Yes, quite so. Two my eyes, this debate looks like a microcosm for idealism vs realism. But with a difference, that in some sense it is for real. But then I ask myself How is that possible unless reality and our ideas are really in conflict? We have come up with some new ideas - wavicles, entanglement, etc - and no doubt more will be required.

I may be making myself misunderstood. The error I mean is to treat the "observer" as in a separate world from the "observed." They're not one and the same, though. — Ciceronianus

It's quite simple really. From one point of view, the teams on the field are separate entities; from another, they are a unity - together, they are a fight, or a match. (From a third point of view, each team is made up of 11 individuals.) Each pair of shoes is a unity of two individual shoes. I don't see a problem here.

I don't see a problem here. — Ludwig V

The problem, I think, comes when we ask which of these points of view (if any) reflect how the world really is. Is there any way to make the case that some points of view are ontologically privileged? -- that is, that they describe the world more accurately than their competitors?

The problem, I think, comes when we ask which of these points of view (if any) reflect how the world really is. Is there any way to make the case that some points of view are ontologically privileged? -- that is, that they describe the world more accurately than their competitors? — J

Take a weather map, a geological map and a road map of the same territory. They are not competitors, and they describe different aspects of the world. The question of which is the most accurate doesn't apply. They are all about truth, but not about the same truth. The question which is the best map depends on the context - what you are doing, what your interests are.
Some puzzle pictures can be taken in more than one way. Again, those questions don't arise - the interpretations are not in competition with each other.
The territory and the picture are such that they can be represented in more than one way. That's the reality. There's no way to make a choice.
On the other hand, I'm not at all sure that the "interpretations" model applies to this debate. Some form of realism seems to me much more satisfying than anti-realism or idealism. The latter seems to be make far too much of our limitations and failing to recognize that our senses and our language are very powerful tools.

The irony enters when those, who generally take science to have only epistemic or epistemological, and not ontological, significance, nonetheless seek to use the results of quantum physics to support ontological claims, such as that consciousness really does, as opposed to merely seems to we observers to, collapse the wave function, and that consciousness or mind is thus ontologically fundamental.

The irony enters when those, who generally take science to have only epistemic or epistemological, and not ontological, significance, then seek to use the results of quantum physics to support ontological claims, such as that consciousness really does, as opposed to merely seems to we observers to, collapse the wave function, and that consciousness or mind is thus ontologically fundamental. — Janus

That's a new one to me.

They are all about truth, but not about the same truth. — Ludwig V

Yes. This invites a couple of responses:

First, are some truths more "natural" or "about the world" than others? It is true, for instance, that several stars, when grouped together, make a constellation. But that is so because of something we humans do. It is not actually a feature of the natural world (using a common sense of what is natural).

Second, how far can this be pushed? See Ted Sider's ideas about "objective structure." His "grue" and "bleen" people divide up the visual world in a bizarre way, yet everything they say about it is true. Sider argues, and I agree, that nonetheless they are missing something important about how the world really is.

The irony enters when those, who generally take science to have only epistemic or epistemological, and not ontological, significance, nonetheless seek to use the results of quantum physics to support ontological claims — Janus

Interesting point. In general, I think scientific realism had better include some truths about the role of consciousness -- it would be drastically incomplete otherwise. But what are these truths? Stay tuned . . .

The irony enters when those, who generally take science to have only epistemic or epistemological, and not ontological, significance, nonetheless seek to use the results of quantum physics to support ontological claims, such as that consciousness really does, as opposed to merely seems to we observers to, collapse the wave function, and that consciousness or mind is thus ontologically fundamental. — Janus

I’ve been studying Michel Bitbol on philosophy of science, and he sees many of these disputes as arising from a shared presupposition: treating mind and matter as if they were two substances, one of which must be ontologically fundamental. In that sense, dualists and physicalists often share two assumptions—first, that consciousness is either a thing or a property of a thing; and second, that physical systems exist in their own right, independently of how they appear to us.

On Bitbol’s reading, quantum theory supports neither position. It doesn’t establish the ontological primacy of consciousness conceived as a substance—but it also undermines the idea of self-subsisting physical “things” with inherent identity and persistence. What it destabilises is the very framework in which “mind” and “matter” appear as separable ontological kinds in the first place.

