The line is somewhere short of "absolute certainty". — unenlightened

Right, so how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not, to know whether you ought to doubt your reading or not? What even constitutes "normal circumstances"?

The point though, is that "leave no room for doubt" (85) implies absolute certainty, whereas "under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose" (87) implies something other than absolute certainty. And, since we are talking about the rules (sign-posts) which are foundational to knowledge and understanding, the epistemological difference is significant, depending on which of these two, one chooses to believe.

The latter, "somewhere short of 'absolute certainty'", is what I believe to be the true description. However, in "On Certainty", Wittgenstein proceeds in an attempt to justify some sense of the phrase "it is certain that...", and this is a falling back onto the ideal, 'absolute certainty', which he is here, in his description, trying to dispatch.

§88

OK, last one before things start to ease-up and we get to the 'Wittgenstein rants about philosophy for 40 paragraphs' section. Anyway, §88 is a reflection of the way in which terms like 'exact' and 'inexact' are used when it comes to issues of explanations. Witty's basic question is something like: exact or inexact with respect to what, exactly? As with his rejection of what I called the explanatory pyramid before, here too he rejects the idea that 'exactness' must be exact 'all the way down', as if one must have an specification of 'exactness' at each 'level' - again, explanation ad infinitum and regress are rejected:

§88: "Perhaps like drawing a boundary-line around a region with chalk? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour edge would be more exact. But has this exactness still got a function here: isn’t it running idle? Moreover, we haven’t yet laid down what is to count as overstepping this sharp boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be ascertained. And so on."

So if this idealized notion of exactness (transcendental exactness, we might even call it), isn't appropriate, what notion of exactness is? Well, Witty says, it depends on what you're trying to do with the 'exactness' in question: §88: "what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does what is more exact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. So if I just want to be able to find you after i get back from my toilet break, 'stay roughly here' will more or less suffice for that goal. There's no need to get any 'deeper' (just as it's not inexact "when I don’t give our distance from the sun to the nearest metre, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of a millimetre").

At one point Witty veers even into making 'exact' and 'inexact' nothing more than dispositions: “inexact” is really a reproach, and “exact” is praise."; To put this all otherwise: there are no 'absolute' explanations, explanations 'in-themselves': there are only explanations relative to whatever it is you're trying to do with that explanation. This is all of a piece with his skepticism regarding 'ideal' languages (§81), and how language-use must be treated on its own terms, and not with respect to some ideal of it (compare: §88: "No single ideal of exactness has been envisaged; we do not know what we are to make of this idea"; and §81: "the word “ideal” is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language").

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Anyway, this might be my last post here for some time, as I'm overseas for about a month. I'll still post but not at this frequency. It's a good place in the book to slow down anyway, as the next few sections really mark a change in pace and tone from what has come so far.

Right, so how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not, to know whether you ought to doubt your reading or not? What even constitutes "normal circumstances"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. The fact that I have just answered the questions you are asking, indicates that circumstances are not normal. Let me put it simply. Normality is what is assumed to be the case until something abnormal impinges. In this case, what is abnormal is your question about knowing what is normal. I don't need a reason to think that sign posts stand at junctions and indicate what lies down the road. That's normal. The answer to, 'how would you know ...?' is 'why would you ask ...? And you might have a good reason for asking, for thinking things might not be normal. But you have to bring that forward before your question makes sense, otherwise it becomes one of those endlessly repeating games. How would you know you are asking a sensible question?

The answer to, 'how would you know ...?' is 'why would you ask ...? And you might have a good reason for asking, for thinking things might not be normal. — unenlightened

Yes, I had good reason for asking. You used the phrase "normal circumstances", so I asked for an explanation, how would I know if the circumstances are normal or not. This is what Wittgenstein is investigating at 87, such explanations. Is there is a way to end the possibility of infinite regress of explanations required to ensure that one does not misunderstand? Yes, there is an end he says, but this end only exists under "normal circumstances". But if "normal circumstances" itself needs further explanation, then this is not a real solution to the problem.

