What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems — 180 Proof

‘Arranged’ by what? What property of matter is such that it spontaneously assembles itself into sentient life-forms. Because

Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all. — flannel jesus

What property of matter is such that it spontaneously assembles itself into sentient life-forms. — Wayfarer

I don't think that's the right question.

:up:

spontaneously assembles itself — Wayfarer

Red herring.

Wayf, you're not one of those evolution-deniers who mischaracterize natural selection as "a process of random chance", are you?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abiogenesis

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis

What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems. — “180 Proof"

What property of matter is such that it spontaneously assembles itself into sentient life-forms.
— Wayfarer

I don't think that's the right question. — flannel jesus

Why not? What’s the matter with the question? Surely it’s germane to the subject.

Autopoiesis doesn’t explain the molecular steps of how life arose, but it does provide criteria for when a system becomes “alive.” In this way, it complements abiogenesis research by addressing the conceptual threshold between non-life and life.

Why not? What’s the matter with the question? Surely it’s germane to the subject. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure it's established that there's anything "spontaneous" about it. And once you realize that, the rest of your question is just... chemistry. Literal chemistry. Like, if you want to understand how life forms came about from non life, that's a question for science, and you can take classes on chemistry, bio chemistry, maybe even early life chemistry.

I'm not sure it's established that there's anything "spontaneous" about it. And once you realize that, the rest of your question is just... chemistry. Literal chemistry. Like, if you want to understand how life forms came about from non life, that's a question for science, and you can take classes on chemistry, bio chemistry, maybe even early life chemistry. — flannel jesus

I was responding to a single sentence ‘ What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems embedded-enactive within eco-systems of other generative systems’. I’m asking, what causes that ‘rare arrangement’? That is actually a philosophical question rather than a scientific question. Naturalism always starts with nature herself. It doesn’t actually ask that kind of question, which is a philosophical, not a scientific question. I’m asking the question of ‘cause’ in a different sense than physical causation -perhaps in a more Aristotelian sense. To ascribe causation in that sense to bare chemistry is precisely to disregard the questions that give rise to ‘dual aspect’ type theories in the first place.

I’m asking, what causes that ‘rare arrangement’ — Wayfarer

Maybe I got distracted by the word "spontaneous", which is a word magical thinkers tend to use to dismiss out of hand the idea that, say, evolution can happen. They say "well if evolution is true, how did monkeys spontaneously turn into humans, and why aren't monkeys in zoos sometimes spontaneously turning into humans?" Spontaneously is a word used to straw man scientific ideas about the progression of life, because really, the science doesn't say it's spontaneous at all. Right?

So now that we have that word out of the way, what causes the ears arrangement of matter into a brain? If we take life as a given, it's a question of evolution and DNA. The question is, how and why did DNA ever build the first building block of a brain? Which is a neuron. And why was that mutation that built the first neuron beneficial enough to survive into future generations? (And it's feasible it wasn't, fun fact, not all evolved traits are beneficial, and they don't need to be beneficial to survive)

But then once you have the basic building block, eventually getting a network of these neurons together that are big enough to do something useful seems like almost an inevitability.

And it probably doesn't need much explaining why intelligence can become favoured by natural selection processes.

I still don’t think you’re thinking philosophically about it. I’m not preaching any kind of ID. I fully accept the scientific account, but it is a scientific account. It’s not a matter of facts, but one of meaning.

Go back to the OP

At the micro level, matter has various physical properties. Mass, charge, spin, color, whatever else we're aware of. These properties determine how particles combine and interact, which determine the physical objects, energy fields, and everything else we see all around us, and their macro characteristics. — Patterner

But already with the most rudimentary organisms, there are principles that are out of scope for physics and chemistry. Why? Consider this passage from Thomas Nagel, mentioned in the OP.

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. — Thomas Nagel, Core of Mind and Cosmos

Can you see how that relates to the ‘hard problem’? This ‘what it is like to be…’ begins to manifest with the most rudimentary forms of life and becomes progressively elaborated through evolutionary processes. But it retains an irreducibly first-person element or perspective, which is precisely what has been bracketed out in the analysis of physical and chemical processes.

