Fine; but if the datapoints are entered, it is false to state that the datapoints are not entered, and it still remains a true fact in reality that Patient A cannot both have allergy B and not have allergy B at the same time. — A Christian Philosophy

This says something about the type of thing that "allergy B" refers to. It is a property, and we have categorized the aspects of reality so that things known as properties obey the fundamental rules. The issue is that there are aspects of reality which do not necessarily obey those rules.

So Aristotle propose another category, known as "potential", to classify the aspects of reality which do not obey those rules. The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present.

You can see that these aspects of reality are not accurately called properties. They are better known as concepts or ideas. The future event decided by choice, exists as an idea in someone's mind. And "matter" is a concept which Aristotle used to substantiate the reality of bodies in their temporal extension.

For a modern example of why we must allow violation of the fundamental laws of logic, you could investigate Peirce's triadic system.

If that's okay, I'll drop the efficient cause/final cause cause topic to avoid going off on a tangent. — A Christian Philosophy

Sure, but final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door, as what substantiates the efficacy of ideas and concepts, confirming their reality. This will be required to demonstrate that potential is something real. Otherwise one might simply deny the reality of the things in this category, possibility, potential, ideas, matter, etc., calling them imaginary or fictional, and insist that all reality must obey the laws of logic.

"A rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry" — A Christian Philosophy

Great! The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? What is the agency or power of the laws? The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. And as you note, this is just ordinary usage. The trouble being you're giving it unusual significance, that I call reifying, making the unreal thing real. And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be?

So what? — MoK

You asked here how do I know that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds, and I answered.

As a counter argument to your line of argument, one could argue that there is no necessity of understanding the cause of something. Maybe humans just can't understand some things. — Brendan Golledge

I accept that humans can't understand everything. However, as per the OP (if there is no error), the PSR must be fulfilled and there are only 3 types of reason. By eliminating 2 types, we conclude that the laws of nature must be explained by type 2, i.e., explained by design. That said, the argument does not go so far as to claim that the designer is God.

This argument also presupposes the existence of free will, which is itself disputed. — Brendan Golledge

True, but that only applies to explaining man-made things and man, not to explaining the laws of nature.

It could be that impersonal laws of physics exist without cause. — Brendan Golledge

As per the PSR, the fundamental laws of physics must be explained; and they do not exist necessarily because they are not tautologies.

Or reality could be circular (like somebody goes back in time to start the big bang). — Brendan Golledge

Circularity in cause and effect violates the law of causality that an effect cannot occur before its cause.

We need to take care to seperate logically possible worlds form physically possible worlds. — Banno

Correct. I am talking about physical worlds.

There are finite possible worlds, logically speaking, if there is no contradiction in supposing a finite world. — Banno

Physical worlds could be finite or infinite.

There seems no reason to supose that a finite world could not sustain life, and no logical contradiction in
a finite world that contains life. — Banno

Correct. The finite world could sustain life.

I said that given an infinite world, whatever the laws of nature, life is possible in this world, so no design is involved.

The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules.


I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does?

final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door — Metaphysician Undercover

For sure - I believe in final causes. As per reason type 2 described in the OP, a thing that exists by design is designed with a purpose, i.e., it has a final cause.

"A rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry"
— A Christian Philosophy
Great! The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? What is the agency or power of the laws? The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. And as you note, this is just ordinary usage. The trouble being you're giving it unusual significance, that I call reifying, making the unreal thing real. And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be? — tim wood

Questions pending. Are you going to answer?

The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? — tim wood

It is not necessary to know the "how" in order to know the "why". For a simpler example: Ball A hits Ball B which then moves. We don't know exactly how the cause transitions into the effect because there is no inherent logical necessity between the two. Yet, clearly, Ball A is the cause of the movement of Ball B.

The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. [...] And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be? — tim wood

Whether the laws of nature are descriptive or effective does not change the fact that they cause the rock to exist. To say the same thing in a different way: The agglomeration of molecules which we call a rock, is the result of the laws of nature acting on those molecules, whether those laws refer to something forcing the molecules into place, or they merely describe the ordered behaviour of those molecules.

