How does the mind fit into the natural realm since we do not have an explanation for it and mental phenomena? — Andrew4Handel

I'm a physicalist/identity theorist. One of the things that's incoherent about a lot of supernatural stuff is that it posits nonphysical existents. The idea of a nonphysical existent is incoherent.

Re explanations, I just wrote this in another thread yesterday:

"The first step in tackling 'the hard problem' is setting out our criteria for explanations in a way that (a) the things we consider explained fit our criteria, (b) the things we consider not explained are not explained because they don't fit our criteria, and (c) our criteria are fashioned in a manner where anyone (reasonably educated/competent), or even perhaps a well-programmed computer, could check whether a putative explanation counts as a legitimate explanation under our criteria, so that we can't just willy-nilly declare things to be explained or not."

I'm a physicalist/identity theorist. — Terrapin Station

I don't know what identity you are positing?

I do not see how something like nerve fibres firing is identical to brain states. if that is what it means then you are making our mental realm objective where you can just read someones mental states off brain states.

You could give an explanation of why someone held a certain opinion by explain how it was determined by her brain states

I think the notion of the nonphysical is derived from the mind and personal experience where I can think about something and not see it or have a pain and not see it because it is not spatial temporal.
Physicalism can lead to idealism or panpsychism and the idea that every thing is mental.

i think what ever goodness is it does not seem to be physical.

I don't know what identity you are positing? — Andrew4Handel

Should be clear from the context of the discussion: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

if that is what it means then you are making our mental realm objective — Andrew4Handel

The definition I use of subjective/objective is that subjective refers to mental phenomena. That definition in no way hinges on what mental phenomena really are. If mental phenomena are brain phenomena (as I believe), then the subjective is brain phenomena (or rather, the subset that amounts to mental phenomena). That's by definition of subjective referring to mental phenomena.

You could give an explanation of why someone held a certain opinion by explain how it was determined by her brain states — Andrew4Handel

Again, I wouldn't get into an "explanation" discussion without the demarcation criteria discussion (re what counts as explanations) as I outlined above. That's just not a game I'd play until we set out the rules for the game first.

i think what ever goodness is it does not seem to be physical. — Andrew4Handel

Again, the very idea of nonphysical anythings is incoherent. You could try to make it coherent, but that would require a lot of work.

Again, the very idea of nonphysical anythings is incoherent. You could try to make it coherent, but that would require a lot of work. — Terrapin Station

It is not at all incoherent because it is the reality of our mental life. The only way you can make the mental seem physical is based on a crude mind brain correlation.

If the mind was physical then everything I imagine, however silly, would be physical (such as me imagining a purple giraffe juggling bananas on Pluto.)(Or phlogiston and the ether which are considered not to exist)

The idea of the physical is not a scientific concept, it does not really refer to anything specific unless you attach it to specific concepts like spatial-temporality, energy and matter.

These however are the same concepts that fail to account for the mind.

You could give an explanation of why someone held a certain opinion by explain how it was determined by her brain states
— Andrew4Handel

Again, I wouldn't get into an "explanation" discussion without the demarcation criteria discussion (re what counts as explanations) as I outlined above. — Terrapin Station

The idea that brain states are determined is a common belief. If the mind is the brain then brain events are determined by other physical events. This explanation would usurp the subjective as an explanation.

For example say I saw a woman get hit and felt anger or concern, the theorist would say that this was a determined response. So that any moral response would be forced on us by a prior cause. So if light hits my retina and presents an image of a woman being hit, to my brain, the neural activity created from this incident is not in my control and my emotional response is determined by other neural activity.

This would square with what I said elsewhere about the external world almost determining a moral response.

If the mind was physical then everything I imagine, however silly, would be physical — Andrew4Handel

Yes, and that's indeed the case. Everything you imagine is a state of your brain.

Saying that the nonphysical is the "reality of our mental life" is just completely empty. You'd need to try to make any sense whatsoever of what nonphysical things are supposed to be ontologically, what their properties are in general, etc.

Free will is a problem for any moral theory and a physicalist theory is far less likely to allow for freewill.

The idea that brain states are determined is a common belief. If the mind is the brain then brain events are determined by other physical events. This explanation would usurp the subjective as an explanation. — Andrew4Handel

Earth to Andrew4Handel. You'd have to set out demarcation criteria as I outlined above if you want me to have an explanation discussion.

Free will is a problem for any moral theory and a physicalist theory is far less likely to allow for freewill. — Andrew4Handel

Physics hasn't been determinist in over 100 years.

Saying that the nonphysical is the "reality of our mental life" is just completely empty. You'd need to try to make any sense whatsoever of what nonphysical things are supposed to be ontologically, what their properties are in general, etc. — Terrapin Station

I don't know what mental things are made of but I have compared them with things that are spatial temporal and have energy. You could also say things that are measurable directly. Just because someone cannot explain an experience to someone else does not mean it doesn't exist. The problem with the mental is that it defies our current methodologies of explanation and causality.