You're not intelligent because of the properties alone of the chemicals in your body. You can't skip the middle step. You're intelligent because of the processes that that specific arrangement of chemicals allows to happen. And those processes AREN'T in all the particles. Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all. — flannel jesus

:up:

I think it's certainly worth talking about the hard problem! I bought an audio book that's all about the question "what is it like to be something?" What's it like to be a bat? I love it, fascinating, brilliant question.

I just don't think your wording of the way you asked the question was pointing in the right direction. It's not really any spontaneous anything, and contrary to patterners pattern of writing, it's not just a straightforward matter of low level properties -> high level properties

Right - so what is it a matter of?

And the whole thread is about the hard problem. Patterner is proposing ‘property dualism’ as the solution.

And I agree with Wonderer1 above.

Right - so what is it a matter of? — Wayfarer

Well you skip the question about spontaneous generation of sentience, and just ask, why is it that this hunk of smushy pink wet matter has an experience? Why is it that there's something it's like to be a human with a brain, and is it maybe the case that there's also something it's like to be a worm, an amoeba, an atom?

That's the question, right? Why is there something it's like to be anything, and what things is that even true for? Maybe there's not something it's like to be a paper clip, or maybe there is.

Well you skip the question about spontaneous generation of sentience, and just ask, why is it that this hunk of smushy pink wet matter has an experience? — flannel jesus

No, that’s not the question. You’re starting from the object. You’re viewing it from the outside. The ‘wet matter’ (to transpose to a Buddhist register) is not self. The capacity for experience is what is apodictic, that which cannot plausibly be denied.

well then I can't rephrase your question for you. I'm not sure what you're getting at, if not my attempt at rephrasing. I do recommend avoiding the spontaneous generation wording, whatever it is you're getting at.

is it meant as a challenge to physicalism? Something along the lines of, "well if physicalism is true, then at what point does matter go from just matter to matter with experience?"

I'm reading your question like a challenge - and if it is, it's a good challenge, worthwhile to ask, I just want to understand.

Very good! (I’ll take it up a little later, it’s sleep time in my timezone.)

Patterner seems to want to leap from low level properties to high level properties, that there's some direct correspondence there. The problem with that is, there's intermediate steps that are super important that get missed by that approach. — flannel jesus

flannel jesus seems to want to say Patterner is claiming the opposite of what he has clearly said more than once, in order to weaken his position.

I just discussed water. The electron shells of oxygen are such that hydrogen atoms bond to it in a certain way, with a certain angle between the atoms. The hydrogen bonds between water molecules are weak, So they break easily in liquid form. but, because of the angle between the atoms of the molecule, when the temperature goes down, and the hydrogen bonds do not break as easily, they solidify into a lattice arrangement that is less dense than when they are in liquid form. Therefore, A solid form floats on top of the liquid form.

DNA is the beginning of life. It is an information processing system. It is coded information of amino acids and proteins. The system assembles the amino acids and proteins, creating an environment in which it replicates itself. Then the process repeats. The environment is the living organisms. Because of evolution, more coding has been added to DNA, resulting in more information systems being added to organisms, which often means greater intelligence.

I say again: properties of higher levels are often, if not always, different from properties of lower levels. However, the properties of higher levels are exactly what they are because the properties of lower levels are exactly what they are. For example, the properties of hydrogen atoms are such that, within a certain temperature range, hydrogen is a gas. The properties of iron are such that, within that same range of temperature range, iron is a solid. Three states of matter are not properties of particles. But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping?

But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping? — Patterner

The way you had worded it prior didn't seem to acknowledge the "other factors". It sounded like you just thought, you have particles with these lower level properties, you get them all in a group, you get this higher level property.

But perhaps I misunderstood, or perhaps you changed your phrasing on that point, in either case, we agree that it's not just a straightforward properties-to-properties.

But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping — Patterner

In your example of iron, a path of decomposition, reduction and reconstruction is still possible. In these paths you find the parts that constitute the whole and with which you can reconstruct it. That does not happen with experience. You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. So the idea of composition and decomposition is not useful for understanding this matter of experience and physical matter.

