I don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). — Sam26
No, only that it can be - if that's it role in a particular language game. — StreetlightX
This is how "the rule" appears to us, as something general, vague and ill-defined, as "various possibilities". — Metaphysician Undercover
Now the name itself, is used to signify a type of object "slab" for example signifies a type of object. And, the rule itself, is used to signify a type of action. Both are signifying "a type", so in each case what is signified is something general, as types are. However, we can point to the name, as something particular, "slab" etc., now let's move along and point to the particular rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
The rule dictates a correspondence between the sign and the square. But how the rule does this is what appears to us in the form of various possibilities. This is what stymies our attempts to isolate the particular rule. We see the chart and we see the action of the people following the rule, but if we go to describe how the rule acts, we can describe it in a variety of different ways, despite the fact that it is one and the same rule which may be acting in a variety of different ways. How can we isolate the particular rule when it appears to exist in a variety of different ways at the same time? — Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose I do not know what you mean by 'generalizable rule". So I don't know what you mean when you say that Wittgenstein is claiming that the generalisable rule does not exist. I haven't yet seen him claim that any sort of rule does not exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
But there is no problem here to resolve. The rule only appears vague when we are looking for something 'hidden' behind it. Absent of that, it is not vague and ill-defined at all. Do you have any great trouble speaking to people in ordinary language? — Isaac
The chart of relations in 48 shows which types of action (in response to which utterances) are considered by the players to be in accordance with the rules. — Isaac
We can't. That's the point. — Isaac
Wittgenstein believes that philosophy has been misguided by our grammar. I cannot put it much more basically than to say that it has been misguided into thinking that because we can "say" something in one context, we can analyse it without context. His work here is trying to show the effect of context on the meaning of words. It is not trying to map those effects, or explain them, or find some unifying theory behind them. — Isaac
But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?
However, meaning resides in a multitude of uses that may not have any one property that corresponds to that meaning. Hence, Wittgenstein's talk about games and family resemblances. This isn't the case though with all meanings (speaking in terms of properties). For example, part of what it means to be a triangle resides in the idea that a triangle has three sides. That said, the concept still gets its meaning in terms of how we use the word triangle, as opposed to pointing to some thing that is a triangle. — Sam26
But I see no rules, so I don't know what you're talking about. How could I be looking for something hidden behind the rules, when I do not even see any rules? — Metaphysician Undercover
The chart does not show this though, that's the point. The chart is just an arrangement of coloured squares. Along with the chart there are instructions as to how to use the symbols, "R", "G" "W" "B". It is the instructions, whether the actions are according to the instructions, which determines whether the actions are according to the rules. So I have to associate "the rule" with the instructions, not with the chart. — Metaphysician Undercover
The chief danger of our philosophy, apart from laziness and wooliness, is scholasticism, the essence of which is treating that which is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. — F. P. Ramsey
Are you saying that you aren't able to respond when someone asks you to "fetch a red apple"? If not, then you know the rule to that language game to the extent that anyone else knows it (the extent to which it can be known). A rule is like a signpost. It is not meant to be exhaustive, it is only meant to be sufficient, that sufficiency being determined by use. — Isaac
Eventually you have to arrive at simply what we have been instructed to understand by our existing within a social network, the near constant 'reverting to the mean' effect of each person trying to copy the other, which is what Sam has been trying to explain. — Isaac
Following on from his remarks at 55, using the example of a colour, he asks whether we could proceed without a paradigm/sample if instead we were to "bear in mind" the colour that a word represents. He suggests that such memories could provide us with the "indestructible" element sought at 55. However, the problem with this consideration is one which will famously return later: — Luke
56 ...This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.
57 ...For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour
this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language,
58. "I want to restrict the term 'name* to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.
