Libertarian free will ... will thereby necessitate a metaphysics ... which is different from that in which the only two ontically occurring options are either that of a) randomness or b) causal inevitability — javra

It seems that, at least for some flavours of libertarianism, this is the case. And this is really the crux. I believe it's tautologically the case that those are the two options.

One might phrase (b) as causal inevitability, or determinism, or an instance of the principle of sufficient reason. I'm actually leaning towards that latter phrasing lately - that determinism inside a universe means everything that happens in that universe has sufficient reason to happen. And the alternative is, some things happen that don't have sufficient reason. If everything that happens has sufficient reason, that's what I call 'determinism'. If some things don't have 'sufficient reason', then that means there's some aspect of their explanation which is reason-less, because it isn't sufficiently explained with reasons, and a reason-less happening is another way of looking at something random.

So it seems I am just doomed to never understand these libertarians because this dichotomy of determinism / randomness is an inevitable consequence of the way I've defined these words. And it seems they're similarly doomed to not understand why that's the dichotomy.

Do you think there's a way around the dichotomy?

Libertarian free will has been espoused in many different flavors, ture. And I personally don’t subscribe to libertarian free will being completely devoid of determinants and thereby of reasons for what it does (which could be construed in certain such variants of the concept). That said, this is to me the very crux of the issue:

One might phrase (b) as causal inevitability, or determinism, or an instance of the principle of sufficient reason. I'm actually leaning towards that latter phrasing lately - that determinism inside a universe means everything that happens in that universe has sufficient reason to happen. — flannel jesus

“Determinism” to most will necessarily entail what in former days was termed “necessarianism” and what today is coined as “causal inevitability” – in both cases, potential subtleties aside, everything that happens happens necessarily. Thereby disallowing for any possibility of libertarian free will.

It’s why I explicitly specified (b) as “causal inevitability”. Which is in no way equivalent to “everything that happens holds an ontically occurring reason for it so happening”. To exemplify this, in the libertarian free will that I sponsor, every possible decision will need to hold at the very least one intent which one intentions as the particular decision’s ontically occurring reason for its occurrence. And this intent is of itself construed to be a teleological determinant - an ontically occurring teleological reason - for the decision between options which was made. For any choice one makes, one will – at the very least when in the right frame of mind – be able to affirm why one made the choice: e.g. so as to get rich, or so as to find love, etc. All these being intents that determine that option which one chooses via one’s libertarian free will. Due to this, the principle of sufficient reason here fully applies – but it in no way translates into “the decisions I/you make are causally inevitable”.

I fully know and acknowledge that such a reality wherein the PSR holds for all choices made would be one in which all choice made via libertarian free will (as it was previously defined) are nevertheless determined by some determinant. However, when one does X for the sake of Z, Z (the end pursued) will not of itself causally determine X – but will instead teleologically determine X; this without in any way nullifying the lack of metaphysical constrains one has in choosing one of the options toward Z as intended outcome.

All this is not determinism as the term is understood today, such that it entails causal inevitability, while nevertheless yet being a reality wherein everything is yet determined by some or other determinant and, therefore, wherein the PSR holds for all events. One's of libertarian free will fully included.

Causally though, when one entertains libertarian free will, the agent in a large sense becomes an non-causally determined cause of the option chosen as effect - keeping in mind that this agent in its causing of the effect is necessarily teleologically determined by the intent which the agent pursued.

This is of course a very different mindset relative to those commonly held today: such as those wherein everything can only be either causally inevitable or else random. .

But this is the very reason why there is a pivotal difference between a libertarian compatibilism (where libertarian free will is maintained to occur together with the Principle of Sufficient Reason for all choice made), on the one hand, and a deterministic, else non-libertarian, compatibilism (where some non-libertarian understanding of free will is maintained together with the doctrine of universal causal inevitability).

One cannot willy nilly jump back and forth between a libertarian compatibilism and a deterministic, in the sense of non-libertarian, compatibilism on account of both of these being "compatibilism" - for the first mandates the ontic reality of a libertarian free will and the second mandates its very metaphysical impossibility.

