You haven't answered the question which I posed prior to Wayfarer's subsequent response which your post that I ma responding to responds to :

That said the one thing I wonder about with your saying that an artificial mind could be built that has first person experiences coupled with your saying that feelings are the only problematics is whether it would be possible to have first person experiences sans feelings. — Janus

I actually don't like the term "first person"―it is so humancentric. I also don't like the "dimensionless point" model of subjectivity.

The related question that comes to mind is whether you think consciousness is possible absent feelings and whether you equate consciousness with first person experience. Is it possible to have feelings without a sensate body?

To be discoverable, there needs to be some measurable influence on known things. So there could be particles, or properties, that have no measureable influence on particles or waves we can detect. String theory may true, but there seems to be no means of verifying that. If it IS true. there could be any number of vibrational states of strings that have no direct measurable affect on anything else. — Relativist

I can understand thinking something like dark matter must exist. Not directly detectable in any way we've thought of, but something is having a gravitational effect on things. But if there is no detectable effect, why suspect there is something undetectable present?

Not wanting to pre-empt Relativist's response, but given the current theoretical understanding of cosmology and physics, dark matter and dark energy are presumed to exist, due to the large-scale behavour of galaxies (the former) and the expansion of the Universe (the latter). So as far as dark matter is concerned, there is a 'detectable effect', first found by Franz Zwicky and elaborated by Vera Rubin. This is that galaxies don't rotate at a rate which is commensurable with their observable mass, so something undetectable must be an influence. Either there is some un-detectable matter, or something is the matter with the understanding of physics at galactic scales (the approach known as Modified Newtonian Dynamics). Jury is still out but the majority opinion seems to favour dark matter.

The related question that comes to mind is whether you think consciousness is possible absent feelings and whether you equate consciousness with first person experience. Is it possible to have feelings without a sensate body? — Janus

Sorry I overlooked your question. A being that was built,which lacked feelings is generally referred to as a "Zombie." The being would have experiences, that created memories that might affect its future behavior - so in that sense, it would be a sort of first-person experience. It could behave in ways identical to humans - reacting as we do to bodily injury; crying at a funeral, having the outward physical effects of sexual arousal..., and learning to behave differently based on the experiences.

But it wouldn't be the sort of experiences that we have (IMO). It seems to me that feelings are the direct impetus for all our intentional behavior. This seems to be the relevance of the so-called "first-person-ness" of our minds: feelings are exclusively first-perseon experiences. Zombie behavior could be perfectly understood from standard programming. Real human behavior would need something to produce feelings.

No, and I fully expect that nothing ever will. It’s not the kind of view which is amendable to falsification, as it is a metaphysical belief. — Wayfarer

Yes, but it's a cautious belief - I know it's not necessarily true - it will always ONLY be a best explanation. I don't think you'll admit it, but it's rational to accept best explanations as provisionally true. Compare it to a belief about a historical fact deduced from data too limited to be conclusive.

You will notice, incidentally, that I do not advance a ‘theory of mind’.

I know, and that's why you aren't in position to refute my "best explanation" analysis. I think I said as much, months ago.

Yes, I understand. I didn't know where Relativist was going with the idea that there may be things with no detectable effect.

And after all these months of conversations, I'm still at a loss to understand what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science.

The being would have experiences... — Relativist

Wouldn't it have to be a subject, to be considered 'a being that has experiences'? Experiences are not standalone events. They are experiences for someone. If there is no subject, then at best there are internal state transitions, information processing, memory registration, and behavioral dispositions — none of which by themselves amount to experience in the first-person sense.

Isn't the whole point of the 'philosophical zombie' argument that there would be no objective way of determining whether it really was a subject, as distinct from merely emulating subjectivity? Thereby showing that subjective awareness is not something objectively discernable.

And after all these months of conversations, I'm still at a loss to understand what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science. — Wayfarer

It's a metaphysical underpinning for that methodological assumption: the world is a natural one, evolving entirely due to laws of nature; that everything that exists is an object with properties and relations to other existents. So what it explains is the nature of what exists, and what to expect as new discoveries are made.

It provides a broad, consistent perspective for evaluating philosphical claims. I defend its implications: e. g. compatibilism, a natural (evolutionary) basis of morality, the nature of abstractions (including mathematics), a theory of truth, and quasi-necessitarianism. Any forum topic I comment on will always be based on this position, unless I'm just entertaining other possibilities to see where they lead.

a natural (evolutionary) basis of morality, the nature of abstractions (including mathematics), a theory of truth. — Relativist

I don’t recognise the cogency of “evolutionary morality.” Evolutionary theory explains how biological traits are selected and propagated; it does not generate norms or obligations. Even Richard Dawkins has been explicit on this point: “survival of the fittest” is not, and must not be treated as, a moral maxim.

Likewise, I hold that mathematical entities such as numbers are real but not physical. They are not located in space-time, do not enter into causal relations, and are not products of evolutionary history, yet they retain objective necessity and normative force.

These are not peripheral disagreements but principled objections to the claim that physicalism explains morality, mathematics, or truth rather than redescribing them in ways that vitiate their real attributes.

