I don't think the argument from illusion even has anything to do with the OP. It's just a mistake I made about what TGW was saying. — Mongrel
Or is this the stronger claim that we must perceive real things in some sense to know that we are mistaken at some point — The Great Whatever
You have the same problem because ocular phenomena are hardly less representational than sense-data.you still have to come up with an explanation for hallucination, claiming that it's a real perception not of sense-data, but of a misleading ocular phenomenon, or something like that. But then we just have the same problem, rewritten without sense data: how do we know that all of our perceptions are not just of these misleading ocular phenomena and not of what we think they are? — The Great Whatever
I think Hume would say no. No ontological argument can be purely apriori. I think Leibniz would say yes. Old-school rationalism always orbited divinity. I think the contemporary version would be some sort of panpsychism.... so if you believe in purely rational justifications for ontological statements... you probably already think the universe has the character of a dream. — Mongrel
Now the question is just about whether you're seeing merely light or the object. — The Great Whatever
Hallucinations are hardly as recalcitrant, continuous, and non-detachable as the objects of veridical cases of perception. The existence of sense-data is not disvovered by having experiences, they're blindly assumed in the representationalist doctrine according to which we never see objects and states of affairs directly.the same experience can be one of seeing something or seeing nothing, and you aren't able in principle to distinguish between the two. — The Great Whatever
They work when you let go of representational perception. Also direct realists account for dreams, imagination, illusions, hallucinations etcNone of these rhetorical moves are ever going to work, because they all have the same structure — The Great Whatever
Your question makes no sense, because when we see the object we also see the light it reflects, not either light or the object. We can also see emitted light without seeing an object, e.g. a flashlight, that emits it. — jkop
Hallucinations are hardly as recalcitrant, continuous, and non-detachable as the objects of veridical cases of perception. — jkop
The existence of sense-data is not disvovered by having experiences, they're blindly assumed in the representationalist doctrine according to which we never see objects and states of affairs directly. — jkop
Also direct realists account for dreams, imagination, illusions, hallucinations etc — jkop
Look, there is no need to first figure out what a veridical perception should look like; perceptions are not somehow comparable representations from which we'd know whether a current perception isn't an illusion. The real object that you perceive looks as it is, not like something else, and unlike illusions the real object won't suddenly appear or disappear as you move around it etc.. It is not difficult to identify whether something passed for an object of perception is an illusion or a real object that one sees.. . you don't know that, because you haven't antecedently figured out that all, or any particular, perception is not an illusion. — The Great Whatever
..and that point arises from the false assumption that there exists something (e.g. sense-data, phenomena etc.) by way of which all things are experienced. It explains away the possibility of things being experienced as they are, and thus it muddles up perception of real things with dreams, illusions, hallucinations etc..The point that's being made is . . . — Michael
In Mach-bands we see grey shapes as they are, but exaggerate the contrasts between the greys. The exaggeration is a use of the greys that we see, a way to organize them, but which is incorrectly passed for something present in our eyes or minds, yet absent somehow. But absent things are not present, neither in your eyes, nor inside your head. A memory of something absent does not possess parts of what it is a memory of. — jkop
The whole point is that you don't know that, because you haven't antecedently figured out that all, or any particular, perception is not an illusion. — The Great Whatever
..and that point arises from the false assumption that there exists something (e.g. sense-data, phenomena etc.) by way of which all things are experienced. It explains away the possibility of things being experienced as they are, and thus it muddles up perception of real things with dreams, illusions, hallucinations etc.. — jkop
The whole idealism vs realism debate gets hung up on the presumption that something veridical or representational is going on, when what is really going on is something functional or enactive. — Apokrisis
the problem doesn't arise from a representational view of perception, nor from the existence of sense data. — The Great Whatever
Then, despite your denials, it is obviously assumed that his experience represents either something or nothing, and that the object of his hallucinatory experience would be some element of the experience itself, i.e. sense-data, generated by synaptic screw-ups.If during a hallucination one sees nothing, then he does not know for any given experience whether he is seeing something or nothing, unless he antecedently assumes what was to be shown. — The Great Whatever
Then, despite your denials, it is obviously assumed that his experience represents either something or nothing, and that the object of his hallucinatory experience would be some element of the experience itself, i.e. sense-data, generated by synaptic screw-ups. — jkop
What is blind, if anything, is the realist assumptions you are making. — The Great Whatever
I think what you are failing to see is that realist assumptions are not made on the basis of a belief that one possesses any knowledge of the "ultimate nature of things" or anything like that, but simply on the basis that when something is available to perception in common, that is when something is publicly available, then it is classed as real, in the sense of being concrete, and is understood to be logically independent of any particular percipient. — John
So a considered naive realism is simply based on the fundamental logic of the experienced differences between waking and dreaming, veridical perception and hallucination. — John
I really can't see the issue with the triangle illusion apo, it exists as an image on a screen or on paper or as something, whatever doesn't really matter, that reliably gives us the impression of a triangle,but is not seen as a fully delineated triangle. — John
Yet you see an edge that is not physically there to complete the impression of a triangle. So there is now delineation that is a real visual difference and a delineation that is only a visual idea. — apokrisis
The difference between real delineation and the visual suggestion is that the first produces an actual image of a triangle, and the second produces a mere impression, — John
it supports the idea that something real independently of our individual perceptions, thoughts and minds is going on, something we do not fully understand and have no conscious control over. To admit this is not to admit idealism though, because idealism claims that percepts are not merely mediated and added to, but entirely constituted by, ideas. — John
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