.

It was NPR so it was a feel good story -- he knew what he was getting into, and had a positive spin on what people said with a hope for more acceptance.

I say this by way of suggesting, at least, that it's not a malfunction so much.

One of the parts of the radio programme that touched me, with my own shit, is where the people he knew learned how to prefer him as he was, and would not want him to be otherwise.

I say this by way of suggesting, at least, that it's not a malfunction so much. — Moliere

The social model of disability.

There's a great YouTube channel where this woman talks to her audience while she's in the hospital, having a psychotic episode. You can tell when she looks to the side that she's listening to the voices. According to her it's horrible.

The point is: she hears voices that aren't coming from an external source.

I've never seen a case of schizophrenia that wasn't heart breaking in some way. It's a terrible disease.

Yep.

yes. The person on NPR obviously is receiving help. I also receive help others don't need. These conditions can inflict a lot of pain, and as a person who medicates I'm pretty much on board with that line of thinking: do stuff to make the terrible not as terrible cuz why not?

But I also thought that the notion that the person with that disability was valuable even with it was nice to hear, and not just as a hallmark card -- but as a genuine thing. People with disabilities often have unique perspectives, and so they are worthwhile even in the economic sense (which is all we care about)

I understand what you mean. Elon Musk has Asperger's. He's been my hero ever since I learned that, because I do too.

hell yeah.

It's nice to see someone with your struggles succeed.

It makes me feel like I can do it too.

Yep. You're not less than normal, there is no normal.

Well... there is a normal, but I agree it's not normal...

In an attempt to bring it back: that notion of normal, so it seems to me, is more of an indirect realist belief to reconcile how representations can be right or wrong, even when it comes to perception. (for me, "representations" is definitely a turn-off)

To me, it's just obvious that the brain is creating a unified experience out of a flood of discrete sensory input. I think for some, that's direct realism. I don't see how, but ok?

To me, it's just obvious that the brain is creating a unified experience out of a flood of discrete sensory input. I think for some, that's direct realism. I don't see how, but ok? — frank

Here is an illuminating example Marvin Minsky proposed a couple decades ago. I'll expand on it a little.

Suppose you are looking at a tree with thousands of leaves flickering in the wind and evening sunlight. Your experience doesn't resemble a patchwork of sharply detailed leaves surrounded by fuzzy, indistinct areas - even though only your foveal vision resolves fine details at any given moment. As your attention wanders over different parts of the tree, the rich details seem to be present across the whole scene.

This unified, richly detailed phenomenology has two complementary sources. First, your conceptual and proto-conceptual abilities allow you to understand the tree as a coherent whole, with the leaves related to the branches and the overall structure. This conceptual framing helps unify your experience.

But there's also a second source of unity - the tree itself, which remains present and stable as your gaze shifts from one part to another, or as you close and reopen your eyes. The tree as an enduring, mind-independent object grounds the unity of your experience, even as your attention and focus change.

So the unitary, richly detailed character of your perceptual experience isn't simply a matter of your brain constructing a unified representation from discrete sensory inputs. It arises from the dynamic interplay between your embodied, conceptual engagement with the world and the mind-independent structure of the objects you perceive. This suggests a much more direct, enactive relationship between the perceiving agent and the environment than a purely representationalist view would allow.

What do you think "perceive mental phenomena" means? Do you think it means that my eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena? Do you think it means that my ears respond to sound emitted by mental phenomena? — Michael

Yes, I think something along these lines is required when talking about perceiving something, especially since the main point of contention in this debate is whether our sensory perception of external objects is direct or indirect.

I think you're reading something into the meaning of "perceive mental phenomena" that just isn't there. Indirect realists probably aren't saying what you think they're saying when they say that we perceive mental phenomena. Acquaintance with mental phenomena is the appropriate interpretation. — Michael

User
Is Russellian acquaintance a form of perception?

ChatGPT
Russellian acquaintance, as conceptualized by Bertrand Russell, is not typically considered a form of perception. Instead, it's a type of immediate, non-inferential knowledge or awareness of particular things or experiences.

Perception usually refers to the process by which we become aware of or acquire knowledge about the external world through our senses. It involves the direct experience of sensory information, such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, or smelling external objects.

Russellian acquaintance, on the other hand, doesn't necessarily involve sensory experience or sensory data. It's more about direct awareness or acquaintance with specific entities or experiences without the need for inference or mediation. This direct awareness can encompass various aspects of reality, including perceptual experiences, but it's not inherently tied to sensory perception in the same way.

So, while both perception and Russellian acquaintance involve direct awareness or knowledge, they are distinct concepts with different focuses and implications within the realm of epistemology and philosophy of mind.

This is how to interpret the meaning of "feel" in "I feel pain" and the meaning of "hear" in "the schizophrenic hears voice" and the meaning of "see" in "I see colours". — Michael

The first two of these examples do not concern the perception of external objects, or else the external object (as the cause of the sensation) is absent. The third example (colours) may concern the perception of external objects, however, you have already acknowledged that the sensory perception of a mental representation is excluded.

This sense of acquaintance with mental phenomena occurs also in veridical perception, and this is all that is meant when the indirect realist says that awareness of distal objects is mediated by awareness of mental phenomena. — Michael

User
Is the direct/indirect realism debate about perception or awareness?

ChatGPT
The direct/indirect realism debate primarily concerns the nature of perception rather than mere awareness. It revolves around questions such as:

• How do we perceive the external world?
• What is the relationship between our perceptions and the external objects themselves?
• Are our perceptual experiences direct or mediated?

