Perhaps you know what you were speaking of, but the point here is communication, getting the other person to know what you're speaking of. You get to have your private wold of meanings, but clearly that doesn't do for communication. And if communication is your intention, then it becomes a fair question if indeed you know what you're talking about, if your communication of it isn't near the target. — tim wood

This is becoming more and more absurd. I used the term "absolute freedom". You weren't sure what I meant. Then, instead of simply asking me what I meant, you jumped ahead with your own interpretation, and questioned whether I knew what I was talking about. I then clarified by saying that I was referring to the position whereby it's considered morally acceptable for a pregnant woman to get an abortion for any reason whatsoever. I think that that's perfectly clear. And now you're lecturing me about the importance of communication.

And if that's in question, then how is it that it's obvious you should or anyone should favor your standard, if in fact your standard is open to question, i.e., is non-standard? — tim wood

Obviously my standard is obviously open to question, obviously, obviously. Obviously. Obviously, obviously, obviously, obviously...

So what?

Are you saying that it's not about whether or not "it" is a person, but rather about whether or not we should treat "it" like one? That would be okay, I suppose, although it seems to skew the language in your favour, because then one can question why we should treat a "thing" that isn't a person like a person. In that language, I would say that we should do so to an extent I would judge to be appropriate. But it could simply be said that it should be judged appropriately as a "thing" of value, and that would seem to avoid these big problems relating to personhood.

activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments
— Rank Amateur

So in murder these are the future-goods which are deprived, according to your rationale for murder being categorized as wrong.

Now I would say a bird has activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments -- eating, building a nest, whatever the now feels like to a bird, and the pleasures of birds. Dogs too. Animals of all sorts have a future of this sort. And they also have a value.

But I would say that animals are not as valuable as humans. I don't say this with respect to their biology -- as clearly humans are just animals as all the rest -- but because of the ethical category they fall into. — Moliere

Agree, and in the actual argument marquis address it. But the argument is not about any future, it is about a future, like ours.

For myself I would just say murder is the immoral and intentional killing of a person -- immoral because sometimes the killing of person's is warranted, even if it is not praiseworthy. It is permissable -- such as cases of self-defense, in cases of war, and in cases of euthanasia (in order from less to more controversial). Whether a person has a future or not, such as the case where a person does not wake up from a coma, is not relevant to my thoughts -- the person has value regardless of their future. — Moliere

I have addressed this issue in the argument, and it is about non-justified killing. Hopping not to run off into a side argument, I ask we don't spend time arguing what is or is not justified.

To me it seems that your own argument sneaks personhood, of this sort, in by referencing the activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments -- things which, say, a stone or an apple will not have. It just misses some of the important things that makes us specifically persons, rather than just beasts, and then tries to write off personhood accounts by saying the personhood of such-and-such does not matter, its the future of such-and-such that does. For msyelf the history matters ethically because it's the history of persons -- its not just any future, its the future of persons. But maybe there is some way of construing the future in a way that does not reference activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments -- or maybe there is some way to differentiate this from animals while at the same time not resembling what most of us mean by persons. But I'm not seeing how. — Moliere

The entire purpose of the FOV argument is to avoid the personhood issue.

In short form it is quite simple and intuitively true.

Despite the coffee shop philosophy, we - people like you and me have a future that we value.
A significant harm of killing us is the loss of that future

Now the biology

About 2 weeks after conception there is a unique human organism

You, me and every human on the planet can directly trace our existence in time and space as a biological entity to such a unique organism that could only have been us.

What you moliere are living right now was the future of that one unique organism at one time.

The argument is it is wrong to unjustifiably deny a human future of value, like ours at anytime in our unique development

The argument is based mostly on pure biology, one inference that futures such as ours are valuable, and an application of ideal desire to the fetus

The argument has holes, mostly around the issue of ideal desire. But it had lasted 30 years because to a very high degree the premise is true and the logic is sound.

