there are two major positions*, let's call them Sent (your consciousness is transported) and Copied (the person on Mars or wherever, is a new instance of consciousness). — Mijin

Right, and most of us accept Copied, and you too, but you want to tackle Sent on their own ground (show them it's a quagmire), so it's tiresome if I don't join you on that ground?

Fair enough. But the ground over at Copied is perfectly firm? You keep saying it's soggy? Like,

why spatio-temporal continuity matters, I mean why is it critical to whether consciousness persists or not? — Mijin

What's consciousness got to do with it? Copied doesn't need consciousness. (Nor unconsciousness of course.) It just needs a reliable basis for individuation (same what? different what?). Spatiotemporal continuity is such a basis.

E.g. same person?... stage of the same body?

Right, and most of us accept Copied, and you too, but you want to tackle Sent on their own ground (show them it's a quagmire), so it's tiresome if I don't join you on that ground? — bongo fury

Well explaining the context of the transporter problem was important to the OP. And then, I engaged people to the level that they engaged with me. If you consider Copied to already be refuted then great; I guess you don't need the imperfect transporter (although modified versions such as moving, or replacing, someone's atoms present equivalent problems).

What's consciousness got to do with it? Copied doesn't need consciousness. (Nor unconsciousness of course.) It just needs a reliable basis for individuation (same what? different what?). — bongo fury

Because firstly the whole problem is concerned with what happens to the consciousness.
It's much more important to me than what happens to my body. Whatever process I am subjected to, the most important questions are 1. Whether I am still alive, in any form, from my own point of view and 2. What form that consciousness is in (on earth, on mars, with brain damage etc).

And secondly I don't think we have a good model for answering these questions, apart from the proposition that perhaps our consciousness is never persistent.

Bodily continuity seems like the common sense approach, but only because today in 2025 the only way for a consciousness to be created is within a human brain (and probably other animals, though it's hard to know what level of consciousness to what kind of brain). All we can do is snuff consciousness out of existence or modify it with either trauma or drugs.
But if at some future time we can splice / copy / augment the mind, bodily continuity is way too vague, and our model of consciousness too ill-formed, to make concrete predictions.

If you consider Copied to already be refuted then great; — Mijin

You mean Sent?? Or confirmed? (Sent refuted or Copied confirmed.) Otherwise I don't know what's going on.

Oops typo. Yes I meant Sent

Ok cool. But then, was I wrong here?

most of us accept Copied, and you too, — bongo fury

Rather, you think Copied can't answer:

what happens to the consciousness — Mijin

?

You don't think consciousness events must be at least as separate and numerically distinct as the regions of spacetime at which they occur? You do think they might rather achieve some inherent unity? Like entangled particles, perhaps? I guess it's far from inconceivable. I just don't see why you think that a technology of instant copying would demand such an explanation. Copying could just be copying, and why ever not?

apart from the proposition that perhaps our consciousness is never persistent. — Mijin

Maybe not as persistent as we'd like, but it often ebbs and flows in a fairly continuous stream, doesn't it? I need more help seeing the problem here?

You're alluding to bodily continuity, so I am asking follow up questions of why bodily continuity is critical. — Mijin

I am not. I am alluding to bodily identity. It is subtle, to be fair but distinct issues, imo.

A perfect replica is still a replica. Is that a bit clearer? If you are not the exact atoms that make up my body, you couldn't be me. You could be a replica.

Consciousness coming along with it is a bit of an "in the weeds" thing for this specific claim. It was a response to one of your own comments and why I think the spatiotemporal consideration is strong. I think it is correct that even if the replica has your psychology, they cannot be you because of this. They occupy different space (and time). Also, immediately after they become conscious, their memories no longer mirror yours (again, that's partially "in the weeds").

Hard disagree. — Mijin

Hold up (because your explication doesn't touch on this). You disagree that someone who loses their legs (or other body parts) is still hte same person? If you don't disagree with that, then my argument goes through wholesale. Disagreements about "where the line is" aren't quite on the table yet, as i've resiled into a larger context to make the point I'm making. There is no specific point. People lose atoms and gain atoms constantly, with no change to their (intuitive) identity. If you disagree with that.. onward..

