Yes, but as has been pointed out absolute presuppositions are historical. Something can be an absolute presupposition for us at our present stage of knowledge, and not be such for future inquirers. — Janus

If it's absolute, it cannot be relative to temporal existence in this way. Being relative to temporal existence is what makes it about something particular and therefore relative, like your example.

Of course all hypotheses necessarily involve absolute presuppositions; — Janus

Unless you can show the logic behind this conclusion there is no sense to the assertion. As far as I can see, hypotheses involve relative presuppositions, but I don't see how an absolute presupposition is even possible.

So, I think the idea that all events are caused, and related principles, are far more certain candidates for being considered to be absolute presuppositions or regulative assumptions — Janus

Even this is quite clearly a relative presupposition. It is a proposition which relates to physical existence in general.

On a theological note, the related ideas of God — Janus

God may be an absolute presupposition, but this assumption would need to be defended, justified.

Another absolute presupposition is that humans can acquire certain knowledge of a 'higher" kind. — Janus

Again, this is relative. It is relative to human knowledge, and answers a question concerning human knowledge.

No, that's not what I (at least) am trying to avoid at all. And I don't think Collingwood would argue that we could establish what must be absolute presuppositions for all time, but merely what are or have been the absolute presuppositions in various contexts at various historical moments. We can establish what are absolute presuppositions for us, what cannot presently "take the form of a proposition", as I have already argued. — Janus

This is clear evidence of the failure of Collingwood's theory. If the presuppositions change at various moments in history, then they are relative and not absolute. They are relative to the concerns of the people at that time. It is contradictory to say that the absolute presuppositions are different at different times, for different peoples, because this describes them as relative.

I think the mistake you're making is in not treating the classification as a theory. Like any other theory, it's a best guess until something better comes along or some evidence disproves it. — Pseudonym

This is not quite correct. Many insist that the skeptic cannot criticize a theory without offering a better one. But that's not true because we will not seek a better one until the problems of the existing one are exposed. So exposing the problems is first, and does not require offering a better theory. Further, it does not really require "evidence" to prove that a theory is faulty. If a theory can be proven to be illogical, by way of contradiction or that it breaks some fundamental laws of logic, this suffices to demonstrate its faults, though one might call this evidence it is not physical evidence.

In my interpretation, one asks of a belief "why would they believe that?". Sometimes one will find a set of empirical evidence and a rational argument but these will always be accompanied by another belief (the belief that this evidence coupled with this argument leads to this conclusion). So we ask the same question of that belief. At some point in time we do not find empirical evidence and rational argument forming part of the justification. At that point we propose the theory that this is an absolute proposition, and move on with investigating other things until such time as new evidence arises, or a better theory comes along. It's pragmatism as much as metaphysics really. — Pseudonym

This is just an assumption. To break the infinite regress of justification you say there must be an absolute presupposition. But perhaps you are going in the wrong direction. You are looking backward in time, asking which belief is prior to this belief, in order to justify it. But if you consider the nature of intentionality, you'll see that beliefs are justified by what is wanted, or desired, "the end", and this relates to what will come to be in the future, not what has been believed in the past. The infinite regress is ended by "the end", not by the beginning. So to justify "why would they believe that?" you must look at what they wanted, and there is no empirical evidence at that time, for what they wanted, because it comes into existence at a later time. Empirical evidence at one time always points to what was wanted at an earlier time.

You're responding to the wrong sense of 'absolute'. All it means is that the absolute presupposition in a context is the one that underpins all the others and is not itself underpinned by another.

Take revolution as an example, in any revolution where an AP is overturned.., there must have been a period prior to the revolution where the society was still acting as if it held that particular AP but in private it was no longer an AP, it was a proposition made by one class which was being rejected by another. The rejecting class, at least, held it to be a proposition, but at some point in the revolutionary process, they must have done so without any external sign that this was the case. This doesn't just count for political revolutions, but all revolutions and paradigm shifts.

So the key question that needs to be answered for an investigation of APs is - how long does this period last? Do people act as if beliefs were APs, when in fact they're treating them as propositions, for only a short period before the revolution, or does it go on for years, decades even? — Pseudonym

Good question! Collingwood addresses it in The Idea of History. As I understand it, APs are usually buried fairly deep. They're usually not part of a day's discourse; their substance simply a part of the structure of the beliefs and lives of the people who hold them. As such (Collingwood argues) they a) do not change easily, b) it is usually a very big deal when they do change, and c) they change because in any setting there are always tensions that over time work in favour of change - for any number of reasons. I read that ancient Egyptian civilization was relatively static for thousands of years. From that I infer that whatever their APs were, they were relatively stress-resistant. Nearer our time, of course, most things seem to move much faster - although modern religion(s) exhibit a more ancient durability.