Physics hasn't been determinist in over 100 years. — Terrapin Station

But indeterminism does not imply free will. However there is a certain level of determinism and regularity in a system.
You can easily prove someones actions were out of their control by manipulating their brain with medication or some other stimuli to illicit spontaneous behaviour. You would have to give a good reason to hold someone accountable for something they did.

Earth to Andrew4Handel. You'd have to set out demarcation criteria as I outlined above if you want me to have an explanation discussion. — Terrapin Station

I don't now what you mean then, because I have offered a framework for the explanation which is that if mental states are physical brain states then brain states explanations usurp subjective ones.

(This is the same picture as when people commit themselves to the mind being Epiphenomenal)

If you are committed to the mind being the brain then this leads to the redundancy of the mental which is a position several thinkers are committed to.

I am a pointing out why values become worthless in a purely physical world because they are either epiphenomenal or determined.

Everything you imagine is a state of your brain. — Terrapin Station

This just means correlated with the brain because they are clearly not identical.

Contrast to those who say good is subjective.

If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another.

Hence a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno

Whatever the meaning of "good", a moral subjectivist who is a moral relativist avoids contradiction by having relative standards of judgement which correspond to separate and distinguishable statements, such that, for example, it's good in accordance with Banno's standard but not good in accordance with my standard. Those statements can both be true without contradition. It's about the standard of judgement, not the meaning of "good", hence why you bringing this up in the other discussion about moral feeling missed the point.

Maybe Moore is right. It seems like a good argument at first blush. Fortunately, it's compatible with my kind of moral subjectivism. I'm not committed to claiming anything along the lines that "good" means pleasurable. Although I would commit to other claims, such as that our moral judgement is founded in moral feeling.

"There ought be a rose garden" is true if one promised to plant a rose garden. — creativesoul

That conditional is not true in and of itself. It would require one or more additional premises, premises which others might well have good reason to reject. It's possible for the antecedent ("Banno promised to plant a rose garden") to be true, yet the consequent ("There ought to be a rose garden") to be false.

True moral statements correspond to moral facts. — creativesoul

What's a moral fact? What would it look like? :brow:

Making a promise is the moral fact of the matter. — creativesoul

How can you call that a moral fact when nothing follows from it about right or wrong or what one ought or ought not do? I say that it's not a moral fact at all, it's just a fact.

It's as though you've learnt nothing from Hume on this topic, or that you think you know better. I don't think you know better. (Also, Hume didn't abuse the forward slash in that annoying way that you do).

Moral propositions imply an action. That is, one ought act in accord with true moral propositions. — Banno

In what sense, and how? Not logical implication, not in and of themselves.

Moore thought that the concept "good" could not be defined in a subject-predicate way. In other words, good itself could not be explained with other descriptions without begging the question. What is goodness can never be a closed question for Moore. Somehow he thought we intuited it so he was a brand of intuitionist. However, he thought once we "intuited" it, we can judge the effects of actions, and this could lead to closed questions of which effects works better or which effects have more successful outcomes. — schopenhauer1

Sounds good to me.

Relativism.
I don't thing this works, because of the nature of moral judgements.

"I ought not kick the puppy" is not the same as "no one ought kick the puppy". It's this second statement that is moral; it says what others ought do. The first "I ought not kick the puppy", is not a moral statement but a personal preference.

Ought he be permitted to kick the puppy? S says that it's only relative to my moral system that I can say "he ought not kick the puppy"; if in his moral system puppy kicking is permitted, then that's an end to it.

But the question of the permissibility of puppy-kicking remains. And it remains either true or false.

that one ought not kick the puppy.

This is of course an ethical variation on Davidson's objection to conceptual schema. That, in turn, is a variation on Einstein's relativistic, the whole point of which is not to show that truth is relative, but that what is true in one system is true in another, under suitable translation.

Relativism fails. Again.

aren't you arguing that there's something objectively wrong with them? — Terrapin Station

Your obsession with objective and subjective. I don't think these terms work as well as you suggest.

it's the sort of support that if someone says it's not wrong, we can independently check what's the case — Terrapin Station

That's good.

So it's like "The cat is on the mat". I show Fred the cat on the mat, and he yet insists that the cat is not on the mat. I bring in a panel of experts, and do various tests to check his language use, things like washing the mat, patting the cat, and so on, and find no obvious difference. I put the cat back on the mat, and yet Fred still insists that it is not the case that the cat is on the mat. I conclude that there is something wrong with Fred.

"One ought not kick the puppy". I show Fred the puppy, and he yet insists that the it's ok to kick it. I bring in a panel of experts, and do various tests to check his language use and so on, and find no obvious difference. I show him the puppy again, and yet Fred still insists that it is not the case that one ought not kick the puppy. I conclude that there is something wrong with Fred.

It is quite easy to imagine an alternate milieu: another society with radically different moral leanings, where kicking a pup would be interpreted differently (perhaps as a non-event for example). — emancipate

And they would be wrong. See my dismissal of relativism above.

It might be that it is time for someone to point out the poverty of relativism to the community.

While this thread was started in order to show folk the utility of the open question in dismissing silly ethical systems, it seems the main response has been various forms of ethical relativism. Showing why that is erroneous might be a worthwhile use of this thread. Let 'em be.

