This also has issues; e.g. what if we don't delete the original, does it mean we have multiple "I"s? And how can that be, when the experiences of those I's is separate? — Mijin

What exactly is the problem with multiple "I"s? If we had metaphysical selves, aka souls, then it would be a problem. Which one would the soul ("I" here) go to? How could the soul be in two places at once? But if we don't, then simply, two entities would have the experience of being you, instead of one. What is the contradiction?

It's also vulnerable to the "imperfect transporter" as described in the OP. — Mijin

I see zero vulnerability here. There is only a problem, again, if you are secretly importing the notion of metaphysical selves. If not, it is just the problem of damage. If you sustain enough damage, you may not really be "you" any more, in the sense that you won't identify with your previous, undamaged self.

"why would the universe decree that, say, X=12,371 means surviving with brain damage, and X=12,372 means you effectively die from the injury?"

Obviously, the universe is doing no such thing. Adding a teleporter on top of this scenario changes nothing.

What's interesting is that the universe doesn't have a sense of identity for things like atoms. At a fundamental level, the universe can't tell the difference between one electron and another one, one atom and another one.

So if a god steps in and separates all the atoms in your body, and then puts together a bunch of "different" atoms in the exact same arrangement half a meter to your left... who is to say that those aren't "your atoms"? Atoms have no identity, so they have just as much a claim to being your atoms as any other atoms do. — flannel jesus

We all have our opinions. Mine is that, if all of my atoms are separated from each other, I no longer exist. Just because my atoms all still exist doesn't mean I still exist. Just because my atoms can be put back together doesn't mean I still exist. If an exact duplicate is made so both original and duplicate exist, are both originals? I don't see how that can be. If you then destroy the original, is the duplicate now considered the original? I don't see how that can be, either.

@Mijin@AmadeusD

I think the fundamental conceptual problem here is the nature of persistence.

The experience of personal persistence is, in the present,
1. To experience a self
2. To mentally project forward in time, to your hypothetical future self.
3. To mentally project backward in time, to your past selves.
4. In the second order, to consider the series of these forward and backward projections that have occurred over a lifetime.

That is all.

The problem comes when these operations are reified into an actual thing I am calling "the metaphysical self" that is actually moving forward in time. Only then does the problem of this thing being interrupted by physical discontinuity arise.

I think there is a difference between two things being identical and two things being the exact same thing. A factory can pump out, let's say, 1,000 chairs in a day. if this factory is perfect in all detail, including the number of atoms of each type in every one of those thousand chairs, they are not all exactly the same chair. They are only all identical to each other.

I wouldn't say it is otherwise with a human. Identical copies of me are not the exact same person.

if this factory is perfect in all detail, including the number of atoms of each type in every one of those thousand chairs, they are not all exactly the same chair. They are only all identical to each other. — Patterner

What we identify as "the exact same chair" is our mental bookkeeping we impose on the world. It is not a part of the world itself. The universe does not keep track of which chairs are the "exact same chairs". Only we do.

The same is true of people.

I think the very concept of original and duplicate breaks down entirely.

Whoever is keeping track, I would think it would be the same for us as it is for chairs.

↪Patterner I think the very concept of original and duplicate breaks down entirely. — flannel jesus

Can you explain what you mean?

Yes. And?

Either the chairs are all the same chair and the people are all the same person, or the chairs and the people are identical copies. If the universe isn't keeping track, meaning there is no objective answer, then it's up to each person to judge for themselves.

If the universe isn't keeping track, meaning there is no objective answer, then it's up to each person to judge for themselves. — Patterner

Not necessarily. People can still be confused, and imagine criteria for "sameness" in certain scenarios that neither they nor anyone else actually apply. For instance, the criterion that "all the molecules have to be the same" is simply imaginary, its not actually a thing.

Is that, like, yes, both? — bongo fury

No. As explained, I am saying that a 'self' and an 'original work of art' are not comparable on a conceptual level, regardless of what might or might not be criteria for each. I then detailed why the criteria aren't related, so they can't be compared (imo). I hope that's clearer..

but evidently you don't bother read through? — bongo fury

No idea what you're referring to. Everything I've said is relevant and seems pertinent at the time I commented it.

Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity? — bongo fury

No, and I don't think you do either. There's nothing that contains 'Napoleon' unless we make assumptions as between bodies and minds. The teletransporter shows this clearly, as it isn't 'your' body on the other side, and its obviously not 'your' mind. But it is hte 'mind of you', so we need to figure out where 'Napoleon' the person exists. It is clearly not in the body, and we don't know what a mind is. So... we're a bit stuck. That's not the case with the piece of art. If you're simply stipulating that, for you, a 'self' is, in fact, a confluence of mind and body in a single, recognizable-over-time entity, that's fine. I just don't think, (and it seems the discussion over a century has found this) that will hold up to many counterexamples.

We have to establish criteria beyond that? I don't follow. — bongo fury

In what does a 'self' consist? This is the central, clearly-still-in-the-air, crux of this and other considerations. If we already knew, point blank, what a 'self' was, the thought experiment could only possibly tell us whether we were happy a clone was wandering about after we die. But that's not how it runs.

ou wouldn't seek to convince me I was deluded by pointing to evidence of provenance contradicting my claim of bodily continuity with Napoleon? By asking me to reconcile that claim with historical evidence of my more recent birth in South London, e.g., etc? — bongo fury

This leapfrogs the question. This is absurd, if your conception of a self is as above. But that concpetion, generally, isn't satisfying when run through these thought experiments. I highly recommend reading Reasons and Persons if you've not. This position is relatively well deconstructed and made obviously unfulfilling or unhelpful beyond describing a widely-held intuition in clear terms.

Given the above, the answer is no, that makes less sense now, but I understand more why you're saying it :)

It's the premise of the OP. — Patterner

The OP vaguely mentions that its 'like star trek'. This thought experiment is from Derek Parfit. Including the problematic versions.

I don't think there's any need for the thread if the person walking out on Mars does NOT think he's me. — Patterner

You seem to have crucially missed, or reversed, the key that makes this senseless: It doesn't matter what he thinks. What do you think? You already know the guy is a 'replica' in the colloquial sense. You knew that before you went in. For you, the you who in real-life knows you have no clones running around - is that an acceptable 'you'? For me, there wasn't a 'me' to be continued, so I don't really need to decide. But its key that person B's opinion is irrelevant. They have been given an artificial worldview, basically. Born at 34 (or whatever age).

and is indistinguishable from me — Patterner

This isn't quite true, once the person is aware they are on Mars. They now have a different set of memories (though, almost identical) to you. And that will just continue to diverge as time goes on. Even arguments that get a 'self' out of the transporter can only maintain it for a literal instant.

If the original is not destroyed, then the copy is more obviously not the original, regardless of how these things are defined. — Patterner

No, not quite. This was run by Parfit and called the branch-line case where identity is considered to be 1:x rather than 1:1. There's no reason, unless you take a soul, to assume this person isn't you. They are exactly the same at the instant they appear (again, beyond this, fail, due to the above). If they have literally the exact same everything, including psychology then there's just two of you. The source and biography are exactly the same. You walked into the machine. They walked into the machine. All is well.

I still reject this, because I think either there are two 'you's, which means one cannot be identical with the other (there are two... its not possible) or there is no self to continue, so 'you' didn't even exist to begin with. It just seems everyone has an underlying assumption about what 'self' is and it exactly this, and in what it consists, that we're trying to drill down on with the thought experiment.

If the idea is this guy, B is 'not you' in the "different atoms" sense, then you must feel it is your bod which continues your self. That is highly unsatisfactory to me. If your mind was in my body, it wouldn't be 'me' in the sense you seem to be getting at (apologies if I'm misunderstanding your version of 'self').

My self is the experience of this body, with these senses; this brain, with these memories; etc. The continuity of self is due to the memories. — Patterner

But this would make B obviously and inarguably you, at the instant they appeared?

How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist? — Patterner

Based on the above, obviously you don't exist. You have no memory or experience and there's no continuity.

This is a genuine question, are you just working through these intuitions as we go?

That is all. — hypericin

I suggest if it were this simple, the answer would be quite obvious: Many people can be you. B is you, and you are you. Does this not seem unsatisfactory to you?

I think there is a difference between two things being identical and two things being the exact same thing. — Patterner

That's true, but this is, I think, about what Identity actually is. My response to this initially was always to move to your 'exact same thing' and reject that B could be me, on any conception other than a Soul being sent through space. I think this sidesteps the question though. Even if exactly me is hte only 'me' in the intuitive sense, there is no reason to think that two people can have that exact same experience. Is that identity? Yeah, shaky to me too, but its worth considering beyond resiling into the 'exact same' version imo. Technically, 'identity' means we can't have two, and they be the same. The issue is that a 'self' may not operate as a object does and could violate that.

