Sure I know the difference between facts and beliefs. What does this have to do with my argument?

Sure I know the difference between facts and beliefs. What does this have to do with my argument? — MoK

Your arguments are predicated on beliefs and assumptions and thus have no more force than your beliefs and assumptions provide. This a fatal flaw for proofs.

Your arguments are predicated on beliefs and assumptions and thus have no more force than your beliefs and assumptions provide. This a fatal flaw for proofs. — tim wood

I don't think that my argument is based on beliefs and assumptions. Here is my argument in syllogism form for further consideration:

D1) Consider two states of a physical (consider an electron as an example of a physical), S1 to S2, in which the physical exists at time t1 first and t2 later respectively
D2) Now consider a change by which I mean that physical moves from the state S1 at time t1 to the state of S2 at time t2
A) Assume that the physical in the state of S1 has the causal power to cause the physical in the state of S2
P1) Physical however does not experience time
P2) If so, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct time, t2, to cause the physical in the state of S2
P3) If so, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2
C) So, physical cannot be the cause of its own change

I don't think that my argument is based on beliefs and assumptions. — MoK

I suggest you review your English language reading and writing skills.

What do you mean?

What do you mean? — MoK

I don't think that my argument is based on beliefs and assumptions. — MoK

Assume — MoK

Physical however does not experience time — MoK

If so, then — MoK

So, — MoK

Unsupported claims, assumptions, hypothetical conditionals, false conclusions.

Unsupported claims, assumptions, hypothetical conditionals, false conclusions. — tim wood

The physical neither has a sensory system to experience time nor has a memory to estimate the passage of time through the accumulation of memory, as humans do. In fact, saying that the physical can experience time is absurd since the physical including us exists within each instant of time only and each instant of time is similar (please consider my thought experiment).

The physical neither has a sensory system to experience time nor has a memory to estimate the passage of time through the accumulation of memory, as humans do. — MoK

As humans do.... Things that are not human are generally not expected to "experience" the way humans do. Are you suggesting that things are not, then, subject to the passage of time?

As to your thought experiment, you can believe what you like, but you have proved/demonstrated nothing. And that is the important point. You seem to think you have, and that's why I wonder if you can tell the difference between belief and fact.

As humans do.... Things that are not human are generally not expected to "experience" the way humans do. — tim wood

So you agree that the physical, a cup of tea for example, does not have subjective experience at all, including experiencing time.

Are you suggesting that things are not, then, subject to the passage of time? — tim wood

I think that anything that is changing is subject to the passage of time.

As to your thought experiment, you can believe what you like, but you have proved/demonstrated nothing. And that is the important point. You seem to think you have, and that's why I wonder if you can tell the difference between belief and fact. — tim wood

My thought experiment in fact is very demonstrative. Philosophers use examples all the time to demonstrate something that is difficult to grasp.

It's not just that it is not in syllogistic form - which it still isn't. The terms you use are odd, to the point of nonsense.

I don't know how to understand your supposed argument, even giving a generous interpretation. You have a change from one physical state to another over a time, but claim physics doesn't "experience" time... and does nto "know" time. what does that mean? Physical states certainly include time. And there is an odd jump from "the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2" to "physical cannot be the cause of its own change". I don't understand what that phrase is trying to do.

Despite you, and best attempts there's precious little here supporting sufficient reason as a principle, intelligent design or god.

Once again ...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/982416

:up: :up:

This statement caught my eye, looking over this thread. Isn't it too strong? If philosophy should discover that some things aren't knowable, at least by us, wouldn't that be worth knowing, part of "all things" philosophy is interested in? Maybe the word you want is "limited" rather than "misdirected." — J

How do you think it could be possible to discover that something is not knowable? I think it is impossible to know something as not knowable.

Despite you, ↪Metaphysician Undercover and ↪A Christian Philosophy best attempts there's precious little here supporting sufficient reason as a principle, intelligent design or god. — Banno

I'm not really interested in the intelligent design aspect, and I really don't understand the claimed relation.

However, sufficient reason, as a principle, supports the will to know, as I explained, and is therefore a very a valuable principle.

You showed little understanding of modal logic. Your contribution here is pretty much on a par with your rejection of instantaneous velocity - an eccentric irrelevance.

How do you think it could be possible to discover that something is not knowable? I think it is impossible to know something as not knowable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, a valid question. Depends how much certainty you want to pack in to the concept of "knowing" something. I can say I'm certain that my cat will never comprehend general relativity (I barely do myself), though I can't prove it. Likewise, we may discover the limits of our own comprehension -- not provably, perhaps, but beyond a reasonable doubt. We would then know that something is not knowable.

I bolded "is" and "as" in your quote because I think what you're pointing to may be the idea that to know "something" as unknowable, is already to know something about it, hence a sort of contradiction. I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that, but there are other ways of being unknowable.

experiencing — MoK

Define, please. I believe you are tangled up in various meanings of this word.

