First, I take it that we then agree that by randomness we are not addressing mere unpredictability but, instead, some ontic attribute of reality.

You did nitpick but then agreed with the definition of randomness I provided. It is here that I'm not understanding your premises. What, to you, then is ontic randomness?

To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic? Or is it not deterministic?

If deterministic, in what way is the ontic randomness not an intrinsic attribute of the ontic determinism specified per se (to which it is otherwise contrasted as something other than)?

If not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld.

Examples of physics will be of no help here, for their metaphysical interpretation can vary considerably in this matter.

This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)? — javra

I've encountered plenty of people that use definition 1, the one in the dictionary, which yes, doesn't seem like determinism at all to me. That D1 allows it does not in any way imply that the others do. D1 just says naturalism: no magic going on. No interfering miracles or anything like that. — noAxioms

You'll notice the SEP article on D1 nowhere mentions that the determinism therein addressed allows for ontic randomness (when understood as not deterministic). Randomness is not address until section "3.3 Determinism and Chaos" which, upon first reading, only presents what might be potential problems for determinism as described by the article. The section, for example, ends with this sentence:

Nevertheless, the mathematical exploration of chaos in dynamical systems helps us to understand some of the pitfalls that may attend our efforts to know whether our world is genuinely deterministic or not.

One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1.

At any rate, rather than writing considerably more, I'm hoping you can clarify things by answer the question(s) posed at the beginning of this post. Just so you know, though I'm currently confident in my position, I'm of course open to the possibility of being wrong.

First, I take it that we then agree that by randomness we are not addressing mere unpredictability but, instead, some ontic attribute of reality. — javra

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it.

You did nitpick but then agreed with the definition of randomness I provided. It is here that I'm not understanding your premises. What, to you, then is ontic randomness?

Your definition: "an event within the cosmos [...] that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring."
I would perhaps have said '... occurring exactly as it does'. A neutron decays because there's a neutron there, but exactly when could be random. Under determinism (D2,3) there's no such randomness.
D4 would not say that a subsequent state can be determined from a prior state, but it is determined in the same way that the past is fixed under presentism. I'd probably not put D4 in the classification with 2&3.

To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic?

What, randomness? By definition of 'not random', it cannot be, but that's not to say that a completely different definition of determinism allowing randomness.

If [randomness is] not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld.

I don't think that in such cases the determinism is otherwise upheld, at least not by definition D2 or D3.

You'll notice the SEP article on D1 nowhere mentions that the determinism therein addressed allows for ontic randomness (when understood as not deterministic).

I'll accept that, except then I'm not sure of their distinction between determinism and causal determinism.
The oxford dictionary definition was pretty clear as it made no mention of inevitable or fixed subsequent states.

Randomness is not address until section "3.3 Determinism and Chaos"

That section seems to concern epistemology and our ability to glean if determinism is the case. I personally don't see how chaos theory is relevant to that other than it being illustrative of the incalculability of even simple systems.

Nevertheless, the mathematical exploration of chaos in dynamical systems helps us to understand some of the pitfalls that may attend our efforts to know whether our world is genuinely deterministic or not.

OK. I'll buy that. If they imply that such knowledge can every be known, I have news. They're looking at a complex chaotic classical system, when a simple double-slit will do. Prove or disprove the system to be deterministic or not. Not gonna happen.

One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1.

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it.

Just so you know, though I'm currently confident in my position, I'm of course open to the possibility of being wrong.

I'm not sure I have a position to be confident in.

Sorry for butting in, but if I'm reading this conversation between you and javra correctly (and I'm not at all confident I am, I would love to be corrected), you're saying that Philosophical Determinism allows for randomness, because Philosophical Determinism is somehow substantially different from Causal Determinism?

Easy. By not asserting that I have the kind of free will that you define. I make decisions for reasons. You apparently assert that you don't, which I suppose explains some things, but doesn't explain how you are alive enough to post to a forum. — noAxioms

Haven't you ever been in a situation where the future outcomes of options were unclear to you? How could reason help you in such a situation?

Making a choice based on what you want is doing it for a reason. — noAxioms

By want I don't mean that you desire an option for a specific reason but just choose an option.

