Going back to being skeptical of this state-of-affairs being a "view", I have to ask, "why does it appear like a "view""? What I mean is, why is there depth, not just in vision, but in our auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory symbols? That may be the one thing that they all share in common because if not for that, we could have good reason to be skeptical of our sensations being about a external world. Each sense supplies very different symbols. The fact that I can see coffee and feel coffee at the same time, isn't as good as being able to see them and feel them in the same location as well. — Harry Hindu

These are great points and questions. An imperfect answer would be that when we are just gliding along pre-theoretically through life the notion of the external world never comes up. I am 'in' the world which is not an object for theory. I drive home for work, at one with the driving. I know that other drivers are in the same world with me. They can see the objects I see (if they are paying attention.) Sharing a world full of objects with others and a language with others is something like a foundation that obscures itself. A critic of this automatic view might talk of presupposing the external. I 'unconsciously' presuppose the reality of the everyday world. But talk of presuppositions arguably just projects a theoretical gaze that just isn't there, covering up the phenomenon of being-in-the-world.

The synchronization of our senses does seem to play a huge role in this. When we see an object, we expect that we can touch it too (though we learn that things like shadows break the general rule.)

Meaning and coherence are subjective. — Terrapin Station

This is that 'isolated ego' you asked me about in the other thread. The 'subject' alone with its meaning. Let's work with this view. Then the isolated subject can interpret marks and noises and approximately repeat the meaning acts of other isolated subjects, therefore generating an 'illusion' of approximately public approximate meaning. Fair enough.

For me what's strange is a naive realism (which I like in many ways) combined with an insistence on the subject cut off from direct public meaning. I see the tree, but I don't hear the other. The other spits out meaningless (but potentially meaningful) noises that I have to 'bring to life' with a 'meaning act.' And yet the tree doesn't send meaningless photons that have to be reconstituted by the subject.

All these positions are defensible, but I like the spirit of naive realism and connect it to communication as well (and that means calling meaning and coherence subjective becomes problematic.) The gap between the subject and the thing-in-itself is not unlike the gap between subjects, a kind of theoretical assumption that ignores our primary experience of the world in order to obsess over absolute certainty, etc.

I am not sure that I agree with you on this point. Berkeley says that all that exists are spirits, ideas and an infinite spirit. Are you sure that our spirits are also ideas of God? It certainly solves my problem with the immaterial universe because as you say it simply doesn't exist if our minds are only ideas of the infinite spirit, we are then in a B.I.V scenario, but is Berkeley saying that?

If he is then isn't he denying the outside world and objects in it? Which he seems committed to maintain, he states that the world is real just not material. Or is he saying that it seems real? — Jamesk

I'm not sure what you mean by the "immaterial universe". It's a long time since I have looked in any detail at Berkeley's philosophy, but my understanding of its basic logic is that material objects, including we ourselves, are real, because they are thought into existence by God. Spirits or souls are also real because they are thought into existence by God. The logical corollary would seem to be that God is substance, and that 'material' and 'mental' are not different substances, but different modes of God. I see a similarity between Berkeley and Spinoza in this.

So Berkeley would not be denying the "outside world and objects in it", because that world and its objects are indeed outside those who perceive it. Of course nothing is 'outside' God. If Berkeley states that the world is real but not material; I would not think he is denying the materiality of things, but rather the idea that there is a brute, material existence of the world independent of God's thinking of it. There would still be a material existence of the world independent of our thinking and perceiving of it, though.

You are simply talking about knowing what the future holds as opposed to what it actually holds independent of our knowledge. Our knowledge can be wrong. Ideas can be wrong. — Harry Hindu

That's true, and that's the difference between this hypothetical deterministic 'entailment' and purely logical entailment. We can't be wrong about logical entailment (if we are being logical at least, and if were not we would not be wrong but would be missing the point).

What was confusing about it? I may be wrong about it but I thought what I typed was pretty clear! Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real? — Happenstance

I would not define "real" in a way so as to exclude relations from being real, such that only absolutes are real.

This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real? — Happenstance

I think that this would depend on your context of usage. Illusions are very real things, the existence of which must be accounted for. However in another sense, an illusion may incline one to believe as real, what is not real. So if we assume this distinction between real and not real, we would need some principles to differentiate one from the other in this context.

There, "music" refers to a particular as in a particular song, like "Kashmir" (and a particular instantiation of "Kashmir" at that.) — Terrapin Station

You were talking about "the song called Kashmir", not a particular instantiation of that song. "The song called Kashmir" is an abstraction, a particular concept. How is it that "the song called Kashmir", and "music" both refer to the very same particular concept when you say "the song called Kashmir is music", without violating the law of identity?