But if we have a good model of personal identity we shouldn't need to dodge; we should be able to apply our model. — Mijin

I don't think we do. I think all non-further fact models fail entirely. I am not arguing that bodily continuity constitutes identity. I am suggesting that:

1. Bodily continuity is thought about wrongly (i.e without the spatio-temporal aspect here noted); and
2. That all this does is defeat certain claims (bodily continuity ones).

Perhaps you've misunderstood me.

arguably Mijin but not me — Mijin

But if you are identical with Mijin, then no, that's not possible. I understand you to be saying that the qualifiers you're using make this possible. But that means there are two identities, which is again, intuitively hogwash. There can't be two yous. There can be two Mijins which are not identical.

A perfect replica is still a replica. Is that a bit clearer? If you are not the exact atoms that make up my body, you couldn't be me. You could be a replica. — AmadeusD

How many of your atoms, and why does it matter?
If the transporter worked by just spitting your atoms across space and reassembling them, is that now you? If not, why not?

To be clear: I don't believe that the transported transports a single instance of consciousness, i am just saying that bodily continuity (or identity...I didn't really follow the distinction) is not as straightforward
an answer as might first appear.

You disagree that someone who loses their legs (or other body parts) is still hte same person? — AmadeusD

No, I disagree with the implied analogy to the problem and your suggestion that it is a "silly question".
Losing a limb does not involve splicing the consciousness. It doesn't solve the problem, it avoids it.

I am suggesting that:

1. Bodily continuity is thought about wrongly (i.e without the spatio-temporal aspect here noted); and
2. That all this does is defeat certain claims (bodily continuity ones).

Perhaps you've misunderstood me. — AmadeusD

Yes it seems there is something not being communicated here, because bodily continuity is defined as requiring continued continuity of the spatio-temporal aspects. So I can't make sense of either your point (1) or point (2) here.

There can't be two yous. There can be two Mijins which are not identical. — AmadeusD

Well this is a critical thing in dispute. Right now I am Mijin, and Mijin is me. And it's all very simple because we have no technological means to duplicate, splice or augment my consciousness.
In a hypothetical time where I could be duplicated, and for some period of time (before they diverge) there are identical Mijin agents, how many are me?
Bodily continuity doesn't make a clear claim here, not in its basic form, and also requires we know the history of how we arrived at this configuration of the universe.

How many of your atoms, and why does it matter? — Mijin

You really need to re-read this exchange. This is no longer a relevant question, and its one I've directly answered in two different ways. Please review.

just spitting your atoms across space and reassembling them — Mijin

I can't understand what you're trying to describe here. This doesn't seem to say anything that could result in the experiment we're talking about. Can you please be clearer?

i am just saying that bodily continuity (or identity...I didn't really follow the distinction) is not as straightforward
an answer as might first appear — Mijin

This makes the preceding far more perplexing then.

I think its entirely straightforward and have given you the reasons why. Its an air-tight reason. You can reject it though. It doesn't bare this sort of scrutiny because its a brute claim. Numeral identity is what is required for bodily continuity to be the source of "me" along all the constituents of "me" at any given time. This is not a logical claim, other than that "if true" its a logical dead-end for identity discussions. In any case I don't think this constitutes Identity so not sure where you're going..

Right now I am Mijin, and Mijin is me — Mijin

Hmm. Unfortunately, I think logically, No. This instantiates that you are two people. Unless you hold that are, in fact, two people (you seem to rejecting that) at all times, all the follow-ons from that position fail immediately. Mijin is all of the things you see as "yourself" at the same time as they are one-and-the-same thing. That is exactly why it's so hard to sort this stuff out. If we had two aspects to ourselves, it would be much easier to talk about because we could have criteria for each. But Identity is, by definition singular. (this is out of order, because the next reply is hte meatier)

It doesn't solve the problem, it avoids it. — Mijin

I cannot understand what you're talking about. The analogy is that it is not relevant how many ,or which atoms are involved. For two reasons. Both of which make this an utterly ridiculous question (to me... it may be entirely reasonable on your understanding of what i've said). These are:

1. It had nothing whatsoever to do with consciousness. You questioned me the position that to answer to bodily continuity claims which get murky, we can say 'You are not the exact atoms I am, therefore you are not me'. There isn't wiggle room. "the exact atoms". It is now incoherent to ask the questions you're asking; and
2. It is 100% true, without any possible discussion, that people lose limbs, multiple limbs etc... and remain exactly the person they were (i.e John Smith, of 134 Arden Street, Baltimore, Maryland (or whatever.. Just making clera I do mean that person before and after the loss of limb/s)).

