If all we wish to do is save any aspect of modal reasoning so as to avoid absolute collapse, we have to show such a thing as modal reasoning exists in impossible worlds. — Hanover

An unusual phrasing, but I supose modal logic apples to impossible worlds and is what shows them to contain the contradictions that render them impossible.

That is, can I not logically reason based upon the antecedent without the antecedent being true in this world? That seems what modal logic is. — Hanover

Yep.

Now, in the present, certain things have certain potentials. Joe might potentially be asleep at 10 PM or be awake then. A rock, by contrast, cannot be asleep or awake. So, we can speak about possibilities in the future according to the ways in which things in the present possess potentiality. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Better: now, in the present, certain states of affairs might be accessible. One accessible word is that in which Joe might be asleep at 10 PM, another accessible world is that in which he is awake at 10 PM. A rock, by contrast, cannot be asleep or awake. So, in no possible world is there a rock that is asleep or awake, and so no world is accessible in which the rock is awake. We can speak about possibilities in the future according to the ways in which things in the present are accessible. But that is only a small part of what we can do with PWS.

And to be clear, accessibility is a formally defined, semantic notion, and part of the possible worlds modelling of formal modal logics, avoiding any messy ontology of potential and actual.

And far more flexible than the Aristotelian model. It handles a wider range of modalities, cleanly avoids category mistakes, and is rigorous enough for computation.

So, in no possible world is there a rock that is asleep or awake, and so no world is accessible in which the rock is awake. — Banno

This is nitpick, but is the definition of "rock" so clear and tight that it cannot allow for the logical possibility of a rock being asleep or awake? I'm thinking of Rock Biter in the movie The NeverEnding Story.

:wink: Nice.

Is Pyornkrachzark a rock? Well, we have a choice here. We might say that while Pyornkrachzark is made of stone, he is not a rock, but perhaps a silicon-based life form, and no more a rock than you and I are pools of water.

Or alternately we might say that Pyornkrachzark is a rock, and that therefore the assertion "rocks do not sleep" is incorrect.

That is, we might re-asses Tim's assertion that rocks neither sleep nor wake. We have a choice here, not about whether rocks sleep so much as about how we use the word "rock".

I don't think this has an affect on the argument given, which is that accessibility does what Tim tried to do with potential, only more clearly and with less metaphysical baggage.

If it rains, I'll get my umbrella is modal logic, and it may or may not be raining at the moment or ever again in the future. Why do these temporal issues of what is happening now or later interfere with our ability to logically assess? That is, can I not logically reason based upon the antecedent without the antecedent being true in this world? That seems what modal logic is. — Hanover

I have no problem with modal logic. It is obviously very useful and I'm not arguing against its usefulness. What I am arguing is that when it is interpreted and applied in a way which is inconsistent with the three fundamental laws of logic, we ought to respect this inconsistency, and not try to argue that it is consistent.

So for example, "if it is raining at 7 AM tomorrow I will be carrying an umbrella" signifies a future condition which could be represented as distinct possibilities, one in which I am carrying an umbrella, one in which I am not carrying an umbrella. To accept these two propositions (possible worlds) as both true, would be a violation of the law of noncontradiction, what is designated by "I" is both carrying an umbrella, and not carrying an umbrella. Under Aristotelian terms, we would represent such cases of future possibility, as neither/nor, a violation of excluded middle. This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle.

However, you can see how some "possible worlds" interpretations, would say that somehow, both possible worlds must be real, due to a sort of splitting of multiverses, and I will experience one of them, but some form of "I" will also be experiencing the other. What is evident, is that if we accept the reality of "future possibility", we also must allow that the future involves a violation of the fundamental three laws of logic. That is simply the nature of "future possibility". I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility.

Now, for comparison, lets look at "If it was raining at 7 AM yesterday, I was carrying an umbrella". Again, we have two possible worlds, one in which I was carrying an umbrella, and one in which I was not. But in this case, we accept that one is true, and the other is false. So in this case, there is no violation of the fundamental laws. We allow that the possible worlds are simply a representation, and there is an independent "actual world", and only one possibility corresponds with the actual, as the truth. This interpretation is implied by terms like "counterfactual". The counterfactual is accepted as other than the truth. The point though, is that we cannot extend this independent "actual world" into the future without the assumption of determinism or fatalism, and this would deny the reality of "future possibility".