But you have to bring that forward before your question makes sense, otherwise it becomes one of those endlessly repeating games. How would you know you are asking a sensible question? — unenlightened

Actually, the onus is on you. When you use language, it is always respectable for the hearer to ask for clarification, so such a question (how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not?) always makes sense. It makes sense because the hearer is asking in order to avoid misunderstanding. It always makes sense to ask for clarification in order to avoid misunderstanding. And, it is disrespectful, and doesn't make sense to automatically assume that the asker is playing an endless repeater game.

If you happen to believe that under "normal circumstances", it does not make sense to ask for clarification of a statement, in order to avoid misunderstanding, then you need to explain how one would know whether the circumstances are normal or not, in order to avoid asking for clarification (in an effort to avoid misunderstanding), in times when it doesn't make sense to ask for clarification..

If you happen to believe that under "normal circumstances", it does not make sense to ask for clarification of a statement, in order to avoid misunderstanding, then you need to explain how one would know whether the circumstances are normal or not, in order to avoid asking for clarification (in an effort to avoid misunderstanding), in times when it doesn't make sense to ask for clarification. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's exactly what I don't need to explain, because that is exactly what I have just explained it doesn't make sense to ask for further explanation of. One can, by definition, only tell normality by experience, Normally I have coffee for breakfast, if I don't, circumstances are not normal; perhaps the coffee has run out, perhaps I have died, perhaps some other abnormality. If you didn't know what I normally have for breakfast, there is no way of knowing whether my lying corpse-like on the kitchen floor is normal or not.

So if this idealized notion of exactness (transcendental exactness, we might even call it), isn't appropriate, what notion of exactness is? Well, Witty says, it depends on what you're trying to do with the 'exactness' in question: §88: "what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does what is more exact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. So if I just want to be able to find you after i get back from my toilet break, 'stay roughly here' will more or less suffice for that goal. There's no need to get any 'deeper' (just as it's not inexact "when I don’t give our distance from the sun to the nearest metre, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of a millimetre"). — StreetlightX

What he does here is replace "the ideal" with "the goal". The degree of exactitude required in any particular circumstance is relative to "the goal". Therefore exactitude is defined in relation to practise, rather than defining it in relation to a theoretical "ideal". Again, this is a rejection of platonic dialectics. Plato would position "the goal", as the ideal, such that the ultimate goal is the ideal, and any particular instance of "a goal", would only have meaning in relation to the absolute, the ideal.

His example of time is quite powerful. We can measure time by seconds, we can measure time by nanoseconds, or whatever, each giving a different level of exactitude for a different purpose. And there is no "ideal' or absolute exactness in relation to time, which we could strive for as a goal, as relativity theory has removed this.

No, that's exactly what I don't need to explain, because that is exactly what I have just explained it doesn't make sense to ask for further explanation of. — unenlightened

All you are saying is that my inability to understand what you mean by "normal circumstances" doesn't make sense to you. That's fine, I'll just go on my merry way, bringing my lack of understanding with me. But no matter how much you insist that it doesn't make sense for me to ask for further explanation, my lack of understanding will continue to exist until you provide for me a satisfactory explanation. You cannot make a person's lack of understanding disappear simply by insisting that the person's questioning doesn't make sense to you.

That's the whole problem with Wittgenstein's approach to doubt. If a person has doubt, then that doubt can only be removed by answering the person's questions, and providing appropriate explanations for that person. You cannot just tell the person, your doubt doesn't make sense to me, therefore it is unreasonable doubt, and assume that this will make the doubt nonexistent.

All you are saying is that my inability to understand what you mean by "normal circumstances" doesn't make sense to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

No I'm not. I'm saying it doesn't make sense at all, to me to you, or to Norman the Norm.

You cannot just tell the person, your doubt doesn't make sense to me, — Metaphysician Undercover

You can accuse me of this, but not Wittgenstein. He's "just" written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples. Me, I'm about ready to make with the poker already.

No I'm not. I'm saying it doesn't make sense at all, to me to you, or to Norman the Norm. — unenlightened

It makes sense to me. Every moment I live from day to day is different from the last. How would I say that the circumstances at one moment are normal, but the circumstances at another moment are not normal?

You can accuse me of this, but not Wittgenstein. He's "just" written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples. Me, I'm about ready to make with the poker already. — unenlightened

Have you read "On Certainty"? If he takes it for granted that "normal circumstances" requires no further explanation, then his epistemology has a big problem. The problem with "many many examples", is that each example is different, so the more examples that one produces the more evidence one gives, that "normal circumstances" is incomprehensible. If it requires normal circumstances to exclude doubt, then doubt will never be excluded because circumstances are never normal.