First, we would have to say that there is a correct response, one which is according to the rule, because simple response is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
So in this sense, memory would be the "highest court" because it determines whether something has meaning or not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Also, it suggests that meaning is not indestructible as was earlier suggested, because when the memory is gone, so is the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you fetch a red apple whenever you are asked to then you know the rule. It is as simple as that. Fetching the apple is sufficient. What more do you think needs to be added? What is missing? Whether or not one is following the rule is determined by an action: — Fooloso4
“We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B; even the whole language of a tribe. The children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others.” (§6) — Fooloso4
The paradigm is the highest court.
"An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game." (§55)
A physical example is in general a more reliable paradigm provided it does not change. In addition, we are able to compare the sample with the name. I do not need to consult a sample of the color red each time I fetch a red apple, but if you fetch a yellow apple and say that this is how you remember the color red, then we can consult the sample to settle the matter of what red means. — Fooloso4
Right now if someone said "fetch a red apple", I would not be in the least bit inclined to go to the store and get a red apple. — Metaphysician Undercover
So despite the fact that acting in a certain way may indicate that I know the rule, if there is such a rule, it's not a reliable way of indicating whether I know that rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
And so it doesn't suffice as a premise, whereby we could conclude the existence of such a rule, because in each and every particular case when someone says "fetch a red apple", people behave differently. — Metaphysician Undercover
As Wittgenstein demonstrates, there are problems with this imaginary scenario of yours. — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to missing the fact that it is made explicitly clear by Wittgenstein at 55, that this so-called "paradigm" cannot be a physical object, because the name must be allowed to have meaning after the physical object is destroyed. — Metaphysician Undercover
What the name signifies must be indestructible … — Metaphysician Undercover
Following a rule does not mean that one must follow it, but rather that one knows how to follow it. — Fooloso4
In this case it is not a matter of whether or not there is such a rule. “Fetch a red apple” is the rule. — Fooloso4
That was a direct quote from the text (§6). What problems are there? — Fooloso4
The object serves as a paradigm. It is something that serves as an example of what red means. If someone does not know what red means I cannot tell them to remember what it means or to look in my memory. The particular object I point to can be destroyed but there are others that can serve as the paradigm. — Fooloso4
What cannot be destroyed is what gives the words their meaning, it “is that without which they would have no meaning” (§55) A paradigm can be destroyed but then word would no longer mean anything . If you were the last remaining member of a tribe and everything owned by the tribe was destroyed a “rel” would mean something to you but not to anyone else. Since no “rels” exist there is nothing that can serve as a paradigm by which “rel” means anything for anyone else, and if you forget or die then it would no longer have any meaning. The paradigm would be destroyed. — Fooloso4
It's easy to say "if you respond when someone says 'fetch the apple' then you know the rule", but this claim needs to be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover
First, we would have to say that there is a correct response, one which is according to the rule, because simple response is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, to justify "then you know the rule" requires that there is a rule available for consultation. Where do we find this rule, for consultation? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm looking in detail, as Wittgenstein suggests, trying to determine the "particular rule", to validate this claim that there are rules within this social network. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you not recognize that as blatantly contradictory? — Metaphysician Undercover
How is that the rule? "Fetch a red apple" is the statement, what is said. — Metaphysician Undercover
You should read the thread from the beginning, we covered that already. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein explicitly states that the name must have meaning even if everything is destroyed. — Metaphysician Undercover
So it is clear that he is not thinking about a multitude of objects acting as the paradigm. — Metaphysician Undercover
So we can conclude that "a paradigm" does not refer to any object, or a multiplicity of objects. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, that presumes that the definition of "rule" exists prior to our investigation and we are demonstrating that the thing we have identified belongs to that definition. That's not what's happening here. Wittgenstein is saying "let's call the paradigm that looks like it is needed to explain this broadly similar collection of behaviours a 'rule'", then look at some examples to see how it varies. You're starting from the premise that a 'rule' is a thing of universally fixed and agreed on definition and the game is to try and see if what Wittgenstein describes is such a thing. You may play that game with your definition of 'rule' but it's not a game I care to play. — Isaac
How would you know when you find such a thing? — Isaac
Two different senses in which one can follow a rule. The first means to understand what the rule is. You have indicated that you can follow the rule to fetch a red apple but choose not to. Do you follow? — Fooloso4
Are you referring to the statement in §55 in quotes? If so, that is not Wittgenstein's position, it is one that is said that he rejects. — Fooloso4
Once the connection between the name and the thing named is made the paradigm is no longer needed, ... — Fooloso4
Then what do you think it refers to? — Fooloso4
You cannot exclude my definition of "rule" because it is presumptuous, and then proceed with your own presumed definition. — Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree that Wittgenstein is saying "let's call the paradigm that looks like it is needed to explain this broadly similar collection of behaviours a 'rule'", because this is to proceed with a preconceived idea as to what a rule is. What Wittgenstein did, in fact say at 53 is: "Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a game is played according to a definite rule." Then he goes on at 54 to explain those kinds of cases.
