No. 'Donald Trump' picking out Donald Trump is not contingent on his being named so in another world. — Snakes Alive
I didn't say it was; I said it was contingent upon the man named Donald Trump being so named in this world. — Janus
Yeah, so? That's a trivial fact. How does that mean the name isn't a rigid designator? — Snakes Alive
All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; and this goes equally for names as it does definite descriptions. — Janus
No, it doesn't. If we say if the South successfully split from the Union, the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century would have governed a smaller territory. Here the definite description does not depend in any way upon who was the president of the United States at which time in the actual world – only in the counterfactual scenario. — Snakes Alive
This is simply irrelevant. Yes you could name anything anything you wanted. So what? The name, as it is actually used, based on the actual naming convention, rigidly designates. — Snakes Alive
Did you have a particular part in mind? The concept of necessity is used in most parts of the book except some passages in lectures 2 and 3. It is used most heavily in the middle part of lecture 1, p34ff in my version, where he discusses the relationship between 'necessary' and a priori. Is that the bit you meant?So, we haven't really covered the necessity part of Kripke's book. Or did I sleep through it? — Wallows
It is possible, even probable (if the Good Lord spares me), that I will go shopping tomorrow. I might go to Asda, or I might go to Aldi. Until tomorrow, which possible world will be actual is unknowable. The actual world of tomorrow is on equal footing with any (other) possible world of tomorrow - until tomorrow. — unenlightened
The fact of the name definitely referring is a fact of this world, and it is on account of that fact that the name can be used to definitely refer to the entity it designates in counterfactual or possible scenarios. — Janus
So, the name Donald Trump by itself does not definitely designate any entity, since there could be any number of entities (including my car) named Donald Trump. — Janus
There are two points, which you seem unable to grasp. The first is that names only rigidly designate by virtue of descriptive or ostensive contexts. The second is that names are themselves shorthand descriptions, the definiteness of which depend on further description. 'Donald Trump' is equivalent to 'the entity named 'Donald Trump' and doesn't rigidly designate until further information is provided: 'the man named Donald Trump who was POTUS at December 5 2019' for example; or 'the car that was named Donald Trump at (insert latitude and longitude) at (insert precise time)'. — Janus
It's trivial, and doesn't have anything to do with the claim that names are rigid designators. — Snakes Alive
I think this latter view has more plausibility than the classical one, though it too is ultimately incorrect, because names are observably rigid in a way that descriptions like 'the entity called N' are not. — Snakes Alive
The first paragraph of the Wiki article on definite descriptions shows were Janus is wrong, yet he bulldozes on. — Banno
Well, Banno is still the leader of this reading group and perhaps the most competent person to be it. — Wallows
If Kripke is not disagreeing then those I have been arguing with have been arguing about nothing. — Janus
But if that were true then Kripke would not really be saying anything that is itself more than trivial. — Janus
'N' and 'the entity called N' seem to me to be logically equivalent. — Janus
No. Kripke's point is that the semantic value of a name is not like that of a non-rigid definite description. The latter varies in what it denotes across possible worlds, while a name does not. — Snakes Alive
They are not. It is a contingent matter that Trump is named Trump; it is not contingent that Trump is Trump (i.e. that he is himself). In another world, where someone else is called Trump instead of Trump (say, Clinton), then 'the entity called Trump' refers to Clinton in that world, not Trump. — Snakes Alive
You seem to be conflating the statement 'it is necessary that the entity that is called Trump is the entity that is called Trump' with the statement 'it is contingent that the entity that is called Trump is called Trump'. — Janus
Yes, that's right. Of course we say that Trump would still be Trump even if he had not been called that, and we say that because he has been called that. But we wouldn't say that if he hadn't been called Trump. All we are really saying is that a particular entity is a particular entity regardless of what you call it, and that is tautologously true. — Janus
Hence 'Trump' doesn't mean the same as 'entity called Trump.' The former refers to Trump; the latter refers to whoever happens to have that name, whether it's Trump or not. — Snakes Alive
and whether or not those things remain necessary afterwards. — creativesoul
The former (without any further qualification or description) refers to anyone called 'Trump' — Janus
Not across possible worlds. It may refer to anyone named Trump in the actual world, but once we establish the use of the name by naming conventions, its denotation remains invariant across possible worlds in evaluating counterfactuals. That's not how definite descriptions work. — Snakes Alive
Yes, but all you seem to be saying here is that once the particular entity called 'Trump' that is being referred to in this world is established (by ostention or sufficient description) then we can refer to that entity by the name 'Trump' across possible worlds. — Janus
So, the point is that once we have established the entity being referred to in this world, by sufficiently definite description, we can use that definite description as it obtained in this world at a particular place, time and date, to establish the same entity referred to across possible worlds. We need such place/time/date/-indexed descriptions to establish precisely which entity is being referred to in the first place; just a name is not enough. — Janus
Yes, that is the point. Minus the 'ostensive/descriptive' stuff, which I never said. — Snakes Alive
There is no reason to think, IMO, that the initial fixing of the individual requires a definite description either. — Snakes Alive
The point of what I said there was to show that 'Trump' and 'an entity called Trump' are logically equivalent. — Janus
The only other way I could think of would be pointing at the individual, or showing a photograph and the like; in other words: ostention. In the case of "baptism", the original act of naming, for those present it would be ostention and for anyone who subsequently met the baptized entity and was told 'it's name is X' it would be ostention also. For remote figures and historical figures, the referent of the name is established by description, and perhaps by ostention in the form of images: photographs if there are any, drawings, prints or paintings. — Janus
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