Locke presents us a world created by God that runs by itself, so I guess he does allow for it.

Also Berkeley has a strict definition of 'sensible thing', for him the tree presents itself to our senses,'matter' or material substrata do not directly present themselves as 'clouds' of atoms, particles and forces. Matter presents itself in the form of the tree, all we sense is that aspect, anything more behind it is beyond our senses. — Jamesk

Locke's view is close to deism, God as a remote 'first cause' who no longer has anything to do with the running of the world which unfolds according to mechanical causes and effects. An influential and pernicious view in my opinion.

But I think that's the correct depiction of Berkeley. He takes the reality of perceptions as primary.

I would not think [Berkeley] is denying the materiality of things, but rather the idea that there is a brute, material existence of the world independent of God's thinking of it. There would still be a material existence of the world independent of our thinking and perceiving of it, though. — Janus

Berkeley doesn't deny that material bodies exist, but your second claim is the very point that he denies. The whole point of his philosophy is to deny the reality of 'mind-independence'. 'Esse est percipe', 'to be is to be perceived'.

It's worth reading Richard Conn Henry's controversial opinion piece, The Mental Universe. He advocates an explicitly idealist/mentalist view of the world very like Berkeley, and based, he says, entirely on physics, of which he is Professor at Johns Hopkins.

Is explanation just the projection of necessary relationships? Or does passion come into it? A sense of recognition and familiarity? One can use the word in various ways, but I'd say that metaphors the frame the situation in terms of motive and purpose have their value. — sign

If you think back to the Greeks, try and imagine the immensity of the realisation that accompanied the discovery of the faculty of reason. Consider the awe-inspiring achievements of the ancient world, such as Archimedes' discoveries in mathematics (to name but one). We're at a transitional stage between nomadism and the beginning of civilisation as we know it. The whole intellectual project was about discovering the 'logos' of things - from whence all of today's disciplines ending in -logy arose, as well as 'logic' itself. 'Reason' and 'rationality' originated with such discoveries as the Pythagorean ratios and harmonics. In that context, everything point back, or up, to the origin or source (the One, in later Platonism).

In the intervening millenia, all of that understanding became absorbed into Christian theology (for better or for worse) although many aspects of it are still visible in language and culture. But along with the overall rejection of religious philosophy by Enlightenment philosophers, much of that traditional understanding went with it. I know that I am going to be criticized for saying it, that it's sentimental or idealised or whatever, but I really think that is what happened.

So, originally, I think the search was for a kind of intellectual illumination, a seeing-into-the-first-principles as a noetic act.

Aristotle never stated this exactly, but in 6.7.2-3 [Nichomachean Ethics] said that Wisdom [σοφία] is the most perfect mode of knowledge. A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles and also know the conclusions that follow from them. “Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence [Intellect; νοῦς] and Scientific Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.” Contemplation is that activity in which ones νοῦς (nous) intuits and delights in first principles.

I would not think [Berkeley] is denying the materiality of things, but rather the idea that there is a brute, material existence of the world independent of God's thinking of it. There would still be a material existence of the world independent of our thinking and perceiving of it, though. — Janus

Berkeley doesn't deny that material bodies exist, but your second claim is the very point that he denies. The whole point of his philosophy is to deny the reality of 'mind-independence'. 'Esse est percipe', 'to be is to be perceived'. — Wayfarer

The second claim is only that the material existence of the world is independent of our thinking and perceiving of it, not independent of Gods' thinking and perceiving of it. So the world is 'human-mind-independent' but not 'God-mind-independent'. That seems to be the logic of Berkeley's position. This also seems to be the point of the limericks I posted earlier.

Of course I could be wrong, so if you can cite any text where Berkeley explicitly states that the world is human-mind-dependent I will gladly revise my view.

If that’s what you mean, then sure, agree.

:cool:

The problem is that if you say that meaning is public, then what, exactly, would you be saying it is ontologically?

No, I'm talking about the sounds, because we were talking about experiencing it. Why would I be talking about concepts per se?

No, I'm talking about the sounds, because we were talking about experiencing it. Why would I be talking about concepts per se? — Terrapin Station

This is what you said.

Do we violate the law of identity when we say that the song "Kashmir" is music? — Terrapin Station

Clearly you were talking about two distinct abstract concepts here, "the song Kashmir", and "music". As distinct, particular concepts, one cannot be the other without violation of the law of identity. As universals, one, "the song Kashmir", may be classed as within the larger category "music". Obviously you were not talking about experiencing sounds. If that were the case you'd be talking about what you were hearing, not about classifying the song Kashmir as music.