Therefore he has not made the generalization which you claim. He has not claimed to call "this broadly similar collection of behaviours" is a "rule", he has only described a variety of different behaviours in which we say that a game is being played according to a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't disagree with this, I only mean to emphasise that Wittgenstein is not saying that 'rule' should mean something and then proceeding to see what meets this definition, but rather working the other way around. — Isaac
I felt like your point was implying that some situation might exist where we say a game is being played according to a rule, but which, on investigation we find it is not (ie your comment about the assertion needing to be justified). I was trying to get across that Wittgenstein is simply accepting that whatever we say is being played according to a rule is part of the definition of 'rule' so he's not (at this stage) undertaking an analysis of whether people are right to say that a game is being played according to a rule. — Isaac
I follow, but clearly the point Wittgenstein is making at 54 is that there are different senses of "following a rule". On what basis would you choose one over the other as the correct sense? — Metaphysician Undercover
All I see is that it is stated, I do not see him rejecting it. — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not see where Wittgenstein makes this claim. In fact, if this were the case, then we'd have to rely on memory. But he explicitly rejects a reliance on memory at 56. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a reason why it is in parentheses. The next paragraph begins -
“One might, of course, object at once …”
And concludes:
“An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game."
The example serves as a paradigm for something that corresponds to the name. — Fooloso4
No serious student of Wittgenstein, if even they disagree with Wittgenstein, would deny many of these points being made about rule-following. There may be disagreements, but most of this is understood by those who study Wittgenstein in a serious way. — Sam26
The one thing I can say about MU is that he keeps his cool about all of this. In that sense he is better than me. The Marine in me wants to take the person and kick them in the ass, which would solve nothing. I think it comes down to this, you either see it or you don't. If you don't see it, fine, just move on. Now, if I can take my own advice, I'd be doing well. — Sam26
My point is that if you think you're going to get anywhere with your explanations you're living in a dream world. The only reason I see to answering some of his questions is to help others who may also be confused. — Sam26
So why is it a case of "you must see it my way or else you don't see it at all"? It really does not come down to "I must see it your way, or else I don't see it". What makes your way the correct way? — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, I see that, but then he proceeds with "what if no such sample is a part of the language..." and proceeds from here. So it is still undetermined as to the criterion for "correct". — Metaphysician Undercover
One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. — Sam26
My first challenge to you would be to find other philosophers who see it the way you do, no interpretation is a matter one person's view, as if you can simply choose any interpretation you want. So why don't you find other philosophers who view rule-following the way you do, and present the argument. — Sam26
One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. — Sam26
My second challenge to you is to explain Wittgenstein's rule-following argument as you understand it, whether you disagree with it or not. Explain it like you were explaining it to someone who never read Wittgenstein, and use supporting paragraphs. — Sam26
Right, if there were no sample that could be used as a paradigm then there is no way to settle whether one remembers the color correctly. It is possible that the sample has darkened but it is also possible that one does not remember the color correctly.
Such indeterminacy or uncertainty is not something Wittgenstein is attempting to overcome. See below regarding rules. — Fooloso4
When we forget which colour this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language, ...
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