Therefore I don't know what you're asking me to clarify. The answers are baked in to the position outlined. And again, to be clera (because this doens't seem to be landing) this is not my view of identity. I am answering the questions posed.

This is no longer a relevant question, and its one I've directly answered in two different ways. Please review. — AmadeusD

Your first response was that it was a silly question. Your second response was that it needs to be your atoms. Neither response addresses why it needs to be your atoms, let alone the question of what if we create a mind using partially your atoms and partially others (I make a brain that is N% of the atoms that made up your brain. What N means you are alive (with brain damage) versus simply not living on at all?)

I can't understand what you're trying to describe here. This doesn't seem to say anything that could result in the experiment we're talking about. Can you please be clearer? — AmadeusD

I am asking the question: if the only consideration is that it is the same atoms, what if the transporter does use the same atoms, however, those atoms need to spend T time unconnected. When they get reassembled afterwards, did you survive that? What if T is 1 million years?

I think its entirely straightforward and have given you the reasons why. Its an air-tight reason. — AmadeusD

Which is probably a good point to stop and consider whether you're appreciating all the nuances here. Crucially, can this position be used to answer any of the questions related to the transporter that I have posed? Otherwise, it's a non-explanation. We may as well go with the "mojo" explanation for consciousness and declare no follow-up questions about mojo are permitted.

Hmm. Unfortunately, I think logically, No. This instantiates that you are two people. — AmadeusD

What the hell? I am talking about the situation prior to doing anything; the current status quo of our everyday life. It is both true that I am me. And that I am Mijin. As well as, heck, that I am 6'3 tall.
That doesn't instantiate 3 people.

I cannot understand what you're talking about. The analogy is that it is not relevant how many ,or which atoms are involved. For two reasons. Both of which make this an utterly ridiculous question (to me... it may be entirely reasonable on your understanding of what i've said). These are:

1. It had nothing whatsoever to do with consciousness. [...]
2. It is 100% true, without any possible discussion, that people lose limbs, multiple limbs etc... and remain exactly the person they were — AmadeusD

The whole topic of personal identity, the transporter problem, and this thread, all concern continuity consciousness.
If you don't want to talk about consciousness, then please stop posting in this thread. I am not interested in the trivial question of whether I am still me if I lose a pinkie.

Neither response addresses why it needs to be your atoms — Mijin

I've addressed this twice. You can either review the exchange, where I noted that numerical identity bakes this aspect in (i.e there isn't a question. It is ridiculous. Why is water wet, mate?). It shouldn't be my responsibility to repeat myself over and over for you to get a point.

what if we create a mind using partially your atoms and partially others (I make a brain — Mijin

A brain isn't a mind, or at least we cannot assume that for the purposes of the discussion., You are making plenty of fundamental assumptions and then getting confused when these are up for debate. This may explain a lot. Please try to notice where you've made an assumption. I will try to b clearer when I think tihs is what's on the table.

if the only consideration is that it is the same atoms, what if the transporter does use the same atoms, however, those atoms need to spend T time unconnected. When they get reassembled afterwards, did you survive that? What if T is 1 million years? — Mijin

This would simply be the same question as "are you the same person when you awake?" Those atoms are still those atoms, and still constitute you (on this account - you still seem to be under the impression this is my position i'm defending. It is not. Please calm down). So, yes, you would, under almost all accounts that aren't further fact accounts.