Indeterminism is a short-hand for physical indeterminism, I would say; but I get your point.

you say your concept isn't determined because things are teleologically determined, not causally determined. To me it's just 6 of one, half dozen of the other. Determined it's determined. It looks exactly the same as determinism to me, you just have some abstract reason not to call it determinism despite it walking like a duck and quacking like a duck. Determinism has a simple criteria to me, and what you described passes that criteria.

I'm not insisting you call it determinism, but as far as the reasoning in the op of this thread goes, it's determinism, not indeterminism. You can have your reasons for calling it indeterminism, those reasons just don't appeal to me, they aren't compelling to me.

Indeterminism is a short-hand for physical indeterminism — Bob Ross

There's plenty of conceptual things that are deterministic that have nothing to do with anything physical. There are plenty of conceptual things that are indeterministic that have nothing to do with anything physical. I'm not partial to this "physical" talk. We live inside a system that evolves from the past to the future, it doesn't matter if that system is 100% physical or 100% non physical or some combination.

I mean I'm sure it matters in some sense, I'd be certainly curious to know, but it doesn't affect any of the reasoning here.

Determined it's determined. It looks exactly the same as determinism to me, you just have some abstract reason not to call it determinism despite it walking like a duck and quacking like a duck. Determinism has a simple criteria to me, and what you described passes that criteria.

I'm not insisting you call it determinism, but as far as the reasoning in the op of this thread goes, it's determinism, not indeterminism. You can have your reasons for calling it indeterminism, those reasons just don't appeal to me, they aren't compelling to me. — flannel jesus

Not to be rude, but the enterprise we term “philosophy” does not revolve around your personal preferences, no more than it revolves around mine.

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing?

You’ll also notice that if the article in the OP intended by “determinism” a non-causally-inevitable reality in which the Principle of Sufficient Reason yet holds, the very problem of libertarian free will it addresses would dissolve. Not being causally inevitable, the two worlds of Bob 1 and 2 would readily allow for the possibility of different choices made, despite the PSR yet holding. As quoted from the OP's article:

Both the hard and soft determinists endorse determinism, which is the view that all events (including human choices) are causally determined (necessitated) by antecedent conditions. Humans do what they do, make the choices they do, according to both these views because of factors outside of the agent’s control

... which equates to a causally inevitable world, one that thereby precludes the metaphysical possibility of libertarian free will.

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience

Of these, 2,4,5,6 can probably be pitched as entailing causal inevitability (with full libertarian free will on #6), but #1 does not entail this inevitability, and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability.

Decision making probably falls under class 5 for the short term.
As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. This is phenomenally inevitable only under 2,4,6

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I personally don't think what you've described is fundamentally different from causal inevitability. I consider your distinction to be a word game. My conception of determinism isn't vulnerable to that word game.

Not being causally inevitable, the two worlds of Bob 1 and 2 would readily allow for the possibility of different choices made, despite the PSR yet holdin — javra

The PSR doesn't hold if Bob 1 and Bob 2 do different things.

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience — noAxioms

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." But I grant there's a bunch of variants: biological determinism, cultural determinism, etc.

Maybe I should have specified "as pertains to the concept of free will as context".

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms

Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms

How is this in any way relevant?

EDIT: Almost forgot:

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms

How do you figure that?

I personally don't think what you've described is fundamentally different from causal inevitability. I consider your distinction to be a word game. — flannel jesus

Well then. That's that, then. No further comment.

Another way to say this is that the “will” used as a noun does not exist until we are willing something. We are not free first - we free ourselves afterwards with our consent or our denial of the pre-determined circumstances always already in front of us.

Or if not, maybe there simply is no freedom. Which seems impossible, just as freedom is impossible to explain. — Fire Ologist

You seem to be saying that freedom only obtains conceptually after the fact. The way I see it the only freedom is freedom from oppression, repression, depression and any other forms of constraint you can think of.

I think Schopenhauer got it right when he said, "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants," We are free to act according to our natures, our dispositions and desires, but we do not create our natures, our dispositions and desires.

So, I think it is clear that freedom in the sense of "freedom from" is real, but freedom in the libertarian sense is impossible to explain; on analysis the very idea seems incoherent.

