The unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment. — Bateson, Form, Substance, and Difference

That is perfectly in keeping with the ‘mind-created world’. Bateson is one of the sources of ‘enactivism’ and a major influence in The Embodied Mind, which comprehensively deconstructed ‘the view from nowhere’.

I recognize that influence. I submit that it is incompatible with the Gerson view of Platonism.

You seem to want to have both at the same time.

I submit that it is incompatible with the Gerson view of Platonism. — Paine

Sure, but that is not a topic of debate in this thread.

So, I should not connect all the things you have said as the continuity of your thought?

I suffer from institutional memory.

They’re different topics, but there is a way of connecting them, subject of a forthcoming OP.

If you say, the world is created by your mind, I feel your world is likely to be very much in illusion. A perceived world sounds more accurate. — Corvus

Just out of curiosity, what is the difference between a person's created world and a person's perceived world?

The world perceived by a mind has an external cause that may be of a different nature from the mind (classical dualism).

The mind-created world, as I understand the OP, has no external cause and is a monism where everything that exists has mental properties.

The mind-created world, as I understand the OP, has no external cause and is a monism where everything that exists has mental properties. — JuanZu

Not quite what it says. I don't claim that the mind is constitutive of objects in the way that wood is constitutive of boats or clay of pots. It is an epistemological arrgument.

I acnowledge that the word 'created' might be a poor choice of words in the context. I'm referring more to the role of the mind in constructing or synthesising what we take to be a completely independent and external world.

I acnowledge that the word 'created' might be a poor choice of words in the context. — Wayfarer

Was that controversial key-word a Freudian slip, or intentional challenge, to keep this thread going in circles for 70 pages? :wink:

Reality vs Ideality : Divine Creation vs Human Construct vs Cosmic Accident

In Western metaphysics, ‘creation’ has a specific status, reserved for the Creator (‘creature’ meaning ‘created being’). It is of course used more broadly nowadays, for all manner of creative work, but it still retains some overtones, in the philosophical context. But I’m not going to retroactively update it. Besides, ‘mind-constructed world’ just doesn’t have a ring to it.

In Plotinus, the soul animates matter as far as it can. The source is a power that can only go so far because matter is never completely mastered by form. The origin of that soul is from before our birth. Plotinus has also said he has visited that realm through contemplation.

Nicely put, (I’m not familiar with Plotinus), I would go further. There are a constellation of souls including some who instantiate matter from pre matter. But I would caution that these latter souls are very distant from our own, (“ Some very old material is moving through”, from your post).
Perhaps it is time we consider the role played by the distant past.

The search function on the site is pretty darn good at locating where this has been discussed in the past.

I will withhold from saying more about it in this thread.

Thanks for this, but I cannot see how this is particularly relevant to the arguments, rather than a good go-over of what was put forward as commentary.

The fact remains, Kant's system *does not work* unless there is an assumption that something causes our sensations. That is all I've claimed, and it is literally required to get the system off the ground. This is not an argument from anything particular. His system quite obviously requires it. Kant knew this - which is why his later work treats the noumenon differently*. Here, we can say that Kant understood noumena to be intelligible, but not knowable. He couldn't have begun his first page without this.

You, and others, are quite right that the focus in the CPR, and one of the two fundamental aspects of the noumena is simply a limiting concept for the human understanding. I've not argued against that, either. *But it is quite clear (to me) that by the time he published the Prolegomena, he almost said outright that these 'objects' must be presupposed:

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena … is not only admissible, but unavoidable.”

"We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a world of understanding, and a Supreme Being (all mere noumena), because in them only, as things in themselves, reason finds that completion and satisfaction, which it can never hope for in the derivation of appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and because these actually have reference to something distinct from them (and totally heterogeneous), as appearances always presuppose an object in itself, and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or not.”

There are several others of varying degrees of clarity (and from other works). But in any case, this shows a contrast to how he speaks in the CPR where he's essentially saying we are all necessarily agnostic, despite any other claims, as to noumena. We can't know. But later, he's saying we must pre-suppose them (despite, not being able to know them). This is how a shadow works, so is not conceptually controversial at all. For his moral systems, this is also required (with the same necessity - albeit, one which simply follows from concept-to-built-up-concept). The bolded passages are, for me, quite good enough to essentially say "No, thank you" to the objectors so far here.

I hope this clarifies what I'm talking about. It is an extremely discreet issue which, quite frankly, doesn't need much discussion. For my personal part (which is far more open to discussion) this was obviously to me from the first 30 pages or so of the CPR. There couldn't be anything further to talk about unless these objects are pre-supposed. His inability to admit this was the right thing to do in that book (though, i contend it was left open, not denied so this could be a weaker objection than I'm giving it anyway). His later ability to admit to this was the right thing to do in those circumstances.



I suggest I've responded to anything this underhanded post could be meaning underneath, above. Suffice to say this response shows me some pretty damn bad faith. Would you like me to send you a picture of me holding my copy which has obviously been read-to-death? Good lord.

My argument is that a person may misjudge what one is perceiving, and this does not imply that the person perceives nothing. That was to counter your claim that if a person is not perceiving objects one is perceiving nothing. It may be the case that the person judges oneself to be perceiving objects, but is not perceiving objects, yet still is perceiving. — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't touch the claim I've made, so I have to assume i did it clumsily. The above should clarify pretty well. Insofar as this can be treated, you've not adequately understood even what you've jsut said, it seems. Let me try to make that understandable:

"a person may misjudge what one is perceiving, and this does not imply that the person perceives nothing."