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it. — noAxioms

OK, thanks of the replies. Want to point out that this example is not good, though. Given a metaphysics of determinism, though epistemically unpredictable in it's outcome, a rolling of the dice can only be ontically determinate. Else we get into issues of omniscience, which we've already agreed upon is a dud.

"To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic?" - javra

What, randomness? By definition of 'not random', it cannot be, but that's not to say that a completely different definition of determinism allowing randomness.

" If [randomness is] not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld." - javra

I don't think that in such cases the determinism is otherwise upheld, at least not by definition D2 or D3. — noAxioms

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism" - this instead of now validly being termed an "indeterminism"?

This issue will only validly apply in reference to D1, due to the reasons given bellow:

----

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience — noAxioms

In having had further time to think about your initial reply, and with the definitions you provide here for D1 - D6: We already agree that D6 is a dud, so D6 does not validly count. D2 - D5, however, are all models of physics which are construed to be different types of determinism only in so far as they can each be deemed a subcategory of D1.

Because of this, the only one of the six categories listed which validly counts toward a "philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing" will strictly be that of D1.

To this effect, I for example found this article in relation to "D2":

Why Bohm was never a determinist

Marij van Strien

Forthcoming in Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave
Theory (ed. Andrea Oldofredi). Oxford University Press, 2024.

Abstract
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore
the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially
proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never
the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that
the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has
been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in
Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-
deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite
number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further
weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance. — https://philarchive.org/archive/VANWBW

Point being, whether or not in this case D2 is a determinism is measured against D1. This as I just specified above.

--------

"One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1." - javra

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it. — noAxioms

Your answer is unjustified. And, unless you can answer the question posed at the beginning of this post in a manner that makes cogent sense, it further seems to me unjustifiable in principle.

you're saying that Philosophical Determinism allows for randomness, because Philosophical Determinism is somehow substantially different from Causal Determinism? — flannel jesus

'Philosophical determinism' is my term, and is often the sort of determinism referenced by the dualists. It means naturalism, but that sounds good, and they don't want their stance to be 'unnaturalism', so they pick a word 'determinism' that means that your decisions are determined by natural physics and not by you (the immaterial thing they envision themselves to be). So D1 boils down to 'not dualism', and has nothing to do with the presence or absence of randomness in natural law.

I am not sure if that's the definition that SEP talks about with the term 'causal determinism'. The page is pretty vague about single or multiple evolutions being possible from a given state, but their definition of 'determinism' (not the causal determinism definition higher up) has the word 'fixed' in it, which sort of implies that.

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it. — noAxioms

Want to point out that this example is not good, though. Given a metaphysics of determinism, though epistemically unpredictable in it's outcome, a rolling of the dice can only be ontically determinate. — javra

Disagree. Given metaphysics of determinism (D2, 3 say), there is no dice rolling at all. I was defining ontic indeterminism, anything where true randomness is going on.
None of this has anything to do with predictability. A simple program running very deterministic code can be utterly unpredictable, as proven by Turing. Unpredictability is a feature of our universe. There's no getting around that, even in principle.

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism

Determinism and randomness are ontological opposites only under D2 and D3. The opposite of D1 is supernaturalism, which makes the physical universe not a closed system, open to external causes from outside. Those causes are presumably not random but rather conveying intent.

D2 - D5, however, are all models of physics which are construed to be different types of determinism only in so far as they can each be deemed a subcategory of D1. — javra

Yes, D2-5 are all naturalistic views. D6 is not.

Because of this, the only one of the six categories listed which validly counts toward a "philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing" will strictly be that of D1.

To this effect, I for example found this article in relation to "D2":

Why Bohm was never a determinist

Marij van Strien

Forthcoming in Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave
Theory (ed. Andrea Oldofredi). Oxford University Press, 2024.

Abstract
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore
the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially
proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never
the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that
the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has
been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in
Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-
deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite
number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further
weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance. — https://philarchive.org/archive/VANWBW

Cool. I saw the interpretation not as an attempt to restore the determinism of classical physics (which classical physics never was), but to restore a classical feature to quantum physics. It is a full embrace of the intuitive principle of counterfactual definiteness, at the expense of the classical notion of locality. But I can agree that the goal never was to keep determinism. Some other (far simpler) interpretations also keep that.
Funny that Marxism held resources for any of this.