Does this not seem unsatisfactory to you? — AmadeusD

It is unintuitive, but not "unsatisfactory". What is unsatisfactory is letting intuitions about persistent selves remain unchallenged.

I differ - it seems both, to me. It's obviously unintuitive, but it is also unsatisfactory as it gives us no notion of self. It allows for 1:x without explanation. Isn't that an issue, to you?

It's obviously unintuitive, but it is also unsatisfactory as it gives us no notion of self. It allows for 1:x without explanation. Isn't that an issue, to you? — AmadeusD

I have articulated a notion of self already. "Self" is a conceptual integration of sensory experience, mental experience, and memory into a unified idea. According to this notion, there is nothing contradictory about multiple individuals all having the idea of being you, and thus the experience of being you.

And this implies that, as unintuitive as it sounds, you "continue" after entering the teleporter, after being cloned, etc, because "continuance" is just the succession of these experiences of "self" over time.

Not necessarily. People can still be confused, and imagine criteria for "sameness" in certain scenarios that neither they nor anyone else actually apply. For instance, the criterion that "all the molecules have to be the same" is simply imaginary, its not actually a thing. — hypericin

How is it decided what is confusion, and what is or is not a thing?

How is it decided what is confusion, and what is or is not a thing? — Patterner

Because for instance, nobody actually counts molecules or uses molecules as a criteria for identity (and as already established, nor does the universe). It is a made up criteria.

And this implies that, as intuitive as it sounds, you "continue" after entering the teleporter, after being cloned, etc, because "continuance" is just the succession of these experiences of "self" over time — hypericin

Very clear and precise. Thank you. I don't call that a self, but I think its what matters.

The OP vaguely mentions that its 'like star trek'. This thought experiment is from Derek Parfit. Including the problematic versions. — AmadeusD

The OP is about the transporters on Star Trek, and it doesn't mention Parfit.

This is a genuine question, are you just working through these intuitions as we go? — AmadeusD

No. I first started thinking of it when I read a Star Trek novel called Spock's World. McCoy didn't like using the transporter, because he was worried that the soul would be lost. Silly, because he had been transported many times, so, if that was a problem, it was already too late.

In a good episode of The Next Generation, they went to an uninhabited planet where Riker and a team had been doing some work many years prior. When they got there, they discovered another Riker. When he transported away those years ago, the beam had both gotten through and been reflected back to the surface. So two of him. Both were the result of the same transport. Neither could claim to be more the person that dematerialized than the other could.

Of course, the actual original Riker had dematerialized many years before that, when he was transported for the very first time. So, after the unusual transport, these two were identical copies of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy... And years later, during this episode, the Riker we had known all along was many times removed from that.

The OP is about the transporters on Star Tre — Patterner

I have addressed this. No it isn't. A plain reading shows this. The experiment comes from Parfit, not Star Trek. This is not controversial.

these two were identical copies of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy... And years later, during this episode, the Riker we had known all along was many times removed from that. — Patterner

Now this is interesting, and the branch line squarely addresses it. That's not an argument or anything, but more reason to read Parfit's book where this thought experiment stems. No shade at all, but it'll help understanding most of the positions and how/why they work or don't work because Parfit is extremely through. The book took him nearly 14 years.

I never heard of Parfit until you mentioned him in the other post. But I know what I think about the topic, so if such a device is built, I will avoid it at all costs. :grin:

How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist? — Patterner

Yes. A significant problem within personal identity is whether my particles could be separated for T time interval and still preserve my instance of consciousness.
You have given your position of "no", but is there an argument / reasoning behind that?

What exactly is the problem with multiple "I"s? If we had metaphysical selves, aka souls, then it would be a problem. Which one would the soul ("I" here) go to? How could the soul be in two places at once? But if we don't, then simply, two entities would have the experience of being you, instead of one. What is the contradiction? — hypericin

I thought I already said what the issue is: there might be two entities that could call themselves Mijin, but stick a pin in one, and the other doesn't feel pain. There are two instances of consciousness.

And I don't know why you keep raising souls. As I say, within this topic it seems to only be invoked by people trying to express incredulence about the other position to their own.
I don't think anyone in this thread has taken the position that souls exist, certainly not me.

"why would the universe decree that, say, X=12,371 means surviving with brain damage, and X=12,372 means you effectively die from the injury?"

