When we're talking about thought/belief in any context, it is never equivalent to feelings.
— creativesoul

It is re the way I'm using "feelings" in this context. That's the whole point I've been making. — Terrapin Station

Which is why I've been at pains to explain to you how your use of "feelings" is not equivalent to my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". Those two uses do not have the same referent.

Which is why I've been at pains to explain to you how your use of "feelings" is not equivalent to my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". Those two uses do not have the same referent. — creativesoul

What's an example where you'd use "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" (in this moral context)?

Your question does not bear upon the argument I'm giving. Mine does.

I don't care at the moment if it does or not. I asked you a question. If you're to not be a rude a-hole, you'll answer.

I answered the apple question right? Didn't have anything to do with anything. But I answered, because you asked. If I ask you a question, answer it, whether you think it has anything to do with anything else or not.

What's an example where you'd use "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" (in this moral context)? — Terrapin Station

What difference does that make?

None.

You conflate thought/belief and feelings.

I don't.

I answered the apple questino right? Didn't have anything to do with anything. But I answered, because you asked. — Terrapin Station

The apple question had everything to do with how feelings are not equivalent to thought/belief.

What difference does that make? — creativesoul

If there's no example of you using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" then there's no reason to believe that you're using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" differently than I'm using "feelings"

The apple question had everything to do with how feelings are not equivalent to thought/belief. — creativesoul

Not in my view. But I answered it anyway. So how about not being a rude jerk?

If there's no example of you using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" then there's no reason to believe that you're using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" differently than I'm using "feelings" — Terrapin Station

If "feelings" are thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour on your view, then you're working from a conception of thought/belief that is in stark contrast to my own. There is no better reason to believe that you're using the same terms differently.

You use y however you use it. Let's say there's no example where I'd use y in any different way.

Then, I say, "I use x so that it's identical to y." You don't at all use x that way.

That doesn't give you any grounds to say that we use y in any different way. You only know that you don't at all use x in the same way.

Your question asks the participant a question about their approval/disapproval of the behaviour.

My argument shows that not all utterances of "ought" are equivalent to a voice of approval/disapproval.

The appropriate question to ask is the one I suggested.

Perhaps.

I mean, it does seem quite odd to me when someone else(you in this case) insists that their use of the term feelings has the same referent as my use of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour even when it does not. The oddity arises not from the mistake, but rather from the insistence of telling me that I'm wrong about my own terminological use. This oddity is further perpetuated/compounded when this person remains adamant while openly voicing no interest whatsoever in understanding my position.

Without knowing both frameworks, one cannot possibly know which terms - if any - in the respective accounts share the same referent. There can be no comparison between without knowledge of both.

:sad:

Some conceptions are of that which exist in their entirety prior to being conceived.
— creativesoul

It's a mystery to me what that might be saying/what it might amount to. — Terrapin Station

Glad it wasn't just me. Good luck to anyone trying to make sense of it. I tried.

We come up with all sorts of names for all sorts of things. It quite simply does not follow from that that all of those things are artificial. — creativesoul

That's a misunderstanding. I wasn't talking about things, at least not things as in trees and rocks and whatnot. These are obviously things, and obviously natural things. I was talking about language and abstractions.

Yes, I'm pointing to human actions. If Joe murders Bill then Joe's action is wrong. That's a perfectly ordinary example using a moral predicate.

What makes a specific action moral (or not) is a function of what is universally valuable for human beings (namely, life and well-being).

To make a parallel with your paragraph above, suppose Alice claims that it is raining outside. If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, claiming it is raining, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, speech acts, rain. Where's the truth to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature?

Yet we do say that Alice's claim is true (or not) independent of her preferences or opinions on the matter. — Andrew M

These are just the same bad arguments, only made by different people, or put in a different way. So now I'm expected to believe that your "wrong" is like rain? It's really easy to make a false analogy which looks the same, but has important differences which render it false or misleading.

I'm not presenting an isolated form of reasoning consisting of variables that you can simply replace with whatever you want without effecting the soundness of the reasoning. The content matters, the context matters, the differences matter.

And for the umpteenth time, you can't just take for granted what you're supposed to be trying to prove. What universal values? You haven't demonstrated any. That's the whole point.

I believe the original post contradicts the quoted passage. In fact, I think precisely the opposite is implied.
On the second comment I would like to interject my own opinion that the word ‘good’ is a flexible term in real life where line soften blur and there are more than a few factors for every action rather than one singular desire to ‘do good’ or to desire to desire the ‘good’.
Here it is easy to repeat Meno’s error against Plato that virtue is subjective, like a child’s, a policeman’s and a retired person each ought to follow different and sometimes conflicting policies to be virtuous. It must be remembered that: different virtues like kindness, courage and even the modern meaning of virtue viz skill or talent, and such individual qualities are subjective. But virtue itself, by very definition, is objective.