I would have thought that, even though there are many sub-branches of logic, all the branches are compatible with each other so that logic as a whole is one coherent system.
— A Christian Philosophy

That's a point of some debate. It will not do simply to assert that this is so, and the arguments thereabouts are a topic of much recent work. — Banno

If we allow the fundamental laws of logic to change and not be part of fundamental reality, wouldn't that make all mentions of possible worlds meaningless? Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them.

frankly I think you would benefit from some study of formal logic.

Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them. — A Christian Philosophy

Think on that for a bit. Why shouldn't there be rules that apply in one world, but not in another? We then use the rules of each world to talk about that world. Does there then have to be at least one rule that applies in every world? Why?

This actually an open discussion in contemporary logic, one I tried to address in this thread: . Curiously, it seems to be those of a theistic bent who have most trouble with such thinking.

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules. — A Christian Philosophy

In this example, the law of excluded middle is violated. The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is neither true nor false. We do not say that it is both true and false, so non-contradiction is upheld. You express this as "it is possible", and this is an expression which violates the law of excluded middle. The law of excluded middle implies that it is necessary that one or the other is true, therefore real possibility is excluded.

I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does? — A Christian Philosophy

Well, it's beyond the scope of this thread, but if I remember correctly, firstness is the realm of real possibility, potential, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable, as demonstrated in your example of "possible" above. Secondness is the realm of actual occurrence where the law of identity and the other laws of logic are all applicable. Thirdness is the realm of generality, universals, which unites the first and second, but this is only done through violation of the law of non-contradiction.

Ball A is the cause of the movement of Ball B.
Whether the laws of nature are descriptive or effective does not change the fact thatthey cause the rock to exist.[/i] To say the same thing in a different way: The agglomeration of molecules which we call a rock, is the result of the laws of nature acting on those molecules, whether those laws refer to something forcing the molecules into place, or they merely describe the ordered behaviour of those molecules. — A Christian Philosophy

Ball A causing B's motion is descriptive, and no question, useful. But you're missing the point. If causes are real then where are they and how and why do they work? And all the day long if you try to answer, you end up with description. Which is entirely your invention. You can believe what you like, but the trouble with taking them as real,or in any way in-themselves effective, is that you likely will suppose that all sorts of things are real and existing in ways they are not and cannot be.

Between ball A and B, something happens, and for most purposes describing that as A's causing B to move is convenient and useful. But the question here is not the utility of using a concept like cause-and-effect, but the concept's status as an existing thing (other than as an idea), and the burden on you if you take it to be an existing thing, is to prove/demonstrate that existence.

And the reason you cannot, in most general terms, goes back to map and territory distinction.

Of course this all may seem nit-picking, but it turns out that the fallacious reification of ideas may be the third deadliest of mankind's afflictions, after plague and passage of time. Serious business, then, after all.

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules. — A Christian Philosophy

There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. In one, the sea battle occurs. In the other, it doesn't.

In no possible world does the sea battle both occur and not occur.

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened.

Possible world semantics provides a formalisation of such questions that allows is to avoid the sorts of issues Aristotle and Quine feared. Logic moves on.

There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. In one, the sea battle occurs. In the other, it doesn't.

In no possible world does the sea battle both occur and not occur.

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened.

Possible world semantics provides a formalisation of such questions that allows is to avoid the sorts of issues Aristotle and Quine feared. Logic moves on. — Banno

It would be nice to see a post on the tension between temporal possible world semantics and scientific determinism. Or maybe there was?

Temporal possible world semantics allows for multiple accessible futures, while scientific determinism implies only one fixed future. If determinism is true, branching futures misrepresent reality. One response is to treat "possible futures" epistemically—as reflecting our ignorance—not metaphysically, preserving the utility of branching models without denying determinism. Or, as argued earlier, determinism is false.