In this debate, "perception" refers to the process by which we become aware of or acquire knowledge about the external world through our senses. Direct realists argue that our perceptual experiences directly correspond to features of the external world, meaning that when we perceive an object, we are directly aware of that object itself.

Indirect realists, on the other hand, propose that our perception of the external world is mediated by mental representations or sense data. According to this view, when we perceive an object, we are not directly perceiving the object itself but rather a mental representation or sense data that represents the object to us.

So, while both direct and indirect realism involve questions of awareness, they primarily focus on the process and nature of perception and how our perceptions relate to the external world.

Yes, I think something along these lines is required when talking about perceiving something, especially since the main point of contention in this debate is whether our sensory perception of external objects is direct or indirect. — Luke

Indirect realists don't believe or claim that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena and that our ears respond to sound emitted by mental phenomena, so you clearly misunderstand indirect realism and are arguing against a strawman.

What all is involved? That’s gonna be a pretty long list, I should think, depending on what one thinks experience is. In my world, experience is an end, the terminus of the human speculative intellectual methodology, from which follows, all that is involved for that end, is the sum of the means necessary for the attainment of it. — Mww

Indeed. Carelessly worded on my part. I suspect neither of us requires omniscience from us in order to know anything about experience though. I also note the use of "human" here. Combined with the earlier reply concerning the cow, I'm left with a question: Do you restrict experience to only humans? Are non human animals forbidden, by definition, from having any experience?

For my part, although we cannot know everything, we can surmise one very important feature of our own experience. It is meaningful to us. Thus, if any other mind is capable of experience, it ought at least be meaningful to them. I'm curious what you think about that?

ndirect realists don't believe or claim that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena and that our ears respond to sound emitted by mental phenomena, so you clearly misunderstand indirect realism and are arguing against a strawman. — Michael

Coherency/consistency demands that all constituents of experience reside in the mind.

Light comes from where? External to the mind. So, light itself cannot be a constituent of experience. What is color again?

What is color again? — creativesoul

Qualia/sense-data/mental phenomena.

Are those constituents of experience? Earlier you said they were. Hence, we've arrived at incoherency/self-contradiction.

Are those constituents of experience? — creativesoul

Yes.

Hence, we've arrived at incoherency/self-contradiction. — creativesoul

How so?

Have you abandoned the eliminative materialist approach in favor of a sense data theorist one?

Have you abandoned the eliminative materialist approach in favor of a sense data theorist one? — creativesoul

As I've said before, I'm undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. If eliminative materialism is true then experience and its constituent properties (e.g. smells, tastes, colours) are reducible to physical phenomena like certain brain states. If property dualism is true then experience and its constituent properties are non-physical emergent phenomena.

You do realize that they are incompatible with one another, yes?

Are you asking if I'm aware that eliminative materialism and property dualism are incompatible? Yes, I'm aware. I'm undecided between them, but my inclination favours property dualism although I'm open to eliminative materialism.

Either way, distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience. Naive realism would seem to require some sort of substance dualism, as only that would seem to allow for experience to "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of".

Indirect realists don't believe or claim that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena and that our ears respond to sound emitted by mental phenomena, so you clearly misunderstand indirect realism and are arguing against a strawman. — Michael

How is Russellian acquaintance with mental representations of external objects an indirect perception? Russellian acquaintance is not a perception, so it cannot be an indirect perception of an external object.

Hence, we've arrived at incoherency/self-contradiction.
— creativesoul

How so? — Michael

Light is color. Light does not reside in the brain/mind. Remember this?

It's not odd at all. We build it to measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.

Your words about color matching. Either light resides in the mind or color is not a constituent of experience.

Are you asking if I'm aware that eliminative materialism and property dualism are incompatible? Yes, I'm aware. I'm undecided between them, but my inclination favours property dualism although I'm open to eliminative materialism. — Michael

Arguing for them both results in saying incompatible things when compared to one another. Have you been arguing for both throughout this thread, at different times arguing for one, and then the other later?

How is Russellian acquaintance with mental representations of external objects an indirect perception? Russellian acquaintance is not a perception, so it cannot be an indirect perception of an external object. — Luke

This is where you're getting confused by grammar. The words "see" and "experience" and "perceive" and "aware" are all being used ambiguously and interchangeably.

Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are literal constituents of conscious experience and that as such we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties, and so our knowledge of them is direct and there is no epistemological problem of perception. The external world just is as it appears. They call this "direct perception of distal objects".

Indirect realists claim that distal objects and their properties are not literal constituents of conscious experience – that the constituents of conscious experience are something like sense data/qualia/mental representations – and so that we are not acquainted with distal objects and their properties – only this sense data/qualia/mental representations – and so our knowledge of them is indirect and there is an epistemological problem of perception. The external world might not be as it appears. They call this "indirect perception of distal objects".

That's all there is to it. You're misunderstanding indirect realism if you think it's saying something else, e.g. that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena and that our ears respond to sound emitted by mental phenomena.

This is where you're getting confused by grammar. The words "see" and "experience" and "perceive" and "aware" are all being used ambiguously and interchangeably. — Michael

An open admission of equivocation.

Light is color. — creativesoul

No it's not. Light often causes us to see colours, but they are not the same thing, as evidenced by the obvious fact that I can see colours when I dream and my eyes are closed in a dark room.

Arguing for them both results in saying incompatible things when compared to one another. Have you been arguing for both throughout this thread, at different times arguing for one, and then the other later? — creativesoul

I have only been arguing that distal objects are not constituents of conscious experience given that conscious experience does not extend beyond the head. This is impartial to which of property dualism and eliminative materialism is correct.