Because both dualism and materialism tacitly treat consciousness as something—a thing among other things—while also presuming that physical systems exist independently of observation, the observer problem then appears as a paradox. The realist question becomes: what are these objects really in themselves, prior to or apart from any observation?

This line of thought aligns closely with what has humorously been called Bitbol’s “Kantum physics”—a deliberate play on words marking the Kantian dimension of quantum theory. Just as Kant argued that we know only phenomena structured by our cognitive faculties, Bitbol argues that quantum mechanics describes the structure of possible experience under the conditions of measurement. It is less a picture of an observer-independent world than a framework specifying how observations arise from our experimental engagement with it.

See The Roles Ascribed to Conscousness in Quantum Physics (.pdf) He's also done a set of interviews with Robert Lawrence Kuhn recently.

It is true, for instance, that several stars, when grouped together, make a constellation. But that is so because of something we humans do. It is not actually a feature of the natural world (using a common sense of what is natural). — J

This is a real problem. I don't know the answer and perhaps there isn't one - or not just one. In this case, we should compare constellations with another case. I suggest the solar system as being an actual feature of the world. ("natural" just makes additional complexity). These cases could also usefully be compared with the sun. My first instinct is to say that the solar system is maintained by a collection of what we call "laws of nature". The sun falls into the class of concepts of objects (medium-sized dry goods is not particularly helpful in this case, but indicates what I have in mind).

Second, how far can this be pushed? See Ted Sider's ideas about "objective structure." His "grue" and "bleen" people divide up the visual world in a bizarre way, yet everything they say about it is true. Sider argues, and I agree, that nonetheless they are missing something important about how the world really is. — J

I agree with you. My first stab at identifying what is missing is that this notion of truth is very thin. It is neither use nor ornament. It consequently doesn't have a future in our everyday language. I don't rule out the possibility of concepts like these finding a use somewhere some day. On the other hand, I'm a bit doubtful whether "how the world really is" is a useful or usable criterion for what we are trying to talk about.

I had a look at the article you linked to. It's very promising, so I've saved it. The concluding paragraph has a lot going for it.

The point of metaphysics is to discern the fundamental structure of the world. That requires choosing fundamental notions with which to describe the world. No one can avoid this choice. Other things being equal, it’s good to choose a set of fundamental notions that make previously unanswerable questions evaporate. There’s no denying that this is a point in favor of ontological deflationism. But no one other than a positivist can make all the hard questions evaporate. If nothing else, the choice of what notions are fundamental remains. There’s no detour around the entirety of fundamental metaphysics. — 'Ontological Realism' - Theodore Sider

The first task is to clarify the sense of "fundamental" in this context.

On Bitbol’s reading, quantum theory supports neither position. .... What it destabilises is the very framework in which “mind” and “matter” appear as separable ontological kinds in the first place. — Wayfarer

We certainly a conception of mind vs matter that not only distinguishes them, but shows their interdependence - co-existence in the same world. The concept of categories was supposed to do this, but it seems to me to posit them as separate without explaining their unity.

Because both dualism and materialism tacitly treat consciousness as something—a thing among other things—while also presuming that physical systems exist independently of observation, the observer problem then appears as a paradox. The realist question becomes: what are these objects really in themselves, prior to or apart from any observation? — Wayfarer

That's the beginning of a diagnosis of the problem. But it doesn't help much in trying to resolve it. Your realist question doesn't help either. Trying to describe objects "in themselves" apart from any observation is like trying to pick up a pen without touching it.

I have an essay on it I’m trying to get published. If it is I’ll provide a link if you’re interested.

I would be interested in that.

. . . an actual feature of the world. ("natural" just makes additional complexity). — Ludwig V

It's the familiar problem of trying to find terminology that isn't hopelessly vague and/or controversial. "Actual feature" is fine with me, though "actual" has some of the same issues as "natural." But short of coining new terms and defining them precisely, what's to be done?