Fascinating stuff

David Foster Wallace gives a very original analysis of the sea-battle problem in his "Richard Taylor's 'Fatalism' and the semantics of physical modality." (Before he turned to fiction, Wallace was on track to be a professional philosopher.) Wallace uses Taylor's canonical essay “Fatalism” as his target to contest the apparent contradiction in the sea-battle problem. Taylor believes that the logical and semantical premises of the problem do indeed force an acceptance of determinism. But Wallace makes this distinction:

The legitimate conclusion of Taylor’s argument can only be that, given the absence of a battle today, it is not today possible that I did give order O at P1, not that at P1 it was not possible for me to give order O if I chose to do so. — Wallace, in Fate, Time, and Language, 170-71

Wallace constructs an entire toy modality system, based on Kripke and Montague’s work, to demonstrate how this works. He also offers an ordinary-language way of capturing a critical modal difference in how we think about tensed operations:

[If there is no sea-battle, then it] can’t have occurred yesterday, not that it couldn’t occur yesterday. This is an absolutely vital sort of distinction. Compare the following sentences, and think of the kinds of “impossibilities” they really express: “It can’t have rained last night; there are no puddles on the sidewalk this morning” vs. “It couldn’t rain last night; last night a high-pressure ridge was keeping all precipitation-causing clouds out of the area.”

. . . The thing to see is that every properly used physical-modal operator appears, and is to be evaluated as appearing, within the scope of an index-specifying tense operator (or tense-marker); when no tense-/time-operator is explicitly designated, it takes as a default assignment the index “here and now.” [This] actually reflects the way considerations of tense, time and modality are used in our everyday thinking and speech. — Wallace, 171

In the “rain” example, the tense-markers (and concomitant physical conditions) of “last night” vs. “right here now” determine how we evaluate the modal possibilities. And the sea-battle's possibility will change, depending on whether we're looking forward or looking back. Strictly logical modalities don't work this way; logical form doesn't occur in physical space/time at all.

And the sea-battle's possibility will change, depending on whether we're looking forward or looking back. — J

That's an issue of accessibility, it seems to me. So the day before the battle might occur, the possible world in which it takes place and the possible world in which it does not take place are accessible. If it occurs, then the day after, only the possible world in which it did occur will be accessible.

Strictly logical modalities don't work this way; logical form doesn't occur in physical space/time at all. — J

Not following that. Seems I just showed this to be mistaken, by showing how logical modalities can be used to describer physical states.

That's an issue of accessibility, it seems to me. So the day before the battle might occur, the possible world in which it takes place and the possible world in which it does not take place are accessible. If it occurs, then the day after, only the possible world in which it did occur will be accessible. — Banno

Yes, a perfectly good way of putting it.

Strictly logical modalities don't work this way; logical form doesn't occur in physical space/time at all.
— J
Not following that. — Banno

I'll try to put it more precisely. A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. That form is unaffected by tense. A physical impossibility, on the other hand, may be so by virtue of a host of stipulations about the physical world, including temporal ones. I found a helpful paraphrase in the Wallace essay:

The "→" acts differently in

1) (Order O → Battle B)

from the way it acts in, say,

2) ((p & q) → p).

The arrow in 2 is the arrow of material implication and expresses what Hume would call mere "relations among ideas" . . . In contrast, though, the arrow in 1 tells us something about the world. There is nothing about the "concept" of my giving order O that contains or logically entails the occurrence of battle B tomorrow. — Wallace, 147

The sea-battle problem, if it is a problem, depends on a variety of stipulations, including tense, about the world in which it occurs. I didn't mean anything more metaphysically dodgy than that.

A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. That form is unaffected by tense — J

That form is unaffected by tense is impossible because “by virtue of form?” If so, does that really say anything at all?

Sorry, the "that" was ambiguous. Better to have said, "A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. And we know that logical form is unaffected by tense."

See the example I gave @Banno from Wallace.

Yep.

We should also keep clear the distinction between volition and physics. Giving an order involves volition, on the part of the order-giver and the order-follower; it is possible not to follow an order, and that sort of possibility is not a physical possibility.

So we have at least three sorts of implication - logical, volitive and physical.

And I dare claim only the first involves what might be called determinism.

So we have at least three sorts of implication - logical, volitive and physical.

And I dare claim only the first involves what might be called determinism. — Banno

I agree. And "might be called" is a good way of saying it, because logical or semantical determinism is peculiarly arid and sui generis, and doesn't really scare us in the way that the other kinds do -- or at least it never has for me. One more quote from Wallace:

"Taylor was offering a very curious sort of argument: a semantic argument for a metaphysical conclusion. . . . If Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics."