Cool, nothing is normal. That must make life difficult.

As you honestly don't seem to understand, I've thought of an example to elucidate. Every morning when I leave the house I have a little routine of chores that I do outside before I go to work. One of the things I do is to feed some cats outside, so I bring a little plastic bag with some cat food. So under "normal circumstances" when I go out the door I am carrying a little bag of cat food. But some times I'm bringing other things, or I'm distracted talking to someone, or thinking about philosophy, and I forget the cat foot, so this is an "abnormal circumstance". Now, when I'm going out the door, it clearly makes sense to doubt myself in the abnormal circumstances, before I proceed, because then I will notice that I've forgotten something. Also, it appears like it doesn't make sense to doubt myself before proceeding in the normal circumstances, because that doubting would be a useless waste of time. However, I will never know whether the circumstances are normal circumstances or abnormal circumstances, unless I doubt. So it actually does make sense to doubt myself every time I go out the door, in order to distinguish the normal situations from the abnormal situations.

Compare this to understanding the sign-post, or another person's use of language. Under normal circumstances I have a correct and adequate understanding of what the other person is saying. It is an abnormal circumstance if my understanding is mistaken. In the abnormal circumstances, when my understanding is mistaken, it clearly makes sense to doubt my understanding. And, it appears like it doesn't make sense to doubt my understanding in the normal circumstances when my understanding is correct and adequate. However, this appearance is an illusion created by the way that the situation is being described. In reality, I cannot determine whether the circumstances are normal or abnormal without doubting. Therefore, if we base whether doubting is justified or not, on a determination of normal or abnormal circumstances, doubting is always justified because this determination requires doubt.

In other words, one cannot avoid doubt by judging the normalcy of the circumstances, because the very premise which produces the need for that judgement, the possibility that the circumstances might be abnormal, itself justifies doubt.

one cannot avoid doubt by judging the normalcy of the circumstances, because the very premise which produces the need for that judgement, the possibility that the circumstances might be abnormal, itself justifies doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed one cannot, and so one does not make such a judgement. In making that judgement one would have already raised the question that the judgement would give one reason to raise or not to raise. The whole point is that one does not need a reason not to doubt, but a reason to doubt. If I notice the ground around the post is disturbed, or the paint is still wet, then I might have a reason to doubt - I don't need a reason not to doubt that the sign post is doing its job. What you seem to be describing is close to OCD. And my experience of living with someone with OCD is that the endless unjustified self-doubt in the end makes decisions less reliable not more.

The whole point is that one does not need a reason not to doubt, but a reason to doubt. — unenlightened

This is clearly not the case. Our natural approach to all circumstances is to consider possibilities. And, the nature of possibility makes doubt natural, whereas certainty is only created by subjecting possibilities to the principles of probability. Therefore the reasoning of probability gives us reason not to doubt. But without probabilities we are presented with possibilities and no certainty, so doubt is natural. Doubt is fundamental, and reason is needed to exclude doubt.

If I notice the ground around the post is disturbed, or the paint is still wet, then I might have a reason to doubt - I don't need a reason not to doubt that the sign post is doing its job. — unenlightened

The job of the sign-post is to direct you in the intended direction. You are the person reading the sign. You need a reason to believe that you are reading the sign correctly, otherwise you are unsure as to whether you are reading the sign correctly (doubt). Doubt as to the intent of the sign-post, is the natural state when you approach the sign-post, unless you have a reason to believe that you know how to understand the sign. If you have such a reason you can proceed from the sign-post without doubt. Without such a reason there will be nothing conclusive within your mind, that you are reading the sign-post correctly, and doubt as to how to read the sign will be pervasive.

Now let's say that you have good reason to believe that you know how to read this type of sign correctly, you have much experience with this type of sign. You assume that your understanding of this sign, under "normal circumstances" gives you no reason to doubt. But what if the person who posted the sign doesn't follow the same conventions as you, and planted the sign in a backward way, or the sign has been tampered with as you allude to as a possibility, making the circumstances "not normal". If you approach these signs with the certainty that you know how to read this type of sign correctly, you will not doubt your capacity, and you will not notice that the circumstances are abnormal, until after you make your mistake. If you approach these signs with uncertainty, doubt, then the probability that you will notice an abnormal situation will be greatly increased.