The thing that I always find ironic in these discussions is how so many folks, who value science so greatly in the theist, atheist discussions abandoned it in a heart beat in the personhood issue.

And the same folks how value reason so greatly in the theist,atheist discussions, are willing all kinds of twists of reason when it comes to the personhood issue, as below

The fetus is not a person because it does not have trait X
But there are all kinds of things we are happy to call persons that don't have trait X

Ok, let me modify trait X so it only applies to a fetus

Which just make the argument a fetus is not a person because the fetus is not a person

As your, it is not sentience, it is the history of sentience that is important, There is only one kind of human without a history of sentience, a fetus at some stage. Take out all the parts in the middle and your point is just a fetus is not a person because it’s a fetus

Yes! That's exactly what I'm saying -- personhood is not a metaphysical category (though if we are cognitivists then we should supply some criteria by which to make a judgment), but an ethical one.

Technically I wouldn't say a newlyborn has all the qualities of a person, but in the interest of laying down a line that is on the safe side I say birth is a good point because at least at that point there is a separate body.

I make no capacity argument for the fetus at all its claim to future, just like ours is pure biology.

The life Tim wood is living right now was at one time a completely unique fetus that could only ever become one thing with one unique future- the thing that became to be known as Tim wood. That entire amount of time from then to now was at different points its future, then its present, and then its past. And that is just plain fact.

one other point, forgive me the laziness of not finding it, but I think you made a point to S that morality wasn’t black and white, it was on some type of a continuum. If so, and we are something less than sure about the morality of an action with irreversible consequences, what would you say is the right way to proceed?

Agree, and in the actual argument marquis address it. But the argument is not about any future, it is about a future, like ours. — Rank Amateur

Marquis did, but I think his argument is a bit different from yours. At least if we're thinking of the same paper that he's famous for. Maybe he's made modifications that I'm unaware of.

I was wondering how your argument might deal with this.

I have addressed this issue in the argument, and it is about non-justified killing. Hopping not to run off into a side argument, I ask we don't spend time arguing what is or is not justified. — Rank Amateur

Sure, that's fine. I was mostly supplying this to say that my theory is able to match yours, since you claimed that one of the benefits of the FOV argument is its ability to account for why murder is wrong -- so I was just displaying that personhood can also function like this. We don't need to get into what I agree would be tangential about which is better at representing the ethics of killing.

The entire purpose of the FOV argument is to avoid the personhood issue.

In short form it is quite simple and intuitively true.

Despite the coffee shop philosophy, we - people like you and me have a future that we value.
A significant harm of killing us is the loss of that future — Rank Amateur

I don't think I quite see how it avoids the personhood issue, though. That's at least my failing in reading you. If it does I'm not understanding how it does so -- when I read you saying "people like you and me have a future that we value" and "A significant harm of killing us is the loss of that future" I cannot help but think -- well, yes, people like you and me do value our future. This is true.

And then wonder how we count "People like you and me" -- and that's where it seems to me personhood is assumed by yourself, or I'm just not understanding what it is about the future that is not personhood that makes it valuable.

Now the biology

About 2 weeks after conception there is a unique human organism

You, me and every human on the planet can directly trace our existence in time and space as a biological entity to such a unique organism that could only have been us.

What you moliere are living right now was the future of that one unique organism at one time.

The argument is it is wrong to unjustifiably deny a human future of value, like ours at anytime in our unique development

The argument is based mostly on pure biology, one inference that futures such as ours are valuable, and an application of ideal desire to the fetus

The argument has holes, mostly around the issue of ideal desire. But it had lasted 30 years because to a very high degree the premise is true and the logic is sound.

I think it's just the best contender in town that at least claims to not rely upon theological premises, so it lasts because there is nothing else. But that's just me :D

The thing that I always find ironic in these discussions is how so many folks, who value science so greatly in the theist, atheist discussions abandoned it in a heart beat in the personhood issue.

