Yes, but as has been pointed out absolute presuppositions are historical. Something can be an absolute presupposition for us at our present stage of knowledge, and not be such for future inquirers. — Janus
Of course all hypotheses necessarily involve absolute presuppositions; — Janus
So, I think the idea that all events are caused, and related principles, are far more certain candidates for being considered to be absolute presuppositions or regulative assumptions — Janus
On a theological note, the related ideas of God — Janus
Another absolute presupposition is that humans can acquire certain knowledge of a 'higher" kind. — Janus
No, that's not what I (at least) am trying to avoid at all. And I don't think Collingwood would argue that we could establish what must be absolute presuppositions for all time, but merely what are or have been the absolute presuppositions in various contexts at various historical moments. We can establish what are absolute presuppositions for us, what cannot presently "take the form of a proposition", as I have already argued. — Janus
I think the mistake you're making is in not treating the classification as a theory. Like any other theory, it's a best guess until something better comes along or some evidence disproves it. — Pseudonym
In my interpretation, one asks of a belief "why would they believe that?". Sometimes one will find a set of empirical evidence and a rational argument but these will always be accompanied by another belief (the belief that this evidence coupled with this argument leads to this conclusion). So we ask the same question of that belief. At some point in time we do not find empirical evidence and rational argument forming part of the justification. At that point we propose the theory that this is an absolute proposition, and move on with investigating other things until such time as new evidence arises, or a better theory comes along. It's pragmatism as much as metaphysics really. — Pseudonym
Take revolution as an example, in any revolution where an AP is overturned.., there must have been a period prior to the revolution where the society was still acting as if it held that particular AP but in private it was no longer an AP, it was a proposition made by one class which was being rejected by another. The rejecting class, at least, held it to be a proposition, but at some point in the revolutionary process, they must have done so without any external sign that this was the case. This doesn't just count for political revolutions, but all revolutions and paradigm shifts.
So the key question that needs to be answered for an investigation of APs is - how long does this period last? Do people act as if beliefs were APs, when in fact they're treating them as propositions, for only a short period before the revolution, or does it go on for years, decades even? — Pseudonym
I hadn't intended to give the impression that this would necessarily be a metaphysical analysis. In fact, I'm fairly convinced it would not be. Maybe a psychological at the most analytical end, but, as you say, mostly simply historical, or anthropological. My concern really is that whilst I agree entirely with Collingwood's concept and his method, I find myself disagreeing with many of the classifications I've read used as examples of APs from a psychological point of view. — Pseudonym
You're responding to the wrong sense of 'absolute'. All it means is that the absolute presupposition in a context is the one that underpins all the others and is not itself underpinned by another. — Janus
This would mean "absolute" in the sense of that which can exist without being related to anything else.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Until then we should consider "absolute" in the sense that Collingwood uses it, as distinguishable from relative. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, as i understand it, for Collingwood absolute presuppositions are always such in relation to a context. — Janus
Have you actually read Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics? It doesn't sound like it! — Janus
Interesting idea! If you're a student, you're on to something! — tim wood
TBH, I don't think you want to understand it or, it seems, anything else that doesn't tally with your pedantic sophistry. — Janus
I don't see that; it seems to me that if truth and falsity are properties of propositions. then the truth of a proposition is justified by its accordance with actuality. this is the logic in "Snow is white is true" iff snow is white. Perhaps I am using "justification" in a way somewhat different than you might be accustomed to; for me it is synonymous with 'verification". — Janus
But there is clearly a distinction to be made between a proposition being true, and its being verified as true. There are, after all, unverified true propositions. — Banno
You appear to be confusing truth with belief. — Banno
Propositions can be true and yet not known, not believed and not justified. Get that right, and we can move on. — Banno
A proposition consists of two aspects, the words or symbols, and the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct.The term proposition has a broad use in contemporary analytic philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of declarative sentences. Propositions are the sharable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens which are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which cannot be false.
Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct. — Banno
And interpretation is a form of verification. — Metaphysician Undercover
but a proposition is only true if it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry. — Janus
Propositions can be true and yet not known, not believed and not justified. Get that right, and we can move on. — Banno
I asked you to provide an example of a proposition, or kind of proposition, that would support your assertion that truth is completely independent of validation, verification and justification, and since you failed to do that, then I can only assume that you have no evidence to support your assertions. — Janus
Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct. — Banno
I can interpret the meaning of the statement "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe" without being able to verify (or falsify) it. — Michael
I think Metaphysician Undercover is saying that propositions don't exist sans interpretation. The ink on the paper exists independently, the rain exists independently, but the proposition expressed by the two sentences "it is raining" and "il pleut" does not exist independently. That they share the same proposition just is that we interpret them the same way. — Michael
No, I didn't. My point is the simple one that a proposition's being verified is not the exact same thing as a proposition's being true. I think Janus is wrong here. — Banno
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