I want to make it clear that I'm not trying to be unfair or silly with that.

I'm a programmer. In programming, a function can be deterministic or not. A deterministic function is one for which, for any given input, you'll always get the same output. So if you input w, and you get x as a response once, if it's deterministic then every time you input w you'll always get x. And if you input y, and you get z once, then every time you input y you'll get z.

And in contrast, an indeterministic function is simply a function where that isn't true - it's a function where, for at least some inputs, you'll get a different output. Maybe you input w and you get x once, and maybe you do it 9 more times you get x again, but the tenth time you get n̴͚̎̌ȍ̶͓͖͔̱̠̘̣̓̿̓̒̈́t̷̪̝̮̦̫͐̎̄̌͜ͅx̴͇̖̬̮͉̝̞̂̄͗͝ - the fact that you got a different output from the same input makes that function indeterministic. Even if it only happens sometimes, rarely.

You've brought in all sorts of fancy ideas like teleological reasons as opposed to causal reasons, but when we simplify everything you've said into a system that takes an input and produces an output - well, the input is the set of all relevant facts before Bobs decision, and the output is Bobs decision a few moments later, and since you said Bob will always choose the same, then it really doesn't matter if you choose to use the word "causal determinant" or "teleological determinant". It doesn't matter what types of facts you use in the function that takes the input and turns it into the output. You can call it whatever you want, you can call it causal or teleological or Susan if it makes you happy, but if the output is always the same from the same input, then what you have on your hands is a deterministic function.

You're semantically convinced that determinism and teleology are somehow opposed, that if teleology is involved it can't be determined. I, on the other hand, see no reason why teleology can't be part of a deterministic function. In fact what you described is explicitly a deterministic function that uses teleological reasons to produce an output. Teleology and determinism are perfectly compatible.

I don't expect you to agree with any of that, but I'm writing this in the hope that you might at least understand why I'm calling that determinism.

To go into more detail on why the PSR can't hold if Bob 2 does something different from Bob 1:

First of all, I recognize that my take on the PSR that I'm about to give is not necessarily standard, and is potentially contrary to what the standard view is. I'll argue for it nonetheless.

Everything is the same about bob and his entire universe in both worlds before Bobs choice. And since everything is the same, all possible reasons are the same. So if Bob1 makes some choice, that means there's a sufficient reason why Bob 1 made that choice. And since everything is the same preceding the choice, then there must be a sufficient reason for Bob2 to make the same choice. And yet he doesn't?

And instead he does something else. Something that didn't happen to Bob1. And if it didn't happen to Bob1, that means the preceding state of the world wasn't such that there was a sufficient reason for that choice to happen. So Bob1 didn't have a sufficient reason to make that choice, and given that all facts are the same before the choice for Bob1 as Bob 2, that means it also doesn't have sufficient reason to happen in bob2s world. And yet it happens anyway?

So if Bob2 makes a different choice from Bob1, and you insist the Psr holds, we have an action that does have sufficient reason to happen and yet doesn't happen anyway, and an action that doesn't have sufficient reason to happen and yet does happen anyway.

Now you might retort, no, actually both actions have sufficient reason to happen in both universes. Action 1 and Action 2 were both given sufficient precedent in both universes, and so either one happening matches the PSR. To which I would reply, touche...

But then we'd still need a sufficient reason for the difference. What's the sufficient reason for why Bob2 did something different from Bob1? It looks to me like the only possible answer is "just cause". Bob1 had sufficient reason to do action1 or action2, and he did action1 "just cause". And Bob2 did action2 "just cause". Just cause they could. There's no reason why one did one and one did the other, other than they could. So why did they do something different? To explain a difference, you must appeal to a difference, and since there's no difference between bob1 and bob2 prior to the choice, there's no explanation, there's no sufficient reason.

I think so anyway. I could easily be wrong, I'm not infallible. That's just the way I see it.

Does the thought experiment of the two Bobs provide a strong argument against free will, or does it only show that there is no definitive argument in favor of free will?

Because if it's the latter, then on a philosophy forum it should come to no one's surprise that definitive arguments are hard to come by.