PS -- You could also divide physical determinism into two classes: Things that are necessary/ impossible for everyone under all circumstances, and things that are so only for me. Class one: It's impossible for humans to flap their arms and fly -- no one can. Class two: I can't be in Australia tonight -- but you can. Are these things "determined"? I don't think so, but the question is probably an open one, depending on usage.

Is it relevant to consider when "our voice of reason" enters into this dynamic?

Right on! I am following and have very similar thoughts/notes on this take myself:

They are better known as concepts or ideas. The future event decided by choice, exists as an idea in someone's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are asking how to solve the problem of infinite regress. Infinite regress is avoided if we posit that the first cause has inherent existence. In which case, the reason or explanation for the existence of the first cause is an internal one (type 3): The statement "the first cause which has inherent existence exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true.And no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

I agree that no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR and PSR is able to defend intelligent design this way by avoiding (infinite regress) those whom question the cause of the creator as needing to be or as being created.

If a creator was born and their ideas came at a later time [of life on earth,humanity,and the balance of it in mother nature] it was not about who, what, why, when, how they were created but how the ideas came to be...To question the creator at all, we are assuming they exist to begin with right? So I see why the claim you make regarding Inherent existence is relevant here. Otherwise, bringing up the infinite regress aspect of design vs designer arguments as an acceptable position is assuming the existence exists in the first place..or is questioning how the existence was created apart of it's inherent nature?

Is this questioning, the same or similar to what was previously mentioned in the thread as "the will to know" by Metaphysician Undercover in response to Banno's comment expressing their displeasure in the attempts others made to support the principle, ID, or god thus far....?

Despite you, ↪Metaphysician Undercover and ↪A Christian Philosophy best attempts there's precious little here supporting sufficient reason as a principle, intelligent design or god. — Banno


I'm not really interested in the intelligent design aspect, and I really don't understand the claimed relation.

However, sufficient reason, as a principle, supports the will to know, as I explained, and is therefore a very a valuable principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is to be created at the moment of conception is to be after birth and ought to be at death. After death though is different, as in order to be THAT it ought to be confirmed as such. Who is in place to judge? [ This place is important, to judge from--I CAN EXPLAIN LATER ITS NOT NECESSARY NOW] To be dead, is impossible but not after verification of what it was to be alive as that. We can verify the life and what is gathered from credible sources. From this, what is accepted by the seeker, is now the knowledge that can be used for further guidance into the mystery or unknown as our intelligence is updated as one maneuvers through life one day at a time...

Look in the mirror....watch and learn. As the being is actively creating a cause, again. Then, in a moment of realization that is fleeting and fleeing towards another moment, to become what it always was to be....full of ideas, thought-like, intelligent...of an unnecessary necessity.

The point I was making is that there is a gap in understanding between the two. If we assume that you, as the person going to work, is the efficient cause of you creating the desired end, making money, the gap in understanding is the question of how your desire to make money causes you to get out of bed and go to work. In all cases of final cause, there is this gap of understanding, of how the final cause (a desire for something), causes the physical activity which is the efficient cause designed to produce the end. — Metaphysician Undercover

A breakdown of the quote above from my understanding of it (my response in brackets) and for further clarity:
MU-of how the final cause (a desire for something), causes the physical activity which is the efficient cause designed to produce the end
[designed to produce the end, created and caused from desires, intentions, expectations, of the aware being, of the consciousness co-creating the human experience in/with/from/of time and another.]
MU-of how your desire to make money, causes you to get out of bed and go to work
[ I think the final cause, if linked to desire can be known by acknowledging intentions and allowing verification process of them to unfold naturally...a desire for something (to know ones purpose) is driving (causing) the activity in the physical to occur, which also causes other interactions unknown at the moment a decision was made and acted upon] (randomness exists here perhaps...randomness can exist with or without assuming free will is true as it is linked to time, place,and/or state in decision making moments-- random, timing constraints, chance, accidents, coincidence, patterns, probability?)

I wonder now, if the moment of/in/with/from time measured is (in itself) creating a constraint linking the mental decision and physical activity? Relevant, how??? (time between moment (thought) to moment (activity) from the mind to reality. What does it look like? IS this the vision? Memory? Impressions. Forgetting on purpose?