I don't expect them to be recognised, however.

Do you REALLY want to get into each of those topics? That would extend this long discussion several more years. I've contributed to threads on all these topics, and am likely to do so again, so lets's not go there now. I only brought these up to answer your question.

I only brought these up to answer your question. — Relativist

And I only wanted to make it clear that I don't think you have. But, sure, let's take them up elsewhere.

And I only wanted to make it clear that I don't think you have. But, sure, let's take them up elsewhere. — Wayfarer

What part of your original question did I not answer? You had asked:

what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science. — Wayfarer

I gave you a pretty thorough answer.

But if there is no detectable effect, why suspect there is something undetectable present? — Patterner

I started by saying it's possible there is some aspect of reality that accounts for feelings, that is otherwise undetectable. This doesn't justify believing there is some such thing, but it counters the notion that physicalism is impossible if feelings cannot be accounted for by known aspects of reality.

It's a bit like dark matter. There were measureable gravitational effects that were inconsistent with General Relativity. Naively, this might be treated as falsification of GR. But GR explains so much, and it made many verified predictions. So dark matter was proposed to explain those apparent anomalies, despite there being no direct evidence of it.

Similarly, physicalism is successful at accounting for almost everything in the natural world - so it seems more reasonable to assume there's something we're missing than to dispense with the overall theory.

Reminder: I do not insist that every aspect of the natural world is discoverable through science. It may very well be that there are aspects of mental activity that are partly grounded in components of world that are otherwise undiscoverable. This is worst case, but it is more plausible than non-physical alternatives.

I agree with this admission and your position on philosophical zombies. It does leave a rather large gap for “non-physical alternatives” to creep in though.
I tend to steer clear of the division between physical and non physical, because I don’t see why there is necessarily such a distinction. The so called non physical mind and physically existing things, though appearing entirely separate, may be part of the same external manifold that we are not aware of, which may be undiscoverable, but in which the two are grounded.

I'm very interested in this. Can you explain? If a component is physical, why would it be undiscoverable?

I too picked up on this. I had thought we were not allowed to admit undiscoverable components.

I would point out, though, that something that is undiscoverable in one arena, or domain. Might be discoverable in another, so is really a meaningless statement absent a contextual arena, or domain.

Again, even though dark matter is undetectable, the putative effects are detectable. A lot of people think it means there’s something really wrong with current physics, but then, those who defend the idea have considerable expertise, so I’m loath to pass judgement. Nevertheless it is, shall we say, portentous, that according to current science, 96% of the mass of the universe can’t be accounted for by known physics…. :yikes:

I agree with this admission and your position on philosophical zombies. It does leave a rather large gap for “non-physical alternatives” to creep in though.
I tend to steer clear of the division between physical and non physical, because I don’t see why there is necessarily such a distinction. The so called non physical mind and physically existing things, though appearing entirely separate, may be part of the same external manifold that we are not aware of, which may be undiscoverable, but in which the two are grounded. — Punshhh

I start with natural: That which exists (has existed, or will exist) starting with oneself, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe. Naturalism= the thesis that the natural world comprises the totality of existencr.

I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. This implies everything is the same kind of thing, which I label, "physical".

I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. This implies everything is the same kind of thing, which I label, "physical". — Relativist

I've said before, quantum physics demolishes such a Newtonian conception of reality. At the fundamental level, the properties of sub-atomic primitives are indeterminate until measured. But of course, that can be swept aside, because 'physicalism doesn't depend on physics'. It's more a kind of 'language game'.

Similarly, physicalism is successful at accounting for almost everything in the natural world - so it seems more reasonable to assume there's something we're missing than to dispense with the overall theory. — Relativist

I quite agree that, regarding consciousness, there's something undetectable we're missing.

There's no need to dispense with physicalism. It's phenomenally successful and accurate in many ways. But that doesn't mean it can explain all of reality, and we have no justification for insisting it must be able to. Nobody can even describe consciousness in physical terms, much less explain it. Many people who are leaders in relevant fields - people like Anil Seth, Antonio Damasio, Peter Tse, Brian Greene, Donald Hoffman, and David Eagleman - most of whom think physicalism must be the answer, say we don't have a theory, and don't even have any idea what such a theory would look like.

I tend to steer clear of the division between physical and non physical, because I don’t see why there is necessarily such a distinction. The so called non physical mind and physically existing things, though appearing entirely separate, may be part of the same external manifold that we are not aware of, which may be undiscoverable, but in which the two are grounded. — Punshhh

Otoh, they may be entirely separate. But even if you're right, if a common, external manifold is undiscoverable, it amounts to the same thing. As the saying goes: If you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make? Anyway, making distinctions is what we do. Liquid and solid are both physical, but the differences between them are clear, and important. The differences between the so called non physical mind and physically existing things are surely not less important.

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I've said before, quantum physics demolishes such a Newtonian conception of reality. At the fundamental level, the properties of sub-atomic primitives are indeterminate until measure. But of course, that can be swept aside, because 'physicalism doesn't depend on physics'. It's more a kind of 'language game'. — Wayfarer

You're referring to complementary properties, like the position & momentum of an electron.

These are not intrinsic properties of an electron (like -1 electic charge, and 0 mass). They are relations (relational properties) to other objects. In a dynamic system, relations are constantly changing; e.g. the distance to your home changes as you drive toward it. At exactly one point in your path, a distance relation of 5km emerged. So the emergence of new relational properties is perfectly consistent with the model.

With what model?

I start with natural: That which exists (has existed, or will exist) starting with oneself, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe. Naturalism= the thesis that the natural world comprises the totality of existence).

I’m probably not the person to critique this as I’m not a trained philosopher and come to this from a different school, so the other end of the stick so to speak.
I will say though that; “everything that is causally connected to ourselves through the laws of nature”. Is a catch all so big that due to it being an open ended set, it inevitably includes things which are regarded by Western philosophy as wishful thinking, woo woo etc.

I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. This implies everything is the same kind of thing, which I label, "physical".

This is where it gets interesting. I would use the word material rather than physical. That there is a spectrum of material including subtle (mental) materials. With physical material at the more dense, or concrete end of the spectrum. I go further in that I regard within the domain of subtle materials, a transcendent super subtle material for which mind (which is on the spectrum) is the correlate of physical material as seen at the bottom of the spectrum and the super subtle material is a higher, or transcendent mind.

Due to the solid concrete incorruptibility (in normal life) of dense physical material, the subtlety of the higher materials is drowned out, or confined. To the extent that our true nature as pure mind is constrained to such an extent that we are confined in a Neanderthal Stone Age (by comparison, and no disrespect for Neanderthals) life of moving concrete objects around the place. And subject to the consequences of dense physical bodies.

Otoh, they may be entirely separate.

This is the problem, or so they say. That if they are entirely separate, how do they happen to come together? I like you don’t see it as so much of a problem, but people who subscribe to the distinction between idealism and materialism see a yawning chasm between the two.

a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. — Relativist

If you mean this is the model, then it is falsified by physics. So this:

At exactly one point in your path, a distance relation of 5km emerged — Relativist

Is post measurement. The point at issue is what exists prior to the act of measurement. Prior to measurement there’s no determinate object with intrinsic properties.

This is the problem, or so they say. That if they are entirely separate, how do they happen to come together? I like you don’t see it as so much of a problem, but people who subscribe to the distinction between idealism and materialism see a yawning chasm between the two. — Punshhh

I would think it's equally difficult to explain how one ground could manifest in (at least) two different ways that appear entirely separate.

The point at issue is what exists prior to the act of measurement. Prior to measurement there’s no determinate object with intrinsic properties. — Wayfarer

Here are 2 aspects of the model you are overlooking:

1. Strict identity means conforming with Leibniz' law. Individual (strict) identity does not endure over time, because from one instant to the next, the world changes - and therefore relations change. What we refer to as an individual identity over time is a perdurance. A perduring identity is something we reference; it is not a fundamental ontological category of existent. So it's necessarily false to say that an object has set of properties s1 at time t1, and that identical object has set of properties s2 at time t2.

We can reference a loose (perduring) identity by pointing to the intersection of s1 and s2. This looslely defined object perdures between t1 and t2.

2. A pure state quantum system has definite properties: it evolves deterministically per a Schroedinger equation. These properties are not classical properties. The act of measurement entails that system becoming entangled with something external to that quantum system- producing classical relations to the measurement device.

Here's a sequence of events:

t0 (prior to measurement) there is a 2 "object" state of affairs consisting of a pure state quantum system and a measurement device.

t1 (point of measurement): the original 2 object state of affairs perdures into a new state of affairs that includes an entanglement between the quantum system and the measurement device. As a consequence of the entanglement, the quantum system has new, classical relations that didn't previously exist. Of course, this is a subjective view, from the perspective of humans; what is physically going on is dependent on whichever interpretation of QM is correct- but I see no reason to think there isn't law-directed behavior going on.

I would think it's equally difficult to explain how one ground could manifest in (at least) two different ways that appear entirely separate.

But they might only appear to be entirely separate from our limited perspective, from another perspective they might be related.

Right. I'm just saying that either scenario - two entirely separate things coming together, or one ground manifesting as entirely separate things - presents a yawning chasm.

Of course, many don't think the mind is non-physical, so don't think either scenario is what's going on.

[Technically, I don't think the mind is non-physical. I think there are minds much simpler than the human mind. And I guess it's possible for a living thing to have no mind at all? But I think consciousness is always present, and that is what's non-physical.]

I would use the word material rather than physical. That there is a spectrum of material including subtle (mental) materials. With physical material at the more dense, or concrete end of the spectrum. I go further in that I regard within the domain of subtle materials, a transcendent super subtle material for which mind (which is on the spectrum) is the correlate of physical material as seen at the bottom of the spectrum and the super subtle material is a higher, or transcendent mind. — Punshhh

As you noted, naturalism is more open-ended. Materialism is less so, and physicalism is most restrictive. More restrictive= a more parsimonious ontology, which is why I go with it.