The possibility of a "not-normal" situation creates the possibility of a mistake in understanding. The goal is to avoid mistakes in understanding. This requires that we doubt the normalcy of every situation. If we are inclined to assume that the situation is normal, because there is a high probability that the situation will be normal, and therefore we do not doubt the normalcy of the situation in each instance, then when the improbable "not normal" situation occurs, it will slip past our attention and mistake will occur.

Have you ever worked in a factory with multiple levels of safety precautions? You would think that one simple form of safety precaution would be adequate. But no, we tend to let down our guard with respect to one level of safety precaution, assuming to be certain that we would apprehend the not-normal circumstance, and a mistake would not be made, and so the second level of safety precaution is required to save us when we fail to apprehend the not normal situation.

The possibility of a "not-normal" situation creates the possibility of a mistake in understanding. The goal is to avoid mistakes in understanding. This requires that we doubt the normalcy of every situation. If we are inclined to assume that the situation is normal, because there is a high probability that the situation will be normal, and therefore we do not doubt the normalcy of the situation in each instance, then when the improbable "not normal" situation occurs, it will slip past our attention and mistake will occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. How does that work out for you? Ever make a mistake?

Doubt as to the intent of the sign-post, is the natural state when you approach the sign-post, unless you have a reason to believe that you know how to understand the sign. If you have such a reason you can proceed from the sign-post without doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

What sort of a reason?

I make lots of mistakes, that's not really relevant except to show that doubt is always called for. The point is that Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. His ontology of rules necessitates doubt. There cannot be absolute certainty in understanding, he excludes Ideals, rendering absolute certainty as impossible. Then he proceeds in his epistemology as if there could be a situation which leaves no room for doubt. He seeks to ground his epistemology in the Ideal (the exclusion of doubt) which he has already designated as impossible.

When the absolute is excluded, then certainty can only be a function of probability. We can name some arbitrary degree of probability, and claim that at this level of probability doubt is excluded, but this claim that doubt is excluded at this arbitrary level, cannot be justified because of that arbitrariness. The arbitrary level of probability could be one in a thousand, one in a million, whatever; and we could take each lottery ticket, and claim that without a doubt this ticket is a loser, but at the end of the day, one of the tickets wins, so those claims are not justified.

The point being that the exclusion of doubt is inherently incompatible with Wittgenstein's ontology. That's why he's "written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples". He's trying to do the impossible, and he could continue that great fat book to infinite fatness without success. Not even the principle of plenitude could save him because instead of leaving absolute certainty as a possibility, he has denied it as impossible.

As I said above, I have no problem with this ontology, I think it's strong. But we need to accept the ramifications, and principally this is that doubt cannot be excluded. Consider doubt to be a natural product of the physical constitution of the human being; that physical constitution disallows the possibility of absolute certainty, therefore the claim that doubt can be excluded cannot be justified.

What sort of a reason? — Luke

Any reason. You might think, I've seen this type of sign before, and I've learned what it means, therefore I know what this one means. You might think, someone has explained to me this type of sign, and told me what it means, therefore I know what this one means. Perhaps your reason is even some sort of superstition, or intuition. The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, allowing you to decide, and proceed. But removing your doubt with respect to the meaning of the sign, no matter what the reason is, does not justify the claim that there is now no room for doubt.

When the absolute is excluded, then certainty can only be a function of probability. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well no. When the absolute is excluded, and when one acknowledges that this includes absolute doubt as well as absolute knowledge, something we seem to disagree about, then certainty becomes a matter of psychology, of the attitude one takes, the questions one does and does not ask, of the behaviour of the person in relation to things. One can always make room for doubt, but if one does always make room for doubt, then one ends up with no room for anything else. Therefore, demand reasons to believe and reasons to doubt equally, that thy days may be long in the land.