Crucially, can this position be used to answer any of the questions related to the transporter that I have posed? — Mijin

It answers them all. I've been explicit about this. The only possible "interesting" change is the idea that the transporter literally beams the exact same atoms to Mars. There's questions here about whether or not unity of your atoms create anything of significance, but most people are going to assume only the brain is relevant to that consideration - thus leapfrogging the entire question of what constitutes identity (or whether it obtains at all. I say not, so most of these questions don't make sense to me). To be super, super, un-debatably clear:

If the position is that my atoms make me then there is no version of the transporter in which I survive, without your ad hoc adjustment about taking my atoms and sending them across space (note, this is not the thought experiment, but an interesting adjustment for sure). The TE postulates that a blueprint is sent and 3D-prints another body that supposedly can carry your consciousness. You'll note (and i don't reply to this later, so do take note) that intuitions about consciousness is only one aspect of what this experiment draws out of us. It also draws out intuitions about "selfhood" generally, bodily continuity, time, space and the possiblity of "multiples" given certain theories on might take up. It is certainly not as simple and restricted as you contend.

We may as well go with the "mojo" explanation for consciousness and declare no follow-up questions about mojo are permitted. — Mijin

That is, roughly, what a further fact account will do, unfortunately. But that is canyons from what I've said, and explained. You can reject it, but I have made the position consistent enough that it is logically discreet. Its brute, as noted.

It is both true that I am me. And that I am Mijin. — Mijin

So, hang on mate - you've accepted my premise wholesale. Yet you opened with:

What the hell? — Mijin

Please have a think before posting these comments. The inconsistency will turn me and others off pretty quick, if they are personal like this. Onward..

I am not interested in the trivial question of whether I am still me if I lose a pinkie. — Mijin

You asked me a question under which that is a direct, relevant and telling response. If you do not want to talk about Identity, the transporter and all its implications, you could have said that instead of stringing this exchange along to an end that tells me you are not open to discussions that challenge your presumptions. If my position is that the transporter problem tells us that consciousness is not hte most important aspect of discussions on identity, then that's what it is. You can't just say "nah, not that kind of reply". That is... ridiculous my dude.

You asked me a question under which that is a direct, relevant and telling response. If you do not want to talk about Identity, the transporter and all its implications, you could have said that instead of stringing this exchange along to an end that tells me you are not open to discussions that challenge your presumptions. — AmadeusD

Amadeus, you are clearly very confused because, like I say, this whole topic concerns the continuity of the mental self and I was clear about that in the OP.
No-one but you seems to have a problem with this.

have you seen the first Existential Comic?

@wonderer1 I have now. Very interesting, thanks.
It also raises another point. If numerical identity is based purely on the pattern of atoms then it implies a form of immortality. Because, even if our universe terminates at a heat death, that's not really a final end point as particles are still moving, and there is a non-zero chance of a structure of arbitrary size forming.
Even if it takes Graham's Number years before your current brain state is recreated by chance, it seems it will eventually happen.

it seems impossible, in principle, to ever know where that line is, as that line makes no measurable difference to objective reality — Mijin

Any analysis would depend on one's attitude toward essentialism: is there an individual essence? If not, then (it seems to me) that individual identity = strict identity, which means that even a 1 particle difference would render the transported object something non-identical (having a different identity) on each end.

The nature of the transport also seems important. Are the actual particles being moved from place to place, or are a different set of particles being assembled into the same form at the receiving end? If the latter, then arguably - the receiving end is a duplicate, not the "same" individual.

If there's an essence, is it material or immaterial (like a soul)? If it's a soul, it's questionable whether or not the soul is transported.

If not, then (it seems to me) that individual identity = strict identity, which means that even a 1 particle difference would render the transported object something non-identical (having a different identity) on each end. — Relativist

Really? So if we made the machine then if particle 4ea26363f75 was in position x=71.23 then: welcome to your new life on mars. But had it been at x=71.23000001 then: it was simply a murder box. An infinitesimal difference is life and death?
...and we'll never know for sure. Theres no experiment to perform to ever know if it's a numerically identical person or just qualitatively (nearly) identical.

The nature of the transport also seems important. Are the actual particles being moved from place to place, or are a different set of particles being assembled into the same form at the receiving end? If the latter, then arguably - the receiving end is a duplicate, not the "same" individual. — Relativist

Why? Do the particles contain some essence of you?

if a one particle difference is all it takes to remove identity, then identity is lost every moment anyway

and we'll never know for sure. Theres no experiment to perform to ever know if it's a numerically identical person or just qualitatively (nearly) identical. — Mijin

There is no objectively correct answer. Any answer depends on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individual identity. I gave you an answer in terms of strict identity - consistent with identity of indiscernibles. Perdurance theory needs to be added to make sense of individual identity across time.

