If you deny states, then you deny things. — Metaphysician Undercover
See, you are faced with a question here. Which is real, what is depicted by the model, a series of states, or what you call "actual motion"? — Metaphysician Undercover
Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe. — Samuel Lacrampe
There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak. — Samuel Lacrampe
E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. — Samuel Lacrampe
Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). — Samuel Lacrampe
Not at all; things can be conceived as agents or manifestations of activity, rather than as bearers of states. Things must then be thought of as extended instantiations of temporal activity, rather than as entities that exist merely in successions of static point-instants. — Janus
Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place.The abstraction occurs within the mind, a process which the mind carries out. So how does this make an argument that concepts are outside of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover
It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition.So what happens if no one can say what the essential properties of "justice" are, or, like in Plato's republic, there is no agreement as to what the essential properties are? — Metaphysician Undercover
A property is essential to a concept if, should it be removed, the concept would no longer be present. Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice.What makes you think that there is such a thing as the essential properties of "justice"? — Metaphysician Undercover
I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides.How does that make sense? You say that the essence of "fiveness" is that there is five of them. So the essence of justice is that it is just? ... — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place. — Samuel Lacrampe
Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place. — Samuel Lacrampe
It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition. — Samuel Lacrampe
Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice. — Samuel Lacrampe
I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. — Samuel Lacrampe
So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides. — Samuel Lacrampe
OK, if you want to take that route, and deny that a thing is a state, then the laws of logic do not apply to any thing. An activity, is by definition a change. So instead of explaining activity as a thing which is active, carrying out an activity, for you the activity is the thing. There is no thing which is carrying out that activity, because the activity is the thing. As an activity, then,what that thing is, or is not, cannot be stated because it is changing, and this depends on one's perspective. It is relative. Are you satisfied with an ontology which denies that the laws of logic can be applied toward understanding real things? — Metaphysician Undercover
Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it.So, how do you conclude that because the input is not in the mind, therefore the abstraction is not in the mind? "Abstraction" refers to either the process, or the output, it doesn't refer to the input. The input is what the abstraction is abstracted from. — Metaphysician Undercover
I claim concepts exist as things in themselves, found in particulars, and later abstracted in the mind. We describe concepts with words and definitions, but these are merely signs pointing to the concepts.What is being discussed is the possibility of a concept which is not within our minds. If your claim is that a concept exists as a definition, that definition is only symbols on a piece of paper, which needs to be interpreted by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree with you. My method was not to separate the essential from the accidental properties, but merely to demonstrate that the essential properties existed. Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not.I don't buy this at all. By the method you've proposed, accidentals can be mistaken for essentials. Suppose I want to know the essential properties of the concept of "wet". I have some cold water which is undeniably wet. And I have some warm sand which is undeniably dry. According to your logic, this property, "cold", which is found in the water, but not in the sand, is an essential property of "wet". — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts.I think that the essence of five is defined by order. [...] What if we were to trade places between five and three? Then five would represent a different quantity, and a different place in the order. In reality, the essence of fiveness is just a convention, one which we can't even agree on. What kind of convention is that? — Metaphysician Undercover
I side with Hume and Descartes, among others, when they say that we acquire most of our concepts from observation of the outer reality. The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. Therefore the concept is not conceived in the mind, but is abstracted from observation of outer reality. One might argue that since colours are physical, then so is the concept of greenness; but I counter-argue that since size and location is not an essential property of greenness, then the concept is not physical.How do you propose that the immaterial concept could exist within the material symbols, independently of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover
I would say the world "as we inhabit it", or "as we experience it" is only here while we're here. But there's no reason to suppose that the world as we inhabit it is "the whole world". We only get a glimpse of the world, even while we're here. That's all. Or so it seems.I just mean that the world as we value and know it as humans is only here while we are. If an asteroid wipes us out, the substratum will still be here. But I can only think or say this while I'm here. Where was the world before I was born? It was here, of course. But only because I arrived to think the world before my birth. To my knowledge, the human world (the world I care about) is only experienced first-person. — t0m
I don't think the two views conflict. They seem compatible to me, but one seems supported by experience and the other doesn't.Why should the idea that the existence of the world is not independent of first-person experience conflict with the observation that the world continues when other animals sleep? — sime
It's not an assumption or a prejudice.Why the single-standard assumption that what is true to say of the third-person must also be true to say of the first-person?
Why the prejudice against solipsism? — sime
Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it. — Samuel Lacrampe
Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not. — Samuel Lacrampe
Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe
The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. — Samuel Lacrampe
What light does this shed on the point in question? Or is this more "skating"?I would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means. — Wayfarer
I'm inclined to agree that artificial simulations of human intelligence are not adequate to explain human cognition, as Searle for one has argued. It seems AI designers produce increasingly accurate simulations or representations of human thinking. Simulating or representing is not the same as explaining, though representations may be of use in various explanations.But, whether something is 'the same' or 'similar', in both cases, the faculty that makes that judgement is essential to the matter. That is the faculty of abstract judgement. You and I, as rational beings, are able to make such judgements; it is the source of such judgement that interests me. That's why I included the long quotation from Steve Pinker in this post. He is confident that 'the computational theory of mind' accounts for such judgements; he tries to give a materialist account of how this works, in terms of 'bits that are arranged to bump into other bits'.Whereas, I'm arguing (not very well, perhaps) for a dualist view: that the symbolic and the physical are ontologically distinct. Also, I argue that even if computers are analogies for the processes of thought, that is only because humans have specifically manufactured them for that purpose, so the fact that they reflect the operations of human thought, doesn't explain the nature of thought. — Wayfarer
So much skating, it's hard for me to tell what connection your claims have to the rigorous disciplines you cite. It's as if you suggest your skating is informed by these disciplines, but so far as I can see, the only connection is that you borrow a few of their words and phrases, then point to the disciplines as if they are justifications for any claim you make with those words and phrases.Symbols and language are the province of semiotics and linguistics, respectively, and they're enormous disciplines in their own right; to become conversant with them takes considerable study. That's why I admit to 'skating over' a lot of major issues. It's a very general and high-level argument based on a single observation. — Wayfarer
In this case you used the claim in responding to me, not to Pinker, and you put the claim in my mouth. That's just one example of the way you seem to conflate the views of your interlocutors till you wind up skating circles around straw men. At least, I often feel that you've mistaken the claims of a skeptical naturalist like me for the claims of an extreme materialist.No, but it's the widespread assumption of e.g. Steve Pinker above. I would say that the cultural mainstream is generally physicalist in its orientation to these issues. I think that the account of 'how the mind works' is generally a lot nearer to Steve Pinker's view (that was the title of the book I quoted, by the way) than anything I am likely to advocate, and that it's probably a much less contentious view than my own. — Wayfarer
Isn't a rational animal a sort of animal? I recall we've spent some time trying to distinguish our use of terms like "rational", "intelligent", and "sentient" in our conversations, for it seems we have different dispositions in the use of such terms. In my view, traditional English translation of Aristotle's zoon logikon muddies the distinction between language and rationality. Humans are the only full-fledged language-users we know of, and our capacity for language seems closely associated with our distinctly human practice of reasoning, of "giving and taking reasons". But it makes most sense to me to say that many nonhuman animals are rational, intelligent, and sentient, like human beings.I am addressing what I see as the issue at hand. I don't regard that as a process of stereotyping but of analysis of the implications of the physicality, or otherwise, of ideas and symbols, in the context of philosophy and history of ideas. Now the fact that you will characterise yourself as a 'thoughtful, perceptive and introspective animal', is, I think, significant - incidentally, you are extremely thoughtful and highly perceptive, not to mention articulate, so let's put that aside - it's the 'animal' tag that I'm questioning. Rational animal, yes; animal, no. And it's a difference that makes a difference. — Wayfarer
Do you mean the question, "Is information physical"? I ask again, what would it mean to deny that information is physical? If information is not physical, then what is it, and how do we come to know of it, and how do we determine that it is not physical?Right - are the issues being discussed here empirical in nature? Is the basic question one for empiricism at all? — Wayfarer
I do find your arguments tendentious. I suspect they'd be more clear and persuasive for me, if you'd spend more time bearing down in small spaces to tighten up your discourse before reaching out to synthesize whole disciplines in quick runs around the rink. But you put it together with intelligence, imagination, creativity, and passion. It's challenging and enjoyable exercise for me.This, incidentally, is why I provided that excerpt from the article on the 'indispensability of mathematics'. That article likewise notes the incorporeal nature of number, as I have done with 'information'. It says that the non-materiality of mathematical objects is very difficult to reconcile with the fact that 'our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects'. And why do 'our best arguments' do that? I suggest it's because they're empiricist in the sense you are defending. The difficulty is, that rationalist philosophy indicates the reality of rational truths that are not justifiable on solely empirical grounds. So the whole point of the argument is 'an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight'. (My emphasis. By the way, I can't help but find this conclusion ironic, considering the degree to which empirical science goes on about 'reason'.)
I am not going to come to any conclusions on this point, but I think it's worth considering why such an argument has to be made, in the context of modern analytical and empirical philosophy.
(Now, also, I acknowledge that my attitude is tendentious - I was accused of that as an undergraduate, and it's probably true. And I know it goes against the grain. I am trying to have these arguments, therefore, in a fairly detached manner, so they're not directed at persons, but ideas. And also that these are difficult questions - especially yours.) — Wayfarer
I would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means.