My first stab at identifying what is missing is that this notion of truth is very thin. It is neither use nor ornament. It consequently doesn't have a future in our everyday language. — Ludwig V

I agree, we can mount a pragmatic case for why certain uses of "truth" are to be preferred. Sider is coming at it slightly differently; he wants to say that our usual construals of how the world is are useful because they're true, not vice versa -- but the problem is, truth isn't enough. What the grue and bleen people say is also true. Your idea about "thin truth" is on this wavelength too, I think. Sider brings in the idea of fundamental truths, truths that are about "objective structure" -- the latter phrase I find problematic, but surely he's right that there are orders of truth, some more fundamental than others to understanding. It's not enough just to say something true -- we want the true things we say to create a picture we can also understand.

I'm a bit doubtful whether "how the world really is" is a useful or usable criterion for what we are trying to talk about. — Ludwig V

Sure, same point as above. What the hell do we call it? An approximation would be "the world without perspectives or observers" but that description is starting to sound almost quaint. But are we ready to abandon the difference between "making a mistake" and "getting it right"? If these two possibilities still make sense, then whatever marks the difference is what we mean by "how the world really is" -- not much help, is it.

the choice of what notions are fundamental remains. There’s no detour around the entirety of fundamental metaphysics. — 'Ontological Realism' - Theodore Sider

This seems particularly important to me. If you say "There are no fundamental notions," you have nonetheless made an important statement about what is and isn't fundamental.

What it destabilises is the very framework in which “mind” and “matter” appear as separable ontological kinds in the first place. — Wayfarer

Yes. If we can find a way to re-stabilize this so that "mind" and "matter" still refer, but not to irreconcilable ontological kinds in the ways that now seem unavoidable, we'll have come far.

That's a new one to me. — Ludwig V

That doesn't tell me anything much. Do you have anything more to add?

Interesting point. In general, I think scientific realism had better include some truths about the role of consciousness -- it would be drastically incomplete otherwise. But what are these truths? Stay tuned . — J

I'm not sure what you mean by "scientific realism", but the study of consciousness seems to be irrelevant to most of the hard sciences, and we do have cognitive science and psychology to deal with consciousness, among other things. I'm not sure it qualifies as a science, but we also have phenomenology.

I’ve been studying Michel Bitbol on philosophy of science, and he sees many of these disputes as arising from a shared presupposition: treating mind and matter as if they were two substances, one of which must be ontologically fundamental. In that sense, dualists and physicalists often share two assumptions—first, that consciousness is either a thing or a property of a thing; and second, that physical systems exist in their own right, independently of how they appear to us. — Wayfarer

I don't see it as a question of substances. I think that way of thinking is anachronistic. We don't need to talk about 'physical vs mental'. Existence or being is fundamental. First there is mere existence of whatever, then comes self-organized existence (life) and with that comes cognition. Self-organized existents are able, via evolved existent structures known as cells and later sensory organs composed of cells to be sensitive to both the existents which constitute the non-living environment and of course other living existents that share the environment with them. Science shows us that the ability to model that sensitivity has evolved to ever-increasing levels of complexity and sophistication, with a major leap coming with the advent of symbolic language.

Is consciousness a thing? Not if you mean by 'thing' 'an object of the senses'. Digetsion is not an object of the senses either yet consciousness, like digestion, can be thought of as a process, and processes may be referred to as things.

On Bitbol’s reading, quantum theory supports neither position. It doesn’t establish the ontological primacy of consciousness conceived as a substance—but it also undermines the idea of self-subsisting physical “things” with inherent identity and persistence. What it destabilises is the very framework in which “mind” and “matter” appear as separable ontological kinds in the first place. — Wayfarer

I agree that quantum theory supports neither position (re fundamental substances). I don't agree that it undermines the idea of self-existing things, meaning things that exist in the absence of percipients. I also don't think it has anything say about mind and matter being different ontological kinds, as that is merely a matter of categorization. They are different kinds of things, since matter is thought of as constitutive and mind is thought of as perceptive. Matter is thought of in terms of particles or building blocks, whereas mind is thought of as a process. I don't see that QM dispenses with the idea of building blocks at all, although obviously the old 'billiard ball' model is no longer viable.