The other extreme is haeccity- which treats identity as a primitive - thus allowing for 100% of your parts to differ while retaining that identity.

Between the extremes are essentialists. One version entails identity being associated with set of necessary and sufficient properties. I've never encountered anyone who could define what these are.

Why? Do the particles contain some essence of you? — Mijin

I don't believe in essence. Either both of them are the identity of the pre-transportee, or neither is. The former implies both copies will perpetually share the same identity - which seems absurd. So IMO, both copies are new identities - each containing memories of the same past life.

The core confusion of all such problems is the nature of identity. Identity is a mental label masquerading as a metaphysical property. When this is realized, just as with the ship of Theseus, you realize there is no strictly correct answer to such questions.

This leads to uncomfortable conclusion that survival in this kind of thought experiment is also a mental label, not an objective property. But I think this must be accepted. something survives. It may or may not think it survived. Observers may or may not think the original survived. That is really all that can be said.

This also leads to awkward conclusions in related thought experiment. Consider a cloner, that produces an identical copy of a person. The copy insists it is the original. According to my claim, the copy has just as much metaphysical claim that it is the true successor.

The fundamental problem is that identity is a concept that arose under conditions where such things couldn't happen. So the concept, not r backed by any metaphysical reality, cannot accommodate these kinds of thought experiment.

if a one particle difference is all it takes to remove identity, then identity is lost every moment anyway — flannel jesus

Strict identity IS lost with every breath. So this approach uses perdurance to account for individual identity over time.

I cannot help a horse put its snout in the water. I explained in extreme detail why this is the exact wrong description of what's happened. Onward, i suppose...

The core confusion of all such problems is the nature of identity. Identity is a mental label masquerading as a metaphysical property. When this is realized, just as with the ship of Theseus, you realize there is no strictly correct answer to such questions. — hypericin

The problem though is whether I am alive or not is not merely semantics. Right now I am having experiences of the world; those experiences can be at different levels; some are more vivid than others, but we can still say there is a binary between having experiences of any type, and simply no longer having experiences.

And I care about that hugely. I don't care whether some third party is having a ship of theseus moment about whether to consider it the same Mijin. I care if the mind right now that is having experiences will still be having experiences.

There would already be a solution that determines whether you are the target person or not.

I call this concept “self-particle”. If this particle is in the target person, then you are it, otherwise it is a copy.

The problem though is whether I am alive or not is not merely semantics. Right now I am having experiences of the world; those experiences can be at different levels; some are more vivid than others, but we can still say there is a binary between having experiences of any type, and simply no longer having experiences. — Mijin

These are the facts. Someone steps out of the teleporter. That someone has experiences. That someone has a self-autobiography, that tells it that it is, or is not, the same someone that stepped into the teleporter.

That is where the facts stop. These same facts obtain at every moment of everyone's waking life. There is nothing special about the teleporter. The "fact" that there "is" a person that persists moment to moment, day to day, year to year, into and out of teleporters, is more fiction than fact. It is a concept that unifies experiences, thoughts and feelings over time into a stable "self". But it has no metaphysical reality that underlies it.

This is the underlying fiction that gave rise to the notion of souls.

These same facts obtain at every moment of everyone's waking life. — hypericin

Generally speaking, we do not walk into or out of teletransporters. Can you perhaps make it a bit more explicit how those facts obtain in that way? And what of sleep?

Can you perhaps make it a bit more explicit how those facts obtain in that way? — AmadeusD

At every moment, you experience things: sensations from the world, and sensations from yourself. These are facts of experience.

These sensations don't just happen. Sensations from the world are oriented around the pole of the self. They are what the self experiences, from the self's perspective. Sensations from yourself (thoughts, body sensations, emotions) are about the self. Both experiences of the world and experiences of the self point to a self which is never actually disclosed. This gap is filled by the concept of the self, which papers over the hole with a self that experiences and a self that feels. This is the fact of the self-concept.

The self-concept perdures via memory. Through memory, it gains an autobiography, which is the concept of the autobiographical self.