I don't know what you would mean by "absolute doubt". To me, an absolute is an ideal, and the ideal is "certainty", and certainty excludes doubt. So "absolute doubt" appears contradictory. In the context of absolutes, doubt is relative, relative to certainty which is the ideal, the absolute. "Absolute doubt" would be like "absolute evil". In the context of absolutes, "good" is the ideal, the absolute, and "evil" only has meaning insofar as something is deficient in relation to that absolute. But it would be contradictory to make "evil" the absolute because this would make it equivalent to "good", both being the absolute.

So the question for you. If we exclude the ideal, "certainty" from being the absolute, deny that certainty is absolute, doesn't this open the door to doubt as the absolute? The issue being whether or not an absolute is necessary. Wittgenstein denies the ideal, "certainty", but can he deny the absolute? If not, then the absolute may be what is left by the exclusion of certainty, and that is doubt. So "absolute doubt" is very real if we cannot dispose of the need for an absolute.

So the question for you. If we exclude the ideal, "certainty" from being the absolute, deny that certainty is absolute, doesn't this open the door to doubt as the absolute? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. If I am certain, I have no doubt. If I am doubtful, I am uncertain. But since these are both frames of mind, I don't even know what it might mean for them to be absolute.

The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, allowing you to decide, and proceed. But removing your doubt with respect to the meaning of the sign, no matter what the reason is, does not justify the claim that there is now no room for doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, but removing your doubt does not remove doubt?

No. If I am certain, I have no doubt. If I am doubtful, I am uncertain. But since these are both frames of mind, I don't even know what it might mean for them to be absolute. — unenlightened

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing.

The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, but removing your doubt does not remove doubt? — Luke

I would think that having a reason, or reasons, might quell your doubt to the point where you might proceed based on probability. But since a complete removal of doubt is unjustified, you ought not proceed as if you have no doubt at all.

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I’m not misunderstanding:

For what I’ve so far read it seems to me that doubt has mostly been equated to uncertainty; a very common practice which, if I’m correct, is an improper definition of doubt.

As per common usage, if Ted is simply interested in learning more about the properties of X, he does not hold certainty about those properties of X he wishes to learn more about--and is thereby, technically, uncertain about those properties of X he wishes to discover. (We can only be curious about things we are not fully certain about psychologically). However, in this scenario, Ted cannot be validly stated to doubt X’s properties. (Curiosity does not entail doubt for that which one is curious about.) Else: not being omniscient, we are all to some extent uncertain about what the future holds; however, this of itself does not entail that we doubt the specifics of what the future holds.

A hypothesis that I belief to be correct: Doubt is an uncertainty about some previously held certainty, be it one’s own or others, be this held certainty psychological or epistemic. For example:

If I were to claim that the future holds attribute A, and were you to be uncertain that my belief (held beliefs are always held psychological certainties) is valid, then you would doubt that the future holds property A. But without me, you, or anyone else purporting specifics about the future, there would be nothing to doubt about the future—even though one would yet remain uncertain about the future’s specifics.

Doubt demolishes a previously held certainty by making it one credible alternative among rivaling others (not by proving it false). Doubt is one form of uncertainty. But uncertainty in general does not entail doubts:

All enquiry, learning, curiosity, sense of wonder (and maybe some others) require an uncertainty about what if fact is—none entail doubt for that enquired into, learned, wondered upon, and so on.

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In what I believe to be agreement with your general sentiment, I do contend that one can well subsist with an acknowledgment that no such thing as infallible/absolute certainty can be obtained. And that belief that infallible certainties can be obtained is untenable.

Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth.

So uncertainty cannot hold an absolute psychological presence (much less can doubt). The aforementioned instead results in the position of fallibilism*, such that less than infallible certainties of various strengths are maintained till evidenced wrong (with acknowledgment that all of one's certainties are to some extent fallible).

*Which to my mind is validly equivalent to non-Cartesian forms of global skepticism (as in “thoughtful; enquiring”) Global doubt is that pursued by Cartesian skepticism, and this only in the hopes of arriving at infallible certainties that are thereby indubitable.