But surely ↪Metaphysician Undercover, there is a way to do counterfactual reasoning, right? So, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown." But the plant in question has to be, at least in some sense, the same plant, or else we would just be saying that if the plant was a different plant it might not have grown. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm fine with counterfactual reasoning, along with all sorts of applications of modal logic, and even statistics and probabilities, which with the aid of computers has become extremely useful. What I think though, is that we need to maintain a separation between ontology and epistemology, by embracing some fundamental ontological principles, so that we do not allow ontological problem to contaminate our epistemology. In other words, we should attempt to limit uncertainty to metaphysics and ontology, allowing epistemology to obtain a higher degree of certainty.

So to look at your example, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown", it really tells us nothing but an assumption that plants need watering to grow. This principle could be backed up and supported with evidence, but it would still not tell us whether we should water plants or not. Whether we ought to water plants is dependent on whether it is desirable to have plants grow.

Likewise, in counterfactual reasoning, we speak to the potencies that some thing possessed in the past, and then discuss what would be true if they were actualized differently. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what use is there in talking about different ways of actualizing things, unless we have principles as to what is good and not good?

The past is, in some sense, necessary, having already become actual. But when we speak to "possible worlds" with a different past, we are simply talking about different potentialities becoming actualized. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't this self-contradicting? If the past is necessary, then talking about the possibility of a different past is inherently contradictory. We can learn from our mistakes and produce principles like 'plants need watering to grow', but we cannot realistically talk about the past being different than it was, only about what we might do differently in the future.

That's the point. You allow indexation for time, but not for possible worlds. Why? — Banno

I explained this, it is a problem with the interpretation, the "rigid designator" interpretation.. If there is one possible world in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and another in which he did not, then you have two distinct items with the same name "Caesar". They must be distinct items because they have contrary properties. In reality Caesar did one or the other. If Caesar did in fact cross the Rubicon, then the person in that possible world is correctly named "Caesar", and the other is named "counterfactual Caesar". You can see how it would be false to say that they both have the same identity. And if it is not known whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon or not, then they are both "imaginary Caesar". And by the law of identity imaginary things do not have an identity.

I hope it is clear, and as the Roman example given above exemplifies, possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future. If we accept rigid designation, the possible Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is the very same as the actual Caesar who did. That that is, "what might have happened if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon" is a question about Caesar, and not about some other person in some other possible world who happens to have the same name. — Banno

To give both Caesars the same identity is a violation of the law of identity. I hope you understand this by now. However, as I explained above, it is necessary to violate the law of identity to speak about future objects. The reality of future possibilities makes it impossible that an object has an identity beyond the present in the direction o the future. But it is not necessary to violate the law of identity when talking about past objects. How could anyone think that it would be advantageous to violate the law of identity when speaking about past objects, just for the purpose of being able to talk about future things and past things in the same way? Since it is very clear that future things and past things are ontologically different, future things being imaginary with no identity, while past things are not real, this could only be a mistaken proposition. What beneficial purpose could it possibly serve?

In trying to throw out the bath water of fatalism, you have wholly thrown out the babe of modality. And needlessly, since accessibility allows us to make choices. — Banno

If you think I have thrown out modality, then you completely misunderstand. What I've been arguing against is specific interpretations of modality. I believe the concept of "accessibility" is completely misguided. Future possibilities have no truth value whatsoever, due to the incompatibility I described. And choices are based in what is designated as good, what is desired, not in what is determined to be "accessible". The issue here being that the strong willed person can make accessible what others designate as inaccessible so accessibility is dependent on the way that one apprehends the facts.

It handles a wider range of modalities, cleanly avoids category mistakes, and is rigorous enough for computation. — Banno

When you say that " possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future", it's very clear that you do not avoid category mistakes. As I explained, past possibilities are categorically different from future possibilities. Placing them together under the same heading "possible worlds" is a category mistake.

An unusual phrasing, but I supose modal logic apples to impossible worlds and is what shows them to contain the contradictions that render them impossible. — Banno

There's an article on everything:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/#CouRea

Excellent article - thanks. What did you take away from it?

You are repeating the very same errors already addressed. It's not worth my time to respond yet again. Diminishing returns.

If any one else sees a problem so far unaddressed, let me know.

My thoughts on this have returned to our A -> ~ A discussion, distinguishing the vacuous from the semantically meaningful.

One example I came across was Goldbach's Conjecture, which states " that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers." This theory is not proven, thus a "conjecture."

So, consider this statement, "if Goldbach's theory is false, there is an even integer greater than 2 that cannot be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers."