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it. — noAxioms

Your answer is unjustified.

I don't understand the question then.

Haven't you ever been in a situation where the future outcomes of options were unclear to you? How could reason help you in such a situation?. — MoK

Only if I ignore reasons for the choice. Say I am crossing the street. I can ignore reason and just choose a time to do it. Or I can look both ways and use the information about the traffic as my reason for when it is a safe time to cross.

I can eat when I get hungry instead of randomly, and even randomly, I cannot eat because my random gyrations don't result in food being ingested. Knowing where the food is constitutes a reason to reach in that direction. In short, decisions without reason result in unfitness. You'd not survive 10 minutes.

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism

Determinism and randomness are ontological opposites only under D2 and D3. The opposite of D1 is supernaturalism, which makes the physical universe not a closed system, open to external causes from outside. Those causes are presumably not random but rather conveying intent. — noAxioms

D1, as specified by you, is "philosophical determinism". Not "naturalism". And you yourself provided the SEP link to reference D1 as such. From the link to the other forum post which you provided:

1) Philosophical determinism.
I googled 'determinism' and got this: "all events in the universe are caused by prior events or natural laws ". This is probably the primary definition used when asserting a dichotomy between determinism vs free will, the latter being defined as choices made by supernatural causes.
This sort of free will is required to be held responsible by any entity not part of the natural universe (God). It is in no way required for internal responsibility (to say society).

I think this equivocation on your part between "philosophical determinism" and "naturalism" is where our disagreement might likely primarily reside. If so, and if you want to insist that they are the same thing such that they then each "allow of ontic randomness", there then is a lot more befuddlement going on than I currently care to address in regards to determinism. In which case, I'll just call it quits.

Philosophical determinism' is my term, and is often the sort of determinism referenced by the dualists. It means naturalism, but that sounds good, and they don't want their stance to be 'unnaturalism', so they pick a word 'determinism' that means that your decisions are determined by natural physics and not by you (the immaterial thing they envision themselves to be). So D1 boils down to 'not dualism', and has nothing to do with the presence or absence of randomness in natural law. — noAxioms

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. I agree with @javra that calling such a concept "determinism" is very confusing, and is probably not the best name for that idea. In fact, you said it's basically just not-dualism, and that already has a name: monism. Physicalism or materialism also seem to cover it, if I'm understanding it correctly

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. — flannel jesus

Quite true. I wasn't.

In fact, you said it's basically just not-dualism, and that already has a name: monism. Physicalism or materialism also seem to cover it, if I'm understanding it correctly — flannel jesus

Since monism too comes in different flavors - to include both neutral monism and idealism - it can only be a naturalism in the form of physicalism/materialism.

So, because one thus upholds, “philosophical determinism” then is “physicalism” … and since the latter, lo and behold, allows for, but does not necessitate, randomness, so too then does the former.

The style of reasoning will in some ways parallel that of roses being dogs, of dogs having three wings, and of wings being things which slither, ergo that roses can by definition slither (in part if not in whole) … or something to the like.

Not my idea of what philosophy is about. Wish I hadn't squandered so much time on this. But, hey, lesson learned.

The style of reasoning — javra

What style of reasoning is it? I just think he's (a) trying to name a concept that already has sufficient names, and (b) naming it in a misleading and confusing way. Hopefully he takes the feedback and just doesn't continue to insist on calling this "philosophical determinism". Seems like an easy fix.

I think this equivocation on your part between "philosophical determinism" and "naturalism" is where our disagreement might likely primarily reside. — javra

There are many valid definitions of various words, and that definition is the first one that comes up if I ask for determinism, definition. The adjective 'philiosophical' is something I put there to distinguish this definition from the others. The definition is real, and seems to be the one most often used by proponents of dualist free will. They don't care if physics has randomness or not. They care that the physics isn't involved in the making of the choice. Naturalism is something they deny, but they call it determinism because it means one's will is determined by causal physics. I agree it's a stupid choice of words because by their assertion, their will is 'determined' by their immaterial mind. How is that any less 'determinism' the way they're using it?

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. — flannel jesus

The adjective I made up. None of the rest.

I agree with javra that calling such a concept "determinism" is very confusing

Lumping it with the others is perhaps confusing, but the word is very much used that way, and it needed to be on my list. All six of my definitions have different meanings and sometimes one can glean the definition used by context, and sometimes not.