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p.s., haven't read much of Witt

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is peculiar. As if doubt is some ubiquitous and penetrating miasma that will infect any mind not entirely closed. As if, as I open my front door, I am in some doubt as to whether the street will be outside. No, no, no. I don't in the least doubt as i spoon the instant from the jar into the cup, that when the water is added it will taste a bit like coffee, only not as nice, that the precipitation I see through the window is water and not gin, unfortunately, I don't have to grit my teeth and not think of bizarre improbabilities with great difficulty. I am certain of these things. One cannot live in universal doubt, because there simply isn't time. I could conceivably doubt any of these things, but I couldn't conceivably doubt everything - that is the philosopher's fiction, because one would have to doubt that the words mean what one thinks they mean and so whether one's doubt itself is something or nothing. I rest in the certainty that I am talking sense and folks can understand me, that folks are going to read this and get the meaning. I have no doubt of it, though I dare say I could imagine a scenario in which it would not be so.

My partner is like this when it comes to arithmetic. She starts a calculation, but never quite believes the result she gets and has to go back a check it, and double-check. And by then she has lost her place in the original problem and has to start again. It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy.

Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth. — javra

I cannot understand this. I've seen similar statements, by many different people, and no one has been able to justify this claim for me. Why must there be a foundation of certainty? If reality consists of possibilities, then we face reality in terms of probability. And, we create certainty within our minds, by excluding things as impossible. Necessary is equivalent to impossible to be otherwise. But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates.

Further, the threat of infinite regress of doubt is not a problem. Infinite regress is simply repugnant to the mind which seeks to understand, as is doubt. So an infinite regress of doubt is not at all inconsistent.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. I think, perhaps I left it on the kitchen table. Why must I be certain that there is a kitchen table, to consider this possibility? Suppose my memory is quite bad, and I'm confused perhaps by illness, can I not at the same time consider as a possibility that I do not even have a kitchen table? Maybe I sold the kitchen table last week, or moved into a new place without a table. Where comes the need for an underlying certainty?

I could conceivably doubt any of these things, but I couldn't conceivably doubt everything - that is the philosopher's fiction, because one would have to doubt that the words mean what one thinks they mean and so whether one's doubt itself is something or nothing. — unenlightened

This is exactly the point. Are you certain that the words mean what you think they mean? With Wittgenstein's position, there are possibilities as to the meanings of the words. I approach your words assuming that there is inexactness in my understanding of how you are using those words. Therefore I cannot exclude the possibility that I misunderstand what you are saying. The certitude you express in your examples, I am certain of this, and I am certain of that, is really irrelevant, because the goal here is to determine whether this certitude is justified. I think that from Wittgenstein's perspective, his ontology of rules, this internal certitude which you cannot be justified. Therefore you ought not claim to be certain about the things you claim to be certain about.

It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy. — unenlightened

That's a matter of opinion. As you said in the last post, doubt is a frame of mind. When you develop the attitude, that all the things which you might otherwise claim to be certain of, (such as the things you list), might not actually be as you think they are, this does not impede your life. You may simply live your life in the same way as one who claims to be certain, yet recognizing that certainty is an illusion, it's not real. All it does is give you a different world view, the view that we may have a fundamental misunderstanding about the way that the world is, and therefore certainty is unjustified. This does not impede one's daily life.

We live in a society with a foundation in Platonic idealism, and that idealism supports the belief in certainty. Because of this, we have an attitude of certainty. You claim "I am certain", because that's your attitude, you tend to use those words in that way. Wittgenstein demonstrates that these ideals ought to be removed, they are not supported by a real description of language. if this is the case, then we can conclude that the attitude of certainty, and the tendency to say "I am certain" is a statement of falsity created by the illusion of idealism. Removing the attitude of certitude does not incapacitate one's ability to act. It just produces a more realistic description of human actions, and that is that we act without being certain. And when you state "I am certain that...", it is not a statement which is consistent with the possibilities of the human condition, it's a falsity, a self-deception.

It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy.
— unenlightened

That's a matter of opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was talking about my wife, and she agrees with me. You can say it's a matter of opinion, but that too is a matter of opinion, and your opinion is worth rather little on this occasion, not having met the lady. What is not a matter of opinion?

The ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. The kind of certainty Wittgenstein appeals to in On Certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible. It is the certainty of our everyday lives. The certainty that I am sitting here typing this. The certainty that I have read On Certainty.

Now one might invent a situation in which it is possible that I am mistaken about these things, but the more serious and sinister mistake is the philosophical mistake that because such a thing is possible that anything that follows from it disrupts the certainty with which we live and act and think and speak. Descartes' Archimedean point of indubitability is a philosophical illusion.