This is a potentially impossible antecedent that offers a logical piece of information in the consequent.

It is modal in the hypothetical form, yet an impossible antecedent, yet not a vacously true consequent.

To the extent it might be suggested that an impossible world antecedent renders a meaningless or a vacuous consequent, I think has to be reconsidered.

The counter to this is perhaps these impossible antecedents are only resulting in definitional consequents and are obscured tautolgies, but, honestly I haven't thought long enough on it. But that feels like a possible lurking response and goes back to my prior comment about the seeming analytic quality of these statements.

That is, is the Goldbach consequent stated above synthetic or just analytically derived from the antecedent?

I'm sure someone has hashed this out somewhere.

Oh goodness.

Perhaps logical space is broader than just consistency? It seems we might be able to wander away from the safe shore of possible worlds out on to the ocean of impossible worlds.

Beyond the pale for some, no doubt.

But before we go there, perhaps there are two completely consistent mathematics, the one on the left in which Goldbach's Conjecture is true; and the one on the right in which it is false.

Which one is true? Which one is right? Those question ceases to make sense. They are both true and yet incompatible. Logical space ceases to look like a unified whole, resembling instead a patchwork of frameworks, each with its own truths, rules, and meanings.

I think that's wonderful. @Count Timothy von Icarus won't like it.

We have a choice here, not about whether rocks sleep so much as about how we use the word "rock". — Banno

Okay, that makes sense!

Cheers.

Now if we could relate that back to your OP...

This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions.

I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic.

I have no problem with modal logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. You have a metaphysical demand you're placing upon a linguistic/logical function. You're playing the language game of classic logic and refusing to speak modal logic. That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning.

This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another.

David Lewis appears to argue differently than me in my response to @Metaphysician Undercover above, where Lewis asserts that modal possibilities are real. Do you take this position or do you accept the position I've submitted where they are just abstractions (which seems to the be predominate view from what I've seen). I can't see what Lewis' approach adds by creating these empirically unprovable extra worlds.

I'd also wonder what Lewis' response would be to counterpossible worlds, as in are there ontologically real impossibilities? Not only are there worlds where I wear a green hat, but there are worlds where I wear a green hat and not a green hat.

I think this kind of thinking does a disservice to the enterprise by inserting hopelessly confusing notions, but maybe it can be explained to me why modal realism beats modal abstractions.

if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose. — A Christian Philosophy

Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. But first, let's consider whether or not the OG exists contingently or necessarily. (in all cases, I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/contingency, not to confused with conceivability or conceptual modality).

If the actual OG is contingent, then an alternative OG could have existed instead - or perhaps there could have been no OG at all.

Whatever it is, the OG cannot have been caused, because it's a first cause. Can an uncaused thing be contingent? To be contingent, something must account for that contingency - such as its cause (whatever caused it, might have not caused it). But if it exists uncaused then I suggest it must exist necessarily - any OG must exist necessarily.

You believe God is the OG, and probably agree it's existence is necessary, but there's no reason why it couldn't be something natural that includes the fundamental laws of nature in its structure. You alleged this entails "modal collapse", and dismiss this because it's "frowned upon". But how is it any different from a God existing necessarily? The only difference I see, is that a God is infinitely more complex (possessing infinite knowledge that is not the product of learning or experience) than an natural OG - which is a good reason to think it's natural.

At the risk of sounding condescending, you've a good understanding of the issues

Lewis was a somewhat eccentric chap. From what I can work out he thought that possible worlds were no different to the actual world, but to the extreme that he concluded that they must therefore also be actual. It's an interesting idea, but I don't agree with it.

Instead I think there are a multitude of possible worlds, but that there is one possible world amongst them that is actual. I take this to be the most common view, almost to the point of a consensus.

In this possible world we can discover things - like that the table is red. We get to talk about other possible worlds by stipulation. So "what if this blue table had been red" stipulates a possible world in which this very table - the blue on - is instead red. The possible world comes about in virtue of the stipulation. That's how I think of them.

An alternative is to think of a logical space containing all the possible worlds, and understanding "what if this blue table had been red" as picking out some world in which this table, which is blue in this world, is red. This is probably the way most logicians think of possible worlds.

My reason for preferring stipulation is simple parsimony. Where the logical space folk list uncountably many possible worlds, I list only those that are explicitly stipulated.