Alright. It's too bad we did not reach an understanding. Thanks for the chat.

But life is possible whatever the laws of nature are! So my objection about the design is valid. — MoK

Even if that is true, it is also true that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds. So the laws of nature for a given possible world are designed.

I agree with your defense of the PSR. But I think we can build a stronger defense by showing that the way we infer that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics is no different than the way we infer that logic is a first principle of metaphysics. What do you think of the following argument?

On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.

We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

This attitude would provide a reason not to seek knowledge of things which are difficult to explain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. To draw a parallel with logic again, we sometimes encounter situations that seem illogical, called a paradox. We could adopt an attitude that not all outcomes are logical, or we can hold on to the belief that nothing stands outside of logic and make an effort to solve the paradox.

This strikes me as a defense similar to those Randians who defend NAP where it makes absolutely no sense to do so, and they end up in knots.

THe questions being asked in the OP are not ones which have answers, generally. Nor could they. The explication cannot support much of anything.

You showed little understanding of modal logic. — Banno

I haven't been discussing modal logic because it's not relevant. As I explained, you use reference to modal logic as a trick of sophistry. This trick allows you to name as "possible", what the logician takes as necessary for the logical procedure. Therefore you can portray what is required by (necessary for) the logician, as a "logical possibility", instead of portraying it as it truly is in the logician's use, a necessity. Premises are required (necessary) for logical procedure, even if they are called "possibilities". Your reference to modal logic is nothing but a smoke and mirrors linguistic trick.

I can say I'm certain that my cat will never comprehend general relativity (I barely do myself), though I can't prove it. Likewise, we may discover the limits of our own comprehension -- not provably, perhaps, but beyond a reasonable doubt. We would then know that something is not knowable. — J

This is not applicable. That a cat cannot understand something, is a deficiency of the knower. You cannot conclude that the object is unknowable, based on the capacity of the knower, because a more capable knower could know it. Likewise, even if we determine the limits of the human capacity of knowing, and discover that some objects are beyond our ability to know them, this does not imply that they are unknowable.

I bolded "is" and "as" in your quote because I think what you're pointing to may be the idea that to know "something" as unknowable, is already to know something about it, hence a sort of contradiction. I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that, but there are other ways of being unknowable. — J

No, that's not really what I meant. I was asking directly, how could you determine that a specific thing, X, is unknowable. Finding out "I can't know X" doesn't mean X is not knowable. Even determining that X is beyond the capability of all human knowers doesn't imply that X is not knowable. This is because there are other types of knowers, like your cat example demonstrates. Living beings evolve, and knowledge evolves. So reference to the current condition, and knowing ability of life on earth, cannot be used as an indication as to whether X is knowable. So, I asked the question, how could you determine that X is not knowable? Wouldn't this actually require knowing X? I cannot look at a thing and say that since it is impossible for me to understand it, it is therefore unknowable. What type of information about that object can I use to draw that conclusion?

OK, I did think that by "unknowable" you meant "unknowable by us humans". I admit I'm confused about what "unknowable, period" or "not capable of being known by anyone or anything" might mean. Could you clarify that? Would, for instance, the decimal expansion of pi be an example of this? Or, as your post seems to suggest, do we need to understand what alien forms of life might be capable of knowing? That seems an awfully high bar to settle the question.

I agree with your defense of the PSR. But I think we can build a stronger defense by showing that the way we infer that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics is no different than the way we infer that logic is a first principle of metaphysics. What do you think of the following argument? — A Christian Philosophy

I look at logic as a procedure, an activity, something we do. We cannot accurately portray it as "a first principle" because it consists of a number of principles which are applied. We can describe human beings as using logic, and use that as a first principle, i.e. human beings use logic.

On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.

We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal". — A Christian Philosophy

Here is the difficulty. Deduction, induction, and abduction, can all be said to be types of logic. Or, we could restrict the meaning of "logic" to deduction, and class the other two in a broader category, as reasoning, along with deductive "logic" as a different form of reasoning. However, no matter how we define the categories of classification, we cannot avoid the fact that there are different forms of reasoning, which employ different principles.

So, if we place severe restrictions on "logic", we cannot say "everything must necessarily be logical", then we exclude the things which are understood by other forms of reasoning. This is why the PSR employs the most broad term, "reason". Then even if we restrict "logic" to a specific form of human reasoning, and we find that some things appear to be illogical, this does not imply that these things are unreasonable, and vise versa.

