there are two major positions*, let's call them Sent (your consciousness is transported) and Copied (the person on Mars or wherever, is a new instance of consciousness). — Mijin
why spatio-temporal continuity matters, I mean why is it critical to whether consciousness persists or not? — Mijin
Right, and most of us accept Copied, and you too, but you want to tackle Sent on their own ground (show them it's a quagmire), so it's tiresome if I don't join you on that ground? — bongo fury
What's consciousness got to do with it? Copied doesn't need consciousness. (Nor unconsciousness of course.) It just needs a reliable basis for individuation (same what? different what?). — bongo fury
If you consider Copied to already be refuted then great; — Mijin
most of us accept Copied, and you too, — bongo fury
what happens to the consciousness — Mijin
apart from the proposition that perhaps our consciousness is never persistent. — Mijin
You're alluding to bodily continuity, so I am asking follow up questions of why bodily continuity is critical. — Mijin
Hard disagree. — Mijin
But if we have a good model of personal identity we shouldn't need to dodge; we should be able to apply our model. — Mijin
arguably Mijin but not me — Mijin
A perfect replica is still a replica. Is that a bit clearer? If you are not the exact atoms that make up my body, you couldn't be me. You could be a replica. — AmadeusD
You disagree that someone who loses their legs (or other body parts) is still hte same person? — AmadeusD
I am suggesting that:
1. Bodily continuity is thought about wrongly (i.e without the spatio-temporal aspect here noted); and
2. That all this does is defeat certain claims (bodily continuity ones).
Perhaps you've misunderstood me. — AmadeusD
There can't be two yous. There can be two Mijins which are not identical. — AmadeusD
How many of your atoms, and why does it matter? — Mijin
just spitting your atoms across space and reassembling them — Mijin
i am just saying that bodily continuity (or identity...I didn't really follow the distinction) is not as straightforward
an answer as might first appear — Mijin
Right now I am Mijin, and Mijin is me — Mijin
It doesn't solve the problem, it avoids it. — Mijin
This is no longer a relevant question, and its one I've directly answered in two different ways. Please review. — AmadeusD
I am asking the question: if the only consideration is that it is the same atoms, what if the transporter does use the same atoms, however, those atoms need to spend T time unconnected. When they get reassembled afterwards, did you survive that? What if T is 1 million years?I can't understand what you're trying to describe here. This doesn't seem to say anything that could result in the experiment we're talking about. Can you please be clearer? — AmadeusD
I think its entirely straightforward and have given you the reasons why. Its an air-tight reason. — AmadeusD
Hmm. Unfortunately, I think logically, No. This instantiates that you are two people. — AmadeusD
The whole topic of personal identity, the transporter problem, and this thread, all concern continuity consciousness.I cannot understand what you're talking about. The analogy is that it is not relevant how many ,or which atoms are involved. For two reasons. Both of which make this an utterly ridiculous question (to me... it may be entirely reasonable on your understanding of what i've said). These are:
1. It had nothing whatsoever to do with consciousness. [...]
2. It is 100% true, without any possible discussion, that people lose limbs, multiple limbs etc... and remain exactly the person they were — AmadeusD
Neither response addresses why it needs to be your atoms — Mijin
what if we create a mind using partially your atoms and partially others (I make a brain — Mijin
if the only consideration is that it is the same atoms, what if the transporter does use the same atoms, however, those atoms need to spend T time unconnected. When they get reassembled afterwards, did you survive that? What if T is 1 million years? — Mijin
Crucially, can this position be used to answer any of the questions related to the transporter that I have posed? — Mijin
We may as well go with the "mojo" explanation for consciousness and declare no follow-up questions about mojo are permitted. — Mijin
It is both true that I am me. And that I am Mijin. — Mijin
What the hell? — Mijin
I am not interested in the trivial question of whether I am still me if I lose a pinkie. — Mijin
You asked me a question under which that is a direct, relevant and telling response. If you do not want to talk about Identity, the transporter and all its implications, you could have said that instead of stringing this exchange along to an end that tells me you are not open to discussions that challenge your presumptions. — AmadeusD
Any analysis would depend on one's attitude toward essentialism: is there an individual essence? If not, then (it seems to me) that individual identity = strict identity, which means that even a 1 particle difference would render the transported object something non-identical (having a different identity) on each end.it seems impossible, in principle, to ever know where that line is, as that line makes no measurable difference to objective reality — Mijin
If not, then (it seems to me) that individual identity = strict identity, which means that even a 1 particle difference would render the transported object something non-identical (having a different identity) on each end. — Relativist
The nature of the transport also seems important. Are the actual particles being moved from place to place, or are a different set of particles being assembled into the same form at the receiving end? If the latter, then arguably - the receiving end is a duplicate, not the "same" individual. — Relativist
There is no objectively correct answer. Any answer depends on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individual identity. I gave you an answer in terms of strict identity - consistent with identity of indiscernibles. Perdurance theory needs to be added to make sense of individual identity across time.and we'll never know for sure. Theres no experiment to perform to ever know if it's a numerically identical person or just qualitatively (nearly) identical. — Mijin
I don't believe in essence. Either both of them are the identity of the pre-transportee, or neither is. The former implies both copies will perpetually share the same identity - which seems absurd. So IMO, both copies are new identities - each containing memories of the same past life.Why? Do the particles contain some essence of you? — Mijin
if a one particle difference is all it takes to remove identity, then identity is lost every moment anyway — flannel jesus
The core confusion of all such problems is the nature of identity. Identity is a mental label masquerading as a metaphysical property. When this is realized, just as with the ship of Theseus, you realize there is no strictly correct answer to such questions. — hypericin
The problem though is whether I am alive or not is not merely semantics. Right now I am having experiences of the world; those experiences can be at different levels; some are more vivid than others, but we can still say there is a binary between having experiences of any type, and simply no longer having experiences. — Mijin
Can you perhaps make it a bit more explicit how those facts obtain in that way? — AmadeusD
Generally speaking, we do not walk into or out of teletransporters. — AmadeusD
At every moment, you experience things: sensations from the world, and sensations from yourself. These are facts of experience. — hypericin
one still experiences, still maintains a self concept, — hypericin
These are the facts. Someone steps out of the teleporter. That someone has experiences. That someone has a self-autobiography, that tells it that it is, or is not, the same someone that stepped into the teleporter.
That is where the facts stop. — hypericin
Sensations from the world are oriented around the pole of the self. They are what the self experiences, from the self's perspective. Sensations from yourself (thoughts, body sensations, emotions) are about the self. — hypericin
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