Fine; but if the datapoints are entered, it is false to state that the datapoints are not entered, and it still remains a true fact in reality that Patient A cannot both have allergy B and not have allergy B at the same time. — A Christian Philosophy

This says something about the type of thing that "allergy B" refers to. It is a property, and we have categorized the aspects of reality so that things known as properties obey the fundamental rules. The issue is that there are aspects of reality which do not necessarily obey those rules.

So Aristotle propose another category, known as "potential", to classify the aspects of reality which do not obey those rules. The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present.

You can see that these aspects of reality are not accurately called properties. They are better known as concepts or ideas. The future event decided by choice, exists as an idea in someone's mind. And "matter" is a concept which Aristotle used to substantiate the reality of bodies in their temporal extension.

For a modern example of why we must allow violation of the fundamental laws of logic, you could investigate Peirce's triadic system.

If that's okay, I'll drop the efficient cause/final cause cause topic to avoid going off on a tangent. — A Christian Philosophy

Sure, but final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door, as what substantiates the efficacy of ideas and concepts, confirming their reality. This will be required to demonstrate that potential is something real. Otherwise one might simply deny the reality of the things in this category, possibility, potential, ideas, matter, etc., calling them imaginary or fictional, and insist that all reality must obey the laws of logic.

"A rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry" — A Christian Philosophy

Great! The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? What is the agency or power of the laws? The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. And as you note, this is just ordinary usage. The trouble being you're giving it unusual significance, that I call reifying, making the unreal thing real. And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be?

So what? — MoK

You asked here how do I know that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds, and I answered.

As a counter argument to your line of argument, one could argue that there is no necessity of understanding the cause of something. Maybe humans just can't understand some things. — Brendan Golledge

I accept that humans can't understand everything. However, as per the OP (if there is no error), the PSR must be fulfilled and there are only 3 types of reason. By eliminating 2 types, we conclude that the laws of nature must be explained by type 2, i.e., explained by design. That said, the argument does not go so far as to claim that the designer is God.

This argument also presupposes the existence of free will, which is itself disputed. — Brendan Golledge

True, but that only applies to explaining man-made things and man, not to explaining the laws of nature.

It could be that impersonal laws of physics exist without cause. — Brendan Golledge

As per the PSR, the fundamental laws of physics must be explained; and they do not exist necessarily because they are not tautologies.

Or reality could be circular (like somebody goes back in time to start the big bang). — Brendan Golledge

Circularity in cause and effect violates the law of causality that an effect cannot occur before its cause.

We need to take care to seperate logically possible worlds form physically possible worlds. — Banno

Correct. I am talking about physical worlds.

There are finite possible worlds, logically speaking, if there is no contradiction in supposing a finite world. — Banno

Physical worlds could be finite or infinite.

There seems no reason to supose that a finite world could not sustain life, and no logical contradiction in
a finite world that contains life. — Banno

Correct. The finite world could sustain life.

I said that given an infinite world, whatever the laws of nature, life is possible in this world, so no design is involved.

The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules.


I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does?

final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door — Metaphysician Undercover

For sure - I believe in final causes. As per reason type 2 described in the OP, a thing that exists by design is designed with a purpose, i.e., it has a final cause.

"A rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry"
— A Christian Philosophy
Great! The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? What is the agency or power of the laws? The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. And as you note, this is just ordinary usage. The trouble being you're giving it unusual significance, that I call reifying, making the unreal thing real. And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be? — tim wood

Questions pending. Are you going to answer?

The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? — tim wood

It is not necessary to know the "how" in order to know the "why". For a simpler example: Ball A hits Ball B which then moves. We don't know exactly how the cause transitions into the effect because there is no inherent logical necessity between the two. Yet, clearly, Ball A is the cause of the movement of Ball B.

The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. [...] And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be? — tim wood

Whether the laws of nature are descriptive or effective does not change the fact that they cause the rock to exist. To say the same thing in a different way: The agglomeration of molecules which we call a rock, is the result of the laws of nature acting on those molecules, whether those laws refer to something forcing the molecules into place, or they merely describe the ordered behaviour of those molecules.