You may be right that Lewis would have a problem with counterpossibel worlds - an interesting point. A counterpossible world cannot be actual. Good argument. The world in which you wear a green hat and not a green hat cannot be this world.

The fun here is in taking "hopelessly confusing notions" and un-confusing them. Something I take as central to the whole enterprise of doing philosophy.

Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? — Relativist

Why?

Why? — Banno

Seems to me the following sentence answered your question.

If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. — Relativist

That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions. — Hanover

That's right, what I am saying is that modal logic is not consistent with classical logic. But there is a further point. If modal logic, which is necessary for making decisions about the future, is not consistent with classical logic which produces the basis for what is, in what has been, then there is a gap in our decision making process because we use two distinct types of logic which are inconsistent with each other. This is similar to, or even a form of, the is/ought gap.

Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic. — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that we cannot logically consider it. I am saying that it violates classical logic, therefore we cannot consider it in relation to the premises classical logic.

You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. — Hanover

That's not true. I am very clearly talking about violations to classical logic. Therefore I am objecting to classical logic. And I accept that modal logic was developed to deal with these aspects of reality which classical logic cannot address, due to that deficiency in classical logic. Look at your above quotes from me, I explained how Aristotle showed that future possibility violates classical logic. He described it as a violation of excluded middle. I describe it as a situation where the law of identity does not apply. The fact that future possibility violates classical logic is ancient knowledge. We probably all take it for granted. Modal logic is an attempt at a different logic to deal with this problem. What I complained about, in this thread, is people who insist that modal logic is used in a way which is consistent with classical logic.

You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. — Hanover

It is not a rejection of modal logic, it is a rejection of the way that modal logic is often applied. To apply logic correctly requires ontological principles. Demanding ontological clarity of the meaning of propositions before performing logical functions is not a matter of rejecting the logic. It is a matter of requesting an adequate explanation of the premises, similar to asking for definitions. If an important term like "possible" is left with ambiguity between two very distinct senses, this is cause for concern, because it allows for the possibility of misuse.

The potential for misuse of logical reasoning is obvious from the ancient knowledge which shows us that applying classical logic to future possibility is a misuse. In a like way, I insist that applying modal logic to past possibilities (counterfactuals) and applying it to future possibilities, in the very same way, according to the same rules, is also a misuse of logic.

That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning. — Hanover

The first sentence is correct, the second is not. I went through this with Banno earlier. I had to explain that I am not claiming that modal logic is inconsistent internally, I am saying that it is often applied in a way which is not consistent with classical logic. What I point out is the inconsistency between classical logic and modal logic. That inconsistency ought to be obvious, because classical logic is violated by future possibility, and modal logic is applied to future possibility. Banno first did not accept this inconsistency, then accused me of rejecting modal logic completely. When I pointed out that I was only distinguishing an inconsistency between these logical forms, Banno finally said "fine", and seemed to agree.

The second sentence is false, because I am in no way refusing to accept modal logic as a mode of reasoning. Again, that it is a mode of reasoning is obvious. However, I am pointing out that if we do not distinguish between applications of modal logic which are consistent with classical logic from applications which are inconsistent, and we interpret applications which are inconsistent as if they are consistent, that is a form of misuse of this mode of reasoning. So the misuse is multifaceted. First, there is misuse of modal logic if future possibility is treated in the same way as past possibilities. Second, there is misuse of classical logic when future possibility in the application of modal logic, is interpreted as consistent with classical logic. The latter misuse propagates determinism and fatalism.

This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another. — Hanover

The "actual world" is the grounding for a judgement of truth in the sense of correspondence. Judgements of truth are necessary for judgements of the soundness of the logical conclusions. As I said, I do not reject the application of "possible worlds" and model logic in general. But since the "actual world" exists at the present time, and past possibilities are substantially different from future possibilities, then "possible worlds" when referring to the past must have a substantially different meaning from "possible worlds" when referring to the future, in order to maintain truth, and sound conclusions.

Instead I think there are a multitude of possible worlds, but that there is one possible world amongst them that is actual. I take this to be the most common view, almost to the point of a consensus. — Banno

This is the problematic statement right here. In the case of "possible worlds" referring to the past time, the past has already been determined by the passing of time, and it is correct to say that of all the possible worlds, "one represents the actual", or even (depending on one's ontological stance) "one is the actual". However, when referring to future time, that time has not yet passed, and the actual has not yet been determined, therefore it is incorrect to say that one of the possible worlds is the actual, or even that it represents the actual. This is what leads to determinism and fatalism. In order to allow for the reality of real choice, there is no such things as "the actual".