Generally speaking, we do not walk into or out of teletransporters. — AmadeusD

I know it. But, I want to make clear, what the facts of the thought experiment are, and aren't. The facts are, when one steps out of the teleporter, one still experiences, still maintains a self concept, and may or may not maintain the concept of the autobiographical self. The comic posted by @wonderer1 illustrates this well. Seemingly everybody except the subject of the comic maintained the concept of the autobiographic self through the teleporter, and through sleep. But the absurdity is, there is no actual fact of the matter, there is no metaphysical self that perdures. The subject totally reconfigured their life because of a concept, not a fact.

At every moment, you experience things: sensations from the world, and sensations from yourself. These are facts of experience. — hypericin

You outlined facts about the teletransporter and said they obtained in those terms. If that wasn't the claim, i suggest that was incredibly unclear. But fair enough. I don't argue with the above.

one still experiences, still maintains a self concept, — hypericin

I do not think this is correct, and explains some of what I see as dead-ends in your discussion.
The facts are that you(a) walk into the machine, and someone(b) walks about. Someone experiences. The point is to figure whether you think "still" even applies to (b). Or whether the same "one" applies to (a) and (b).
Within the way the experiment is written, that someone does have the same autobiographical sense as the one who walked into the machine - that's already a given, and not something we are supposed to ascertain. The point is is sort out whether that matters. Parfit says yes. I say no for the same reasons you have outlined: MY mind stops having those experiences, even if a mind doesn't. The fact that someone thinks they are me doesn't mean they are. I gave a possible example of why that could be the case (the atom identity issue) which was unsatisfactory. I agree, it was just to point out that you can solve the issue by saying that person cannot be you for physical reasons, and ignore the mind part. But again, I also find that unsatisfactory.

The point of all this is to say that I think you've slightly misunderstood the thought experiment becuase you're not addressing certain aspects which are written in. Maybe the branch-line case is a better one for your purposes.. seems so to me.

I have just realised I've addressed much of this to Mijin, recalling their posts in kind with yours. Sorry about that - points remain, but you can ignore references to things "you" have said before.

The comic: The answer the Devil gives is not satisfactory and does not answer my potential response, despite my not being satisfied with it myself. Unless we have reason to think that each time we sleep, we are disassembled and reassembled, its a totally misconceived response, changing nothing about the intuitions involved.
The man is utterly perplexingly stupid to me, and is making wild moral miscalculations. More importantly (and demonstrably) the comic seems to ignore the biggest issue people have: "he" is not a given on the other side of the machine. There is no guaranteed "me". There is just someone, and our job in the thought is to decide what we think of that. Not whether we disagree with it. If the psychological relation is enough, that's fine. If it's not, we have work to do. I think this is fundamentally being misunderstood by a lot of people. Parfit just gives an answer I don't like, but runs the same avenues to get there as I have.

These are the facts. Someone steps out of the teleporter. That someone has experiences. That someone has a self-autobiography, that tells it that it is, or is not, the same someone that stepped into the teleporter.

That is where the facts stop. — hypericin

Those facts are the premise of the problem though. The actual problem is in figuring out which persistent self(s) exist. All this kind of description does is take the difficult bit off the table so we can pretend the problem is simple

Sensations from the world are oriented around the pole of the self. They are what the self experiences, from the self's perspective. Sensations from yourself (thoughts, body sensations, emotions) are about the self. — hypericin

Which self?
I know it might seem I'm being a bit obtuse, but put it like this: we understand a phenomenon when we can make useful predictions or inferences about it.
It's very easy to just say: Mijin that walks out of the transporter truly is Mijin or whatever. In fact, that's a given part of the problem.

But the key thing is: do we have an explanation that allows us to clearly answer questions like "Is quantum immortality possible?" "If a configuration of atoms one day, by chance, is in an arrangement that has my memories right now, am I ressurected? What if that configuration of atoms is only N% the same...what N brings me back from the grave, and why?" etc etc

The actual problem is in figuring out which persistent self(s) exist. — Mijin

If at all... It may be that (as with further fact types) there is no perdurance occurring in the machines output.

@Mijin Where do you stand on The Perfect Fake? (Chapter III)

Can you summarize the argument please? I can't read every book / chapter or watch every video suggested to me in forums.