I hadn't intended to give the impression that this would necessarily be a metaphysical analysis. In fact, I'm fairly convinced it would not be. Maybe a psychological at the most analytical end, but, as you say, mostly simply historical, or anthropological. My concern really is that whilst I agree entirely with Collingwood's concept and his method, I find myself disagreeing with many of the classifications I've read used as examples of APs from a psychological point of view. — Pseudonym

It's useful, when setting out, to take a fix on where you are - are starting from - so that at least for a while you can navigate from that as a fixed point so that you may gauge your progress by a meaningful scale. For the author, the proposition that some group held an AP at some time is a statement of a fact. Disagreement can only be along the lines of its either not being an AP (the analysis is in error), or it's not actually being held by the folks in question (the history is in error) - and you appear to be concerned with the possibility of one or both of these possible errors.

Which seems pretty reasonable and interesting to me. Given, then, the assertion of an AP, you apparently want to "get into it" as if taking apart a mechanism to see how it works, first to validate the designation, then, and this is the engaging part, to see how it works in itself. What indeed are the political APs of the populace in North Korea? And how do they actually work? Or of the American revolution? "We hold these truths to be self-evident...". This seems to be an opening up of the notion of APs. Collingwood's end point of determining what the APs are for some group becomes your starting point. As such, it strikes me you have opened up a subject in which you have great freedom, and it's a subtle and slippery enough subject to require a good and strong grip. Interesting idea! If you're a student, you're on to something!

You're responding to the wrong sense of 'absolute'. All it means is that the absolute presupposition in a context is the one that underpins all the others and is not itself underpinned by another. — Janus

I think we're talking about "absolute" as opposed to relative. That is to say "absolute", as distinguishable from "relative". This would mean "absolute" in the sense of that which can exist without being related to anything else..

If you think you can show how one "absolute presupposition" could underpin every single presupposition that someone has, then be my guest. This would disallow the possibility of conflicting or contradicting presuppositions, which many people appear to have.

Until then we should consider "absolute" in the sense that Collingwood uses it, as distinguishable from relative. This would mean that the absolute presupposition is not underpinned by another presupposition, because this would make it "true" in relation to that other presupposition, and the absolute presupposition must be free from that relation. But the absolute presupposition doesn't necessarily underpin all others, that one may have, and this is why multiple absolute presuppositions are possible.

The reason why I said that there could only be one absolute presupposition, so that all absolute presuppositions would be one and the same presupposition, is that there could only be one end to that seemingly infinite regress of presuppositions, and that would be the complete lack of presupposition. So an absolute presupposition could be nothing other than a presupposition of nothing. Nothing presupposed. This could be the only "first" presupposition, the one which supports others, but is not itself supported, the presupposition of nothing. If it presupposed something, this would be a prior presupposition which supports it.

This would mean "absolute" in the sense of that which can exist without being related to anything else.. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, as i understand it, for Collingwood absolute presuppositions are always such in relation to a context.

Until then we should consider "absolute" in the sense that Collingwood uses it, as distinguishable from relative. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is obvious that in all senses 'absolute' is "distinguishable from relative", so you're not really saying anything that is not trivial here. Have you actually read Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics? It doesn't sound like it!

I have already said that absolute presuppositions are not underpinned by any other presuppositions; but the conditional here is "in particular contexts". So, the AP that underpins physics will not be that same one that underpins biology. Also you must realize that there can be different APs for different standpoints in each field. So, there is no "infinite regress" and APs are not necessarily all reducible to one master AP; it would depend on your worldview. That said, as I have already alluded, the idea that all events are caused in the broadest sense of the notion, might indeed qualify as a master AP. In theology, though, God is the master AP, because He is the Ultimate Cause.

No, as i understand it, for Collingwood absolute presuppositions are always such in relation to a context. — Janus

Sounds just like a relative presupposition then.

Have you actually read Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics? It doesn't sound like it! — Janus

No I haven't it doesn't sound very interesting, and full of contradiction according to how you and tim wood explain it.

Any contradiction is only on account of your misunderstanding. TBH, I don't think you want to understand it or, it seems, anything else that doesn't tally with your pedantic sophistry.

I was always under the impression that Collingwood rejected the whole idea of revolutions. In The New Leviathan doesn't he say something like the term revolution being just an admission of the historian's lack of understanding about the continuity of the historical process? Its a long time since I read anything about him so I may be wrong, but this line of argument has always been a point of diversion for me, as I outlined above.