This topic got kind of sidetracked. The argument in the OP I feel is a strong one against the libertarian (dualist) view being any more 'free' than one that uses physics, hard-deterministic or not.

Maybe we can focus on what it means to bear responsibility, and which view support and don't support that. Not sure if that discussion belongs here.

Since monism too comes in different flavors - to include both neutral monism and idealism - it can only be a naturalism in the form of physicalism/materialism. — javra

So does naturalism. If 'dualism' is actually how things work, then it's by definition natural. I can see why the dualist want to pick a different word for something they don't consider to reflect how natural things work.

How is the <usual> definition of naturalism different from physicalism? Materialism is quite controversial, but those two are almost the same, and neither is necessarily a realist position, stating only that mential processes supervene on the physical. I see no obvious distinction.

Hopefully he takes the feedback and just doesn't continue to insist on calling this "philosophical determinism". — flannel jesus

I'll find something else. Does it belong on my list of 6 at all then? When people talk about determinism vs randomness, they're not using that definition. But if they talk about determinism vs free will, they are using it.

Lumping it with the others is perhaps confusing, but the word is very much used that way — noAxioms

You said it's your term. Now you're saying it's "very much used that way". My head's spinning. Which is it? Is it in common use or is it your term?

[edit] Ignore the above, I'm happy to just let it drop given that you want to find something else.

In trying to presume the best here: your usage of the term does not equate to the usage of the term. If it did, then theological determinism would equate to naturalism and thereby be a physicalist stance. This conclusion then being in tune with the slithering roses motif I previously mentioned.

Not essential to the issue, but I'll add this to my former post just in case it might eventually come up:

Yes, the naturalistic pantheism of someone like Spinoza is a non-dualistic naturalism wherein God pretty much equates to the sum of all natural laws and their effects. It is nevertheless a theism due to a stringent affirmation of God's being, a theism which upholds theological determinism. Ought one then consider it to be a form of “theistic physicalism”?

While I couldn’t give a hoot either way, this or any other possible to conceive of exception - such as the “naturalism” of the ancient Stoics - do not nullify today’s commonly held stance that theological determinism is fully resultant from a supposed omni-creator deity - one who thereby has reputedly created both the natural laws and the causal processes that are, this so as to result in … a reality of determinism. One which can be said to preclude libertarian free will to boot.

Nor, for that matter, would any possible exception nullify the use of the term “determinism” within such contexts as that of theological determinism. Which, again - I’ll here say “typically” - is taken to be at direct odds with physicalism, or else with non-dualistic naturalism when thus understood.

In trying to presume the best here: your usage of the term does not equate to the usage of the term. — javra

You said it's your term. Now you're saying it's "very much used that way" — flannel jesus

The people that use it in the D1 way (it seems pretty prevalent) just call it 'determinism'. I added the adjective, as I said above, since it is a dictionary definition used in philosophy discussions (not all discussions) as opposed to D2-5 which are physics definitions of 'deterministic' (and also used in philosophy discussions like this one). I could have called those 'science-determinism' but there are several kinds of that.

D6 is a form, but admittedly the theology people that push that view do not call the omniscience 'determinism'. I've never seen it used that way, but it's still a form of the 'inevitability' meaning.
Izzat so? : "a theism which upholds theological determinism" in the following post. I stand corrected.

The people that use it in the D1 way (it seems pretty prevalent) just call it 'determinism'. — noAxioms

If people are saying determinism is compatible with randomness, they're doing something extremely strange. Wikipedia lists randomness as "an extreme antonym" to determinism.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism

A more extreme antonym of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to random chance.

I could have called those 'science-determinism' but there are several kinds of that. — noAxioms

Given what you've previously said - namely, that the opposite of "philosophical determinism" is not randomness but supernaturalism - this term of "science-determinism" would be akin to calling all scientists atheists (uniformly disbelieving in all that atheists consider to be supernatural and hence unreal). Which, to be blunt, is quite contrary to facts. It's not science (which is the sum of all that scientists do and present) which you here are implicitly referring to but scientism, a term that often enough gets used on this forum, and which need not be pejorative if it honestly reflects one's views.