I don't agree that it undermines the idea of self-existing things, meaning things that exist in the absence of percipients. — Janus

That precise point is written all over the history of quantum mechanics. The customary dodge is 'well, there are different interpretations' - but notice this also subjectivises the facts of the matter, makes it a matter of different opinions. If you don't see it, you need to do more reading on it. The fields of quantum physics are in no way 'building blocks', which is a lame attempt to apply a metaphor appropriate to atomism to a completely different conceptual matrix.

The whole debate between Bohr and Einstein, whilst very technical in many respects, is precisely about the question of whether the fundamental objects of physics are mind-independent. This has already been posted more than once in this thread, but it still retains relevance:

From John Wheeler, Law without Law:

The dependence on what is observed upon the choice of experimental arrangement made Einstein unhappy. It conflicts with the view that the universe exists "out there", independent of all acts on observation. In contrast Bohr stressed that we confront here an inescapable new feature of nature, to be welcomed because of the understanding it givs us. Bohr found himself forced to introduce the word “phenomenon”. In today's words Bohr’s point – and the central point of quantum theory – can be put into a single, simple sentence. "No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed ) phenomenon”.

‘what we consider to be ‘reality’, symbolised by the letter R in the diagram, consists of an elaborate paper maché construction of imagination and theory fitted between a few iron posts of observation’.

A clear a statement of 'the mind created world', as I intended it, as you're likely to find anywhere.

That precise point is written all over the history of quantum mechanics. The customary dodge is 'well, there are different interpretations' - but notice this also subjectivises the facts of the matter, makes it a matter of different opinions. If you don't see it, you need to do more reading on it. The fields of quantum physics are in no way 'building blocks', which is a lame attempt to apply a metaphor appropriate to atomism to a completely different conceptual matrix. — Wayfarer

I don't have the time to search for specific citations to present, but I know from having watched many interviews with Quantum Physicists that the idea of particles as real entities is still a live option. So, I asked Claude, and this is the answer I received:

Hi Claude, I wonder if you can tell me what the consensus is today in Quantum Mechanics as to whether fields are composed of particles?

This is a fascinating question that remains actively debated among physicists and philosophers of science. There isn't a firm consensus, but rather several competing views:

The main perspectives:

Fields as fundamental - Many contemporary physicists and philosophers view fields as real, continuous entities, while particles are merely useful approximations in specific contexts
In this view, what we call "particles" are actually excitations or disturbances in underlying quantum fields.

Particle ontology - Some defend a moderate form of object realism with respect to particle-like entities, particularly when distinguishing between quantum field theory as a framework versus specific theories like the Standard Model.

Mixed or functionalist approach - Some recent proposals argue for a mixed ontology of particles and fields, suggesting both are legitimate descriptions that serve different functional roles in the theory.

Key challenges to a particle interpretation:

The evidence weighs against viewing fields as "composed of" particles in any simple sense. The number of particles and their energy-momentum are not invariant in curved spacetimes, particularly in the presence of black holes, while what remains invariant is the energy-momentum of the fields
MDPI. This suggests fields are more fundamental.

Current state of debate:

The question remains philosophically complex. As of 2024, there's active debate about whether this is even the right question to ask - some argue we should focus on how particles and fields function consistently within quantum field theory rather than which is "more real."

In any case even if energy fields are fundamental, and matter and energy are equivalent, and fields exist, then it follows that something exists independently of minds if QM is actually showing us something about objective reality. On that view embodied minds and bodies and entities of all kinds as well as perception and thought itself would also be "excitations in a field".

The other point is that, if you think science shows us only things as they are apparent to us, then the idea of independent existents cannot be ruled out on that view. You might say that all we know is that there appear to us to be independent existents, but what appears to us cannot answer the question as to what is independently of us and so we cannot know whether there are or are not such entities.

I am not interested in defending one view or the other, but only in establishing what can, with intellectual humility and honesty, be said.

As to the Wheeler diagram, it says nothing about whether the ways in which the world can be divided up are more or less in accordance with the actual structure of the world.