I would have thought that, even though there are many sub-branches of logic, all the branches are compatible with each other so that logic as a whole is one coherent system.
— A Christian Philosophy

That's a point of some debate. It will not do simply to assert that this is so, and the arguments thereabouts are a topic of much recent work. — Banno

If we allow the fundamental laws of logic to change and not be part of fundamental reality, wouldn't that make all mentions of possible worlds meaningless? Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them.

frankly I think you would benefit from some study of formal logic.

Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them. — A Christian Philosophy

Think on that for a bit. Why shouldn't there be rules that apply in one world, but not in another? We then use the rules of each world to talk about that world. Does there then have to be at least one rule that applies in every world? Why?

This actually an open discussion in contemporary logic, one I tried to address in this thread: . Curiously, it seems to be those of a theistic bent who have most trouble with such thinking.

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules. — A Christian Philosophy

In this example, the law of excluded middle is violated. The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is neither true nor false. We do not say that it is both true and false, so non-contradiction is upheld. You express this as "it is possible", and this is an expression which violates the law of excluded middle. The law of excluded middle implies that it is necessary that one or the other is true, therefore real possibility is excluded.

I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does? — A Christian Philosophy

Well, it's beyond the scope of this thread, but if I remember correctly, firstness is the realm of real possibility, potential, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable, as demonstrated in your example of "possible" above. Secondness is the realm of actual occurrence where the law of identity and the other laws of logic are all applicable. Thirdness is the realm of generality, universals, which unites the first and second, but this is only done through violation of the law of non-contradiction.

Ball A is the cause of the movement of Ball B.
Whether the laws of nature are descriptive or effective does not change the fact thatthey cause the rock to exist.[/i] To say the same thing in a different way: The agglomeration of molecules which we call a rock, is the result of the laws of nature acting on those molecules, whether those laws refer to something forcing the molecules into place, or they merely describe the ordered behaviour of those molecules. — A Christian Philosophy

Ball A causing B's motion is descriptive, and no question, useful. But you're missing the point. If causes are real then where are they and how and why do they work? And all the day long if you try to answer, you end up with description. Which is entirely your invention. You can believe what you like, but the trouble with taking them as real,or in any way in-themselves effective, is that you likely will suppose that all sorts of things are real and existing in ways they are not and cannot be.

Between ball A and B, something happens, and for most purposes describing that as A's causing B to move is convenient and useful. But the question here is not the utility of using a concept like cause-and-effect, but the concept's status as an existing thing (other than as an idea), and the burden on you if you take it to be an existing thing, is to prove/demonstrate that existence.

And the reason you cannot, in most general terms, goes back to map and territory distinction.

Of course this all may seem nit-picking, but it turns out that the fallacious reification of ideas may be the third deadliest of mankind's afflictions, after plague and passage of time. Serious business, then, after all.

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules. — A Christian Philosophy

There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. In one, the sea battle occurs. In the other, it doesn't.

In no possible world does the sea battle both occur and not occur.

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened.

Possible world semantics provides a formalisation of such questions that allows is to avoid the sorts of issues Aristotle and Quine feared. Logic moves on.

There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. In one, the sea battle occurs. In the other, it doesn't.

In no possible world does the sea battle both occur and not occur.

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened.

Possible world semantics provides a formalisation of such questions that allows is to avoid the sorts of issues Aristotle and Quine feared. Logic moves on. — Banno

It would be nice to see a post on the tension between temporal possible world semantics and scientific determinism. Or maybe there was?

Temporal possible world semantics allows for multiple accessible futures, while scientific determinism implies only one fixed future. If determinism is true, branching futures misrepresent reality. One response is to treat "possible futures" epistemically—as reflecting our ignorance—not metaphysically, preserving the utility of branching models without denying determinism. Or, as argued earlier, determinism is false.

Fascinating stuff