As to the adjective "philosophical", determinism, being of itself a purely metaphysical stance regarding what ontically is, can only be philosophical. (That in itself threw me off a bit.)

All the same, determinism remains determinism, regardless of subspecies. This as per 's comment.

I've never seen it used that way, but it's still a form of the 'inevitability' meaning.
Izzat so? : — noAxioms

Yup.

I stand corrected. — noAxioms

Don't currently know of a better way to say this, so I'll just say - in as honest and humble way as I can - very cool of you to so express. Can only hope I can return the phrase to you some day.

If people are saying determinism is compatible with randomness — flannel jesus

They (the ones using the D1 definition) are not saying that about determinism defined roughly as 'not randomness'. It's a different definition than that one, different from the scientific definition given in wiki, which is (wait for it) not random.

I've edited the linked post, and removed 'philosophical' from the description of E1.

Given what you've previously said - namely, that the opposite of "philosophical determinism" is not randomness but supernaturalism - this term of "science-determinism" would be akin to calling all scientists atheists — javra

You seem to confuse science with scientist. There are plenty of theists in the science world, but science itself, since around the renaissance has operated under methodological naturalism, which is indeed the presumption of no magic. So science operates as if there is no god, true, but it makes no demand on the beliefs of the people doing the science.
Heck, I believe stuff that I know is wrong. I hold contradictory beliefs. I don't explode because of this.

I was educated in a Christian school since the public ones were in serious need of help. My school taught good science, but not all of them do.

Which, to be blunt, is quite contrary to facts.

Could well be, yes.
I'm just trying to clarify definitions, and I don't want to coin the phrase scientific-determinism, but the science glossary would give a definition that is essentially "not-random"

As to the adjective "philosophical", determinism, being of itself a purely metaphysical stance regarding what ontically is, can only be philosophical. (That in itself threw me off a bit.)

True. All six are philosophical. Maybe I should have referred to it as dictionary-determinism, but then you'd google that and still come down on me for making up how other people use the word instead of just making up names.

Can only hope I can return the phrase to you some day.

Not likely. What do I know? I've avoided opinion in this topic as much as I can, so it's not like there's anything new I'm likely to spout.

Do I believe in determinism? I find belief to be very restrictive, a door closed for no reason. The way I look at things, the word isn't even meaningful without a bunch of premises I don't presume.

You seem to confuse science with scientist. There are plenty of theists in the science world, but science itself, since around the renaissance has operated under methodological naturalism, which is indeed the presumption of no magic. So science operates as if there is no god, true, but it makes no demand on the beliefs of the people doing the science. — noAxioms

I don't think I'm "confusing science with scientist". Isn't it only via science that we can affirm things such as that ESP has no objective bearing? I'll maintain that it is. In which case science and the scientists it consist of is free to scientifically study such things as ESP. And this irrespective of whether the beliefs of the scientists' involved are pro or contra things such as ESP's validity.

BTW, in relation to this boogieman word "magic": even for a naturalistic pantheist who most can't hardly distinguish from a diehard atheistic physicalist, the whole of reality can only of itself be, in one word, magic. To disprove this affirmation one would need to find a cogent reason for being's so being. It's been tried plenty of times. No results so far.

I'll maintain that it is. In which case science and the scientists it consist of is free to scientifically study such things as ESP. — javra

Just so, and I've seen it (the study) done for water dowsing. It seemed to fail spectacularly under controlled conditions and yet it seems to work in the field. I tried it, and it worked for me (I was a kid at the time), but didn't work well. I quickly forgot how to hold the stick.
If it worked, there is probably a natural explanation for it. Maybe even ESP.
Dualism makes some really obvious empirical predictions, and yet these are never investigated AFAIK.

And yes, all that sort of falls under 'magic'.

BTW, in relation to this boogieman word "magic": even for a naturalistic pantheist who most can't hardly distinguish from a diehard atheistic physicalist, the whole of reality can only of itself be, in one word, magic.

I actually agree with that, which is why I don't label myself a realist.

To disprove this affirmation one would need to find a cogent reason for being's so being.

Exactly. The old 'why is there something instead of nothing?'. Wrong first question. Better to ask, 'is there something?', and only after justifying that one way or another go on to what follows. But naturalistic rules cannot explain being's being.