For example, logical conclusions are judged for validity and soundness. And, basic deductive logic often proceeds from premises which are produced from induction. This means that if we restrict "logic" to refer to the validity of the deduction, an unsound conclusion would still be "logical", yet unsound. So false premises could produce very absurd conclusions, which appear to be very illogical, but we'd still have to say that they are logical conclusions no matter how absurd they are. (Zeno's for example)

Furthermore, we still need to allow ourselves the capacity to judge the principles employed in reasoning. If we allow a more general definition of "logic" and the use of any system of reasoning is called "using logic", then we still need to be able to judge faulty applications. There are many specialized forms of modal logic, and we need to be able to judge the modes of application according to acceptability. This is how I judge Banno's reference to modal logic as unacceptable in the context of this thread.

The PSR, as a principle can be judged similarly. We cannot judge it as to whether it is logical or not, because it says something about logic, and the way that we apply logic in general. That's why I judged it as a valuable principle.

Correct. To draw a parallel with logic again, we sometimes encounter situations that seem illogical, called a paradox. We could adopt an attitude that not all outcomes are logical, or we can hold on to the belief that nothing stands outside of logic and make an effort to solve the paradox. — A Christian Philosophy

Paradoxes are generally produced from the misuse of reasoning. One might apply logic to faulty premises, or misuse the modes of modal logic as Banno does in the context of this thread.

I admit I'm confused about what "unknowable, period" or "not capable of being known by anyone or anything" might mean. Could you clarify that? Would, for instance, the decimal expansion of pi be an example of this? Or, as your post seems to suggest, do we need to understand what alien forms of life might be capable of knowing? That seems an awfully high bar to settle the question. — J

To understand what is meant, we need to consider the context. The PSR says that everything has a reason. So "unknowable" in this context means having no reason. Having no reason would make it fundamentally unknowable.

So the question is, how would we be able to determine that there is no reason for something. If we cannot find the reason, or even judge ourselves as incapable of finding the reason, that does not mean that there is no reason. Making the judgement "there is no reason for X" would only put an end to the search for that reason. Clearly, to the philosophical mind which desires to know, such a judgement would be counterproductive. Therefore the possibility of making this judgement must be excluded. We exclude this possibility with the PSR, which states that there must be a reason for everything.

Your contribution here is pretty much on a par with your rejection of instantaneous velocity - an eccentric irrelevance. — Banno

Every serious philosopher knows that instantaneous velocity is a nonsensical idea. So you are just making a fool of yourself by bringing this up, over and over again in a philosophy forum.

RE: "OP" - Demonstrating Intelligent Design from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
SUBTOPIC: Metaphysics of the Question
⁜→ et al,

Our friend "Tim Wood" pointed out that there are many entanglements here that confuse the multiple central issues.

• The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is neither a "theory" nor a "logic pattern" in and of itself. It is one of many logical approaches (a tool) within the framework to study the question under examination.

• The original question is an examination of the concepts and superfactors (including a consciousness) that drive what is behind "Intelligent Design."

Embedded in the application of the PSR (For every inferred action → there must be a reason why
the inferred action happened) is the concept of "first" causation. And as everyone here knows (already), the implication is a "First Cause," a "Creator," an "Ultimate Power," → a "Supreme Being" (or any other supernatural entity or deities) (AKA: God).

The question of "Demonstrating" Intelligent Design is a huge question that needs to be broken down.

Most Respectfully,
R

To understand what is meant, we need to consider the context. The PSR says that everything has a reason. So "unknowable" in this context means having no reason. Having no reason would make it fundamentally unknowable. — Metaphysician Undercover

The context is helpful. You’re not concerned so much with things that might be unknowable in principle, such as the complete decimal expansion of pi. What you want to know is, Is there a class of things that a) have reasons which b) must remain unknowable by us? And if such a class exists, how would we know what the members were? I wonder, though, whether you’ve defined such a possibility out of existence, by stipulating that the PSR is and must be true, so that the idea of a thing without a reason is already impossible.

I guess I’m not sure whether you’re offering this connection of reasons with what can be known as a demonstration that the PSR must be true, or as an entailment of what must follow if the PSR is true.

BTW: There’s a provocative book called No Way: The Nature of the Impossible, edited by a mathematician and a physicist, that collects instances of the debate over what’s possible (including in epistemology) from a wide variety of disciplines, from medicine to music. With a question as big as this, it’s really helpful to hear from people who’ve encountered the problem in a specific situation related to their expertise. Well worth finding a copy if you can.

Every serious philosopher... — Metaphysician Undercover

:rofl:

Folk can Google it, Meta. Cheers.

So the laws of nature for a given possible world are designed. — A Christian Philosophy

Total non sequitur.



I think the point he's driving for is that for a philosopher, the term is ridiculous. It's a totally reasonable and real physics thing though. I suggest his point is irrelevant anyhow, But this seemed to me the crossed purpose there. "instantaneous" doesn't hold it's standard meaning in that phrase.

He extends the same argument to other areas of mathematics, were he has repeatedly been shown not to understand the concepts.

A waste of time.

Ah. Perhaps I was a little too charitable then..