How does the mind fit into the natural realm since we do not have an explanation for it and mental phenomena? — Andrew4Handel
I'm a physicalist/identity theorist. — Terrapin Station
I don't know what identity you are positing? — Andrew4Handel
if that is what it means then you are making our mental realm objective — Andrew4Handel
You could give an explanation of why someone held a certain opinion by explain how it was determined by her brain states — Andrew4Handel
i think what ever goodness is it does not seem to be physical. — Andrew4Handel
Again, the very idea of nonphysical anythings is incoherent. You could try to make it coherent, but that would require a lot of work. — Terrapin Station
You could give an explanation of why someone held a certain opinion by explain how it was determined by her brain states
— Andrew4Handel
Again, I wouldn't get into an "explanation" discussion without the demarcation criteria discussion (re what counts as explanations) as I outlined above. — Terrapin Station
If the mind was physical then everything I imagine, however silly, would be physical — Andrew4Handel
The idea that brain states are determined is a common belief. If the mind is the brain then brain events are determined by other physical events. This explanation would usurp the subjective as an explanation. — Andrew4Handel
Free will is a problem for any moral theory and a physicalist theory is far less likely to allow for freewill. — Andrew4Handel
Saying that the nonphysical is the "reality of our mental life" is just completely empty. You'd need to try to make any sense whatsoever of what nonphysical things are supposed to be ontologically, what their properties are in general, etc. — Terrapin Station
Physics hasn't been determinist in over 100 years. — Terrapin Station
Earth to Andrew4Handel. You'd have to set out demarcation criteria as I outlined above if you want me to have an explanation discussion. — Terrapin Station
Everything you imagine is a state of your brain. — Terrapin Station
Contrast to those who say good is subjective.
If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another.
Hence a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno
"There ought be a rose garden" is true if one promised to plant a rose garden. — creativesoul
True moral statements correspond to moral facts. — creativesoul
Making a promise is the moral fact of the matter. — creativesoul
Moore thought that the concept "good" could not be defined in a subject-predicate way. In other words, good itself could not be explained with other descriptions without begging the question. What is goodness can never be a closed question for Moore. Somehow he thought we intuited it so he was a brand of intuitionist. However, he thought once we "intuited" it, we can judge the effects of actions, and this could lead to closed questions of which effects works better or which effects have more successful outcomes. — schopenhauer1
aren't you arguing that there's something objectively wrong with them? — Terrapin Station
it's the sort of support that if someone says it's not wrong, we can independently check what's the case — Terrapin Station
It is quite easy to imagine an alternate milieu: another society with radically different moral leanings, where kicking a pup would be interpreted differently (perhaps as a non-event for example). — emancipate
I don't thing this works, because of the nature of moral judgements.
"I ought not kick the puppy" is not the same as "no one ought kick the puppy". It's this second statement that is moral; it says what others ought do. The first "I ought not kick the puppy", is not a moral statement but a personal preference. — Banno
Ought he be permitted to kick the puppy? S says that it's only relative to my moral system that I can say "he ought not kick the puppy"; if in his moral system puppy kicking is permitted, then that's an end to it. — Banno
But the question of the permissibility of puppy-kicking remains. And it remains either true or fals ethat one ought not kick the puppy. — Banno
This is of course an ethical variation on Davidson's objection to conceptual schema. That, in turn, is a variation on Einstein's relativistic, the whole point of which is not to show that truth is relative, but that what is true in one system is true in another, under suitable translation.
Relativism fails. Again. — Banno
Yep. That's what happens to a critique when you only look at part of it. — Banno
Thank you. — Banno
Actually, I was poaching a couple of eggs for breakfast. And the toast just popped. — Banno
"One ought not kick the puppy". I show Fred the puppy, and he yet insists that the it's ok to kick it. I bring in a panel of experts, and do various tests to check his language use and so on, and find no obvious difference. I show him the puppy again, and yet Fred still insists that it is not the case that one ought not kick the puppy. I conclude that there is something wrong with Fred. — Banno
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