Ah, so you want to find out the implications of a mistaken idea. Cool.

what I am saying is that modal logic is not consistent with classical logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Trouble is that modal logic includes propositional logic and predicate logic. Every valid proposition in propositional logic and in predicate logic is valid in modal logic. And for every valid syllogism in classical logic there is an equivalent valid formulation in propositional or predicate logic.

So again, you are just mistaken about this.

And your other errors follow on from this.

If you insist that modal logic fails because of its failure to adhere to classical logic standards related to ontological status, then you will be de facto rejecting modal logic. Modal logic admits to the incompatibility noted by Aristotle and responds to it, so I don't know how to respond other than to say if you want modal logic to act like classic logic you can't have model logic.

In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object.

I

Trouble is that modal logic includes propositional logic and predicate logic. Every valid proposition in propositional logic and in predicate logic is valid in modal logic. And for every valid syllogism in classical logic there is an equivalent valid formulation in propositional or predicate logic. — Banno

Think about what you are saying Banno. All propositional, predicate, or classical logic can be expressed as modal logic. This does not mean that all modal logic can be expressed in the terms of those other forms of logic, and that is where the problem lies. The three fundamental laws are not sound when applied toward future possibilities, but modal logic is. Concluding that because modal logic is applicable to past possibilities, and is consistent with classical logic in this instance, therefore classical logic must also be consistent with modal logic when applied to future possibilities, is what supports fatalism.

If you insist that modal logic fails because of its failure to adhere to classical logic standards related to ontological status, then you will be de facto rejecting modal logic. — Hanover

I don't claim that. What I claim is that classical logic fails when applied to the future. Modal logic is designed for future possibility and does not fail.

Modal logic admits to the incompatibility noted by Aristotle and responds to it, so I don't know how to respond other than to say if you want modal logic to act like classic logic you can't have model logic. — Hanover

It appears like you understand this quite well, now try to convince Banno of this. Banno does not admit that incompatibility, and this is what supports fatalism. Yet Banno also denies fatalism, and that is a problem.

In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object. — Hanover

This is the point you are missing. My claim is that classical logic fails, not that modal logic fails. However, interpretations of modal logic which attempt to understand it in the terms of classical logic (i.e. make the two compatible) are themselves a failure. So I am saying that it is not modal logic which fails, but certain interpretations of it which fail. For an example o this failure, just look at what Banno has written.

Why? — Banno

Because he's a Christian, he believes there is an OG. I am arguing that an OG does not entail a God.

Can you show that there is no OG?

All propositional, predicate, or classical logic can be expressed as modal logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's not at all what I said.

It really would help if you were to read about and try to understand logic rather than just dispensing your wisdom.

Can you show that there is no OG? — Relativist

I don't know. What's an OG? An ontological grounding...?

And wouldn't it be incumbent on those positing an OG to demonstrate the need for one?

I gather it's some form of foundation on which things are, in some fashion. ut as I said in my first post in this thread,

Perhaps some things just are the case, unexplained and unexplainable. — Banno

don't know. What's an OG? An ontological grounding...?

And wouldn't it be incumbent on those positing an OG to demonstrate the need for one? — Banno

Yes: OG = ontological ground. I don't need to demonstrate there is an OG to someone who already believes there is one.

It really would help if you were to read about and try to understand logic rather than just dispensing your wisdom. — Banno

Hey, if I've got wisdom, it's best that I dispense it. And it would be best for you to pay attention. Fuck the logic, it doesn't qualify as wisdom so why waste time trying to understand it, when all that has ever done is produce faulty interpretations. It's best to leave logic as it is, impossible to understand.

I don't need to demonstrate there is an OG to someone who already believes there is one. — Relativist

Ok. I do not.

Fuck the logic, it doesn't qualify as wisdom so why waste time trying to understand it, when all that has ever done is produce faulty interpretations. It's best to leave logic as it is, impossible to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, then, best you stop posting about logic, don't you think?

Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. — Relativist

Yes, I agree that there is an OG.

You believe God is the OG, and probably agree it's existence is necessary, but there's no reason why it couldn't be something natural that includes the fundamental laws of nature in its structure. — Relativist

I am unclear from your comment whether you agree with the conclusion from the OP, that the fundamental laws of nature must be designed. If so, then we can infer that the OG has the faculty of being a designer; which in turn implies a free will, because beings that are not free cannot produce things out of design.