I agree with your analysis that APs are usually so deeply set as to be outside of the matter of day-to-day discourse. That's really the point where I start to doubt the correctness of the classification of many of the examples I've heard of, as many beliefs overturned during revolutions (political or otherwise) become necessarily part of day-to-day discourse. I'm not sure whether to call this the method by which absolute presuppositions are replaced (that which was unspoken becomes a topic of conversation, thereby questioned and thereby no longer an AP), or is it more correct to say that this is just such evidence which the historian could use to show a belief not to be an absolute presupposition afterall, but merely seeming so? Not sure myself, but I'm tempted by the latter as I think it preserve the 'absoluteness' of APs better. To make real use of them in our historical understand of different societies (as well as our contemporary understanding of those with different world-views to us), it's important that they really are absolute and not a kind of 'conspiracy of silence', where everyone knows the belief is on shaky ground because they've questioned it privately (meaning it isn't really an AP) but no-one dare say so because of social taboo, or fear of ostracisation (causing it to appear to be an AP to the casual observer).

As you say it's more about picking apart the way absolute presuppositions work because without this knowledge of mechanism it will be impossible for the historian, or contemporary analyst to know what signs to look for, probably more psychology than philosophy, but I'm interested in the overlap.

Interesting idea! If you're a student, you're on to something! — tim wood

Thanks, though my student days are way behind me.

TBH, I don't think you want to understand it or, it seems, anything else that doesn't tally with your pedantic sophistry. — Janus

I understand it, it's not very complicated at all. I just don't agree with it, and that's why I point out the inherent contradictions. The only true absolute presupposition is to presuppose nothing, because to presuppose is to presuppose something and this makes the presupposition relative. To go beyond relative presuppositions, is to leave the category of presuppositions, and then we're not talking about presuppositions. anymore. So what Collingwood calls an "absolute presupposition" is not a "presupposition" at all, and he's completely off track with that term. He's trying to leap from presuppositions to something which is not a presupposition at all, giving it the misleading name of "absolute presupposition".

Sophistry is only possible when the fundamental laws of logic are not strictly adhered to. So pedantry is not sophistry, it's the way we defeat it.

I don't see that; it seems to me that if truth and falsity are properties of propositions. then the truth of a proposition is justified by its accordance with actuality. this is the logic in "Snow is white is true" iff snow is white. Perhaps I am using "justification" in a way somewhat different than you might be accustomed to; for me it is synonymous with 'verification". — Janus

But there is clearly a distinction to be made between a proposition being true, and its being verified as true. There are, after all, unverified true propositions.

And until we agree on this, there is not much else to be said.

But there is clearly a distinction to be made between a proposition being true, and its being verified as true. There are, after all, unverified true propositions. — Banno

That depends on how you look at things. Some might say that truth requires judgement, that to be true requires a judgement of truth. Ever heard the saying "beauty is in the eye of the beholder"? We can say the same with "truth", it is a property of the judgement.

The reason why it makes sense to argue this position, against what you say, is that the words or symbols of the proposition must be interpreted for meaning. And, it is the meaning which is judged for truth or falsity. So without the interpretation of what the proposition means, the proposition cannot have any status of being true or false. Let's say "the sky is blue". Without definitions for "sky" and "blue", it makes no sense to talk about this proposition being true or false. A judgement as to the meaning of "the sky is blue" is required in order that the proposition may be either true or false, and there can be no such thing as an "unverified true proposition".

You appear to be confusing truth with belief.

Yes, but a proposition is only true if it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry. This rules out the idea of absolute truths that are forever beyond human, or any finite intelligences', verification in principle. The only way such truths could be would be if there were an infinite intelligence to think them. An infinite intelligence would not need to verify them, they would be, and be justified, merely on account of being thought by such a mind.

I'm guessing you don't wish to go there, so you have no coherent and consistent way to justify the idea of truths that could be absolutely independent of verification and justification, as far as I can tell.

but a proposition is only trueif it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry. — Janus

Why add that?

Propositions can be true and yet not known, not believed and not justified. Get that right, and we can move on.

You appear to be confusing truth with belief. — Banno

No, absolutely not. A proposition consists of two aspects, the words or symbols, and the meaning. The truth or falsity of a proposition is relative to its meaning. The meaning is dependent on interpretation. Therefore the truth or falsity of the proposition is relative to the interpretation of the proposition.

