I can't see any way around that. — Janus

I suspect that's because you are looking at it wrong.

You haven't looked at this topic much, have you. That you think we are looking for an example of a definite description sorta gives that away.

On your definition, identical twins are the very same person.

A bit of an issue, no?

Fine just add in epigenetics and the physical properties that make them unique. This wouldn’t change it much. Also I meant rigid designator, not definite description. It makes sense. In all possible worlds, that person would be that person and no one else.

Yeah. Nuh. You are not even reading, let alone on the same page.

Hey solved your problems

It's interesting 'what seems obvious' to different people. I remember the first time I came across Kripke's thesis that names have literally nothing to do with definite descriptions. This stuck me as obviously true and wondered - and still do - what all the fuss was, and is about.

Something to do with proper names being different.

That's easy to say...can you explain why you would think that?



Again, talk is cheap; can you explain where I am going wrong according to you?

How do we know what a name is designating absent either ostention or description?

Interesting. I had to be convinced - a very rabbit-was-a-duck experience. I guess that's what is happening here.

I'm simply commenting on the phenomenon of 'what seems obvious' - not really anything to do with the book or its argument. Kripke does a better and more rigorous job than I can in answering your question.

I think it came out of my having read Witty first. Kripke's thesis follows quite nicely from that background.

Have I mentioned my friend Paul?

The odd thing about Paul is that you have no definite description of him, nor have I pointed to him in a way that picks him in particular out for you; and yet can ask me whatever you like about him.

How can that be possible, if you cannot know what a name is designating absent either ostention or description?

I ate your friend Paul btw. He's been replaced by a robot that looks a great deal like Paul. I'm sorry you had to find out this way.

I read Kripke before WItti, at least in detail, so that might be right.

I don't see any need for a causal theory of reference.

Em. He's been dead this last year. Soup?

Awkward.

Come one; it's obvious the two "over theres" are different. 'Over there' is itself meaningless without description or ostention.

By stipulation. Banno might have red hair. I don't, but I might have. — Banno

You're contradicting yourself; you've just given me a description of yourself. And even without that description (a description which is pretty much irrelevant, since you could dye your hair and remain the same person) I still don't know who you are beyond " the person who goes under the name of 'Banno' who is conversing with me on this forum"; which is itself another description.

You need to come up with something better than this if you are to convince me that I have been wrong.

A child could not give a definite description of their friend, mark; and yet can say "what if mark is at the shops?"

SO, on examination, it simply is not true that a definite description is what is needed to set the referent for a name. — Banno

Again untrue, because the child would need to have met Mark and know by means of ostention that he is referred to by that name (by at least one person even if only him or her self) in order to be talking sense.

You have given me a description; that he is your friend; you just haven't specified whether he is imaginary or not.

↪Banno
I ate your friend Paul btw. He's been replaced by a robot that looks a great deal like Paul. — StreetlightX

More descriptions!

I'm simply commenting on the phenomenon of 'what seems obvious' - not really anything to do with the book or its argument. Kripke does a better and more rigorous job than I can in answering your question. — StreetlightX

All this tells me is that you don't seem to be able to answer the question, even though you've read the work (as I have also, but many years ago, and didn't find it answered the question either). Since I didn't think Kripke answered that question when I read the paper, I'm not surprised that you apparently cannot answer it.

Yeah. Might leave that one there.

And which combination of these descriptions sets out for you without fail the exact person you are talking about?

And yet we are talking about one individual. The name refers without your having an associated definite description.

Most of the things commonly attributed to
Aristotle are things that Aristotle might not have done at all.
In a situation in which he didn't do them, we would describe
that as a situation in which Aristotle didn't do them.(p.61)

For me, this point settled the argument. The reference "Aristotle"pick out Aristotle even if we know nothing about him.

Mm, it is not the mere fact of 'having descriptions' that matters. That alone would pull the rug out from any causal theory before it even got off the ground. Its instead a question about - necessity: these descriptions, and not others. Anyway, I'll let yall get back to reading.

It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is
probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong.(p.64)

...Kripke's most quoted.

And which combination of these descriptions sets out for you without fail the exact person you are talking about?

And yet we are talking about one individual. The name refers without your having an associated definite description. — Banno

I haven't said that any set of descriptions would or could " set out...without fail that exact person" being talked about. Descriptions give us ideas about which individuals are being referred to, and those ideas are never infallible. I see no problem with that.

Of course, in principle, one person is being talked about, and of course, in principle, names refer; but no explanation has been given how a name could rigidly (i.e. infallibly) designate, not to speak of how it could refer even fallibly without any specification (i.e. description) of, or pointing to, the individual that is being referred to.

That's what you need to give an account of; aspersions, assertions and allusions won't cut it; you need an argument!

You want a set of rules for referring.

Think on that, and we might move on to Lecture 2.

Then it's the baptism thing.

Of course it is the baptism thing, but to say that a name refers to an entity that has been baptized with that name is itself a definite description of that entity: 'the entity that has been baptized'..

The corollary is that if no such baptism occurred everyone could be mistaken in believing that the name in question rigidly refers to the entity in question. this doesn't seem to solve the question about how I know which entity is being referred to. On the other hand if I do know, on account of knowing the baptism, occurred of having witnessed it, then that would count as a knowing via ostention.

If someone tells you Nixon could have lost the election, you must already know who Nixon is. And he would have to be something like an American human. Human-shaped, at least. There are sime essential properties to this Nixon. But that's not really informative. You know who Nixon is in the possible world the same way you know the meter-stick is a meter long.

Terrapin Station asks us to respect the chess player who moves the bishop to any square they like. Sure, but let's also understand that that they are not a good chess player, and that their behaviour is not conducive to improving your game. — Banno

If you don't understand that "good x" is subjective and not a fact, you're in no position to be judging anyone.

What page are we all on? I'm on 53.