Obviously, the universe is doing no such thing. Adding a teleporter on top of this scenario changes nothing. — hypericin

It does though. Going back to the OP, what if the transporter makes so many errors that (an alive) Abraham Lincoln walks out at the destination? He's alive, but nothing at all like the person that stepped on the source transporter pad. This illiustrates that the line for suriving or not is not the same as whether the original instance of consciousness is preserved or not, as the two are independent.

but evidently you don't bother read through?
— bongo fury

No idea what you're referring to. Everything I've said is relevant and seems pertinent at the time I commented it. — AmadeusD

Wouldn't you think I was referring to the sentence of yours that I had just quoted? This one:

I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. — AmadeusD

Did you read that through when I quoted it, and still make sense of it? Just curious. Presumably you knew what you meant. So maybe it's forgiveable that you failed to notice the syntactic malformation, even when urged to reinspect it. Or maybe it's well formed, and I'll be astonished and humbled.

Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity?
— bongo fury

No, and I don't think you do either. — AmadeusD

I do, though. As you later on recognise as a possibility:

If you're simply stipulating that, for you, a 'self' is, in fact, a confluence of mind and body in a single, recognizable-over-time entity, that's fine. — AmadeusD

Oh, good. Yes, I was simply stipulating that obvious materialist usage of "self" and declaring it suitable for discussion, and stress-testing. Goodman's discussion of authenticity seems entirely relevant, even if it shows up contrasts as well as parallels. Or contrasts for you, and parallels for me.

How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist?
— Patterner

Yes. A significant problem within personal identity is whether my particles could be separated for T time interval and still preserve my instance of consciousness.
You have given your position of "no", but is there an argument / reasoning behind that? — Mijin

Would you willingly be transported if, for some weird reason of the technology, the duplicate came into being, and then you were disintegrated? You see your duplicate, so you know your identity survives. Then you wait some seconds, knowing you are about to be disintegrated. No problem with that?

I don't think my answer to that is going to elucidate much, because there's a principled and practical answer.

From a principled point of view, I think the best solution to the transporter problem is that there is never continuity of consciousness. Every instance of Mijin lives for a millisecond but in that millisecond is convinced that he has lived for years. So I should have no problem using transporters, as it is no different to the death and rebirth that happens at every instance of time.

But in practice of course I am not going to risk my life on my best philosophical guess at the moment. Heck, I'd be wary of using the transporter even if I was convinced it preserved my instance of consciousness. I'd need to see a formal proof to even consider using it.

I suspect nobody would go along with my scenario of being disintegrated after seeing the copy come into being. Much less assuming or being assured a copy has come into being in some distant place. Despite the certain knowledge that their identity, their self, still exists and will continue.

I'd need to see a formal proof to even consider using it. — Mijin

Make up any formal proof, any scenario you like. What is it that would convince you?

I suspect nobody would go along with my scenario of being disintegrated after seeing the copy come into being. — Patterner

Sure but this is a somewhat different question to the hypothetical. Even most proponents of the "sent" position say that the entities immediately diverge after the process (hypericin might be an exception to this, but we will see how he responds to my last post). So yes of course if you're stood there on the source pad, seeing the duplicate, you've already diverged and nobody on either side of this debate would advocate you take the death.

Make up any formal proof, any scenario you like. What is it that would convince you? — Patterner

I don't know. I don't think we have such a model and I don't know what one would look like.
Right now, as I say, the most bulletproof position is to basically say that there's never continuity and personal identity is basically an illusion.

Right now, as I say, the most bulletproof position is to basically say that there's never continuity and personal identity is basically an illusion. — Mijin

I don't think this is a sensible position: whose illusion? On the contrary, my subjective experience and its continuity are the only certainties in the world.

Regarding transporters: there are two types, the Star Trek transporter (matter transport) and the information transporter (non-matter transporter).

In the first case, the self could be transported, in the second case it could not.

I don't think this is a sensible position: whose illusion? On the contrary, my subjective experience and its continuity are the only certainties in the world. — SolarWind

I think you might be conflating two different things here.
I am not saying that subjective experience itself is the illusion. I am talking about persistence of a single entity of consciousness.

We all take it for granted that we are the same entity that was born N years ago -- numerically the same entity, that is, not qualitatively of course. However, when it comes to the transporter problem and similar hypotheticals, this assumption seems to lead to complex questions. The issue of how, concretely, an instance of consciousness is determined turns out to be really problematic to answer. So, as I say, the simplest option right now is to question the assumption itself. If an instance of consciousness is merely an instant of consciousness, with no persistence, just the illusion of being the same person by virtue of inheriting the memories of the last guy, all the problems disappear.

In the first case, the self could be transported, in the second case it could not. — SolarWind

Why's that? What's special about the atoms?