And the same folks how value reason so greatly in the theist,atheist discussions, are willing all kinds of twists of reason when it comes to the personhood issue, as below

Hrrmmm? Have we talked about a/theism and science before? I honestly don't remember.

FWIW, I try to be consistent. Obviously I fail at times.

The fetus is not a person because it does not have trait X
But there are all kinds of things we are happy to call persons that don't have trait X

Ok, let me modify trait X so it only applies to a fetus

Which just make the argument a fetus is not a person because the fetus is not a person

As your, it is not sentience, it is the history of sentience that is important, There is only one kind of human without a history of sentience, a fetus at some stage. Take out all the parts in the middle and your point is just a fetus is not a person because it’s a fetus

So for yourself it seems like a shell game ,basically. If you come up with one thing that's wrong, then there's something else to put forward. So it seems like the conclusion is just assumed to be true, and the premises are ad hoc, more or less, and so not really a principle worth considering.

I don't think that personhood has a singular trait. It's a morass of traits. And, for whatever it happens to be worth, it was only after reading up on the philosophy of abortion that I believed as I do now -- I used to be more pro-life.

Not that this is to persuade you, or anything, but I'm just letting you know where I am at. I don't think I'm playing a shell game -- so at least I am not doing so intentionally.

I think that some moral considerations are not black and white, and that abortion is the sort of action that falls in that category. The best way to proceed, in such cases, is to allow people to make the decision on their own because the complexity of the situation is too great for a universal prescriptive rule.

Some actions are just straightforwardly wrong, and it would be inappropriate to have that much permissiveness in those cases -- like murder or slavery.

But abortion is not clear cut. I think that mostly stems from the fact that there are multiple things we care about in conflict with one another, plus the (relatively recent) history of equating abortion to murder to intensify those emotions.

Hrrmmm? Have we talked about a/theism and science before? I honestly don't remember.

FWIW, I try to be consistent. Obviously I fail at times. — Moliere

Not specific to you, just a side rant. But at is core the issue of personhood is a denial of biology in favor of “something else. Just find it ironic

think that some moral considerations are not black and white, and that abortion is the sort of action that falls in that category. The best way to proceed, in such cases, is to allow people to make the decision on their own because the complexity of the situation is too great for a universal prescriptive rule. — Moliere

Who gets to speak for the fetus in that case? And that was the point I am making, are you 100% sure it deserves no moral standing in the discussion?

Yes! That's exactly what I'm saying -- personhood is not a metaphysical category (though if we are cognitivists then we should supply some criteria by which to make a judgment), but an ethical one. — Moliere

I would say that it's neither. It's a linguistic category. But I agree that it's more appropriate here to focus on whether to treat like a person than whether to count as a person.

Technically I wouldn't say a newlyborn has all the qualities of a person, but in the interest of laying down a line that is on the safe side I say birth is a good point because at least at that point there is a separate body. — Moliere

So long as you don't use that as a basis to make the wrong ethical judgements about that which is prior to birth, then that's a secondary matter which we don't need to get into here.

Who gets to speak for the fetus in that case? And that was the point I am making, are you 100% sure it deserves no moral standing in the discussion? — Rank Amateur

The mother does. In some ideal sense I'd say the father too, but it's too idealistic to the practical realities of birth and who shoulders the costs of birth.

It's not that the fetus has no moral standing -- it's that the mother is the one in the best position to make that judgment, more than any other person, and in terms of universal prescriptions at least, the mother's worth is infinitely greater than what is effectively an organ.

Worthless? Surely not. But by my estimation the mother is clearly a person, and the fetus clearly is not, so there isn't really any basis of comparison.

Who gets to speak for the fetus in that case? — Rank Amateur

The Foetus Ventriloquist gets my vote, but he got a life sentence for his crimes.

You're right about child welfare being relevant since if parents know their child would suffer then they'd surely opt for abortion.