Human beings have physiological needs including the need for food and water, therefore food and water is valuable for humans. — Andrew M

Doesn't follow, unless perhaps you're using "valuable" to mean something else.

Humans are individuals. Physiological needs aren't necessarily valuable for an individual. And they aren't in certain cases. If I'm on hunger strike, and that's the most valuable thing to me in the world right now, then the "need" for food isn't valuable for me. It's actually the antithesis of value for me.

So now I'm expected to believe that your "wrong" is like rain? — S

No, I'm saying "right/wrong" is like "true/false". The former relates to actions generally, the latter to speech acts. Joe murdering Bill is wrong. And that statement is true.

And for the umpteenth time, you can't just take for granted what you're supposed to be trying to prove. What universal values? — S

I didn't say I'd proven it. I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model.

Humans are individuals. Physiological needs aren't necessarily valuable for an individual. And they aren't in certain cases. If I'm on hunger strike, and that's the most valuable thing to me in the world right now, then the "need" for food isn't valuable for me. It's actually the antithesis of value for me. — S

The empirical issue is whether the reason for hunger strike behavior is consistent with the above model's assumptions. I would suggest that the most valuable thing for the hunger-striker is not that they suffer and die, but that an injustice be overturned (which adversely affects people's lives and well-being). Their hunger strike behavior is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

No, I'm saying "right/wrong" is like "truth/falsity". The former relates to actions generally, the latter to speech acts. Joe murdering Bill is wrong. And that statement is true. — Andrew M

Except that the way in which we judge whether the statement about rain is true differs in important respects from the way in which we judge Joe murdering Bill is wrong, so your analogy is false or misleading at best, and not for the first time.

I can look outside to see whether it's raining. I can't look outside to see whether it's wronging. I reach a moral judgement through my moral feelings. I don't judge the weather that way - my feelings are irrelevant.

These differences have been pointed out time and again, yet still the false equivalencies keep on coming.

I didn't say I'd proven it. I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model. — Andrew M

No, you said that they're universal values. Can you, for once, not move the goalposts? That's an informal fallacy, you know? It's a bad model as you originally described it when I made this criticism in my last reply before you moved the goalposts. It fails Ockham's razor. I don't need to make the additional posit of universal values in order to explain their observed behaviour, and if it is truly universal, then there can be no exceptions, but there can be, so your claim about universal values is false.

The empirical issue is whether the reason for hunger strike behavior is consistent with the above model's assumptions. I would suggest that the most valuable thing for the hunger-striker is not that they suffer and die, but that an injustice be overturned (which adversely affects people's life and well-being). Their hunger strike behavior is a means to an end, not an end in itself. — Andrew M

It's obviously not consistent with the model. It's an example of a situation where food isn't valuable to a human: it's the opposite of being valuable to them. It doesn't matter what you think is valuable. You don't get to decide. I'm telling you that food isn't valuable to them.

I also gave the earlier counterexample of poison being more valuable to a human than water.

I don't think that you're going to be reasonable here. You'll just explain away whatever counterexamples I raise rather than concede. If I say that the sky is blue, you'll say no, it's red. If I say that it's Monday, you'll say no, it's Friday.

Morality, at the very least, definitely has an artificial aspect. We came up with "good" and "bad", moral language, moral rules, moral principles, etc. We came up with moral concepts. — S

We come up with all sorts of names for all sorts of things. It quite simply does not follow from that that all of those things are artificial.

Trees come to mind as an obvious example, or rocks, if you prefer. These are obviously not equivalent to our notions/conceptions of them, obviously not artificial. They are physical things. Only a moron would think that they are existentially dependent upon our names for them, or that they were artificial.

However, there are other things that are not physical objects that we've named, talked about, conceived, and misconceived even. Human thought and belief is one such thing. Morality consists entirely thereof. Thus, if one does not understand the former, there can be little hope of understanding the latter.

Our moral concepts, ideas, rules, and principles can be mistaken/false. — creativesoul

That's a misunderstanding. I wasn't talking about things, at least not things as in trees and rocks and whatnot. These are obviously things, and obviously natural things. I was talking about language and abstractions. — S

Clear it up then. You invoked the notions of "artificial" and "conception"...

I thought we were talking about morality. Particularly I was making the point that just because we 'come up' with a conception of "morality", it does not follow that morality is artificial.

Except that the way in which we judge whether the statement about rain is true differs in important respects from the way in which we judge Joe murdering Bill is wrong, ... — S

So it does. Nonetheless morality is an abstraction over actions just as truth is an abstraction over speech acts.