Yes. They are perceiving something. Things are objects. That fact we can't know what/which (and similar questions) doesn't change that part of the position. (and, as above, Kant knows this too).

Good. That's all I needed.

"a person may misjudge what one is perceiving, and this does not imply that the person perceives nothing."

Yes. They are perceiving something.

Good. That's all I needed.

Yes. They are perceiving something. Things are objects. That fact we can't know what/which (and similar questions) doesn't change that part of the position. (and, as above, Kant knows this too). — AmadeusD

The thing perceived is not necessarily objects. The person may judge oneself to be perceiving objects, but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving, then that judgement is wrong. the person is mistaken, and is perceiving without perceiving objects.

Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that.

but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving, — Metaphysician Undercover

What are the criteria?

What are the criteria?

I thought Kant had just explained that.

I'm just not very good at this. Wondering about any specifics.

I'm just not very good at this. Wondering about any specifics.

Sorry, I was joking.
It’s difficult to work out what Kant has got to say about it.

The fact remains, Kant's system *does not work* unless there is an assumption that something causes our sensations. — AmadeusD

I don't think Kant was ever saying that our experiences came only from our minds. The issue I see is how many of the properties we develop in our judgement of appearances can be applied to the things in themselves. Things in themselves are an inevitable outcome of our judgement. He says that in the quoted passage, adding that they are "problematic." The issue of "mind independence" as a cause does not come up for Kant. What Strawson and Allison were debating {in the link I provided} concerns:

It therefore has subjective real-
ity in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of
time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded re-
ally not as object but as the way of representing myself as object But
if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sen-
sibility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to our-
selves as alterations, would yield us a cognition in which the represen-
tation of time and thus also of alteration would not occur at all. Its
empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences. — CPR A36/B53

The "physical objects" we experience in our sensations and judgements are representations made possible through combinations of our intuitions of space and time. That space is consistently called the "outer" intuition and time the "inner" demonstrates that Kant was not disavowing a difference between the two. The correlation between what happens beyond our experience and the way we map the world as space would, of course, never work if it did not work. That points back to the repeatability factor central to Hume. What gets Strawson's knickers in a twist concern how time is excluded from what we can ascribe to whatever is beyond our experience.

Note in the quoted passage how Kant confines the issue to whether or not he or others "could intuit himself" by some other means. That does not make our judgements to be without a cause beyond our experience but forces us to include the absence of other "intuitions" into the set of our limitations.

Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that — AmadeusD

"Required as an assumption" implies that the assumption is a necessary aspect. That is why the sensation is commonly called a representation. It is assumed to represent something.

Consider what Paine says:

The "physical objects" we experience in our sensations and judgements are representations made possible through combinations of our intuitions of space and time. — Paine

If these representations are false, it may be the case that the person is not actually perceiving objects, despite believing oneself to be perceiving objects.

What are the criteria? — Patterner

I would say that the single most important criterion for "object" is temporal extension.

If these representations are false, it may be the case that the person is not actually perceiving objects, despite believing oneself to be perceiving objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

That error comes up a lot in Aristotle. Perhaps you could point out where that happens with Kant.

but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving,
— Metaphysician Undercover

What are the criteria?
— Patterner

I would say that the single most important criterion for "object" is temporal extension. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that does (edited to correct stupid auto correct) not have temporal extension?

That error comes up a lot in Aristotle. Perhaps you could point out where that happens with Kant. — Paine

I don't quite understand what you are asking Paine.

Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that fits not have temporal extension? — Patterner

Any activity I suppose. At each moment it is new and different, therefore there is no temporal extension of any specific thing.

Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that does (edited to correct stupid autocorrect) not have temporal extension?
— Patterner

Any activity I suppose. At each moment it is new and different, therefore there is no temporal extension of any specific thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps. But is it likely that someone who thinks they are perceiving an object is actually viewing an activity?

Perhaps. But is it likely that someone who thinks they are perceiving an object is actually viewing an activity? — Patterner

Yes, that is the subject of process philosophy. And, I think it's exactly what modern physics has determined to be the case. So I believe it is likely.

Can you give an example of an activity someone perceives and mistakes to be an object?

Anything perceived as an object, a book, a desk, a chair, might really be activity. Doesn't physics tell you that these supposed objects are just a bunch of activities?

↪Gnomon
In Western metaphysics, ‘creation’ has a specific status, reserved for the Creator (‘creature’ meaning ‘created being’). It is of course used more broadly nowadays, for all manner of creative work, but it still retains some overtones, in the philosophical context. But I’m not going to retroactively update it. Besides, ‘mind-constructed world’ just doesn’t have a ring to it. — Wayfarer

Speaking of the distinction between a Created vs Constructed world, Dan Brown's new mystery/thriller, Secret of Secrets --- I'm almost to the halfway point --- hinges on the competition between Materialistic and Noetic worldviews.

The noetic scientist is publishing a non-fiction non-popular book, asserting that Consciousness is not "created" by the brain, but is a signal received from some external Mind Field. Hence the physical "real" world is actually a model constructed from bits of data transmitted from the noumenal World Mind, and beamed into the brain. For some as-yet-unstated reason, the evildoers seem existentially threatened by an abstruse philosophical theory.

Or, at least that's my personal construct from superficial knowledge of Noetic theory. How does the notion of brain-as-reciever-instead-of-sender fit with the creator/creation topic of this thread? If you think it's off-topic, I may start a new thread. Or you can, if you are more familiar with Noetics. :smile: