You hold that Jack has true belief, right?

If Jack holds true belief, he has formed it by virtue of connecting himself to reality.

Right?

Either there is true belief without truth, or truth is not existentially contingent upon language.

SO you be the grown-up and help me out of this loop. — Banno

We're both grown-ups.

Are we?

Does he believe he has true beliefs?

Holding expectation is possible prior to language. — creativesoul

I don't think the Wittgensteinian angle Banno's flying the flag for would deny this, in fact Wittgenstein's way of looking at things almost relies on there being pre-verbal foundations to thought, that would be part of the idea of a "way of life." There are some things we just do naturally, there are what you might call "motions of the mind" that don't necessarily use words.

But the point would be: could your cat communicate to other cats that treats are on the way?

You see so far, those internal "motions of the mind" are idiosyncratic to each creature, bespoke internal symbolisms. In human beings, that might mean that when I hear the word "tree" it triggers a vague coloured tree image, like an impressionist painting, whereas when you hear the word "tree" a particular sharply defined tree that's an archetypal or prototype tree occurs to you, but in monochrome, for another person a simplified tree schema, for another person, a particular memory of a tree from their childhood, etc.

But the variance of these things means that what's important about words and communication, and therefore thought to the extent that it's shareable, can't be reliant on those internal pre-verbal motions, there's no logic to them, so they all "cancel out" (same as with Wittgenstein's beetle example); what's important for logic, thought and language, is the shared habits of shuffling symbols around in particular ways in particular contexts. That's the thing that crosses the abyss between man and man, that's the thing that allows communication - those shared habits. That's what makes it so that we understand each other even though our internal imagery, etc., might be quite different.

Yep. It's an old discussion, @gurugeorge, including a debate in another forum. But @creativesoul keeps returning to it.

Mind you, I also suspect that if a lion could talk, we could use Davidson's radical interpretation to work out what it wanted. 8-)

Mind you, I also suspect that if a lion could talk, we could use Davidson's radical interpretation to work out what it wanted. — Banno

You blasphemer you.

Regarding that, has there been any progress between the coherentist view of truth and the correspondence theory?

I'm on the fence.

I suspect Wittgenstein might have rejected his own comment. The issue is whether language games are incommensurate. He seems to have thought so in some places, and not in others.

I suspect he would have spurned the vocabulary of commensurability altogether; I'm not sure you can reject the lion comment without giving up Wittgenstein wholesale either.

Regarding that, has there been any progress between the coherentist view of truth and the correspondence theory? — Posty McPostface

I'm not the right person to ask unfortunately.

I'm not sure you can reject the lion comment without giving up Wittgenstein wholesale either. — StreetlightX

Why?

Are we? — Banno

Of course. At least, I think so...

Does he believe he has true beliefs? — Banno

Does Jack, your cat, believe that he has true beliefs? I would say that that is not possible for Jack. He does not possess the complexity of thought and belief that only language allows. Believing that one has true belief requires language, for it requires isolating one's own mental ongoings. We do that with the terms "mental ongoings", "thought", "belief", "emotion", etc.

Because the lion comment reflects what I take to be the entire point of the PI - that our understanding of language is grounded in shared (or rather, shareable) practices or 'forms of life'. The language of 'commensurability' is suspect for that reason too - it abstracts language from practice and treats it as though a ideal realm unto itself. Hence the oft repeated critique - entirely correct imo - that Davidson treats language as "frictionless spinning in a void".

But the point would be: could your cat communicate to other cats that treats are on the way? — gurugeorge

Interesting point to make, but I find it irrelevant, and based upon dubious presupposition. It presupposes either that common language is necessary for true belief, or that communicating one's own thought and belief is necessary for forming and/or holding it.

So, Banno presupposes that thinking about one's own thought and belief is necessary for having and/or forming true belief. It's not. You presuppose that being able to communicate one's own thought and belief is necessary for forming and/or holding true belief. It's not.

Language is necessary for both of those. Language is not necessary for drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. Drawing correlations counts as thought and belief.

that our understanding of language is grounded in shared (or rather, shareable) practices or 'forms of life'. — StreetlightX

If we were able to understand that the lion spoke, them by that vey fact we understand that she and we share something...

So, Banno presupposes that thinking about one's own thought and belief is necessary for having and/or forming true belief. — creativesoul

Hm. The point is perhaps too subtle. Jack can have a true belief; Jack cannot believe that he has a true belief. Doing so requires that he have access to language.

I've been trying to make that clear to you for a while now...

You see so far, those internal "motions of the mind" are idiosyncratic to each creature, bespoke internal symbolisms. In human beings, that might mean that when I hear the word "tree" it triggers a vague coloured tree image, like an impressionist painting, whereas when you hear the word "tree" a particular sharply defined tree that's an archetypal or prototype tree occurs to you, but in monochrome, for another person a simplified tree schema, for another person, a particular memory of a tree from their childhood, etc.

But the variance of these things means that what's important about words and communication, and therefore thought to the extent that it's shareable, can't be reliant on those internal pre-verbal motions, there's no logic to them, so they all "cancel out" (same as with Wittgenstein's beetle example); what's important for logic, thought and language, is the shared habits of shuffling symbols around in particular ways in particular contexts. That's the thing that crosses the abyss between man and man, that's the thing that allows communication - those shared habits. That's what makes it so that we understand each other even though our internal imagery, etc., might be quite different. — gurugeorge

Where you take note of the differences, I note the similarity. Mental correlations.

The point I'm making is that if true belief is prior to language, then so too is truth. If Jack can have true belief, then it cannot be true by virtue of any other notion of truth aside from the correspondence that I argue for. That is not to deny the other senses of the term. Rather, it's to show that all senses aside from correspondence are existentially contingent upon presupposing correspondence.

Hm. The point is perhaps too subtle. Jack can have a true belief; Jack cannot believe that he has a true belief. Doing so requires that he have access to language.

I've been trying to make that clear to you for a while now... — Banno

That's odd, because not only do I agree, I'm arguing for the same assertion/conclusion.

So we agree that in order for Jack to believe that he has true belief, he has to have the capability that only complex language can allow. He has to be able to think about his own thought and belief.

Agree?

Sure, but that something is always a matter of more-or-less; more something, less something: and where we fall along that line is a matter of ingratiating ourselves with a form of life, or at least farmiliarizing ourselves with it; 'commensureability' is not given, it is forged, made, enacted. The entire sphere of action and practice is missing in Davidson: he is a linguistic idealist in this very strict sense.

The entire sphere of action and practice is missing in Davidson: — StreetlightX

No, it isn't.

I should have said: he has a very thin and anemic conception of linguistic practice; at least, emaciated in comparison with Witty.

...what's important for logic, thought and language, is the shared habits of shuffling symbols around in particular ways in particular contexts. That's the thing that crosses the abyss between man and man, that's the thing that allows communication - those shared habits. That's what makes it so that we understand each other even though our internal imagery, etc., might be quite different. — gurugeorge

We understand another as a direct result of drawing the same or similar enough correlations between language use, what's being talked about, and/or ourselves.

I'm not even saying that what you're setting out is wrong.

Logic is a non-starter. Logic aims to take account of thought and belief. Language does as well. Get thought and belief right, and both logic and language will be better off.

So, Jack has true belief but he cannot believe that has has true belief, for he has no language. Language is necessary for thinking about one's own thought and belief. It does not follow that language is necessary for true belief.

Jack has true belief without language. True belief does not require truth, or truth does not require language.

Hmm. He explicitly accepts much of Wittgenstein, then moves on to what he sees as the next step.

Language games are not fixed. They can change, mingle and disappear to be replaced by novel games. Talking to lions would be a novel game.

So, what are facts in a coherentist view of meaning and truth?

Language games are not fixed. They can change, mingle and disappear to be replaced by novel games. Talking to lions would be a novel game. — Banno

Definitely - this is what Witty's account of learning emphasizes. But this is the problem with speaking of 'commensurability': the language of commensuribility bothers me because it's so binary: "X is or is not commensurate with Y". But the fluidity of language games and the dynamism of linguistic practice abjures such black and white vocabulary. I honestly think sometimes a ton of philosophers of language would hang their head in shame if they simply learnt another language other than English. To anyone who is bi or multi-lingual, I think the question 'are those languages commensurate?' would really come off as a dumb question, a question to which answers would be 'not even wrong'.

Our disagreement now appears trivial...

I dunno, I'm still very suspicious of what I see as the disembodied view of language that you/Davidson have. I think this is particularly apparent in your recourse - elsewhere and previously - to the Lorentz transform in analogizing between languages (clever as I think it is). I can't imagine a more idealist treatment of language than that.

The whole effort of learning, of inhabiting a life of language, of embodied practices of language-use is abstracted away in a bloodless manner where languages are treated as just so many idealizations able to be mapped upon one other painlessly. But then I think literally everything interesting in language happens precisely in the 'in between' of the transform.

I think I will start a thread inspired by this discussion, although it's been percolating in me for a while now.