Yet, your position seems weak in first world countries where life is relatively comfortable. In third world countries your argument makes sense.

Quite strange to see that according to statistics, birth rates are highest in poor regions than in the rich part of the world.

Does this mean that people are being stupid? The well-off in the rich part of the world who should have children are not and the economically challenged are multiplying like rabbits.

Perhaps it's a question of access to health care - the poor who need safe abortion facilities don't have it.

Never said it, or thought it. — tim wood

It follows from your position that abortion should be unrestricted.

I don't think anyone has said or implied this.

A pregnant woman wants to have an abortion
— tim wood

Only if we could replace the wants with needs.
— TheMadFool
Absolutely not, in a free society. It's enough she want one. Whether she needs one or not may be someone's business: hers, her family's, the father's, her doctor's, but definitely not yours. Suppose it were yours. What account could you give for any attitude you might have about it, much less any decision about it? — tim wood

If abortion is just a wants issue doesn't it mean that it's nothing more than about right of a woman over her body?

No subtlety, then.

If she wants to have one, she should be allowed, within the first two trimesters. Third trimester, needs might come into it.

It follows from your position that abortion should be unrestricted. — TheMadFool

No, it doesn't.

Absolutely not, in a free society. It's enough she want one. — tim wood

In terms of moral justification and in accordance with UK law, it's not enough that she simply wants one. And if that means that we're not a free society as you conceive of one, then so be it.

Abortion Act 1967

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith—

(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.

Big difference between implication and intention. A very great many things "follow" from any proposition, where likely only one or two are intended. My view on abortion, as noted above. runs with Roe v. Wade. For example, it "follows from your post that your a (you fill in the blank).

I suspect, though - and I think a whole lot of people already buy this - that killing even animals is deeply wrong, the kind of wrong that keeps most of us as a moral matter from killing each other. That is, I'm persuaded there's more "humanity" in most mammals than we dare admit. Perhaps in some birds and fishes. We've never, as a species, reconciled ourselves with "Nature, red in tooth and claw." And so, for example, some of us spend ridiculous money on "sport" hunting. But it runs deeper: the sin, if it is such, extends to the killing of the animal your Burger King burger used to be, or perhaps the tuna in your sandwich. I do not resolve this in my person or my actions, but it's out there. Most people who deal with animals in almost any capacity know there's more to them than at first seems: I'm looking for this to be established with hard science in terms that are beyond any dispute. Once, say, the Supreme Court is forced to rule that animals have rights, beyond those they have now, then life may get interesting!

If abortion is just a wants issue doesn't it mean that it's nothing more than about right of a woman over her body? — TheMadFool

I mean by this that there are no a priori grounds for interfering with her on the basis of her wants. Or, in other words, it's none of your business. As argued in Roe v. Wade, at some point it may become your business, but the grounds for that are not, in my opinion, either radical, controversial, or in question.

Anybody here besides me read Roe v. Wade?

If abortion is just a wants issue doesn't it mean that it's nothing more than about right of a woman over her body? — TheMadFool

Whether this is exactly right is a good question. In civil society none of has an absolute right over our bodies. But it's a good place to start and a reasonable position to take and hold, with allowances for well-grounded exceptions.

If she wants to have one, she should be allowed, within the first two trimesters. Third trimester, needs might come into it. — Banno

Ah! So we agree. There should be constraints to abortion. It can't be absolutely free like having a haircut.

@tim wood says an abortion is like having a haircut, a woman's right to do whatever to her body.

In terms of moral justification and in accordance with UK law, it's not enough that she simply wants one. — S

It's never enough for anything, to simply want it. The requirement for two doctors seems intrusive to me. Does UK law require such duplication in most things?

timwood says an abortion is like having a haircut, a woman's right to do whatever to her body. — TheMadFool

Trolling, Fool?