HOW a final cause, causes the act -which is the cause designed , prior to the act, [in thought, mind, before cause is unfolding in reality*] before it was caused accordingly [to what?**] to our desires being tickled, it was a mere thought....thoughts create action from what?Baseless ideas or the grounding of them in reality? The chance for them to become grounded from the caused design that was created, caused prior to the act.

We create from the act that was caused prior to it, from a desire or final cause that offers nature an active experience in/of motion towards an end designed, NOT prior to the "act of thinking"*** - still a physical activity, id argue - as a result, in the thought of acting on these reactions, feelings, emotions, reality plays out with the chance to ground self (as a functioning design) and give (create) purpose (drive, causing desires, goals, ends) in the way you move thru day to day tasks/survival needs.

*SEE QUANTUM ZENO EFFECT and compare notes linking concepts of "feeling/being stuck" or "in your head" to an act or event from thinking thoughts. I could use MU's backdoor reference here perhaps???
**INTENTIONS that KNOW the nature of
***if this act is of focus, attention driving force or the brain being a brain...both physical activities. If its necessarily true of the latter, the effort required and awareness is measured - outcomes that form the future possibilities from intel gathered - using knowledge to update or effect how we act from that point onward...

The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules.


I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does?


final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door — Metaphysician Undercover****

For sure - I believe in final causes. As per reason type 2 described in the OP, a thing that exists by design is designed with a purpose, i.e., it has a final cause. — A Christian Philosophy

Interesting.....I am thinking now more about this**** re-entry mentioned regarding "final cause"

Well, it's beyond the scope of this thread, but if I remember correctly, firstness is the realm of real possibility, potential, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable, as demonstrated in your example of "possible" above. Secondness is the realm of actual occurrence where the law of identity and the other laws of logic are all applicable. Thirdness is the realm of generality, universals, which unites the first and second, but this is only done through violation of the law of non-contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am with Metaphysician Undercover when they say, "future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present." and my contribution/s at large do reflect that.

Beyond the scope of this thread or not, It's clear to me as I re-read this draft of words once thought, now expressed and typed out because it is not just here where I have felt and seen these words. WE'VE been here and there before. Do know, I am always pleased to revisit and move onward to the next thread...for this moment alone is worth another lap.

It seems like I am consistently coming in through the back door just to make an Irish exit out the front.

Reveal ONLY to SEE one of my personal notes from the past on similar topics relevant to points made in this thread by multiple people, as I am only sharing them for credibility purposes. The note is for me to reflect upon, to see my thoughts that were real before, compared to how they exist in me today 4/29/25 838pm. and again at 935pm, as I re-read this another time before I post.
Contents were always subject to change as I do with/in/as time does. BUT what is more interesting [to me] is to see what does not....

You say here:

Why shouldn't there be rules that apply in one world, but not in another? We then use the rules of each world to talk about that world. Does there then have to be at least one rule that applies in every world? Why? — Banno

But you say here:

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened. — Banno

I personally side with the second claim.

Put simply, those worlds in which LNC is contradicted are not possible worlds.

That ought confuse you even more...

In a world in which the LNC is contravened, anything goes.

The law of excluded middle implies that it is necessary that one or the other is true, therefore real possibility is excluded. — Metaphysician Undercover

But there is a shwack load of situations with real possibilities. This would make the application of the law of excluded middle to be so infrequent that it would be no law at all. Which sounds absurd.

Here is my alternative solution: There is ambiguity in the terms "there will be".
The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" either means "there will necessarily be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow". Both statements are either true or false.


Thanks for the summary of Peirce's triadic system! I'll dig further someday.

I'm pretty sure most people agree that causes are real. And this statement "causes are real" can be understood exactly as what is meant when used in the common language. No need to complicate things without necessity.

And this statement "causes are real" can be understood exactly as what is meant when used in the common language. — A Christian Philosophy

What is your point? You appear unwilling to address the issue of whether causes exist "out there," or are just a certain kind of overlaid understanding. I've always already agreed with the utility of the presupposition, but you want something more. What is it you want?