Going back to being skeptical of this state-of-affairs being a "view", I have to ask, "why does it appear like a "view""? What I mean is, why is there depth, not just in vision, but in our auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory symbols? That may be the one thing that they all share in common because if not for that, we could have good reason to be skeptical of our sensations being about a external world. Each sense supplies very different symbols. The fact that I can see coffee and feel coffee at the same time, isn't as good as being able to see them and feel them in the same location as well. — Harry Hindu
Meaning and coherence are subjective. — Terrapin Station
I am not sure that I agree with you on this point. Berkeley says that all that exists are spirits, ideas and an infinite spirit. Are you sure that our spirits are also ideas of God? It certainly solves my problem with the immaterial universe because as you say it simply doesn't exist if our minds are only ideas of the infinite spirit, we are then in a B.I.V scenario, but is Berkeley saying that?
If he is then isn't he denying the outside world and objects in it? Which he seems committed to maintain, he states that the world is real just not material. Or is he saying that it seems real? — Jamesk
You are simply talking about knowing what the future holds as opposed to what it actually holds independent of our knowledge. Our knowledge can be wrong. Ideas can be wrong. — Harry Hindu
What was confusing about it? I may be wrong about it but I thought what I typed was pretty clear! Relationships do exist, there is no denying this, as do illusions, so what is your definition of real? — Happenstance
This is a question to both of you, are illusions, even though they exist, real? — Happenstance
There, "music" refers to a particular as in a particular song, like "Kashmir" (and a particular instantiation of "Kashmir" at that.) — Terrapin Station
Locke presents us a world created by God that runs by itself, so I guess he does allow for it.
Also Berkeley has a strict definition of 'sensible thing', for him the tree presents itself to our senses,'matter' or material substrata do not directly present themselves as 'clouds' of atoms, particles and forces. Matter presents itself in the form of the tree, all we sense is that aspect, anything more behind it is beyond our senses. — Jamesk
I would not think [Berkeley] is denying the materiality of things, but rather the idea that there is a brute, material existence of the world independent of God's thinking of it. There would still be a material existence of the world independent of our thinking and perceiving of it, though. — Janus
Is explanation just the projection of necessary relationships? Or does passion come into it? A sense of recognition and familiarity? One can use the word in various ways, but I'd say that metaphors the frame the situation in terms of motive and purpose have their value. — sign
Aristotle never stated this exactly, but in 6.7.2-3 [Nichomachean Ethics] said that Wisdom [σοφία] is the most perfect mode of knowledge. A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles and also know the conclusions that follow from them. “Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence [Intellect; νοῦς] and Scientific Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.” Contemplation is that activity in which ones νοῦς (nous) intuits and delights in first principles.
I would not think [Berkeley] is denying the materiality of things, but rather the idea that there is a brute, material existence of the world independent of God's thinking of it. There would still be a material existence of the world independent of our thinking and perceiving of it, though. — Janus
Berkeley doesn't deny that material bodies exist, but your second claim is the very point that he denies. The whole point of his philosophy is to deny the reality of 'mind-independence'. 'Esse est percipe', 'to be is to be perceived'. — Wayfarer
No, I'm talking about the sounds, because we were talking about experiencing it. Why would I be talking about concepts per se? — Terrapin Station
Do we violate the law of identity when we say that the song "Kashmir" is music? — Terrapin Station
The problem is that if you say that meaning is public, then what, exactly, would you be saying it is ontologically? — Terrapin Station
The whole intellectual project was about discovering the 'logos' of things - from whence all of today's disciplines ending in -logy arose, as well as 'logic' itself. 'Reason' and 'rationality' originated with such discoveries as the Pythagorean ratios and harmonics. In that context, everything point back, or up, to the origin or source (the One, in later Platonism). — Wayfarer
Spirit must know itself, externalize itself, have itself as object, must know itself in such a way as to exhaust its own possibilities in becoming totally object to itself...The goal of spirit is, if we may employ the expression, to comprehend itself, to remain no longer hidden to itself. The road to this is its development, and the series of developments form the levels of its development.
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Now, the history of philosophy is precisely that and nothing else. In philosophy as such, in the present, most recent philosophy, is contained all that the work of millennia has produced; it is the result of all that has preceded it. And the same development of Spirit, looked at historically, is the history of philosophy. It is the history of all the developments which Spirit has undergone, a presentation of its moments or stages as they follow one another in time. Philosophy presents the development of thought as it is in and for itself, without addition; the history of philosophy is this development in time. Consequently the history of philosophy is identical with the system of philosophy. — Hegel
But along with the overall rejection of religious philosophy by Enlightenment philosophers, much of that traditional understanding went with it. I know that I am going to be criticized for saying it, that it's sentimental or idealised or whatever, but I really think that is what happened. — Wayfarer
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm thinking your question is about how to categorize the being of meaning. — sign
Not categorize, per se, but to say what it's supposed to be physically as something public. — Terrapin Station
You are still making a category error. The law of identity doesnt apply to “music” and “the song of Kashmir”, music is a universal and Kashmir song a particular. It does not violate the law. — DingoJones
I was talking about experiencing things. The whole point was talking about experiencing a tree pre-conceptually. You said that you can experience the tree but not matter, which is what led to mocking you with the music example . . . and then you decided to seriously endorse the absurdity I was mocking. — Terrapin Station
Is any 'meaning act' ever the perfect repetition of another? If it is not, then any categorization of meaning is itself necessarily inexact. — sign
I don't take this as the final word, but the idea of system as history or history as system really speaks to me. — sign
But idealism, Hegelian and anything like it, pretty well fell right out of favour in the English-speaking world (except for amongst 'neck-beards' ;-) ) That's the problem! — Wayfarer
That's where maths comes in so handy! Nobody has to say 'whaddya mean, "7" '? — Wayfarer
Incel, I know about. As for idealism - have a browse through some of the pages about Timothy Sprigge. Only learned of him when his obituary was published, but a full on — Wayfarer
Berkeley doesn't deny that material bodies exist, but your second claim is the very point that he denies. The whole point of his philosophy is to deny the reality of 'mind-independence'. 'Esse est percipe', 'to be is to be perceived'.
— Wayfarer — Janus
So, originally, I think the search was for a kind of intellectual illumination, a seeing-into-the-first-principles as a noetic act. — Wayfarer
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