A clever mind can come up with an objection to literally anything.

If a decision is based on a reason, then that decision is not free.

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." — javra

The SEP article on the subject is the best I can do, and it opens with using #1 as its definition, and touching on some of the others.

I got into philosophy precisely due to the lack of any articles from people that know their physics. So I learned the physics myself and payed little attention to any philosopher that wasn't aware of physics up to about a century ago.

What is 'biological determinism'? Sounds like biological things operate deterministically, but robots don't.

Maybe I should have specified "as pertains to the concept of free will as context".

All of them pertain.

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

If you read my linked post, I ask exactly that. You have to ask those that assert the omniscient god also granting us (and only us) free will. There are articles about this one since the contradiction is so obvious. They wave hands almost as hard as the people trying to rationalize the Millennium Falcon being so fast that it "made the Kessel Run in less than twelve parsecs" which is a unit of distance, not time.

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms
Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

Sort of. If the initial state is far enough back, you choose both vanilla and chocolate. You do otherwise. Both are causally inevitable.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms
How is this in any way relevant?

It (along with double slit) are flagships of hard determinism vs randomness. The former says that the decay will happen at time X. Quantum theory gives only probabilities of when it will decay (a half life). Most interpretations consider such decay to be totally uncaused, just like where the photon gets detected after passing through the double slits.

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms
How do you figure that?

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. It stands opposed to supernaturalism (dualism) where this is not the case. Most modern incompatibilist proponents of free will presume dualism. Anyway, naturalism does not necessarily imply inevitability. As I said, quantum theory (very much part of naturalism) is empirically probabilistic.

If a decision is based on a reason, then that decision is not free. — MoK

By this definition, any free choice is irrational.

By this definition, any free choice is irrational. — noAxioms

Call it whatever you like! We have the ability to do otherwise even if it is against reason. Moreover, free decision is necessary in many situations when we have no reason to prefer one option over another. For example, think of a situation in which you have two options where you don't know the future outcomes of the options. We would be stuck in such a situation if we were not free.

Does the thought experiment of the two Bobs provide a strong argument against free will — Tzeentch

I interpret it to be a strong argument against any type of free will which opposes itself to determinism. If you say "free will requires determinism to be false", to me that means "free will requires that Bob2 can actually sometimes behave differently from Bob1", but it doesn't seem that bob2s different behaviour can be explained by anything other than randomness.

You find this a strong argument against free will, in face of a shared experience between countless human beings throughout the ages, who all experience(d) free will on a daily basis?

"type of free will". Not all free will, just some types. That's why I used the word "type"

Doesn't our experience of free will oppose itself to determinism?

Whether we choose to have a glass of water or a cup of coffee, it feels like we make a choice that could have gone both ways.

Doesn't our experience of free will oppose itself to determinism? — Tzeentch

That's very debatable. My experience of my decision making process doesn't feel like it involves randomness, and I understand randomness to be the alternative to determinism. Our experience of free will certainly involves us not knowing what we're going to choose, but not knowing the future is not opposite to determinism.

Determinism implies the outcome of our choice was already decided beforehand, agreed?

But that is not what we experience; we experience agency in that very moment, where our 'free will' seems to make the difference.

Is it not a fair assessment that the libertarian idea of free will corresponds with an almost universal human experience?

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." — javra

The SEP article on the subject is the best I can do, and it opens with using #1 as its definition, and touching on some of the others. — noAxioms

Are you sure you provided the correct link? To be clear, as it stands, this forum post (which your link takes me to) does not reference any SEP article. Nor does it specify six determinism types. Nor does it address why omniscience cannot hold librarian free will.

I searched SEP again, and the only entry that stands out is this one, which defines causal determinism in the same old way: in short as entailing causal inevitability.

Can you link to "the SEP article on the subject" you had in mind?

What is 'biological determinism'? Sounds like biological things operate deterministically, but robots don't. — noAxioms

Biological determinism, also known as genetic determinism,[1] is the belief that human behaviour is directly controlled by an individual's genes or some component of their physiology, generally at the expense of the role of the environment, whether in embryonic development or in learning — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_determinism

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

If you read my linked post, I ask exactly that. — noAxioms

Again, I read nothing in the linked post to that effect. But then, if we agree on this, then #6 as specified in the parentheses does not apply to the issue at hand. Period.