I don't thing this works, because of the nature of moral judgements.

"I ought not kick the puppy" is not the same as "no one ought kick the puppy". It's this second statement that is moral; it says what others ought do. The first "I ought not kick the puppy", is not a moral statement but a personal preference. — Banno

I agree that they're not the same: that much is obvious. But I certainly don't agree that the former is not moral in nature. That's absurd! What I ought or ought not do in that sort of context is obviously a matter of morality, and likewise for what you ought or ought not do, and likewise for any other particular person. The context of puppy kicking makes it so. It's also obvious that it's not mere preference, because it's obvious that there's a categorical difference between, say, whether or not I prefer chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream, and whether or not I judge that kicking the puppy is immoral.

Ought he be permitted to kick the puppy? S says that it's only relative to my moral system that I can say "he ought not kick the puppy"; if in his moral system puppy kicking is permitted, then that's an end to it. — Banno

That's a very poor argument. Why on earth would that be an end to it? Both you and I share the moral judgement that he ought not kick the puppy. Most others share that moral judgement. So why on earth would any of us treat the situation with indifferent acceptance? We wouldn't. Naturally, we'd act as expected as per our respective moral judgement.

You seem to have some very basic misunderstandings about the position you intend to argue against.

But the question of the permissibility of puppy-kicking remains. And it remains either true or fals ethat one ought not kick the puppy. — Banno

Relative to my standard of judgement, it's impermissible, and one ought not kick the puppy. That's a truth right there.

Neither you nor I can speak with any warrant about the morality of the act except in the relative sense, as exampled above.

This is of course an ethical variation on Davidson's objection to conceptual schema. That, in turn, is a variation on Einstein's relativistic, the whole point of which is not to show that truth is relative, but that what is true in one system is true in another, under suitable translation.

Relativism fails. Again. — Banno

How so? I've easily refuted your above argument, as I've easily refuted your arguments elsewhere, such as in the abortion discussion. So do you have something else up your sleeve? :chin:

That's a very poor argument. — S

Yep. That's what happens to a critique when you only look at part of it.

Yep. That's what happens to a critique when you only look at part of it. — Banno

Ah, the typical unhelpful Banno one-liner for which you've gained notoriety. Maybe we should sort this out before continuing. Are you going to be cooperative, so that we may have a productive discussion? Or is it going to be more of the above?

As per your suggestion, which part don't you think that I've covered, and why? Quote it, or link to it - help me identify it in some way, and then explain where you think I'm going wrong. I'm sure I don't have to explain this to you. You should know how this works by now. You've been here even longer than I have. I don't need to teach you how to suck eggs, you just need a kick up the arse in the hope of jolting you out of your laziness.

Ah, the typical unhelpful Banno one-liner for which you've gained notoriety. — S

Thank you.

you just need a kick up the arse in the hope of jolting you out of your laziness. — S

Actually, I was poaching a couple of eggs for breakfast. And the toast just popped.

Thank you. — Banno

You're welcome.

Actually, I was poaching a couple of eggs for breakfast. And the toast just popped. — Banno

Fascinating. Please continue. I want to hear all about it. Believe it or not, that's actually what brought me to this discussion. I saw what the topic was about and immediately thought to myself, "I simply must know what Banno is having for breakfast".

Two poached eggs; not my own, but free range from a local farm. Still runny. Salt and olive oil, not butter. I find it more flavoursome.

Mediterranean coffee, pot-boiled. Strong and sweet, just like me.

Now these are issues of taste. They are about what I chose for me.

But morality, you see, is about what I, and others, ought do; indeed, about what every and each of us ought do.

Everywhere else, if you say one thing, and I say the other, one of us is wrong. You agree with me that one ought not kick the puppy, but apparently lack the intestinal fortitude to apply this to those who come from some other moral background.

If folk ought not kick the pup, then folk ought not kick the pup, even if they think they ought.

Yet you deny this obvious bit of consistency.

"One ought not kick the puppy". I show Fred the puppy, and he yet insists that the it's ok to kick it. I bring in a panel of experts, and do various tests to check his language use and so on, and find no obvious difference. I show him the puppy again, and yet Fred still insists that it is not the case that one ought not kick the puppy. I conclude that there is something wrong with Fred. — Banno

Either Fred doesn't share our standard of judgement, meaning that he judges it to be okay to kick the puppy, like he insists; or he does share our judgement (although he has a funny way of showing it, given his insistence that it's okay to kick the puppy!), but like myself and many others, he rejects the unwarranted suggestion that statements such as, "One ought not kick the puppy", can rightly be interpreted to be true in a non-relative sense. I agree that if it's the former, then there's something wrong with Fred: his standard of judgement in this regard is surprisingly poor from our perspective. But if it's the latter, then, besides his peculiar insistence, there's nothing wrong with Fred - he's actually a sensible chap - you'd just be making him look bad with this sort of misleading shock tactic which keen eyes can detect. It would seem to be a sort of guilt by association fallacy, sending the message that he approves of puppy kicking, when really he just disagrees about the appropriateness of applying an absolute sense of truth in relation to moral statements such as the above.

That's a curious sort of logical yoga you are doing there.