I'm not sure what you mean by "scientific realism", but the study of consciousness seems to be irrelevant to most of the hard sciences — Janus

By "scientific realism," I meant to denote the common-or-garden-variety conception of science. It may be flawed or dead wrong at the quantum level, but we all know it works at most other levels. And by "works," I only mean that it generates predictions that prove remarkably accurate, and at the same time provides us with a powerful measure for what it means to be right or wrong about the physical world.

So, could there be such a practice that, taken all in all, didn't include a theory of consciousness? I don't see how. You're right that, in any given hard science, we may not need that theory; we can assume the fact of consciousness. But if our goal is to give a complete account of what there is, then to leave consciousness out would be laughable. This tells me that we're still in early days of forming such an account. You say that we have cognitive science and psychology to deal with consciousness, and in a way we do, but neither field provides a grounding theory of what consciousness is, or why it occurs. Like the hard sciences, consciousness is accepted as a given (or, for some, deflated or reduced or denied).

So, one of the most extraordinary and omnipresent facts about the world -- that many of its denizens have an "inside," a subjectivity -- still awaits a unified theory. I know many on TPF doubt that science can provide this. I'm agnostic; let's wait and see.

But if our goal is to give a complete account of what there is, then to leave consciousness out would be laughable. This tells me that we're still in early days of forming such an account. You say that we have cognitive science and psychology to deal with consciousness, and in a way we do, but neither field provides a grounding theory of what consciousness is, or why it occurs. Like the hard sciences, consciousness is accepted as a given (or, for some, deflated or reduced or denied).

So, one of the most extraordinary and omnipresent facts about the world -- that many of its denizens have an "inside," a subjectivity -- still awaits a unified theory. I know many on TPF doubt that science can provide this. I'm agnostic; let's wait and see. — J

I'm a little inclined to be on the side of thinking that a unified theory is impossible, but I'm not adamant about it. It seems to me that we understand things via science by being "outside" them, by being able to analyze and model them in accordance with how they present themselves to us. I don't find it plausible that how they present to us is determined by consciousness, but I think it is more reasonable to think that it is determined by the physical constitutions of our sensory organs, nervous system and brain, as well as by the actual structures of the things themselves.

The problem with trying to model consciousness itself is that it is the thing doing the modeling, and we cannot "get outside of it", so we seem to be stuck with making inferences about what it might be from studying the brain being the best we can do, or going with what our intuitions "from inside" tell us about its nature.

The problem with trying to model consciousness itself is that it is the thing doing the modeling, and we cannot "get outside of it", so we seem to be stuck with making inferences about what it might be from studying the brain being the best we can do, or going with what our intuitions "from inside" tell us about its nature.

This is what I was talking about in the other thread, (Cosmos created mind), I am interested in developing ways to break out of this straight jacket. But I don’t have the philosophical language to ground it in digestible philosophy. It just comes across as fanciful wishful thinking.

I see two initial problems, firstly the problem of how a mind can talk about itself with itself and not be convinced that it’s impossible to do it impartially, or that it’s an insurmountable stumbling block.
Secondly how we break out of the state that the world presents us with to some kind of objective starting point, or foundation.

In mysticism (my brand of mysticism) the first problem is covered extensively with a series of processes and practices. But which comes across to a philosopher as dogmatic spirituality, or wishful thinking.
Secondly I have developed a series of conceptual tools by which one can break out of the straight jacket of the world being the way it presents to us. Which again comes across to philosophers as woo woo, spirituality, or wishful thinking.

I don't find it plausible that how they present to us is determined by consciousness, but I think it is more reasonable to think that it is determined by the physical constitutions of our sensory organs, nervous system and brain, as well as by the actual structures of the things themselves.

Yes, but the physical constitutions themselves are parts of the structures of the things themselves. Even the mind, via the brain, as used in our day to day thinking is shaped, framed by these structures. Sooner, or later we have to start considering something that isn’t shaped in this way, in consciousness, but is nevertheless shaped by other as yet unrecognised structures. This is usually described as the soul, although I prefer to describe it as the higher mind.*

Unless we go there, no one is going to make any progress on putting together a unified theory.

* by higher mind, I mean a part of our mind that is recognised as conceptually free, or independent of the mind clothed in the world that we inhabit mostly in day to day life. Like a kind of Platonic region, concerned with pure thought, being etc.