When we're talking about thought/belief in any context, it is never equivalent to feelings.
— creativesoul
It is re the way I'm using "feelings" in this context. That's the whole point I've been making. — Terrapin Station
Which is why I've been at pains to explain to you how your use of "feelings" is not equivalent to my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". Those two uses do not have the same referent. — creativesoul
What's an example where you'd use "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" (in this moral context)? — Terrapin Station
I answered the apple questino right? Didn't have anything to do with anything. But I answered, because you asked. — Terrapin Station
What difference does that make? — creativesoul
The apple question had everything to do with how feelings are not equivalent to thought/belief. — creativesoul
If there's no example of you using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" then there's no reason to believe that you're using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" differently than I'm using "feelings" — Terrapin Station
Some conceptions are of that which exist in their entirety prior to being conceived.
— creativesoul
It's a mystery to me what that might be saying/what it might amount to. — Terrapin Station
We come up with all sorts of names for all sorts of things. It quite simply does not follow from that that all of those things are artificial. — creativesoul
Yes, I'm pointing to human actions. If Joe murders Bill then Joe's action is wrong. That's a perfectly ordinary example using a moral predicate.
What makes a specific action moral (or not) is a function of what is universally valuable for human beings (namely, life and well-being).
To make a parallel with your paragraph above, suppose Alice claims that it is raining outside. If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, claiming it is raining, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, speech acts, rain. Where's the truth to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature?
Yet we do say that Alice's claim is true (or not) independent of her preferences or opinions on the matter. — Andrew M
Human beings have physiological needs including the need for food and water, therefore food and water is valuable for humans. — Andrew M
So now I'm expected to believe that your "wrong" is like rain? — S
And for the umpteenth time, you can't just take for granted what you're supposed to be trying to prove. What universal values? — S
Humans are individuals. Physiological needs aren't necessarily valuable for an individual. And they aren't in certain cases. If I'm on hunger strike, and that's the most valuable thing to me in the world right now, then the "need" for food isn't valuable for me. It's actually the antithesis of value for me. — S
No, I'm saying "right/wrong" is like "truth/falsity". The former relates to actions generally, the latter to speech acts. Joe murdering Bill is wrong. And that statement is true. — Andrew M
I didn't say I'd proven it. I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model. — Andrew M
The empirical issue is whether the reason for hunger strike behavior is consistent with the above model's assumptions. I would suggest that the most valuable thing for the hunger-striker is not that they suffer and die, but that an injustice be overturned (which adversely affects people's life and well-being). Their hunger strike behavior is a means to an end, not an end in itself. — Andrew M
Morality, at the very least, definitely has an artificial aspect. We came up with "good" and "bad", moral language, moral rules, moral principles, etc. We came up with moral concepts. — S
We come up with all sorts of names for all sorts of things. It quite simply does not follow from that that all of those things are artificial.
Trees come to mind as an obvious example, or rocks, if you prefer. These are obviously not equivalent to our notions/conceptions of them, obviously not artificial. They are physical things. Only a moron would think that they are existentially dependent upon our names for them, or that they were artificial.
However, there are other things that are not physical objects that we've named, talked about, conceived, and misconceived even. Human thought and belief is one such thing. Morality consists entirely thereof. Thus, if one does not understand the former, there can be little hope of understanding the latter.
Our moral concepts, ideas, rules, and principles can be mistaken/false. — creativesoul
That's a misunderstanding. I wasn't talking about things, at least not things as in trees and rocks and whatnot. These are obviously things, and obviously natural things. I was talking about language and abstractions. — S
Except that the way in which we judge whether the statement about rain is true differs in important respects from the way in which we judge Joe murdering Bill is wrong, ... — S
I reach a moral judgement through my moral feelings. — S
I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model.
— Andrew M
No, you said that they're universal values. — S
It's obviously not consistent with the model. It's an example of a situation where food isn't valuable to a human: it's the opposite of being valuable to them. It doesn't matter what you think is valuable. You don't get to decide. I'm telling you that food isn't valuable to them. — S
I don't think that you're going to be reasonable here. — S
Clear it up then. — creativesoul
You invoked the notions of "artificial" and "conception"...
I thought we were talking about morality. Particularly I was making the point that just because we 'come up' with a conception of "morality", it does not follow that morality is artificial. — creativesoul
Whereas I consider the consequences of the person's actions in relation to people's life and well-being. — Andrew M
Those assumed values are universal in scope, yes. — Andrew M
Have you ever put up with short-term pain for some reason, say, getting immunization shots or training for a marathon? Does it follow that life and well-being are therefore not valuable when you choose to endure the pain?
The hunger-striker is forgoing food - a value - but not because they regard starving and dying as an end in itself. — Andrew M
I think the dispute is semantic. You define value in terms of opinion or preference, I define it in functional terms. — Andrew M
I only said that morality definitely has an artificial aspect. — S
I know what you said. I quoted it verbatim. Your argument for your conclusion does not hold good. It does not follow from the fact that we've named something - anything - that that which is named is artificial. — creativesoul
Do you have an argument for the conclusion that morality has an artificial aspect?
I doubt it.
Surprise me. — creativesoul
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