I reach a moral judgement through my moral feelings. — S

Whereas I consider the consequences of the person's actions in relation to people's life and well-being.

I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model.
— Andrew M

No, you said that they're universal values. — S

Those assumed values are universal in scope, yes.

It's obviously not consistent with the model. It's an example of a situation where food isn't valuable to a human: it's the opposite of being valuable to them. It doesn't matter what you think is valuable. You don't get to decide. I'm telling you that food isn't valuable to them. — S

Have you ever put up with short-term pain for some reason, say, getting immunization shots or training for a marathon? Does it follow that life and well-being are therefore not valuable when you choose to endure the pain?

The hunger-striker is forgoing food - a value - but not because they regard starving and dying as an end in itself.

I don't think that you're going to be reasonable here. — S

I think the dispute is semantic. You define value in terms of opinion or preference, I define it in functional terms.

Clear it up then. — creativesoul

It was already clear enough. It's your fault if you missed it in spite of that. I didn't even mention trees or rocks. You plucked that out of thin air.

You invoked the notions of "artificial" and "conception"...

I thought we were talking about morality. Particularly I was making the point that just because we 'come up' with a conception of "morality", it does not follow that morality is artificial. — creativesoul

That's an irrelevant conclusion. I only said that morality definitely has an artificial aspect. Pay closer attention in future and you'll reduce the chance of making these same mistakes again.

Whereas I consider the consequences of the person's actions in relation to people's life and well-being. — Andrew M

It's not some sort of pure intellectual thing, though. You don't just consider, you feel a certain way about it, and that's very relevant, perhaps more than you realise.

Those assumed values are universal in scope, yes. — Andrew M

No, and that hasn't been reasonably demonstrated. It's no different, in principle, then if I were to say that God exists or we live on Mars.

Have you ever put up with short-term pain for some reason, say, getting immunization shots or training for a marathon? Does it follow that life and well-being are therefore not valuable when you choose to endure the pain?

The hunger-striker is forgoing food - a value - but not because they regard starving and dying as an end in itself. — Andrew M

You haven't demonstrated that it's necessarily a value to begin with, so saying that it's a value which they forgo does nothing. That's like saying that God exists as an Unmoved Mover, or that we live on Mars on Tuesdays.

I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that you can't reasonably demonstrate a universal value. Begging the question doesn't count, and you've had plenty of opportunities.

Your point that it works as an explanation is refuted by my point about Ockham's razor.

I think the dispute is semantic. You define value in terms of opinion or preference, I define it in functional terms. — Andrew M

Yeah, that's a bit of a problem. You're not even talking about value, not like the rest of us. You should call that something else to avoid confusion. You're talking about food and water, which are just necessities for survival which most people happen to value, and life itself, which again, most people just happen to value. Nothing universal there when you're talking like the rest of us, as you should be. Setting up your own language barrier is not a good thing.

I only said that morality definitely has an artificial aspect. — S

I know what you said. I quoted it verbatim. Your argument for your conclusion does not hold good. It does not follow from the fact that we've named something - anything - that that which is named is artificial.

Clearly, you're invoking notions like "conception" and "artificial" in an attempt to bolster your view on morality. The attempt fails. The arguments are fallacious. The viewpoint is based upon rhetoric. You do not even seem to have a coherent notion of either "conception" or "artificial".

I know what you said. I quoted it verbatim. Your argument for your conclusion does not hold good. It does not follow from the fact that we've named something - anything - that that which is named is artificial. — creativesoul

You're not very good at accurately representing other people's arguments in your own words. Maybe stick to quoting them, and making requests for clarification if need be.

Do you have an argument for the conclusion that morality has an artificial aspect?

I doubt it.

Surprise me.

Do you have an argument for the conclusion that morality has an artificial aspect?

I doubt it.

Surprise me. — creativesoul

I threw you a bone already. Or rather, you snatched it out of my hand and ran off with it. (Bad dog!)

Artificial: made or produced by human beings rather than occurring naturally.

Moral language, moral rules, moral principles, moral concepts, moral theories, etc. comprise an aspect of morality.

Moral language, moral rules, moral principles, moral concepts, moral theories, etc. are artificial.

Therefore, an aspect of morality is artificial.

Surprise! :party:

Artificial: made or produced by human beings rather than occurring naturally.

Scientific language, scientific rules, scientific principles, scientific concepts, scientific theories, etc. comprise an aspect of science.

Scientific language, scientific rules, scientific principles, scientific concepts, scientific theories, etc. are artificial.

Therefore, an aspect of science is artificial.

Yes. A sound argument. It would be absurd to think that these aspects would occur naturally without us. But I wouldn't put it past you. With philosophy-types, anything is possible. Up can be down, forwards can be backwards, the sky can be the sea, and Trump can be president.