Are you certain that the words mean what you think they mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

You should ask yourself this question, given that you are the one making claims of radical doubt. Are you certain that your words mean what you think they mean? According to you, you cannot be certain what the word "doubt" (or any other word) means, so how can you maintain your argument?

Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know? — On Certainty, 158

The ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. The kind of certainty Wittgenstein appeals to in On Certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible. It is the certainty of our everyday lives. The certainty that I am sitting here typing this. The certainty that I have read On Certainty. — Fooloso4

I consider this to be contradictory. If certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible, then how is it "certainty"? What is the point in saying "I am certain", unless you truly believe that the thing you are supposedly certain of, is indubitable, necessary, or infallible? You could only be using "certain" as a means of deception. As unenlightened described, to be certain is a frame of mind, I would call it a confidence. If we accept Wittgenstein's ontology of rules, then we ought to face the consequences, that such an attitude of confidence is unjustified, as I explained to unenlightened. This is the point, and why I insist Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. You could use "certain" in another way, as Wittgenstein tries in On Certainty, but what would be the point of that?

Why not just say "I am sitting here typing this", and "I have read On Certainty". What does "I am certain" add to these phrases other than an unwarranted air of confidence?

Now one might invent a situation in which it is possible that I am mistaken about these things, but the more serious and sinister mistake is the philosophical mistake that because such a thing is possible that anything that follows from it disrupts the certainty with which we live and act and think and speak. Descartes' Archimedean point of indubitability is a philosophical illusion. — Fooloso4

Of course it disrupts the certainty with which we act, that's the whole point. If you are fully aware that there is a possibility of mistake in your actions, how is it at all logical for you to proceed with certainty? But as I explained, this does not impede our capacity to act. We will still proceed in actions, only without the unwarranted air of confidence. This is not a "sinister mistake", it is the virtue of prudence.

You should ask yourself this question, given that you are the one making claims of radical doubt — Luke

Just let me be clear here. This "radical doubt" as you call it, is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules. I am explaining how this form of doubt is the consequence of his ontology. I am not necessarily supporting this ontology, but it appears to be very forceful, and I see no good reason yet, to reject it. If you believe that this so-called radical doubt, which comes as the logical consequence of this ontology is reason to reject the ontology, then you might reject it. I do not judge ontology in this way. If the ontology is based in good solid principles, I'll accept it and allow the epistemological consequences to follow.

Are you certain that your words mean what you think they mean? — Luke

No, I am never certain that my words mean what I think they mean. I have a dictionary beside me which I use incessantly, attempting to find words to fulfil my purpose. I don't even know how I could judge whether I am certain of such a thing, because the words have families of meanings, as Wittgenstein describes. Therefore there is no such thing as the meaning of the word that I am using, only numerous possibilities for meaning. So how could there even be such a thing as what I think the word means, when I see the word as numerous possibilities for meaning? Therefore, I try very hard to make a conscious effort to bear in mind, every time that I print words on the page, or speak words, the possibility that people will misunderstand me, so I choose my words in a deliberate way, hoping to avoid such misunderstanding.

According to you, you cannot be certain what the word "doubt" (or any other word) means, so how can you maintain your argument? — Luke

I don't see a matter of maintaining an argument here. We have a description, from Wittgenstein, of the nature of using words and language. The description is that there is no precise, exact, ideal, meaning to the words, a word indicates an area of possible meanings, like "stand roughly here" indicates an area of possible places to stand. Either you agree with this description or you do not. If you agree, with this, then we can proceed into the epistemology of doubt which follows from the nature of possibility. But if you do not, then there is no point, simply reject Wittgenstein's ontology of rules.

Just let me be clear here. This "radical doubt" as you call it, is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules. I am explaining how this form of doubt is the consequence of his ontology. I am not necessarily supporting this ontology, but it appears to be very forceful, and I see no good reason yet, to reject it — Metaphysician Undercover

Firstly, it isn't a consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology or position; it is only your misreading.

Secondly, you were presenting radical doubt as your own view on the previous page when you said that you do not accept that doubting requires an underlying level of certainty.

No, I am never certain that my words mean what I think they mean. — Metaphysician Undercover

Never? Rubbish.