The problem is that if you say that meaning is public, then what, exactly, would you be saying it is ontologically? — Terrapin Station

I think that's a great question. I'd say we have a experience/phenomenon of partially public meaning and that it's just not easy to fit in to traditional philosophical projects. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm thinking your question is about how to categorize the being of meaning. We could only do so via meaningful signs. You also use the word 'exactly,' and that's another great issue. Granting that meaning is partially shared, is it ever shared exactly? Is any 'meaning act' ever the perfect repetition of another? If it is not, then any categorization of meaning is itself necessarily inexact. Basically we are somewhere between the exaggerated notion that a text has just any kind of meaning and an equally exaggerated notion that there is some exact/true meaning of a text (perhaps relying on the idea that the speaking subject is 'transparent' for himself, understands exactly what his own signs mean.).

*This connects to Speech and Phenomena. In some ways the dream of metaphysics can be reduced to an isolated and yet universal/transcendental mind having the meaning of its signs perfectly and exactly present for itself.

You are still making a category error. The law of identity doesnt apply to “music” and “the song of Kashmir”, music is a universal and Kashmir song a particular. It does not violate the law.

The whole intellectual project was about discovering the 'logos' of things - from whence all of today's disciplines ending in -logy arose, as well as 'logic' itself. 'Reason' and 'rationality' originated with such discoveries as the Pythagorean ratios and harmonics. In that context, everything point back, or up, to the origin or source (the One, in later Platonism). — Wayfarer

I agree. You know I love Hegel, and he in Werner Marx's view was a logos philosopher. His genius was addressing the genesis of the logos. The One or Being divides itself in order to know and recover itself in its fullness, a fullness that is only achieved by division. The acorn becomes the oak. The German idealists were thinkers of the One, but some of them stopped at an intuition of unity and 'the night in which all cows are black.' Along the same lines, some of them insisted that the 'absolute' was only grasped by feeling and not by 'the labor of the concept.' Personally I'm more open minded about grasping the absolute by feeling, while also respecting the labor of the concept. Anyway, Hegel (as I'm sure you know) was a thinker of telos. It is the nature of the One to blossom into a rich self-knowing which is also a self-creation. 'Spirit' is its own product. Theology is God, which it recognizes at the moment of its completion, one might say. Others might say that the whole story is a dazzling fiction. It speaks to me, but I understand the suspicion or disinterest of others (Hegel mostly won't help one pay the rent, etc.)

Spirit must know itself, externalize itself, have itself as object, must know itself in such a way as to exhaust its own possibilities in becoming totally object to itself...The goal of spirit is, if we may employ the expression, to comprehend itself, to remain no longer hidden to itself. The road to this is its development, and the series of developments form the levels of its development.
...
Now, the history of philosophy is precisely that and nothing else. In philosophy as such, in the present, most recent philosophy, is contained all that the work of millennia has produced; it is the result of all that has preceded it. And the same development of Spirit, looked at historically, is the history of philosophy. It is the history of all the developments which Spirit has undergone, a presentation of its moments or stages as they follow one another in time. Philosophy presents the development of thought as it is in and for itself, without addition; the history of philosophy is this development in time. Consequently the history of philosophy is identical with the system of philosophy. — Hegel

I don't take this as the final word, but the idea of system as history or history as system really speaks to me.

But along with the overall rejection of religious philosophy by Enlightenment philosophers, much of that traditional understanding went with it. I know that I am going to be criticized for saying it, that it's sentimental or idealised or whatever, but I really think that is what happened. — Wayfarer

I agree. Natural science is effective by focusing on a certain aspect of experience as it ignores others. Before long there is a tendency to think that meaning itself is unreal (!?). An 'anti-Hegelian' scientism repeats the reality of the rational by denying the reality of anything that doesn't fit into its un-criticized and narrow notion of rationality. What I call scientism ignores the tension in itself between Baconian utilitarian pragmatism and its high-flown rhetoric of about grasping the objective real without distortion. This high-flown rhetoric is what remains of its disavowed spirituality (Deism?)

I was talking about experiencing things. The whole point was talking about experiencing a tree pre-conceptually. You said that you can experience the tree but not matter, which is what led to mocking you with the music example . . . and then you decided to seriously endorse the absurdity I was mocking.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm thinking your question is about how to categorize the being of meaning. — sign

Not categorize, per se, but to say what it's supposed to be physically as something public.