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms
Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

Sort of. If the initial state is far enough back, you choose both vanilla and chocolate. You do otherwise. — noAxioms

No. You don't do otherwise. You by entailment do both in causally inevitable manners, each being done in a different world, with no ability to do otherwise to speak of.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms
How is this in any way relevant?

It (along with double slit) are flagships of hard determinism vs randomness. The former says that the decay will happen at time X. Quantum theory gives only probabilities of when it will decay (a half life). Most interpretations consider such decay to be totally uncaused, just like where the photon gets detected after passing through the double slits. — noAxioms

These "interpretations" are irrelevant to what the metaphysical stance of determinism signifies.

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms
How do you figure that?

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. — noAxioms

Again, provide a link to reference this.

I did a internet search on "philosophical determinism" and nothing came up to this effect, with all results specifying the same thing; again, in short, causal inevitability.

Determinism implies the outcome of our choice was already decided beforehand, agreed? — Tzeentch

"already decided beforehand"... mmm... kinda yes kinda no. Not "decided". Not "beforehand". Not necessarily. It just means that the outcome follows from the preceding conditions. It's not like Zeus is sitting up there in the heavens writing what he wants to happen, and then observing it happen, which is what "decided beforehand" feels like.

Is it not a fair assessment that the libertarian idea of free will corresponds with an almost universal human experience? — Tzeentch

Some certainly think so! But my decisions don't seem random.

"already decided beforehand"... mmm... kinda yes kinda no. Not "decided". Not "beforehand". Not necessarily. It just means that the outcome follows from the preceding conditions. It's not like Zeus is sitting up there in the heavens writing what he wants to happen, and then observing it happen, which is what "decided beforehand" feels like. — flannel jesus

Determinism implies we never have a choice. Is that a better way of putting it?

But we certainly experience having a choice.

Or how would you put it in plain English?

But my decisions don't seem random. — flannel jesus

As far as I know, the libertarian idea of free will doesn't imply that they would have to be.

Determinism implies we never have a choice. Is that a better way of putting it? — Tzeentch

Not necessarily that either. You can still have choices, it's just that your choices follow from... well, follow from YOU, follow from the state of you. If you made a choice at t2, determinism just means that choice was necessarily going to follow from the state of your world, and the state of you, at t1. And that's what you want out of free will - you want the state of YOU to be the thing determining a choice. And if it's true that the state of you at t1 determined the choice at t2, then you "made a choice", and it doens't conflict with determinism.

As far as I know, the libertarian idea of free will doesn't imply that it would have to be. — Tzeentch

But for determinism to not be the case, something must be random. So when someone says "we can only have free will if detreminism isn't the case", they're saying "we can only have free will if there's randomness".

Of course, many people seem to disagree. Which is why the randomness / determinism dichotomy has to be the first thing we talk about if we want to get anywhere.

If you made a choice at t2, determinism just means that choice was necessarily going to follow from the state of your world, and the state of you, at t1. — flannel jesus

The outcome was already determined, therefore the sense of choice was merely an illusion.

However, that's is not what we experience.

But for determinism to not be the case, something must be random. — flannel jesus

How so?

The possibility of multiple outcomes preceding a choice doesn't have to imply randomness, but the weighing of the options by the will - which is what we experience.

Of course, many people seem to disagree. — flannel jesus

Vastly more people seem to agree, though. Every person I ever met acts as though free will exists. Societies are structured around the notion of a free will.

The only exception I can think of of people acting as though free will doesn't exist, are the mentally ill.

Of course, some people may say they disagree with notions of free will, but they continue acting in every way as though they do believe in free will.

The possibility of multiple outcomes preceding a choice doesn't have to imply randomness, but the weighing of the options by the will - which is what we experience. — Tzeentch

Yeah, exactly, so in a choice there's no randomess, the choice follows naturally from the preceding state of everything (which of course includes the state of you), which is what you experience. No indeterminism required.