If that were the case then it would be senseless for me to carry on talking to you since you aren't sure of anything that you're saying. Ever. This is different from using a dictionary "incessantly" because you're unsure of the occasional word. Do you rely on your dictionary for every word? Ridiculous.

If certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible, then how is it "certainty"? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is how we use the term. The demand that it must mean more prohibits its use.

If we accept Wittgenstein's ontology of rules ... — Metaphysician Undercover

? The rules of grammar according to W. are arbitrary.

... then we ought to face the consequences, that such an attitude of confidence is unjustified ...This is the point, and why I insist Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

That depends on what you think stands as justification. See the discussions of the river banks of knowledge, hinges, and his call for a step like that of relativity in On Certainty. See also what he says about groundlessness. It is not incoherent it describes what terms such as certainty and knowledge actually mean based on their use. Consider scientific knowledge. It does not establish eternal, unchanging truths. It represents how we understand things at present, and that will change over time.

Why not just say "I am sitting here typing this", and "I have read On Certainty". What does "I am certain" add to these phrases other than an unwarranted air of confidence? — Metaphysician Undercover

What makes you think it is unwarranted? Generally I would not say that I am certain of these things unless some doubt is raised.

Of course it disrupts the certainty with which we act, that's the whole point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? If you doubt that you are reading this or that your fingers are moving or that their moving is part of your response to what I have said then why do it? Or that is not the right question because you cannot even be certain that you are doing it.

If you are fully aware that there is a possibility of mistake in your actions, how is it at all logical for you to proceed with certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

Once again, the ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt.

But as I explained, this does not impede our capacity to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is because first you acted long before you were capable of doubting, and second, you do not take seriously the possibility that you might be deceived.

This is not a "sinister mistake", it is the virtue of prudence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Prudence? Why be prudent? You cannot be certain that you should be or even what it means to be prudent.

Firstly, it isn't a consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology or position; it is only your misreading. — Luke

I noticed you haven't participated in our discussion of this section of the book where doubt is discussed, so that claim is rather hollow.

That is how we use the term. — Fooloso4

Speak for yourself. I wouldn't use "certainty" in such a deceptive way.

The rules of grammar according to W. are arbitrary. — Fooloso4

Where did I say rules are arbitrary for W? They are like sign-posts, which one might understand, or misunderstand. Haven't you been following the book? Or are you like Luke, just joining in to add your two cents worth in some haphazard fashion, with no respect for what is written in the book?

That depends on what you think stands as justification. See the discussions of the river banks of knowledge, hinges, and his call for a step like that of relativity in On Certainty. See also what he says about groundlessness. It is not incoherent it describes what terms such as certainty and knowledge actually mean based on their use. Consider scientific knowledge. It does not establish eternal, unchanging truths. It represents how we understand things at present, and that will change over time. — Fooloso4

All this does is support my challenge, that Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. He provides his own definition of objectively certain, in On Certainty, as excluding the possibility of mistake. Why would he provide a definition, then proceed to use certainty in some other way, unless equivocation was his intent?

What makes you think it is unwarranted? — Fooloso4

"I am certain that I am sitting here typing" adds nothing to the statement "I am sitting here typing", other than an air of confidence. The air of confidence is unwarranted, because the nature of possibility is such that you may not have used adequate words to describe the situation, therefore misunderstanding cannot be ruled out as impossible, even if it is highly improbable.

Really? If you doubt that you are reading this or that your fingers are moving or that their moving is part of your response to what I have said then why do it? Or that is not the right question because you cannot even be certain that you are doing it. — Fooloso4

That you can act, and put words to your actions, does not mean that you understand what you are doing. I really doubt that you even know what it means for a human being to be doing something, let alone understand what a human being is actually doing.

Once again, the ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. — Fooloso4

Sure, but the possibility of mistake is reason to doubt. I went through this with unenlightened. Each lottery ticket is highly probable to be a loser. However there is still a possibility that it is a winner. Therefore we have reason to doubt that it is a loser, so we verify the numbers. You might insist that it is unreasonable to buy a ticket, but if someone gives you one, it is not unreasonable to verify the numbers. That is because no matter how improbable, it is still reasonable to doubt, because the improbable thing is still possible.