— Wayfarer
What light does this shed on the point in question? — Cabbage Farmer
What is the "faculty of abstract judgment"? — Cabbage Farmer
I take it talk about a "faculty of abstract judgment" is compatible with a view that physical bodies in a physical world are the source of that capacity — Cabbage Farmer
Do you mean the question, "Is information physical"? I ask again, what would it mean to deny that information is physical? If information is not physical, then what is it, and how do we come to know of it, and how do we determine that it is not physical? — Cabbage Farmer
I suspect they'd be more clear and persuasive for me, if you'd spend more time bearing down in small spaces to tighten up your discourse before reaching out to synthesize whole disciplines in quick runs around the rink. — Cabbage Farmer
I am arguing that it is the basic ability to recognise similarity and to abstract. It is 'basic', in the sense that language and representation relies on that ability; we employ it all the time, simply to think and speak, and perhaps for that reason it might be somewhat 'hidden in plain sight' - taken for granted. It might suit you to say that animals display that ability — Wayfarer
Bees like certain types of flowers, not particular individual followers. Vervet monkeys make a certain type of a call when they spot a certain type of predator. Most of nature seems to operate with some degree of abstraction, doesn't it? — Srap Tasmaner
The minimal meaning-bearing elements of human languages—word-like, but not words—are radically different from anything known in animal communication systems. Their origin is entirely obscure, posing a very serious problem for the evolution of human cognitive capacities, language in particular. There are insights about these topics tracing back to the pre-Socratics, developed further by prominent philosophers of the early modern scientific revolution and the Enlightenment . . . though they remain insufficiently explored.
Actually, the fact that some things are wet and some are not, is sufficient to prove that wetness has essential properties, as so: Properties of a concept are essential if, should these properties be removed, then the concept would no longer be present. Conversely, properties are accidental if, should they be removed, the concept would still be present. Now, some things (1) have wetness and some things (2) don't. It means that properties of wetness are present in (1) and not in (2). If all these properties were accidental, then their absence in (2) would not result in the absence of wetness. But wetness is absent in (2). Therefore some of the properties of wetness absent in (2) must be essential to the concept of wetness.We agree that certain things are wet, and that certain things are not wet. But this does not produce the conclusion that "wetness" has essential properties, it just means that we agree about which things we should call wet and which things we should call not wet. — Metaphysician Undercover
I was going to object, but I find I have trouble arguing about this topic. If you don't mind, I will drop it to focus on the other topics.I don't agree that order necessarily implies quantity. One comes after the other, which comes after the other, and so on. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover
This might get a bit off topic, but I think your claim here is a non-issue, because in real life, there is no such thing as a negative number in the absolute sense. E.g. there is no negative absolute temperature, pressure or mass. So I agree that quantities do not allow for negative values, but this is in conformance to reality.When we allow for negative as well as positive integers, then quantity becomes irrelevant. [...] There is no such thing as a quantity of negative two, or negative three, these are completely imaginary, and nonsense quantities. [...]. — Metaphysician Undercover
Greenness, the thing in itself, is not this 'range of wavelength of light' you describe. If it were, then it would be logically impossible for us to imagine greenness without imagining a light source, inasmuch as we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining three sides; but we can imagine greenness by itself. The true concept of greenness is not about wavelengths, but is simply this. Rather than being one and the same thing, this 'range of wavelength of light' is a cause of us sensing greenness, or to use Aristotle's terminology, it is an efficient cause of greenness, not its formal cause.But this doesn't make sense. What if the blind person learns about the different wavelengths of light, and learns which wavelengths produce the sensations of green. Would you not agree that this blind person has a concept of greenness? Would you think that human beings have no concept of xray, ultraviolet, infrared, and such wavelengths, just because we cannot see these colours? — Metaphysician Undercover
By the way, I think it is impossible for us to conceive a new colour, for the same reasons. — Samuel Lacrampe
It may feel like Landauer's claim that information is physical is part of an attempted reduction of semantics to syntax, to treating living things like computers, but is it really? — Srap Tasmaner
Semantics is not what distinguishes us from other critters, but syntax. — Srap Tasmaner
So here's humanity standing above the rest of creation. — Srap Tasmaner
So the ability of bees to dance and baby chicks to duck hawk shadows, doesn't say anything about semantics in the sense that it applies to language. — Wayfarer
for naturalism, it is an embarrassing question — Wayfarer
I think the shadow means hawk to them in the same way it would mean hawk to us, and that the sense (!) in which the word "hawk" means [[hawk]] is derivative of exactly this "natural meaning". At least that's my working hypothesis. We'll see. — Srap Tasmaner
for naturalism, it is an embarrassing question
— Wayfarer
No it's not. — Srap Tasmaner
Speaking of Chomsky, he gives a reason why animal and human communications are basically different, which I thought I had already mentioned earlier - it has to do with the fact that 'human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences', which rely on syntactical order to indicate meaning. — Wayfarer
Chomsky's work has always suggested that the key difference between human language and signaling is recursive, hierarchical, generative syntax. — Srap Tasmaner
Are you even reading my posts? — Srap Tasmaner
I think the shadow means hawk to them in the same way it would mean hawk to us, and that the sense (!) in which the word "hawk" means [[hawk]] is derivative of exactly this "natural meaning". At least that's my working hypothesis. — Srap Tasmaner
you appear to dismiss semantics. Although perhaps I'm misunderstanding. — Wayfarer
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