This has nothing to do with "belief", it's just a demonstration that a proposition being true or false is relative to an interpretation of that proposition. One interpretation may render the proposition as true while another may render it as false, so there is a need to validate the "correct interpretation". Therefore, there can be no such thing as an unverified true proposition, because verification of the meaning of the proposition is required in order that it may be true.

You seem to be taking for granted that any given proposition has a "correct interpretation" already inherent within it, so that verification of the meaning is not required. But that is a mistaken assumption.

Propositions can be true and yet not known, not believed and not justified. Get that right, and we can move on. — Banno

It's not a question of whether the proposition is presently known, believed or justified. Give me an example of a proposition that could be true and yet incapable in principle of being verified, falsified and/or justified; and then we can move on.

Now you are confusing statements and propositions.

Why?

Now you are confusing statements and propositions. — Banno

Lame.

A proposition consists of two aspects, the words or symbols, and the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The term proposition has a broad use in contemporary analytic philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of declarative sentences. Propositions are the sharable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens which are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which cannot be false.

Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct.

You don't seem to be capable of, or else interested in, engaging with ideas that challenge your own settled views, or of arguing effectively for those views; so I am left wondering what's the point?

I asked you to provide an example of a proposition, or kind of proposition, that would support your assertion that truth is completely independent of validation, verification and justification, and since you failed to do that, then I can only assume that you have no evidence to support your assertions.

Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct. — Banno

This is irrelevant to the fact that the words "it is raining", or "il pleut", if used as a proposition, require an interpretation in order that there can be a truth or falsity to that proposition. There can be no truth without an interpretation because the words have no meaning without an interpretation. And interpretation is a form of verification. Therefore there can be no unverified true propositions.

And interpretation is a form of verification. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't seem right. I can interpret the meaning of the statement "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe" without being able to verify (or falsify) it.

but a proposition is only true if it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry. — Janus

Propositions can be true and yet not known, not believed and not justified. Get that right, and we can move on. — Banno

These aren't mutually exclusive, hence Janus' response. Perhaps you meant to say that propositions can be true and yet unknowable?

I asked you to provide an example of a proposition, or kind of proposition, that would support your assertion that truth is completely independent of validation, verification and justification, and since you failed to do that, then I can only assume that you have no evidence to support your assertions. — Janus

There's Fitch's paradox of knowability. If the proposition p is an unknown truth then either the proposition "p is an unknown truth" is an unknowable truth or there are no unknown truths.

But then I think sentences of the kind "p is an unknown truth" are different to sentences of the kind "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe", and so even if the former must be unknowable truths it doesn't then follow that the latter can be unknowable truths.

Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct. — Banno

I think @Metaphysician Undercover is saying that propositions don't exist sans interpretation. The ink on the paper exists independently, the rain exists independently, but the proposition expressed by the two sentences "it is raining" and "il pleut" does not exist independently. That they share the same proposition just is that we interpret them the same way.

And if there are no propositions sans interpretation then there are no true propositions sans interpretation.

I can interpret the meaning of the statement "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe" without being able to verify (or falsify) it. — Michael

Right, you can interpret without verification, but the point is that there is no truth or falsity without verification of the interpretation. Perhaps Banno confused me into saying something not quite what I meant to say.

I think Metaphysician Undercover is saying that propositions don't exist sans interpretation. The ink on the paper exists independently, the rain exists independently, but the proposition expressed by the two sentences "it is raining" and "il pleut" does not exist independently. That they share the same proposition just is that we interpret them the same way. — Michael

I think that's a good way of putting it. A "proposition", as Banno defines it, is dependent on an interpretation. The interpretation is inherent within the proposition. This would be the "correct interpretation". And "correct" requires verification. So "proposition" implies "correct interpretation" and "correct interpretation" implies verified.

Without the "correct interpretation", any interpretation would be acceptable and this allows that the proposition could be both true and false. So "truth" requires "correct interpretation", and "correct interpretation" requires "verification".

Sure. That's not what meta said, but we can proceed; all propositions are always, already, interpretations.

So is Meta's point that a given proposition can be true under one interpretation, and false under another?

Because I can't see how that could work.

Perhaps you meant to say that propositions can be true and yet unknowable? — Michael

No, I didn't. My point is the simple one that a proposition's being verified is not the exact same thing as a proposition's being true. I think Janus is wrong here.

No, I didn't. My point is the simple one that a proposition's being verified is not the exact same thing as a proposition's being true. I think Janus is wrong here. — Banno

But that's not what he said. He said that a statement is true iff it is verifiable, which isn't the same as saying that it is true iff it is verified, hence why your response to his claim only made sense if you were saying that a true statement can be unknowable (rather than just unknown, which I don't think he disagrees with).