Not categorize, per se, but to say what it's supposed to be physically as something public. — Terrapin Station

For me this identification of the public and the physical is problematic. When I drive, I stop at red octagons inscribed STOP. The meaning of a stop sign is no small point, either. It makes driving relatively safe. Another culture might use yellow diamonds for a stop sign and get approximately the same result. So it can't be about the frequency of red light. Similarly the words and letters we use for the idea of stopping are contingent. What matters is that we can tell the difference between an arbitrary sign for going and another for stopping. Meaning seems to evade our typical measurement devices.

I think this makes a case that meaning can't be reduced to the physical, along with a case for the publicity of meaning. We have instituted relatively safe driving patterns with the help of such arbitrary signs. Meaning matters. It acts in the world as a public phenomenon. It works because it is public.

You are still making a category error. The law of identity doesnt apply to “music” and “the song of Kashmir”, music is a universal and Kashmir song a particular. It does not violate the law. — DingoJones

But TS claims that all universals are really particulars, therefore the law of identity is applicable against TS's claims.

I was talking about experiencing things. The whole point was talking about experiencing a tree pre-conceptually. You said that you can experience the tree but not matter, which is what led to mocking you with the music example . . . and then you decided to seriously endorse the absurdity I was mocking. — Terrapin Station

I said we sense particular things like trees, but we do not sense matter because it is in no sense of the word a particular thing. "Matter" in no way refers to any particular thing which we sense. Where's the problem? Maybe if you could explain where the problem with this is, instead of changing the subject by making a mockery of yourself, we might be able to make some progress on this subject.

i

Is any 'meaning act' ever the perfect repetition of another? If it is not, then any categorization of meaning is itself necessarily inexact. — sign

That's where maths comes in so handy! Nobody has to say 'whaddya mean, "7" '?

I don't take this as the final word, but the idea of system as history or history as system really speaks to me. — sign

I certainly get it. But idealism, Hegelian and anything like it, pretty well fell right out of favour in the English-speaking world (except for amongst 'neck-beards' ;-) ) That's the problem!

But idealism, Hegelian and anything like it, pretty well fell right out of favour in the English-speaking world (except for amongst 'neck-beards' ;-) ) That's the problem! — Wayfarer

I appreciate the neckbeards allusion, but neckbeards are Dawkins fan-boys, haters of Hegel if they've ever heard of him. Neckbeards aren't sexy like Hegelians, damn it! :cool: More seriously, the stereotype is aimed at antisocial atheists who are Conspicuously Rational on social media. The steretype also suggests bad hygeine and complaints about women only liking bad boys who don't mylady them as a neckbeard might.

Must’ve misunderstood. I had the impression it might be a general reference to earnest, stuffy academic types. Hadn’t heard the term before.

I saw it on reddit by chance and looked it up. It really amused me. I don't really spend much time in places where the kids make up this lingo, but I sometimes get curious. I also looked up 'Chad' and 'incel.' It's a weird world out there. I'm getting old.

Incel, I know about. As for idealism - have a browse through some of the pages about Timothy Sprigge. Only learned of him when his obituary was published, but a full on idealist philosopher.

That's where maths comes in so handy! Nobody has to say 'whaddya mean, "7" '? — Wayfarer

Exactly. And this even helps explain scientism as a kind of pythogoreanism in love with the heiroglyphs. It's not unlike some extremely reduced kind of Platonism without a dialectic to make sense of itself. It's a strange worship of power and heiroglyphs that hasn't clarified itself , mixed with the religious idea of a universal reason in which we participate (or so it seems to me.) Of course I like this universal in which we participate. It's what makes philosophy possible (even as certain philosophers deny what makes its denial possible: meeting in a language that aims at transpersonal or objective truth.)

Incel, I know about. As for idealism - have a browse through some of the pages about Timothy Sprigge. Only learned of him when his obituary was published, but a full on — Wayfarer

I like what I just briefly read. But then I embrace ambitious philosophy, 'useless' philosophy that tries to make sense of existence in a way that helps us live well. (I think we agree on this. My 'useless' was ironic, of course.)

Berkeley doesn't deny that material bodies exist, but your second claim is the very point that he denies. The whole point of his philosophy is to deny the reality of 'mind-independence'. 'Esse est percipe', 'to be is to be perceived'.
— Wayfarer — Janus

He does dent material bodies but not physical ones. Objects owe their existence to the power of Gods idea giving them physical form. This physical form however is not material in the way the materialist say's. This material is a spiritual material (substance) not made up of a mind independent substrata.

So, originally, I think the search was for a kind of intellectual illumination, a seeing-into-the-first-principles as a noetic act. — Wayfarer

Have you ever checked out Husserl? I just did recently, and I only wish I had looked into him sooner. It makes sense to me that first-principles have to be intuitively grasped or given.