I mean by this that there are no a priori grounds for interfering with her on the basis of her wants. Or, in other words, it's none of your business. — tim wood

That's a moot point. Abortion is a social issue and not only about women and their rights. This is unfortunate of course but it's a truth that women have to face. I think women ignore this to their own disadvantage. What could have been well regulated and acceptable abortion is now an unsolvable problem.

Abortion is a social issue — TheMadFool

"Is"! Don't you think there might be just a little bit more to it than that? The rest of your post, if it truly represents your views it is too antediluvian even to be worthy of argument.

Perhaps, though, it is as you say. Abortion is just a social issue. Being a "social issue" then it would seem that the issue of the issue would be a social responsibility. Are you sure you want to stick with "is a social issue"?

but it's a truth that women have to face. — TheMadFool

On what compulsion, from whom?

l

What could have been well regulated and acceptable abortion is now an unsolvable problem. — TheMadFool

For whom? Exactly who has this problem and why?

That's a moot point. — TheMadFool

I say it's none of your business. You say that's a moot point. Ok, it is your business. How? Why? On what authority? To what end?

To be precise, how, exactly, is it your business?

quite a few times.

There is dispute on how good or bad a legal decision it was. But there is really no dispute it is bad philosophy.

excerpts from the majority opinion on the nature of the fetus:

Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception.We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. [410 U.S. 113, 160]

It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. 56 It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. 57 It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. 58 As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes “viable,” that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid. 59 Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. 60 The Aristotelian theory of “mediate animation,” that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this “ensoulment” theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from [410 U.S. 113, 161] the moment of conception. 61 The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a “process” over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the “morning-after” pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs. 62

In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born alive. 63 That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few [410 U.S. 113, 162] courts have squarely so held. 64 In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. 65 Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents’ interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. 66 Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.

In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches [410 U.S. 113, 163] term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes “compelling.”

With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the “compelling” point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.

Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.

With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the “compelling” point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion [410 U.S. 113, 164] during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.

Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those “procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,” sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, “saving” the mother’s life, the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional challenge to the Texas statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S., at 67

What seems to underlie all of this is that everyone - or a lot of people - has an opinion and thinks that their opinion has value as compulsive. But there is no rigor in this. Sure, within people's thinking there can be rigor, but not as to any entitlement of that opinion to any other status than just being an opinion. And to be sure, much opinion is grounded on the sand of interpretation of various facts. "Life starts at conception!!!" Well, what is life? Gee-whiz, life is what we need it to to be to have our opinion. There is a deep circularity in these arguments, deep enough for people to forget what they are and where they came from, and to grant them status as "Truth."

Return to facts as they are best understood and strip out loaded terminology, theology and the rest. What do you have? A woman's body - and that's all! The presumption that there can be any ground for making her concerns with her body your business are just that, presumptions.

Can there be such grounds? Sure, as there are for all of us in general. People, in general, have no civil or legal or moral right to do whatever they want with their own bodies. But in each case that needs be argued not from the presumption that it's your business, but to establish that it is your business, and why, to what end, and within what limitations. And the best of that is a partial job. Roe is largely a concession to an anti-intellectual, anti-intelligent, irrational, fundamentalist ranting that does has even included real murder.

"Yes, but,"! The yes, but is a sign of moral bankruptcy. In some parts of the world it's a high art used to defend unspeakable atrocity. "We blew up your restaurant.Yes, a terrible thing, but (in the past....)"

We know this argument; it disgusts us. We recognize the immoral un-morality of it and behind it..

You want abortion control? Stop posting the words of others. Speak for yourself!

And,

But there is really no dispute it is bad philosophy. — Rank Amateur

Really! Make your case! I dismiss your statement as the ignorant repetition of something you think clever to repeat. Keep in mind that Roe isn't intended to be philosophy; it's arguments are mainly sound, as near as I can tell - a qualification of good philosophy. So have at it. Your words please. Tilting at the stuffed straw-man arguments you've been presenting is tiresome.