Where am I leaping? — Patterner

Towards determinism? That behaviour is determined by physical causes?

well if physicalism is true, then at what point does matter go from just matter to matter with experience?" — flannel jesus

Have a look at From Physical Causation to Organisms of Meaning.

Clearly, the objects of our fears and desires do not cause behavior in the same way that forces and energy cause behavior in the physical realm. When my desire for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow causes me to go on a search, the (nonexistent) pot of gold is not a causal property of the sort that is involved in natural laws. (Pylyshyn 1984, p. xii) — Excerpt

You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. — JuanZu

Isn’t that due to the subjective unity of experience? That conscious experience has a quality of integration and intentionality that can’t be resolved to the actions of its constituents? That is a question for mereology.

Second, big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things. — Patterner

Participants in this thread have demonstrated two problems with this statement. First, a lot of the characteristics of the "big things" are due to the variety of different ways that the "little things" can be arranged, therefore many of the characteristics of the big things are not "because of the properties of the little things", they are bcause of the way that the little things are arranged. The next problem is the reason why the little things get arranged in the way that they do. This is the issue of causation, the arrangements are not random chance.

In your example of iron, a path of decomposition, reduction and reconstruction is still possible. In these paths you find the parts that constitute the whole and with which you can reconstruct it. That does not happen with experience. You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. So the idea of composition and decomposition is not useful for understanding this matter of experience and physical matter. — JuanZu

I agree. I used iron and water to show that, although macro physical characteristics are not identical to the properties of the particles that the macro object is composed of (which is a ridiculous notion), those macro characteristics are exactly as they are because of the micro properties. If the micro was different, the macro would be, also. It's impossible for things to be otherwise.

Also you have to take into account emergent properties. That is the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Though a cat is made up of carbon it is not identical to it as it now has a function such as life.

Participants in this thread have demonstrated two problems with this statement. First, a lot of the characteristics of the "big things" are due to the variety of different ways that the "little things" can be arranged, therefore many of the characteristics of the big things are not "because of the properties of the little things", they are bcause of the way that the little things are arranged. The next problem is the reason why the little things get arranged in the way that they do. This is the issue of causation, the arrangements are not random chance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this. It's solid form floats in its liquid form. Very unusual. And it's because of the ways the molecules are arranged in the two different forms. In this case, temperature is key.

Let's take another molecule. How about NaCl. Does that behave the same at the same temperatures? No. NaCl's melting point is 801°C/1474°F. There's one difference. Does solid NaCl float in it's liquids form? No. Another difference.

Why don't water and salt have the same characteristics under the same conditions?

Also you have to take into account emergent properties. That is the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Though a cat is made up of carbon it is not identical to it as it now has a function such as life. — kindred

Sure. But do you think the emergent property of life would be the same as it is if carbon's properties were other than they are?

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this. — Patterner

So, you're disproving what you are asserting?

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this.
— Patterner

So, you're disproving what you are asserting? — Metaphysician Undercover

H2O's macro physical characteristics, under any conditions, are explained by how's it's micro physical properties behave under those conditions. Every physicist, website, and book that explains its characteristics, under any conditions, including why ice floats on water, will say the same. It's because of the properties of its molecules, like its weak hydrogen bonds, and the angle of the arrangement of its atoms in the molecules. These things, in turn, due to the nature of electron shells.

If you know otherwise, that the reason ice floats on water has nothing to do with the properties of its molecules, please share.

Or point me to any other macro characteristic that is not explained by how the micro properties of its constituents behave under the conditions it is in.

Finally working my way through your post.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, — javra

I'm thinking otherwise. Let's take the world's best AI. We have conversations with AI. It gives us very good information. In speed and multitasking, it surpasses us. But, despite it's capabilities, it is not conscious. So there can be intelligence on par with ours, in at least some ways, without consciousness.

Although I don't know where along the evolutionary ladder consciousness begins, I believe many animal species are conscious. Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess.